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ABSTRACT
This article argues for the importance of the Royal Indian Navy mutiny of 1946 in two key aspects of the transition towards Indian independence: civilian control over the Indian military, and a competition for power between Congress and communists that undermined Indian workers and their student allies. The article begins with an investigation of the mutiny drawing on three sources: a first-person account from a lead mutineer, a communist history of the mutiny, and the papers published in the Towards Freedom collection. In 1946 a handful of low-ranking sailors sparked a naval mutiny that ultimately involved upwards of 20,000 sailors, and then crashed into the streets of Bombay with revolutionary fervour. The Communist Party in Bombay seized upon the mutiny as an opportunity to rally the working class against the British raj, with the hope of ending British rule through revolution rather than negotiation. Yet the mutiny proved less of a harbinger of what was ending and more of a bellwether for what was to come. Congress, sensing the danger of the moment, snuffed out support for the mutiny, and insisted on a negotiated transfer of power. Congress’s action thereby set a precedent for civilian dominance over the military in post-independence India. At the same time, however, Congress betrayed the effectiveness of some of organised labour’s strongest advocates, namely the Communist Party, Bombay students and Bombay labour, thereby undermining their costly mass protest, and hobbling them in future conflicts against Indian capitalists.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Wm. Roger Louis, Zoltan Barany and Ami Pedahzur for their detailed input and helpful suggestions, as well as their mentorship and encouragement. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed critique and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Historian D. O. Spence argues in ‘Beyond Talwar’ that the behaviour of sailors throughout the RIN was more complex and interestingly varied than typically described; he also argues for the role of organised crime in exacerbating and facilitating civil unrest in Bombay, a narrative completely absent from the Towards Freedom and Transfer of Power papers. In a separate series of recent articles, geographer Andrew Davies leverages the RIN mutiny to explore three related problems: the peculiar maritime character of resistance and discipline during the RIN mutiny, the multi-faceted identity of RIN sailors and the way that ocean-going service allowed sailors to develop identities and political agendas in ways distinctly different from Indians who remained on the subcontinent. Davies, ‘Learning “Large Ideas” Overseas’; Davies, ‘Identity and the Assemblages of Protest’; Davies, ‘From “Landsman” to “Seaman”?’. Anirudh Deshpande’'s forthcoming A Spring of Despair: Mutiny, Rebellion and Death in India, 1946 also examines the period of the RIN mutiny. For a less scholastic example of recent interest in the mutiny, see Dhanjaya Bhat, ‘Which Phase of our Freedom Struggle’.
2 Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, 405.
3 See Chibber, Locked in Place.
4 Rose, ‘Mutiny’, 317–18.
5 Ibid. See also Rose, ‘The Anatomy of Mutiny’.
6 Stokes and Bayly, eds, The Peasant Armed.
7 Bell, ‘The Invergordon Mutiny, 1931’.
8 A rating is an enlisted naval soldier, as opposed to a commissioned officer. Ratings tend to be from lower-status backgrounds than officers. A naval rating may proceed up the enlisted ranks to the non-commissioned rank of petty officer or chief petty officer. In the RIN mutiny, the vast majority of participants were below the rank of petty officer. See Hastings, The Royal Indian Navy; Das, Revisiting Talwar; Collins, The Royal Indian Navy.
9 Das, Revisiting Talwar, 315.
10 Deshpande, ‘Hopes and Disillusionment’, 180.
11 Ibid., 188.
12 Ibid., 183.
13 Ibid., 181.
14 Ibid., 189.
15 Ibid., 198. For more on the broader context of the Indian military, see Marston, A Military History of India and South Asia.
16 At the time, discontent was not occurring solely in the Indian Army. Phillip Warner notes that ‘[t]he causes of grievance were ostensibly slowness of demobilisation’ and that ‘units which had won a high reputation during the war were now disgraced by the activities of an influx of newcomers who had no genuine motivation and no sense of responsibility’. Warner, Auchinleck: The Lonely Soldier, 196–97.
17 ‘Indian airmen in city camp on hunger strike’, Free Press Journal, 7 Jan. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 43.
18 Ibid. Allied soldiers from virtually all ethnic and national backgrounds (including American) expressed growing discontent in 1945 and 1946; this was not tied solely to colonialism. For an American perspective on the demobilisation problem, Alton ‘The Army “Mutiny” of 1946”; for the potential influence this had on the RIN mutiny, Das, Revisiting Talwar, 30–47.
19 Ghosh, The Indian National Army.
20 Ibid., 216.
21 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 60–61.
22 Spector, ‘Royal Indian Navy Strike’, 271–84.
23 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 62–66.
24 Marston, The Indian Army, 143.
25 Deshpande, ‘Hopes and Disillusionment’, 202.
26 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 77.
27 Ibid., 78.
28 Ibid. 80–81.
29 Ibid.
30 Letter by C. J. E. Auchinleck, C-in-C India, to all Commanding Officers, RIN, IA, RIAF, New Delhi, 1 Jan. 1946, File No. 62/46, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI), in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 43.
31 Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State.
32 Marston, The Indian Army.
33 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 84.
34 Dutt suggests Auchinleck was scheduled to appear, but Free Press Journal, 19 Feb., claims the officer was Flag Officer Commanding RIN John Henry Godfrey. I opt for Auchinleck, as Free Press Journal was reporting on events that transpired more than two weeks previously, and B. C. Dutt was present at the time. It is possible that Dutt intends to mean Godfrey when he refers to the ‘Commander-in-Chief’. See ‘Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike’, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 44.
35 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 86.
36 Ibid., 87.
37 Das argues that Dutt was caught not in the open but in his barracks. Das’s source for this is Lieut. H. L. Verma, who testified during Comdr. King’s court martial after the mutiny. Das, Revisiting Talwar, 64–65.
38 Ibid., 91–100.
39 Ibid., 91–100, 67–68.
40 Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 42–128.
41 Chandavarkar, Origins of Industrial Capital in India, 124.
42 Ibid., 126–30.
43 Ibid., 397–98.
44 Ibid., 7–41.
45 Ibid., 126–30.
46 Ibid.
47 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 101.
48 ‘Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike’, Free Press Journal, 19 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 44.
49 ‘Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike’, Free Press Journal, 19 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 44.
50 As seen in a photocopy of the Free Press Journal front page found in the front matter of Dutt's Mutiny of the Innocents, 1971.
51 Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike, 17.
52 Anonymous speaker in Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike, 17.
53 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 126–35.
54 Ibid., 126.
55 Bonner, ‘Mutiny of the Innocents’, 104.
56 Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike, 26.
57 ‘Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike’, Free Press Journal, 19 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 44.
58 Natarajan's foreword in Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 7.
59 ‘Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike’, Free Press Journal, 19 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 45.
60 ‘City Naval Strike Spreads’, Free Press Journal, 20 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 44.
61 ‘United and Discipline should be Watchwords’, Free Press Journal, 20 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 46–47.
62 Ibid.
63 ‘Delhi Naval Men Fall in Line with Bombay Strikers’, Free Press Journal, 21 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 47.
64 ‘All RIAF Units in Bombay Area on Strike’, Free Press Journal, 25 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 59.
65 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 139.
66 Ibid., 142–43.
67 Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike, 42–43.
68 Robertson, Auchinleck, 828–29.
69 Ibid.
70 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 139.
71 Ibid., 146–60; Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike, 47–61.
72 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 149.
73 ‘All-out Offensive Planned to Crush Ratings’ Revolt’ and ‘Several Ships at Sea in the Hands of Ratings’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 48–50.
74 Ibid.
75 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 149.
76 Report by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 3 April 1946, File No. 5/22/46, NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 40–42.
77 Masani, ‘The Communist Party in India’, 25.
78 ‘City Communists Call for Hartal’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 48.
79 Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 50–61.
80 ‘Non-violence Commended to RIN Men Facing Fire!’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb.1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 50–51.
81 Ibid.
82 ‘My Services at Disposal of RIN’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 54–55.
83 Deshpande, ‘Sailors and the Crowd’, 9.
84 ‘Demonstrators Machinegunned’, Free Press Journal, 23 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 55–56.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Anonymous, Interviewed by Conrad Wood. ‘Oral History 10495 with Anonymous British Officer Serving with 4th and 5th Mahratta Anti-Tank Regiment in India, 1946–1947’, cassette tape, Nov. 1988, Imperial War Museum Audio Archives, London.
88 Ibid.
89 ‘Admiral Threatens to Destroy the Navy’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 54.
90 Both Banerjee and Dutt repeatedly speak of the ratings’ wish for a strong, action-minded nationalist leader to guide their hand and the loss of confidence they experienced when no such leader stepped forward. Banerjee, The R.I.N. Strike; Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents.
91 ‘Naval Ratings Agree to Surrender Arms’, Free Press Journal, 23 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 57–58.
92 ‘RIN Ratings in Pitched Battle with British’ and ‘Hindustan Opens Fire on Karachi’, Free Press Journal, 22 Feb. 1946; ‘Ratings Give Up after 25 Minute Battle’, Free Press Journal, 23 Feb. 1946, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 89–91.
93 Extracts from M. K. Gandhi’'s ‘Statement to the Press’, 23 Feb. 1946, published in Harijan, 3 March 1946, and reprinted in Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. 83, 171, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 59.
94 ‘Peace Can Come Only when Military Retire’, Free Press Journal, 25 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 55–56.
95 ‘Less than 12,000 Men Involved in RIN Mutiny’, Statesman, 23 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 55–56.
96 ‘It Was Undeclared Martial Law’, Free Press Journal, 26 Feb. 1946, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 61–62.
97 Ibid.
98 Extracts from a letter by M. R. Jayakar to T. B. Sapru dated Bombay 27 Feb. 1946, File No. 807, M. R. Jayakar Papers (1946), NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 55–56.
99 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru. See also extract from a letter from Sir J. Colville (Bombay) to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, 27 Feb. 1946, File No. L/P&J/5/167, India Office Records, British Library, 158–62, Transfer of Power, vol. 6, 1084.
100 Ibid., 63–64.
101 Ibid., 65–67; excerpted articles from People's Age, 3 March 1946; Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom.
102 Chandavarkar, Origins of Industrial Capital in India, 398, 402.
103 Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics, 320.
104 Chandavarkar, Origins of Industrial Capital in India, 402–04.
105 Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics, 280–91.
106 Ibid., 280.
107 Ibid., 317–19.
108 Deshpande, ‘Sailors and the Crowd’, 21.
109 Secraphone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Government of India, from CIO Bombay at 3.40 p.m. on 22 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 82.
110 Telephone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Govt. of India, from ‘Mr Simms’ at 12.45 hrs on 23 Feb. 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 83.
111 Ibid.
112 Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroy’'s Journal, 211–12.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, 23–26.
116 Ibid. For more on the commander-in-chief, see Connell, Auchinleck; Greenwood, Field-Marshal Auchinleck.
117 Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroy ’s Journal, 215. For a more recent assessment of Wavell's tenure as Viceroy, see Chawla Wavell and the Dying Days of the Raj.
118 Telegram from Field Marshal Viscount Wavell to Mr Attlee, dated 27 Feb. 1946, in Mansergh, ed. Transfer of Power, vol. 6, 1054–56.
119 Wavell, Wavell: The Viceroy’'s Journal, 217.
120 McGarr, ‘“A Serious Menace to Security”’, 441–69.
121 Baker, ‘HMIS Hindustan Incident’. See also Deshpande for a narrative of the mutiny in Karachi and a detailed social history of the events surrounding February 1946. Deshpande, ‘Sailors and the Crowd’.
122 Extracts from a telegram from the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bombay, to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 1 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 116.
123 Letter by A. D. F. Dundas, Secretary, War Department, Govt. of India, forwarding a message from C. J. E. Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in India, to G. E. B. Abell, Private Secretary, Viceroy,3 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI, in Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom, 116–17.
124 The Cabinet in London had expressed concerns about the civil control of the military when considering the punishment of Indian National Army members. See Cabinet minutes, Indian and Burma Committee, I. B. (45) 6th Meeting, Oct. 1945, 128–32, in Mansergh, ed., Transfer of Power, vol. 6, 402–06.
125 Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State, 245–74.
126 Marston, The Indian Army, 144.
127 Chibber, Locked in Place.
128 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, 237.