Shirking the Briggs Plan: Civilian Resistance to Reform and the Army’s Struggle for Control in Malaya, 1950–1952

ABSTRACT

Civil–military tensions played a central role shaping the evolution of the British campaign during the Malayan Emergency. While the Briggs Plan has often been described as focusing exclusively on population control, Briggs developed a strategy combining coercive and security measures with wide-reaching administrative and political reforms. However, the reluctance of top members of the Malayan Civil Service to risk a political confrontation with Malay elites, who were deeply opposed to investment and the extension of political rights to the Chinese squatters, led them to resist the political elements of the programme during Briggs’ tenure as director of operations (June 1950-November 1951). Briggs’ lack of executive authority over the civil service, combined with conservative political preferences and the slow pace of administrative and government reform, led to the manifestation of the Briggs Plan as a programme of coercive population control. From mid-1951, the civil–military struggle over campaign strategy transformed into a struggle for control of the Malayan government. The new Conservative government’s decision to appoint General Templer high commissioner in late 1951 represented a victory for the officers, over civilian resistance. At the same time, singularly crediting Templer overlooks important political successes achieved by Briggs and Templer’s predecessor, High Commissioner Gurney.

KEYWORDS:

• Malaya
• Malayan Emergency
• civil-military relations
• Harold Briggs
• Gerald Templer
• counterinsurgency

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my deepest thanks and appreciation to Marc Opper, Karl Hack, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Special thanks are due to all of the archivists who helped with data collection. Any mistakes and omissions are my own.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The phase between 1948 and 1950 was largely a disorganised series of ad-hoc military measures rather than an integrated campaign directed by any specific strategy.

2 Short, Communist Insurrection in Malaya; Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds; Coates, Suppressing Insurgency. See also Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya”; and Smith, “General Templer and Counterinsurgency in Malaya.” See also the literature in political science including Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change; Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons; Jackson, Organizational Dysfunction; Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency.

3 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect; Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds; Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency; Egnell, “Explaining US and British Performance.” Cf. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 100, who refers to the committee system under Briggs as sometimes “farcical.”

4 Especially Short, Communist Insurrection in Malaya; Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds.

5 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds; Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya; Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya”; Ramakrishna, “‘Transmogrifying’ Malaya”; Smith, “General Templer and Counterinsurgency in Malaya.”

6 Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya.” See also Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 19; Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’?”; French, “Nasty, not Nice”; Gentile, Wrong Turn, 6; Etzioni, “COIN: A Study of Strategic Illusion”; Hazelton, “The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy,” for variations. See also Opper, People’s War, 293–5.

7 Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change; Strachan, Politics of the British Army; Cassidy, “Why Great Powers”; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror; Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons; Jackson, Organizational Dysfunction; Egnell, “Explaining US and British Performance.” Also Paget, Counter-insurgency Operations, 158.

8 Also Caverley, “The Myth of Military Myopia.”

9 Surridge, Managing the South African War, especially Chs 7 and 8.

10 First quote: Memorandum by General Macready, May 24, 1920. P 1. Multiple locations including BL 102/5/21. Bonar Law Papers, PA; Second quote: Letter from Macready to Greenwood, July 17, 1920. LG/F/19/2/12. Lloyd George Papers, PA.

11 Letter to Air Ministry from Brooke Popham, July 20, 1936, in Brooke Popham Papers, 4/6, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, UK (LHCMA).

12 See Telegram 1350 from HC to Colonial Secretary, December 17, 1949. DEFE 11/34, Doc 465. The National Archives of the UK, Kew, UK (TNA).

13 Telegram 151 from HC to Colonial Secretary. February 23, 1950. DEFE 11/34, Doc 523. TNA.

14 Telegram 1358 from HC to Colonial Secretary. December 20, 1949. DEFE 11/34, Doc 467. TNA.

15 Telegram 151 from HC to Colonial Secretary. February 23, 1950. DEFE 11/34, Doc 523. TNA. (My emphasis).

16 Report of CIGS visit to Malaya, Part II. P 2. No Date, the visit itself came in November 1949. CO 537/4374. TNA.

17 See “Appreciation by General Briggs,” October 25, 1950, as COS(50)468, Chiefs of Staff Committee. CAB 21/1682, Doc 8. TNA.

18 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)1. CAB 134/497, p 3. TNA.

19 “British Defence Coordinating Committee, Far East. The Military Situation in Malaya on 9 April, 1950. Appreciation by Commander-in-Chief, FARELF.” SEC(50)7. Received by CoS Committee as COS(50)132, April 19, 1950. DEFE 11/35, Doc 622, p 2. TNA.

20 Memorandum COS 294/9/3/50 by C.R. Price to Chiefs of Staff. March 9, 1950. DEFE 11/34, Doc 548. TNA.

21 Mockaitis, “Briggs, Sir Harold Rawdon,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

22 While the resettlement scheme is often attributed to Briggs in 1950, it was actually Gurney’s initiative, developed in December 1948. Annex to “The Squatter Problem in the Federation of Malaya.” Summary of Federation of Malaya White Paper. P 5. MAL.C(50)5. April 22, 1950. DEFE 11/35, Doc 641a. TNA. Due to the deterioration in the security situation, resettlement had to be put on hold and the British began deporting Chinese detainees. Once the Communists defeated the Nationalists, it was no longer advisable – the British were concerned that this would lead to the Chinese government providing training to the deportees and sending them back to Malaya. Consequently, in late 1949, deportation ended, and resettlement recommenced. See Despatch No. 3 from High Commissioner, January 12, 1950. DEFE 11/34, Doc 493a. TNA. P 4; Cabinet Conclusions CM(50)37, CAB 12817/37. TNA. While Thompson (Defeating Communist Insurgency, 53) argued this was done for ethical reasons, there is no evidence that the British were motivated by moral concerns. Moreover, deportations resumed in the spring of 1951, made available to the Malayan government as a coercive tool in their fight for information. See Telegram SEACOS 213 for Chiefs of Staff from BDCC (FE), June 16, 1951. P 2. CAB 21/2884. Unnumbered Doc. TNA; see also Hack, “Detention, Deportation, and Resettlement.”

23 This, according to a comment by the colonial secretary on May 18. See Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)5. CAB 134/497, p 1. TNA. For an early articulation of the Briggs’ Plan, see notes on a special meeting of the BDCC with General Briggs on May 5, 1950. (document dated May 9, 1950). DEFE 11/36, Doc 693a. TNA. For a more developed version, see “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700. TNA Yet another version, likely the most developed, comes in the form of a memorandum presented to the Malaya Committee on July 7, 1950: “General Briggs’ Plan for the Elimination of Communists in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Minister of Defence. MAL.C(50)23. CAB 134/497. TNA.

24 See “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700. TNA.

25 “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700, p 3. TNA.

26 “Federation Plan for the Elimination of the Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya,” final version. May 24, 1950. Annex to memorandum by the minister of defence to the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)23. July 7, 1950. CAB 134/497. TNA.

27 Ibid., 2; See also “Outline of Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by General Briggs, Annex to “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700, p 2. TNA.

28 “General Briggs’ Plan for the Elimination of Communists in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Minister of Defence. MAL.C(50)23. July 7, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 2. TNA.

29 “Outline of Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by General Briggs, Annex to “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700, p 3. TNA.

30 1st meeting of the Malaya Committee in 1950, MAL.C(51)1. July 26, 1951. CAB 134/497. TNA.

31 Message to state governments from General Briggs. Annex to “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700. TNA.

32 “Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)14. May 12, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 700. P 3–4. TNA.

33 See Carnell, “Malayan Citizenship Legislation.”

34 8th meeting of the Malay Committee, MAL.C(50)8. July 17, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 3. TNA.

35 Directive No. 1. Director of Operations, Malaya. April 16, 1950. CAB 21/1681, Doc 1. TNA.

36 6th Meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)6. June 19, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 2. TNA.

37 Directive No. 1. Director of Operations, Malaya. April 16, 1950. CAB 21/1681, Doc 1, p 2. TNA.

38 Ibid.

39 This point was raised in the 4th meeting of the Malaya Committee, May 8, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 3. TNA.

40 “An Appreciation of the Military and Political Situation in Malaya as on 25th October, 1950,” Memorandum by the director of operations. COS(50)468, November 16, 1950. CAB 21/1682, Doc 8. TNA.

41 See “Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations.” June 4, 1951. CAB 21/2884, Unnumbered Doc. TNA; Opper, People’s War, 298–300.

42 The British Army’s psychological warfare division conducted studies of the surrender behaviour of insurgents. While food shortages were not the primary reason given for surrendering, it constituted an important response that grew in significance over time. See WO 291/1763 – A Study of Surrender Behaviour among Chinese Communist Terrorists in Malaya; and WO 291/1783 – A Study of Surrenders in Malaya. TNA.

43 See Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya.”

44 This has occasionally led to the argument that Malaya was a case of ‘most likely’ for successful counterinsurgency. See Greenhill and Staniland, “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency,” 403.

45 See “The Squatter Problem in Malaya,” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C.50(5), April 22, 1950. DEFE 11/35, Doc 641a. TNA. For long-standing opposition to Chinese rights among the sultans, see “Pro-Malay Policy,” Malaya Tribune, December 13, 1947. For comments about middle class opposition, see Telegram 400 from HC to CO, May 3, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 678. TNA.

46 “Political and Economic background to the situation in Malaya.” P 1. Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, DO 50(94). November 15, 1950. DEFE 11/42, Doc 995, Folio 285. TNA. See Rudner, “The Draft Development Plan,” for a detailed discussion of the development of Malayan economic plans during the Emergency, and White, “Capitalism and Counterinsurgency?” for a discussion of British relations with business in Malaya during the Emergency. While Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 107–11, argued that the Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, led to a budgetary windfall due to a spike in commodity prices, that argument comes with important caveats. The state of Malayan finances was a constant preoccupation for the British in 1950–1951. CAB 21/1682. TNA. See, for example, Doc 8: “An Appreciation of the Military and Political Situation in Malaya on 25 October 1950.” Report by the Director of Operations. Received by Chiefs of Staff Committee as COS(50)468, November 16, 1950; See also Doc 11a, a report to the prime minister of a meeting between the chiefs of staff and General Briggs, no date; Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)5. CAB 134/497, p 3. TNA; Cabinet Conclusions, June 19, 1950. CM(50)37. CAB 128/17/37. TNA; Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya, 277, argues that by the time large-scale investment began, prices had begun to drop and Templer was deeply worried about Malayan finances.

47 “Various Matters Discussed with the Authorities in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, MAL.C(50)25. July 14, 1950. CAB 21/1681, Doc 31. TNA.

48 This was a concern of Gurney’s since 1949. Secret Despatch No. 3 from HC. January 12, 1950. DEFE 11/34, Doc 493A. TNA. It also reflected the consequences of Britain’s conciliatory policy towards the Palestinian Arabs after 1939 in the Palestine Mandate, which triggered a Jewish insurgency in the 1940s; Gurney had previously been the last chief secretary for Palestine.

49 Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 14.

50 See also “United Malays Oppose Union,” Malaya Tribune, March 6, 1946; “The Sultans’ Protest,” The Straits Times, April 3, 1946.

51 “Political and Economic background to the situation in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary DO 50(94). November 15, 1950. DEFE 11/42, Doc 995, Folio 285. TNA. This was written two and a half years after the promulgation of the Federation constitution, and so must be viewed as a retrospective that is not isolated from the challenges the British perceived that the constitution generated.

52 Ibid.

53 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Malaya Committee MAL.C(50)6. June 19, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 2. TNA.

54 British business interests do not seem to have played a significant role. See White, “Capitalism and Counter-insurgency?”

55 “Political and Economic background to the situation in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary DO 50(94). November 15, 1950. DEFE 11/42, Doc 995, p 8. TNA.

56 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Malaya Committee MAL.C(50)6. June 19, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 2. TNA.

57 “Political and Economic background to the situation in Malaya.” Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary DO 50(94). November 15, 1950. DEFE 11/42, Doc 995, p 1. TNA.

58 “Memorandum by the Officer Administering the Government, Federation of Malaya, in Connection with General Brigg’s ‘Appreciation of the Military and Political Situation in Malaya as on 25th October, 1950.’”, submitted to CoS Committee as COS(50)473. November 18th, 1950. P 3. CAB 21/1682, Doc 10. TNA.

59 Ibid.

60 Report of CIGS visit to Malaya, Part II, p 2. No Date. CO 537/4374. TNA.

61 Letter from Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner. December 5, 1949. CO 537/4374, Doc 8, p 2. TNA.

62 Report of CIGS visit to Malaya, Part II. P 2. No Date. CO 537/4374. TNA.

63 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)1. April 19, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 1. TNA.

64 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the BDCC, May 9, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 693a. TNA; “Federation Plan for the Elimination of the Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya,” final version. May 24, 1950. Annex to memorandum by the minister of defence to the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)23. July 7, 1950. CAB 134/497, p 3.

65 Telegram 1052 from OAG to Gurney. November 2, 1950. CO 537/6004, Doc 1. TNA.

66 Ibid. See also documents throughout CAB 21/2884, including Docs 36, 37. TNA.

67 “The Situation in Malaya,” Memorandum by colonial secretary MAL.C(51)2. July 13, 1951. DEFE 11/45, Doc 1349. TNA.

68 Ibid.; Minutes of a Special Meeting of the BDCC, May 9, 1950. DEFE 11/36, Doc 693a. TNA.

69 Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(50)5. May 18, 1950. P 1. CAB 134/497. TNA.

70 “The Military Situation in Malaya.” Memorandum by the War Secretary, MAL.C(50)21, June 17, 1950. CAB21/1681, Doc 14, p 4. TNA.

71 Ibid., 4–5.

72 Personal letter DO/CIC/65 from General Harding, GHQ FARELF, to CIGS. October 24, 1950. WO 216/835, Doc 1. TNA.

73 Ibid.

74 Telegram 1052 from OAG to Gurney. November 2, 1950. CO 537/6004, Doc 1. TNA.

75 Ibid.

76 Meeting with the Director of Operations, Federation of Malaya. GEN 345/1, November 27, 1950. CAB 130/65. TNA.

77 Ibid., 2.

78 GEN 345/5, Meeting at No. 10 Downing St, February 26, 1951. CAB 130/65. TNA.

79 Ibid., 1.

80 Ibid., 2.

81 Notes of a meeting held at the Attorney General’s Office, November 10, 1950. CO 537/6007. TNA.

82 See Discussion and Papers presented during the 5th meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Malaya, May 18, 1950. CAB 134/497. TNA.

83 See Report on Malaya No. 104, January 19–25, 1951. DEFE 11/43, Doc 1104. TNA; See also Report on Malaya No. 107, February 9–19, 1951. DEFE 11/43, Doc 1142. TNA; See also “The Present Situation in Malaya,” Note by the Colonial Secretary. Undated. DEFE 11/43, Doc 1159. TNA; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol 485, 7 March 1951, 78 (Emrys Hughes) https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1951-03-07/debates/e9c45e96-4935-47b8-8246-ba1fa7f3667e/CollectiveDetentionJenderam

84 Colonial Office Report 13–19 October 1950. DEFE 11/40, Doc 919a. TNA; Colonial Office Reports for 1–7 June and 8–14 June 1951. DEFE 11/44, Docs 1289 and 1296b. TNA.

85 There is not much discussion of these food denial operations in the official records. However, there are a number of illuminating accounts of these operations, and their consequences, in the personal records of General Sir Rob Lockhart. See File 9501-165 in the Papers of Sir Rob Lockhart, Deputy DO Malaya, especially Doc 1, a report dated November 3, 1950 detailing food denial operations, as well as Doc 33, a report on Operation Warbler, a large-scale food denial operation. For measures taken in June, 1951, see Doc 22, which is a copy of the food regulations signed by Briggs. Templer Study Centre, National Army Museum, London, UK (NAM).

86 Personal letter from Gurney to Field Marshal Slim, June 14, 1951. WO 216/394, Doc 2a. TNA.

87 Telegram SEACOS 213 for Chiefs of Staff from BDCC (FE), June 16, 1951. P 2. CAB 21/2884. Unnumbered Doc. TNA.

88 Telegram 83 from OAG to Lyttelton, October 30, 1951. CO 1022/148, Doc 2. TNA.

89 Letter from Shinwell to CIGS, May 3, 1951. DEFE 11/44, Doc 1252b. TNA

90 Figures for the first half of 1951 are given in the Annex to “Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations.” June 4, 1951. CAB 21/2884. TNA; See also “Progress Report on Situation in Malaya,” February 15, 1951. Annex to GEN 345/6, Cabinet Memorandum. CAB 21/2884, Doc 36. TNA.

91 Letter from CIGS to MoD Shinwell, May 4, 1951. DEFE 11/44, Doc 1252g. TNA.

92 Extract from Chiefs of Staff meeting COS(51)107, June 29, 1951. DEFE 11/45. TNA.

93 Minute for CIGS on “Appointment of a ‘Supremo’ for Malaya.” Minute Sheet #5, February 24, 1951. WO 216/835. TNA. (My emphasis).

94 “Progress Report on Situation in Malaya,” February 15, 1951. Annex to GEN 345/6, Cabinet Memorandum. CAB 21/2884, Doc 36. TNA; “Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations.” June 4, 1951. CAB 21/2884. TNA.

95 Colonial Office Intelligence, 13–19 July, 1951. DEFE 11/45, Doc 1350. TNA.

96 Letter from Field Marshal Slim to Shinwell, May 4, 1951. DEFE 11/44, Doc 1252g. TNA.

97 Annex to “Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations.” June 4, 1951. CAB 21/2884. TNA.

98 Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya,” 104–05.

99 Minutes of the first meeting of the Malaya Committee, MAL.C(51)1. July 26, 1951. CAB 134/497. TNA.

100 Colonial Office Intelligence, 14–20 July, 1950. DEFE 11/38, Doc 830a. TNA; “The Present Situation in Malaya,” Memorandum by the colonial secretary MAL.C(50)29, September 22, 1950. CAB 21/1681, Doc 57. TNA; Telegram 264 from MacDonald to Colonial Office, November 24, 1950. DEFE 11/42, Doc 1013. TNA.

101 Colonial Office Intelligence, 16–26 March 1951. DEFE 11/44, Doc 1205. TNA.

102 For an explicit evaluation of the civilians in Malaya, see Montgomery’s note “Success in Malaya,” January 2, 1952. WO 216/806, Doc 9a. TNA; David Lloyd Owen, Templer’s military assistance, referred to MacDonald as a “socialist slug” in his diary. March 22, 1952. 1998-06-176-2, Lloyd Owen Papers, NAM; In 1949, Lyttelton accused the Labour government of weakening the UK’s ability to resist communism and accused Shinwell and Strachey (the Labour minister of defence and war secretary) of having communist sympathies. Letter from Lyttelton to Churchill, March 4, 1949. CHAN II 4/5, Churchill Centre Archives, Cambridge University, UK (CCA).

103 Telegram 285 from Commissioner General SE Asia to Lloyd. November 5, 1951. CO 850/254/10, Doc 26. TNA (My emphasis).

104 Telegram 1018 from OAG Malaya to Colonial Office. October 22, 1951. CO 850/254/10, Doc 23. TNA.

105 Telegram 1052 from OAG to Colonial Secretary. November 1, 1951. CO 1022/7, Doc 1. TNA.

106 “The Situation in the Federation of Malaya from the View of the Director of Operations.” Report by Lockhart, November 26, 1951. File 9501-165, Doc 28. Lockhart Papers, NAM.

107 Ibid., 9.

108 “Executive Powers of the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations, 2nd Edition.” Memorandum by General Sir Rob Lockhart. November 29, 1951. P 1. File 9501-165, Doc 32. Lockhart Papers, NAM.

109 Telegram 1214 from Lyttelton (via OAG) to Prime Minister (via Colonial Office). December 8, 1951. PREM 11/639, Doc 2. TNA.

110 See also letter from Lockhart to Slim, January 14, 1952. WO 216/806, Doc 12a. TNA.

111 See WO 216/806 – Gen. Templer, especially draft Telegram 693 to WO. TNA.

112 Telegram from Sakai to Lyttelton, January 9, 1952. CO 1022/60, Doc 1. TNA.

113 Telegram 286 from Templer to Lyttelton, February 28, 1952. CO 1022/60, Doc 3. TNA.

114 Ibid.

115 See CO 1022/101 – appointment of High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner. TNA.

116 Gullick, “MacGillivray, Sir Donald Charles,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. He had previously served in Tanganyika and came to Palestine as part of Harold MacMichael’s entourage.

117 Telegram 128 from OAG (Malaya) to CO, January 30, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 138. TNA. Abdul Rahman would go on to serve as the first prime minister of independent Malaya/Malaysia from 1957 until 1970.

118 Telegram 37 from Commissioner General to Colonial Secretary, January 25, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 117. TNA; See also Telegram 46 from Commissioner General to Colonial Secretary, January 29, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 132. TNA.

119 Telegram 33 from CO to MacDonald, January 17, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 80. TNA; See also Telegram 20 from CO to OAG (Malaya), January 17, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 83/84. TNA.

120 See “Slap in Face for Malaya’ New Deputy HC creates stir in KL,” The Singapore Free Press, February 4, 1952.

121 Telegram 57 from Commissioner General to CO, February 9, 1952. CO 1022/101, Doc 171. TNA.

122 “An Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya on September 22, 1952.” WO 216/561, Doc 1B. TNA.; Colonial Office Intelligence Report, February 22–28, 1952. DEFE 11/47, Doc 1563. TNA; “Templer Streamlines ‘Cabinet’: Changes to Get Rid of ‘Split Personality,’” The Straits Times, March 3, 1952.

123 See, for example, “Note on planning and organization committees,” July 12, 1952. File 7/4/1, Stockwell Papers, LHCMA. It is possible the genesis of this programme predated Templer’s arrival: See “Note of a Visit by Mr. Brett to TC Jerome,” October 26, 1951. Doc 26, Lockhart Papers, NAM.

124 For an early use of collective punishments by Templer, see records on the March 1952 punishment of Tanjong Malim village in CO 1022/54. TNA; See especially the documents in CO 1022/56 – Imposition of Curfew and Other Restrictions In the Federation of Malaya. TNA; Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya, 274.

125 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, Ch 7.

126 Telegram 286 from Templer to Lyttelton, February 28, 1952. CO 1022/60, Doc 3. TNA.

127 Letter from Gurney to Higham, April 28, 1951. CO 537/7262, Doc 51. TNA.

128 Telegram from Sakai to Lyttelton, January 9, 1952. CO 1022/60, Doc 1. TNA.

129 See Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor; Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya”

130 Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 120.

Additional information

Funding

Financial support for the archival research came from small grants from Yale University’s MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and the Smith Richardson Foundation.