Reanalysing Ireland’s Exit from the Commonwealth 1948–49: The Brexit Isles’ Alter Ego?

ABSTRACT

This article reexplores Ireland’s final exit from the Commonwealth in 1948–49, deploying Brexit as a comparative heuristic and organising device. The existing literature has stressed both Ireland’s symbolic motives in fully breaking with the Crown and how it retained many the advantages of Commonwealth membership whilst avoiding its obligations. It is true that, at least from the later 1930s, Ireland was more akin to an associate as opposed to a full Commonwealth member and that both significant support for the Irish position from Commonwealth members with large Irish diaspora populations and decentralisation in the Commonwealth itself made for a relatively hospitable negotiating environment. Nevertheless, the Brexit comparison helps highlights the considerable trade and citizenship links, including with the UK, which were linked to Commonwealth association and which secession thereby put at risk. It similarly highlights the price Ireland paid for its exit including a public commitment to make reciprocal citizenship rights generally available to all Commonwealth members, a strengthening of Northern Ireland’s links with Great Britain and a loss of participation rights in key Commonwealth preference, Sterling Area and related fora. The ultimately rather limited significance of that price may relate more to a subsequent fundamental refocusing of both Irish and UK geographic priorities towards Europe in subsequent decades.

KEYWORDS:

• Brexit
• citizenship
• Commonwealth
• Ireland
• migration
• monarchy
• Northern Ireland
• Sterling
• monetary relations

Introduction

On 7 September 1948, the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Costello announced that the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 (hereinafter External Relations Act (ERA)), the law which formally linked Ireland (Eire) to the Commonwealth (British Commonwealth) through the Crown, was to be repealed.¹ In response to questioning, he also confirmed that this would involve ‘secession’ from this grouping.² The commitment was made by the leader of a party officially committed to Commonwealth association, put at risk vital and long-standing trade and citizenship arrangements and undercut a policy which was formally orientated towards maintaining and strengthening links with Northern Ireland. Despite this, a commitment to change was made without detailed consideration of its potential impacts and was stuck to on national sovereignty grounds despite pleas from other Members for a reconsideration. Instead, Ireland negotiated a future framework for ongoing trade and citizenship ties outside of the organisation, the contours of which were announced during the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act in late November 1948. Further technical discussions followed prior to the commencement of this Act, which repealed the ERA, on 18 April 1949. Ireland agreed to diligently implement common economic and citizenship understandings and made no attempt to adjust its relationship with Sterling and the Sterling Area, an approach explicitly endorsed during Sterling’s devaluation in September 1949. However, albeit with special arrangements agreed in a few cases, Ireland was excluded from membership of the Commonwealth’s decision-making bodies. Finally, whilst an adjustment to the Royal Title to refer to Northern Ireland had to be abandoned due to a lack of unanimous Commonwealth approval, Britain did respond unilaterally by strengthening Northern Ireland’s position within the UK through a statutory declaration confirming that no part of the province would cease being under the Crown and within the UK absent the consent of the Northern Ireland Parliament³ and introducing a three-month residence qualification for voting or standing for the UK Westminster Parliament within Northern Ireland constituencies.⁴

This brief, and admittedly partial, summary hopefully highlights the value of reanalysing the generally neglected topic of Ireland’s final Commonwealth exit in light of the much more prominent and recent experience of Brexit.⁵ Nevertheless, certain counterarguments may be lodged against such a revisitation. In particular, it may be argued that beyond a long-term scepticism (something it shared with the UK during its European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) membership), Ireland’s key rupture with the Commonwealth came not in the late 1940s but in the 1930s through, most clearly, the adoption of a new Constitution in 1937. Secondly, it may be claimed that, in contrast to the EU in the first half of the twenty-first century, the Commonwealth at least by the late 1940s was a loose association whose common arrangements were anyway under general and significant strain and that, furthermore, the issues confronting Ireland almost entirely concerned the UK alone and were therefore essentially bilateral. Thirdly, it may also be asserted that, in contrast to the UK’s substantive red-lines during Brexit on issues such as migration, Ireland’s preoccupations during its Commonwealth exit were largely symbolic as opposed to practical. Finally, it may be claimed that this loosening factor as well as the large Irish diaspora in many Member States led to Ireland being offered a settlement which, in contrast to the UK and Brexit, enabled it to keep almost all of the privileges of membership with few of the commitments. What analytical literature as does exist on Ireland’s Commonwealth exit has tended to adopt this last position, arguing that Ireland obtained a ‘unique intermediate status’ which enabled it to ‘retain most of the material advantages of its association with the Commonwealth, particularly in relation to trade preferences and privileges for citizens’.⁶ The research presented here is premised on an understanding that there is more to this secession and that the use of Brexit as a comparator can usefully elucidate its multifaceted complexities. In particular, as will be seen, this organising and heuristic device helps reveal not only the benefits but also the price which Ireland paid for its exit especially as regards public commitments to generally available and codified reciprocal citizenship rights arrangements, a strengthening of Great Britain’s links with Northern Ireland and the loss of Irish participation rights in valuable fora including as these related to management of the Commonwealth preference and Sterling areas within which it continued to operate. That, in turn, bolsters a case for taking the story forward into the subsequent decades when both Ireland’s and the UK’s relationships with the Commonwealth and with Europe were fundamentally refashioned. What follows is the first article in that broader project.

Whilst adopting Brexit as a heuristic and organising device, it is not the purpose of this article to directly analyse the UK’s exit from the EU. Not only would end up detracting from the article’s central focus but, in any case, the basic contours of Brexit are well-known and many of its aspects have already been the subject of considerable scholarship. In stark contrast, and notwithstanding its significance up until at least the 1970s, Ireland’s post-World War II relationship with the Commonwealth has been sorely neglected within academic writing. Indeed, general analysis consists principally of short article by Nicholas Mansergh published in 1968⁷ and a four-page piece from 2020 by Ben Wynne.⁸ Notwithstanding the almost complete dearth of specific scholarly analysis, the 1948–49 secession itself constitutes something of an exception to this lacuna. The literature here includes a chronological book (also exploring Ireland’s decision not to join NATO in February 1949),⁹ several general pieces¹⁰ and articles focusing more specifically on the Australian,¹¹ Canadian¹² and Northern Ireland¹³ dimensions. However, most of this literature is rather descriptive and also largely dated, being at least thirty to forty years old. These contributions, as well as more general scholarship on Commonwealth history, will be taken into account in what follows. Primary material constitute the main evidential sources from which this article draws including, in particular, those from The National Archives of the UK (TNA), the National Archives of Ireland (NAI) and the National Library of Ireland.

Four main sections follow this introduction. The immediately subsequent section outlines the processes and outcomes which eventuated in 1948–49, subsequent to the Irish Government’s announcement of its general intentions in September 1948. The next two sections analyse this announcement and subsequent processes and outcomes, using a wider historical and evidential lens and deploying Brexit as an organising and heuristic device. The final section closes with some conclusions and pointers for further research.

Ireland’s Exit Announcement, Processes and Outcomes 1948–49

As previously stated, the Irish Taoiseach John Costello announced his government’s intention to repeal the ERA and fully secede from the Commonwealth on 7 September 1948. Over a year before this, in June 1947, the UK Government  – which remained the coordinator of intra-Commonwealth consultation on matters of high politics  – had established an Official Committee on the future of the Commonwealth itself.¹⁴ Its deliberations principally focused on Indian subcontinent developments but also considered the Irish situation. On its back, in the summer of 1948 the UK Government had consulted the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand ‘with a view to preparing the way for discussions at the October [1948] meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ on what ‘minimum formal ties’ were necessary for retention of Commonwealth membership.¹⁵ (At that point, the clear but merely hypothetical consensus of Commonwealth governments as regards Ireland was that, if it repealed the ERA, then it must be regarded as having seceded).¹⁶ In the event, consideration of membership criteria was deferred and the now immediately pressing issue of the future relationship between Ireland and the Commonwealth was dealt with on the fringes of the 11–22 October 1948 Meeting (which the UK Government had, following Costello’s announcement, decided Ireland should not be invited to).¹⁷ Just before this meeting, the UK Government on 7 October had informed Costello via Lord Rugby, its Representative to Ireland, that it considered that ERA repeal would threaten Ireland’s special trade and citizenship arrangements and called for discussions. The Irish in an aide-memoire on 11 October welcomed discussions, suggested these might include not only UK representatives but those of ‘the nations that form the Commonwealth’, stated that it was ‘anxious to continue the exchange of trade preference and citizenship rights’ but also indicated that its commitment to ERA repeal was non-negotiable.¹⁸ The Australian Minister for External Affairs Herbert Evatt separately made the UK Government aware of his strong desire that Australia, Canada and New Zealand be concretely involved.¹⁹ The UK then secured the direct participation of these three Commonwealth States, a criteria of inclusion which was justified by reference to the large Irish diaspora in each country. Attlee personally asked that the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru be informed of this justification whilst it has been stated that South Africa was given the opportunity to be actively involved (which, if so, it declined).²⁰ In light of this, the fact that discussions began during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting itself and that consultation subsequently involved all Commonwealth States, this select group must be taken, at least informally and to a limited extent, to have undertaken negotiations on behalf of the Commonwealth as a whole.

Initial exploratory discussions were organised at Chequers on 17 October, with the Irish delegation headed by its Minister for External Affairs Sean McBride, Australia’s by Evatt, Canada’s by its Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson and the UK’s and New Zealand’s by their respective Prime Ministers, Clement Attlee and Peter Fraser. McBride stated his view that what he called a ‘special kind of association could be established between Eire and the other countries of the Commonwealth based on the reciprocal exchange of trade preferences and citizenship rights’.²¹ In contrast, the Commonwealth representatives urged Ireland to reconsider the possibilities of Commonwealth membership itself and stressed the need for a continuing association to be based on a ‘constitutional link’.²² The meeting ended with an understanding that Irish Ministers ‘would consider the practical difficulties which had been put before them; the possibility that Eire might, after an interval, re-enter the Commonwealth on some basis (e.g. common citizenship) not involving any connection with the Crown; and the suggestion that, meanwhile, there might be some public declaration that Eire and the countries of the Commonwealth did not regard one another as “foreign” States’.²³ On 20 October, the Irish sent a follow-up aide-memoire which reiterated a desire and, in its view, feasibility of simply continuing ‘traditional and long established economic, social and trade arrangements’ especially as regards citizenship and trade preference rights with Commonwealth countries.²⁴

In the first half of November 1948, the UK Government prepared a draft formal reply to Ireland which reiterated its understanding that full Commonwealth exit (via ERA repeal) would compel the UK as a result of its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) commitments to foreign countries to subject Irish citizens to ‘ordinary Aliens Control’ and end all preferential tariff treatment, asked Ireland to indicate how such a result might be overcome and signalled a willingness to enter discussions on this. The draft was informally shared with, and received a lukewarm to negative response from, the other heads of delegation from the Chequers meeting who were all attending the UN General Assembly in Paris. Evatt was unconvinced that the UK concerns were necessarily valid and considered the initiative in any case ‘inopportune’, Pearson indicated he would need consult his Government and Fraser stated that New Zealand did not object but could not itself be associated with the reply. A need for haste arose from the fact that the Bill to repeal the ERA was to be introduced in the Irish Oireachtas/Parliament the following week and all delegations therefore agreed to ask the Irish to postpone at least the commencement of any Act for a ‘sufficient interval for the full implications to be further discussed’.²⁵ On 14 November, a more formal meeting of the Commonwealth delegations took place in Paris, the UK team now being headed by the Lord Chancellor Viscount Jowitt and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Noel-Baker. Jowitt again stressed the legal difficulties arising, although Noel-Baker now acknowledged that there seemed no chance of ERA retention or Ireland declaring continued Commonwealth membership. Both Evatt and Fraser argued that a rupture would be greatly weakening, with Fraser even claiming that ‘it would be a great disaster for the Commonwealth if Eire’s association were terminated’. As regards a continuation of trade and citizenship privileges, Pearson  – with Fraser’s support  – doubted a legal challenge would be made or, if it was, the strength of this. The Governments agreed to invite the Irish Government to further discussions ‘at the earliest possible date and if possible before repeal of the External Relations Act’.²⁶

Two days later discussions did take place in Paris, the Irish delegation again being headed by MacBride. During the morning discussion, Fraser continued to make a strong plea for Ireland to reconsider its position. He stated both that ‘the termination of Eire’s special constitutional association with the Commonwealth would be seized on by our enemies’ and as regards the Irish-Northern Irish Partition (which MacBride had stressed even at the Chequers meeting itself that the Irish Government earnestly desired to end) it would be thought ‘that the present step removed any prospect of a solution by agreement’.²⁷ However, MacBride was unequivocal that any rethink on ERA repeal was impossible. Evatt similarly stated that ‘Australia was deeply concerned’ by these developments but proposed an alternative solution in the form of a draft public declaration stating that Ireland did, and following ERA repeal would, not regard the Commonwealth States represented at the meeting to be ‘“foreign” countries or treat their peoples as “foreigners”’, confirmed on the contrary that ‘rights and privileges’ of nationality or citizenship were reciprocally accorded ‘by law or practice’ and finally asserted that this evidenced ‘the fact of a special association which it is the firm desire and intention of Ireland to maintain and strengthen’.²⁸ This suggestion proved broadly appealing to the meeting, although MacBride noted that only Irish citizens were granted the franchise in Ireland, Pearson hoped that the statement could be strengthened, Jowitt continued to refer to potential legal difficulties and Fraser made no further intervention. The afternoon session turned to detailed discussion of the proposal. Jowitt sought and obtained an understanding that all Commonwealth countries, and not just those represented, would be similarly treated by Ireland. All delegations pressed Ireland for reciprocal citizenship rights to be set out in primary legislation (as opposed to a mere a lifting of ordinary aliens controls by discretionary Ministerial Order as then existed²⁹), with Jowitt especially stressing the need for these citizens to be defined de jure otherwise than as aliens and Fraser arguing that that a statement along these lines should be made during the second reading of the Bill repealing the ERA. McBride finally stated that he thought Irish Government ‘would agree to introduce amending legislation and would so arrange action by temporary [rights] orders under section 23(2) of the [Nationality and] Citizenship Act [1935]’. These proposals were then adopted, albeit subject to later agreement by the Governments concerned.

On 21 November the UK Government was notified of the Irish Government’s approval of the Paris proposals which, notwithstanding concern that Ireland would ‘thereby succeed in retaining many of the practical advantages of Commonwealth membership while renouncing its obligations’,³⁰ prompted them to notify their agreement likewise, subject to urgent consultation with all Commonwealth Governments to be undertaken through UK High Commissions. This consultation did not proceed as smoothly as might have been anticipated from earlier meetings. Australia and New Zealand did agree to the approach, although the New Zealand Cabinet now recorded ‘serious doubt as to whether the policy proposed is in fact a tenable and realistic one’.³¹ The Canadian Government were only prepared to confirm an intention to continue to strengthen close and friendly relations between Canada and Ireland, the Cabinet having decided both citizenship and preferences/trade treatment required careful examination and that, as regards the former, the role of the provinces limited what the federal authorities could do.³² Meanwhile, turning to the previously unrepresented Commonwealth Governments, India assented to publicly indicating its general agreement and that it would implement this if it decided to retain a Commonwealth link³³ and South Africa agreed to a public statement committing itself to make mutually agreed reciprocal citizenship concessions with Ireland, subject to its Parliament’s approval.³⁴ On the other hand, Ceylon indicated that it would be unable to provide any immediate reply³⁵ and it proved impossible to obtain any reply at all within the time frame from Pakistan.³⁶ On 24 November 1948, and notwithstanding these uncertainties, the Irish Taoiseach John Costello gave the following undertaking during the second reading of the Republic of Ireland Bill:

[W]e propose, as and when the Commonwealth countries grant our citizens recognition and rights, to make Orders provisionally under Section 23 (2) [of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935] giving their citizens comparable rights.

At a later stage – but in the near future, I hope – it is the Government’s intention to review our whole nationality law and to bring before the Dáil a comprehensive measure to rectify many of the anomalies that exist under the Act of 1935. In the new Bill provisions will be made to ensure that Commonwealth citizens shall be afforded rights comparable to those afforded our citizens in the Commonwealth of Nations.

There is one thing I should like to make clear to our friends in Britain and the Commonwealth generally. It is that after the passage of this Bill we will continue, provided they so desire, the exchange of citizenship rights and privileges. Ireland does not now, and when the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act of 1936 is repealed, does not intend to regard their citizens as ʻforeigners' or their countries as ʻforeign' countries. Throughout, the position of the Irish Government is that while Ireland is not a member of the Commonwealth, it recognises and confirms the existence of a specially close relationship arising not only from ties of friendship and kinship but from traditional and long established economic, social and trade relations, based on common interest with the nations that form the Commonwealth of Nations. This exchange of rights and privileges, which it is our firm desire and intention to maintain and strengthen, in our view constitutes a special relationship which negatives the view that other countries could raise valid objections on the ground that Ireland should be treated as a ʻforeign' country by Britain and the Commonwealth countries for the purpose of this exchange of rights and privileges.³⁷

Various Commonwealth States subsequently made public their own response which were as indicated above³⁸ and (having completed its passage in the Oireachtas on 15 December 1948) the Republic of Ireland Bill was signed into law by the President of Ireland on 21 December 1948. However, under section 4, commencement was postponed until such day as the Irish Government so appointed.

During the earlier negotiations,³⁹ it had been recognised that Irish and UK officials would jointly examine more technical questions associated with these changes. Whilst discussion principally focused on how to counter any MFN claims made by foreign governments, Ireland’s future relationship with ʻCommonwealth' bodies was another important matter which was considered. During initial conversations on 7 January 1949, Ireland indicated that it saw potential value in continued association with bodies such as the ‘Sterling Area Statistical Committee ‘and the ‘Commonwealth E. R. P. [European Recovery Programme Liaison] Committee’ which it argued dealt with matters ‘different in character from those of foreign countries because of the preferential relationship’. For its part, the UK side indicated its view that membership should cease but added that ‘special ad hoc arrangements’ were not ruled out.⁴⁰ The need for a full exclusion from membership of all relevant bodies was affirmed in the Report of a Working Party of UK officials finalised at the same time.⁴¹ However, during subsequent Cabinet discussion, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer successfully argued that, notwithstanding that it currently only included the members of the Commonwealth, the Statistical Committee was ‘not in form a Commonwealth Committee’ and it was to the advantage of the UK that Ireland ‘should continue to be represented on it’.⁴² Furthermore, on 1 April 1949 the Irish Government wrote to the UK Commonwealth Relations Office specifically highlighting a desire by Ireland to continue to be associated with the technical and scientific work of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (CAB) including, in particular, the Commonwealth Potato Collection.⁴³ Privately, it also stressed a desire that Ireland continue to be represented at Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meetings.⁴⁴ Ultimately, an Associate status was agreed with both the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (as well as its associated bodies⁴⁵). Ireland also retained membership of the Statistical Committee until it merged in 1954 with the Commonwealth ERP/Liaison Committee from which it had already been excluded. The details, rationale and impact of these arrangements will be further considered below.

An even more weighty dimension, namely, that of Northern Ireland was handled almost entirely by the UK Government including through the official Working Party mentioned above. On 18 November 1948 the UK Cabinet made its approval of the outcome of negotiations with Ireland contingent on seeking the Northern Ireland Government’s views⁴⁶ and only finally assented to this on 22 November 1948 after the initial discussions between Attlee and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Sir Basil Brooke had been held at Chequers on 20 November 1948.⁴⁷ Brooke did not demur from the agreement as a whole but argued that Ireland’s full Commonwealth exit, as well as its self-description as the Republic of Ireland, necessitated a strengthening of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the Crown’s dominions and the UK. This agenda was aided by a recognition in December 1948 that implementation of the agreement with Ireland would require new UK legislation.⁴⁸ Consideration was given to Northern Ireland’s position through a joint meeting of the UK and Northern Ireland Cabinets,⁴⁹ by the UK Working Party of officials and by the UK Cabinet itself. By the time the latter came to finally discuss the issue on 3 March 1949, the Irish Government had announced 18 April 1949, the anniversary of the Easter Rising in Ireland, as the Republic of Ireland Act’s commencement day and it was agreed to avoid introducing the UK Government’s Ireland Bill until after this time. As well as establishing that Ireland was neither within the Crown’s dominions⁵⁰ nor ‘foreign’ country,⁵¹ this Bill recognised Ireland’s self-description as the Republic of Ireland⁵² and did not take forward Northern Ireland’s concomitant request to be restyled as ‘Ulster’. However, not only was it agreed to refer to Ireland as ‘the Irish Republic’ even in official situations,⁵³ but recognition was subject to same territorial reservations as had accompanied the recognition of Ireland’s (or Eire’s) new Constitution in 1937.⁵⁴ The Cabinet also included a new constitutional provision guaranteeing that ‘in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland’⁵⁵ and, notwithstanding Northern Ireland’s refusal to accede to the UK Government’s request that the residential qualification for its own Parliament be reduced from seven to at most five years,⁵⁶ a three-month residential qualification for voting or standing for the Westminster Parliament within Northern Ireland constituencies.⁵⁷ The UK Cabinet was additionally minded to replace the reference to ‘Ireland’ with ‘Northern Ireland’ in the Royal Title, something which both the Working Group of officials and the Northern Ireland Government were also keen on. However, as a matter of constitutional convention,⁵⁸ such a change required the consent of all Commonwealth Governments and this was not forthcoming in the case of Canada and Pakistan. Canada’s objections were grounded in a desire for a more comprehensive reform of the Royal Title, something which was ultimately finally achieved in 1953. In contrast, Pakistan’s concerns related squarely to the Irish negotiations themselves. In sum, it was recognised that any such alteration would draw attention to the Irish outcome and it was stated that the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan thought it ‘would be impossible for him to convince either his Constituent Assembly or his people generally that Pakistan, by remaining in the Commonwealth, would enjoy advantages substantially greater than those secured by Eire’.⁵⁹ This issue was revisited at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in April 1949 where Ali Khan again raised the question whether Ireland would ‘have in future the same privileges as Commonwealth countries?’. An attempt was made to reassure him that ‘Eire was outside the Commonwealth’ and that any ‘special treatment’ as regards ‘nationals and trade’ would be on ‘a reciprocal basis’ only.⁶⁰ The Ireland Bill was published on 3 May 1949 and its guarantee of the territorial and jurisdictional position of Northern Ireland prompted a wave of Irish protest including through a Government-to-Government Aide-Mémoire on 7 May 1949⁶¹ and from motions adopted nem con in both the Irish lower house (the Dáil) and upper house (the Seanad) on 10⁶² and 11⁶³ May 1949 respectively. Despite these concerns being echoed by some backbenchers during the Westminster parliamentary proceedings, the Bill completed its passage unscathed and received Royal Assent on 2 June 1949. By this time, the Commonwealth had come to a very different understanding with India, a country which was also soon to become a Republic and break all constitutional links with the Crown. On 26 April 1949, a special Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting issued the London Declaration which agreed that a republican India could remain a full Commonwealth member alongside acceptance of ‘The King as symbol of the free association’ and ‘as such the Head of the Commonwealth’ whilst also stressing that ‘the basis’ of membership of the other Commonwealth States was ‘not hereby changed’.⁶⁴

Ireland’s Commonwealth secession was not accompanied by any adjustment of Ireland’s membership of, and close engagement with, the Sterling Area which included maintaining parity with the British pound and retaining large quantities of assets in this currency. This might appear anomalous given that the Sterling Area in 1948 was essentially a Commonwealth arrangement, encompassing all Members other than Canada, with even Canada being represented on its multilateral bodies and those bodies likewise excluding the few non-Commonwealth countries such as Iceland which were also part of this monetary grouping. It is particularly surprising since the Irish Minister for External Affairs Séan McBride was leader of a political party (Clann na Poblachta) which held that a fundamental readjustment within, or even a full exit from, this system was necessary to achieve full Irish autonomy.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, these demands did emerge during the 30.5 per cent devaluation of Sterling which occurred later in September 1949. However, the Clann’s perspectives were conclusively defeated within the Irish Cabinet⁶⁶ and, in fact, the Irish link to Sterling was maintained until March 1979 when Ireland joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.⁶⁷

Main Similarities Between Ireland’s Commonwealth Exit 1948–49 and Brexit 2016–20

Having provided an outline of the processes and outcomes which followed Ireland’s announced intention to fully secede from the Commonwealth, it is now possible to systematically analyse these using a wider lens which encompasses both a longer chronological sweep and a more expansive evidential base including further economic, political and other material. As previously stated, Brexit will be deployed as an organising and heuristic device. Thus, this section will explore the core similarities with Brexit’s processes and outcomes any the following section will focus on the principal differences.

Association Versus Exit at Point of Announcement

Looking first at Taoiseach John Costello’s initial announcement of intended exit, this was made by a politician representing a political force, namely Fine Gael, which was formally committed to continuing association with, in this case, the Commonwealth. Moreover, its case for association had sought to counter a national sovereignty message with a primarily economic rationale which was bolstered by a claim that engagement with Northern Ireland was also thereby strengthened. However, all these links were put at risk prior to any significant consideration of how these might be countered and without consultation, or in fact even notification, of Commonwealth Members. Turning briefly to the Brexit comparator, all this has broad echoes with its announcement by a Prime Minister (David Cameron) who was personally strongly committed to EU membership, the primarily economic case for remain, the negative impact on Great Britain-Northern Ireland relations and the lack of detailed analysis of how Brexit would work or prior consultation on it with EU partners.

The February 1948 Irish election had resulted in Fine Gael becoming the dominant party within a new ʻinterpartyʹ Government which replaced a series of Fianna Fáil Administrations which had been led by Éamon de Valera since 1932. Fine Gael’s public commitment to continued Commonwealth association was made clear in its election policy which stated that it would ‘not seek to alter the present Constitution in relation to External Affairs’.⁶⁸ The interparty agreement to form a Government had likewise made no mention of ERA repeal.⁶⁹ Instead, this was peremptorily announced by Costello on 7 September 1948, without any detailed discussion of its implications within the Irish Government or any notice, let alone consultation, with other Commonwealth governments.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the twin economic and Northern Ireland public justifications for this erstwhile Fine Gael commitment are made clear by the pronouncements found in the party’s magazine. For example, an unattributed article entitled ʻPolitical Searchlight' published in July 1947 stated:

Fine Gael is honest. It believes that a free Irish State, in association with the Nations of the Commonwealth, gives us greater strength and security and great hope of material prosperity. It believes that association affords the easiest method of ending Partition [between Ireland and Northern Ireland] and uniting the country in one Government and Parliament. Fine Gael is not afraid to say so.⁷¹

The rationale as regards Northern Ireland was that an ‘openly acknowledged association’ with the Commonwealth (and, through this, with the Crown) ‘can be made to reconcile the majority insistence of complete independence with those sentiments of the minority which we cannot propose to trample underfoot if our desire for unity is constructive and friendly’.⁷² Indeed, even Éamon de Valera, the leader of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s arch opponent, had supported retention of the ERA on the basis that ‘might go towards meeting the sentiment of people of the Six Counties [which comprised Northern Ireland]’.⁷³ Meanwhile, Fine Gael also pointed out that Ireland was ‘economically and financially in the Commonwealth’.⁷⁴ The factual underpinnings of this claim were stark. As previously noted, Ireland was in the monetary alliance of the Sterling Area and, as a result of its policy of parity with the British pound, was in a de facto currency union with at least the UK. Moreover, approximately 90 per cent of Ireland’s exports were within the Commonwealth, as well as over 55 per cent of its imports.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, it should be recognised that this trade was overwhelmingly with one country, namely, the UK which took over 87 per cent of Irish imports and supplied approximately 54 per cent of its imports in 1948.⁷⁶

Whilst far from constituting a customs union or even a free trade bloc, Commonwealth countries did grant economic preference to each other, sometimes on the basis of mere status but more usually under the ‘multiplicity of agreements’⁷⁷ which had originally been established through the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in 1932. Although these were the result of ‘toughly fought’⁷⁸ bilateral negotiations, the central agreements between the UK and various of the other Members all shared a common pattern. In sum, ‘Britain imposed substantial restrictions on foreign imports and guaranteed free entry to most Commonwealth products and a preference elsewhere. In return, she obtained an increase in the preferential rate for her exports’.⁷⁹ As a result of a dispute with Britain which will be examined in the next section, Ireland did not make agreements with the UK at Ottawa itself (although it did do so with Canada and South Africa).⁸⁰ However, in 1938 a resolution of the immediate aspects of dispute saw the UK retrospectively treat Ireland as an ʻOttawa' country under the Ottawa Agreements Act 1932 and concomitantly negotiate an Ottawa-style trade agreement with it.⁸¹ Albeit alongside an undertaking not to increase preferential margins, these special arrangements were saved during the post-World War II formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)⁸² and an updated bilateral agreement on 31 July 1948 had confirmed and augmented UK-Irish trading arrangements.⁸³

Dilemmas and Trade-offs During Exit Negotiations

Looking beyond the immediate situation at the time of initial announcement, it is also clear that during the negotiations both Ireland and the remaining countries of the Commonwealth were presented with overarching dilemmas and ultimately trade-offs which again raise echoes with those which confronted the UK and the remaining EU countries during Brexit. Turning first to look at the remaining Members, these States were concerned to ensure that any new arrangement would be compatible with their existing legal obligations, protected their own interests and preserved cohesion within the remaining group. The UK Government was most immediately concerned that agreeing to any far-reaching but ad hoc arrangements on trade and citizenship rights with Ireland would open Britain to credible and serious challenge under MFN clauses included in agreements it had with foreign countries.⁸⁴ Moreover, although these concerns were only weakly supported by other Governments during the immediate negotiations, reflection later in the process by both the Canadian and the New Zealand Cabinet came to support these more strongly and Canada also raised its own legal issues concerning internal federal-provincial relations.⁸⁵ Given that such agreements were in general not taken to include citizenship rights and in light of the savings clause within the GATT agreement, the concerns were especially weighty as regards tariff preferences and were strongest as regards countries such as Argentina which were not a party to the GATT. The need to respond to these potential challenges formed one important factor why during the negotiations Australia, New Zealand and the UK (broadly supported by Canada) urged that any continuing citizenship arrangement needed to establish a genuinely non-ʻforeign' relationship by being grounded not on mere discretionary exemption orders but rather on positive rights secured under primary legislation.⁸⁶ To a limited extent, this demand was also reflective of the desire on the part of these States to defend their discrete interests by securing the legal position of their own citizens within Ireland.⁸⁷ Much more importantly, and presenting the most similarity with the Brexit comparator, a strong concern to preserve the cohesion of the remaining group was also evident. This imperative initially led the negotiating Governments to urge Ireland to reconsider its exit decision, or at least commit to re-joining later. When that did not prove achievable, the UK Government’s insistence that Ireland must extend its trade and citizenship rights guarantees to all Commonwealth countries (and not just those with large Irish diasporas who were specifically represented) was directly prompted by a desire to maintain intra-Commonwealth cohesion. The later concerns raised by Pakistan during consultation on the proposed, but ultimately unsuccessful, amendment of the Royal Title⁸⁸ shows this concern to have been well-founded.

Turning next to the departing country, and again raising an echo with the UK’s predicaments during Brexit, Ireland was confronted with a trade-off between accepting more common arrangements and gaining potential advantages or giving both up. It is true that Ireland was theoretically open to maintaining all of its existing citizenship and trade ties with the Commonwealth and ultimately adopted the same position as regards the Sterling Area. Nevertheless, as previously stated, agreement to continue with existing citizenship and trade arrangements was made subject to Ireland committing to a reciprocal citizenship rights arrangement secured under primary legislation and open to all Commonwealth countries. Subsequent developments would demonstrate that, at least as regards the new Commonwealth States, the implications of this, even if only inchoate at the time, were potentially significant. Furthermore, Ireland had to accept the starting point that cession involved an end to rights of participation in all bodies associated with the Commonwealth including, but not limited to, the monetary and trade area. Thus, Lord Jowitt stated on 15 December 1948 that:

Eire is not to receive that constant flow of information, much of which is secret and confidential, which goes to Commonwealth Government on matters of foreign policy and economic affairs; she is not to be brought into the consultation which goes on within the family circle of the Commonwealth on all matters of common interest; she is not to be treated as a partner with Commonwealth countries in matters of defence; she is not to get the special information, consultation, advice and assistance of military missions which are exchanged between Commonwealth countries; she is not to be invited to the periodical meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or to other meetings of Commonwealth Ministers, and she is not to be entitled to membership of Commonwealth committees which now exist or may be appointed to deal with technical questions.⁸⁹

Since it saw Ireland’s participation in this as advantageous and more particularly was looking for a precedent to retain India on the Committee even if she left the Commonwealth, the UK was initially willing to exempt the Sterling Area Statistical Committee from this exclusion. This special case was theoretically justified on the grounds that, although its membership did not then include any non-Commonwealth country associated with Sterling, it could still be seen as an extra-Commonwealth body. However, surreptitious arrangements were made for Ireland to exceptionally be excluded from certain information flows⁹⁰ and the Irish suggestion that it might continue to engage with the Commonwealth Liaison Committee,⁹¹ a body concerned with broader forms of economic coordination, was not accepted. Moreover, by the end of 1954 (when Commonwealth matters including as regards Indian membership had unequivocally moved on) the Statistical Committee was merged into this latter Committee (sitting, as necessary, as a sub-Committee) and Ireland was thereby entirely excluded from these structures.⁹² In any case, even before this, major policy issues concerning the Sterling Area were primarily discussed within other multilateral Commonwealth fora including at Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings, Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meetings and the periodic Commonwealth Economic Conference. Ireland was not a member of any of these fora and, although it did actively seek to attend the Commonwealth Economic Conference in 1958, it was rebuffed.⁹³ Ironically, these multilateral exclusions tended to make Ireland rather more reliant on one-to-one contacts with the UK when seeking to influence and take account of ʻCommonwealth' trade and monetary arrangements. In some contrast, Ireland was successful in establishing a special Associate status within both the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau (CAB),⁹⁴ which was concerned with research and information exchange within agricultural science, and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA),⁹⁵ which was principally engaged in ensuring ongoing deliberation between Commonwealth parliamentarians as well as supporting parliamentary government across all parts of the grouping. As regards the CAB, agreement arose from the CAB’s own understanding that the loss of Irish contributions would land the organisation in a financial ‘crisis’.⁹⁶ Under its new status, Ireland lost all representation on the Executive Council (although attendance at the Intergovernmental Review Conferences was retained) but also got its subscription reduced from 5 to 3 units (out of 170).⁹⁷ This arrangement proved a happy one and continued until 1977 when Ireland decided to withdraw.⁹⁸ In the case of the CPA, an openness to accepting non-Commonwealth Associates arose primary from a desire to maintain and develop formal connections with the United States Congress which had begun as early as 1943.⁹⁹ However, this status proved far less satisfactory for Ireland. Not only was it entirely excluded from the CPA’s decision-making structure but a CPA General Meeting in 1950 decided that representatives of associated groups were precluded from ‘raising controversial intra-Commonwealth subjects’¹⁰⁰ and when the Irish delegates to the 1952 Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference sought to bring up Partition a furore erupted and their interventions were only printed in brief summary in the final proceedings. In 1953 the CPA Council endorsed this previous ruling.¹⁰¹ The confrontation led to a decade-long absence by Ireland from these Conferences although, without discussing Partition, delegations did reattend at various points in the 1960s and 1970s before this association also ended in 1977.¹⁰²

Weakening of Links with Northern Ireland

Mention of Partition leads naturally to a consideration of the way in which secession led to the departing country finding that that this weakened, or at least rendered more complex, its links with Northern Ireland. This has clearly become apparent in the case of Brexit as a result of the debacle over the so-called Northern Ireland Protocol¹⁰³ but, albeit in a different way and largely outside of any multilateral decision-making process, was equally clear in the case of Ireland’s Commonwealth exit. Admittedly, Ireland’s links with the Crown, which for Northern Ireland at least were the most vital of Ireland’s Commonwealth links, had become so attenuated under the ERA that its mere retention would have proved of little positive worth as a bridge to greater unity. Matters may have been different if Ireland had been willing to recognise the Crown internally as an ordinary Commonwealth Realm, but at least by 1948 that was clearly not practical politics.¹⁰⁴ In fact, the Irish exit was associated with a Government-led anti-Partition campaign which ‘failed to win the country any real international support’ but did serve to ‘harden Unionist opinion in the North’.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, riding on a wave of UK goodwill arising from Northern Ireland’s sacrifices during World War II, its Government was able to successfully convince the UK Government that Ireland’s full rupture with the Crown, its clear assumption of the name of the whole island (as opposed to the alternative title of Eire which, with implicit acquiescence from Ireland, the UK and other Commonwealth States had generally been using) and the anti-Partition campaign, necessitated a strengthening of Northern Ireland’s own position within the Crown’s dominions and within the UK.¹⁰⁶ The UK Cabinet ultimately rejected Northern Ireland’s request than its name be changed to Ulster out of concern that this ‘was likely to provoke acute controversy among Irishmen in other Commonwealth countries’.¹⁰⁷ The need to take account of such concerns was linked to a mutual desire to secure a Royal Title change, a matter which constitutional convention required be agreed amongst all Commonwealth States. In fact, even a substitution of ‘Northern Ireland’ for ‘Ireland’ failed to obtain the necessary unanimity. Nevertheless, most of Northern Ireland’s concerns could and were accommodated on a unilateral basis by the UK and were aided by the need for UK legislation to implement the Irish agreement.¹⁰⁸ As regards the linked anti-Partition campaign, the Northern Ireland Government was particularly concerned that Irish citizens, who like Commonwealth citizens were to retain the Westminster franchise in the UK, might seek to vote or even stand in Northern Ireland constituencies when their geographical link there might be tenuous or even non-existent. This led to the UK Cabinet agreeing to introduce a three-month residence qualification for voting and standing for election in such constituencies, notwithstanding that Northern Ireland proved unwilling to accede to the UK Government’s request to reduce the residential qualification for its own Parliament’s franchise from seven to, at most, five years.¹⁰⁹ Given that Ireland was itself unwilling to grant anyone other than its own citizens the Irish franchise, it proved difficult for it to object to this change which also proved long-standing, only being repealed under section 14 of the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014.¹¹⁰ Even more fundamentally, the UK Cabinet agreed to a formal ‘constitutional’ guarantee in what became the Ireland Bill 1949 which declared that Northern Ireland including any part of it would not cease to be ‘part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland’.¹¹¹ One member of the Cabinet, namely the Minister for Civil Aviation Lord Pakenham, dissented noting, in particular, that there was a majority against Partition in two out of the six Northern Ireland counties. However, the Cabinet stressed that Northern Ireland’s continued adhesion to the UK was integral to UK defence, that Ireland in 1940 ‘had jeopardised her chances of ending partition by remaining neutral’ and that ‘her recent legislation had shown that she laid more store on formal independence than on the union of Ireland’.¹¹²

As stated in second main section of this article, the Northern Irish constitutional guarantee prompted a wave of Irish protest including through a Government-to-Government Aide-Mémoire on 7 May 1949¹¹³ and motions adopted nem con in the Dáil on 10 May 1949¹¹⁴ and the Seanad on 11 May 1949.¹¹⁵ Ireland’s position was that this provision ‘purport[ed] to endorse and continue the existing partition of Ireland’ which it condemned as ‘unjust and unnatural’.¹¹⁶ During the UK Parliament deliberations, these sentiments received some support even from certain Liberal and Labour MPs representing constituencies in Great Britain who (similarly to Lord Pakenham) noted majorities against Partition in two of Northern Ireland’s counties (Fermanagh and Tyrone) and additionally drew attention to way in which the Parliament of Northern Ireland failed to represent the province as a whole. Nevertheless, an attempt in the House of Commons to delete this guarantee was comfortably defeated 324 to 48¹¹⁷ and the Ireland Bill became the Ireland Act with Royal Assent on 2 June 1949. It remained substantively unamended until, during the breakdown in law and order which marked the beginning of the ʻThe Troubles', the Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended in March 1972 (and was later abolished).¹¹⁸ The following year, this guarantee was converted into a lock held by the Northern Ireland people¹¹⁹ (as, in fact, had been proposed but rejected 312 to 54 in the House of Commons during the Ireland Act’s original passage¹²⁰). This reworded provision was subsequently periodically re-enacted. In the very different context of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement 1998, its substantive effect ultimately came to be accepted by both Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland, albeit alongside a similar commitment that should a majority appear to support unification with Ireland then a poll would be held and a positive result acted upon. As a result, section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 currently reads:

1. It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1.

2. But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.

Main Differences Between Ireland’s Commonwealth Exit 1948–49 and Brexit 2016–20

The analysis in the previous section focused on similarities between the Irish Commonwealth exit and Brexit and did thereby reveal some significant and sometimes uncanny resemblances between these two cases. In contrast, this section will uncover and unpack some of the equally significant differences. It may be claimed that, in contrast to the obvious and very serious multilateral break that Brexit represented, the rupture between Ireland and the Commonwealth came in the 1930s as opposed to the late 1940s, that the principal issues confronting Ireland were with the UK alone and so were bilateral rather than multilateral, that at least by the late 1940s the Commonwealth was a much looser association than the EU and finally that Ireland was anyway much more interested in the symbolism of a full rupture with the British Crown as opposed to securing practical changes on issues such as citizenship rights which were a central part of Brexit. Although all these perspectives have partial validity, it will be argued below they can be overdrawn and that the rationale for deploying Brexit as a comparator remains strong. Indeed, such are the commonalities as well as the contrasts here that, at least at the point of exit and as regards relationships within The Isles itself, Ireland’s Commonwealth secession can usefully be considered as Brexit’s ʻalter ego'.

Was 1948–49 a Genuine Breakpoint? Ireland and the Commonwealth, 1921–1948

As previously stated and in contrast to the fundamental change which Brexit manifestly effected in UK-EU relations, it may be argued that 1948–49 embodied no significant divide at all between Ireland and the Commonwealth since effective secession had in fact taken place many years previously. In this regard, it is striking that in the months preceding the Irish Government’s announcement in late 1948, the Taoiseach John Costello had stated that as a result of ‘gradual development’ Ireland had already ‘ceased formally to be a member of the Commonwealth’. Nevertheless, he also emphasised that Ireland was ‘associated with the members of the British Commonwealth’ in the sense conceptualised within the Irish Constitution which provided for association with ‘any group or league of nations for the purpose of international cooperation in matters of common concern’.¹²¹ Consideration of these issues necessitates a broader examination of Ireland’s relationship with the Commonwealth from the time of its independent existence in 1921–22 onwards.

Ireland (or the Irish Free State as it was then styled) became part of ‘the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations’¹²² under the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty (hereinafter the Treaty) which were finalised with the British Government on 6 December 1921 as part of Ireland’s confrontation with, and turbulent separation from, the rest of the UK. Alongside establishing Commonwealth membership and its concomitants including allegiance to the Crown, the Treaty sought to regulate specific aspects of British–Irish relations especially as regards the right of Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK (which it immediately availed itself), the division of financial liabilities and ongoing defence arrangements including the availability to the British navy of designated Irish ports. Although accepted by a democratic majority, the Treaty was divisive and its ratification even prompted a renewed outbreak of violence (known in Ireland as the Civil War). Whilst these disturbances were effectively ended by May 1923, the Treaty including its recognition of a common, even if divisible, Commonwealth Crown continued to prove very controversial and by the late 1940s Ireland’s detachment from the Commonwealth had morphed, at least de facto, into one of sui generis association as opposed to full membership.

During the initial decade following the 1921–22 settlement, Ireland was clearly a member of the Commonwealth, even if only a reluctant one. Led by a Government under Cumann na nGaedhael, the principal party which later formed Fine Gael in 1933, it actively participated in all major Commonwealth meetings and in all of the Commonwealth’s principal agencies including its economic and shipping committees and its agricultural bureaux. It also sought to promote the possibility of reciprocal legal action by Commonwealth members across a wide range of subject matter including coinage, company and bankruptcy law, industrial property, air navigation and the law of extradition and fugitive offenders.¹²³ At the same time, it was relentless in seeking not only full equality and the extinguishment of anything smacking of a colonial relationship but also the greatest possible autonomy as an international state whilst remaining in this grouping. For example, notwithstanding tensions with the Commonwealth’s so-called inter se doctrine, it sought to register the Treaty with the League of Nations in 1924¹²⁴ and in 1929 ratified the Optional Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice without any Commonwealth reservation.¹²⁵ It similarly sought to ensure that it was granted direct access to The King, the ability to make Treaties with foreign countries autonomously and the right to issue independent Passports. As regards appeal to the Privy Council, which until the enactment of the Statute of Westminster 1931 was generally seen as a requirement of Commonwealth membership (and for Ireland was specifically referred to within its Constitution Act¹²⁶ which had been agreed under the Treaty), Ireland’s opposition even led it to resort to the questionable legal technique of passing retrospective legislation to nullify any effect of appeal and restore the law as enunciated by the domestic courts.¹²⁷ In general, however, Ireland during this period sought to achieve its aims through methods recognised as legal throughout the Commonwealth and, if at all possible, through consultation with the other members. Albeit in a considerably less extreme form, such reluctance¹²⁸ was also broadly characteristic of the UK’s entire membership of the EC/EU, an approach which led to opt-outs from the Euro, EU coordination of the many security and justice measures and the Schengen arrangements for free visa travel even for third country nationals.¹²⁹

Turning back to the Irish case, a much more tense reality emerged in March 1932 when the Cumann na nGaedhael Government was replaced with one headed by Éamon de Valera and the Fianna Fáil party. De Valera and Fianna Fáil held that the Treaty including Commonwealth membership had been coercively imposed on Ireland and the new Government pursued a range of policies which were in clear contradiction with the Treaty and with Commonwealth norms. At least one of these, namely the withholding of annuity payments on UK loans extended to enable the Irish to carry out compensated land reform, was in form clearly a British–Irish bilateral issue. However, even here wider Commonwealth effects were evident de facto as the UK responded by refusing to negotiate with the Irish at Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference and imposed unique special duties on Irish trade,¹³⁰ Ireland reacting with discriminatory duties of their own.¹³¹ Following the Statute of Westminster Act 1931, the full abolition of Privy Council appeals in 1935 must be seen as ultimately more straightforwardly bilateral.¹³² However, other changes had a clearer Commonwealth character. These included immediate confrontation with the Governor-General resulting in his replacement with an individual who essentially treated this position of Crown representative as a defunct office,¹³³ the abolition of the Ministerial Oath to the Crown in 1933¹³⁴ and the introduction of a separate Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935 and accompanying Aliens Act 1935. The latter Act defined those from elsewhere in the Commonwealth as ʻaliens' although it did allow for a lifting of ordinary aliens control via executive order which, as regards all parts of the Commonwealth, was immediately forthcoming under the Aliens (Exemption) Order SI 80/1935. In addition, Ireland continued to participate in the same Commonwealth agencies as previously, although it did not take part in any further meetings at ministerial level following the Ottawa conference. In 1936–37, fundamental constitutional change sought to make Ireland’s anomalous position comprehensive and explicit. During the Abdication Crisis in December 1936, all references to the common Crown and the Governor-General were removed from the Irish Constitution¹³⁵ but, at the same time, the ERA was passed which empowered The King to continue to appoint Irish diplomatic and consular representatives and conclude international agreements when and if advised to do so by the Irish Government and for so long as Ireland was ‘associated’ with the other Commonwealth States. A new Constitution, approved by the Oireachtas on 14 June 1937 and then adopted by referenda on 1 July 1937 (with 56.5 per cent in favour and 43.5 per cent against), went further and removed all constitutional reference to Commonwealth membership. It nevertheless included affirmation that ‘for the purpose of the exercise of any executive function of the State or in connection with its external relations’ the Government could make use of any procedure used by the members of any ‘group or league of nations’ with which the State was ‘associated’.¹³⁶ The new Constitution also claimed that the ‘national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas’ and (albeit expressly only symbolically) asserted the Irish Parliament and Government’s right to exercise jurisdiction ‘over the whole of that territory’.¹³⁷

It is clear that the Irish changes in 1936–37, which similarly to Brexit were effected through resort to a referendum, could have been taken by the Commonwealth to have effected a complete break, as well as an additional bilateral rupture with the UK given Ireland’s assertion of sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, on its own terms, this new constitutional settlement sought to preserve a formal Commonwealth association. Moreover, undoubtedly influenced by the deteriorating international situation at the time, the other Commonwealth members (after consultation including at the Imperial Conference in May-June 1937¹³⁸) elected to voluntarily accept Ireland’s unilateral action as if it were compatible with Commonwealth membership and good relations more generally. Thus, on 29 December 1937 – the day the new Constitution came into force – it was announced by the UK Government that all Commonwealth Governments were ‘prepared to treat the new Constitution as not affecting a fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish Free State, in future to be described under the new Constitution as “Eire” or “Ireland”, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations’. On its own account, the UK also emphasised that it did not recognise that the Constitution’s adoption involved ‘any right to territory or jurisdiction over territory forming part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or affects in any way the position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, the following March, the UK agreed to come to a new settlement with Ireland which involved it giving up its Treaty defence rights including the navy ports, ending the financial dispute in return for a single payment by Ireland of £10 million and agreeing to treat Ireland on ʻOttawa' or, in other words, Commonwealth terms through a preferential trading agreement.¹⁴⁰

The explicit aim of this conciliatory approach was to presage more cooperative relations going forward.¹⁴¹ However, these goals were largely dashed by Ireland’s refusal to join the rest of the Commonwealth as an ally in World War II. This extended to the point of denying the allies the use of Irish ports in the Battle of the Atlantic, notwithstanding indication that the UK Government would be willing to provide public support for an end to Partition should Ireland alter its neutral position.¹⁴² Draft plans were drawn up by the UK Government at that point for a termination of Ireland’s Commonwealth membership but this initiative went no further as it was seen as posing difficult legal questions as regards its precise basis, raising complex implications especially for nationality law, necessitating prolonged consultation and agreement with other Commonwealth members and finally being liable to inflict greater practical damage on the UK than on Ireland.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, the Report of an Inter-departmental meeting did note that war-time trade controls could be adjusted ‘in particular cases by purely administrative action’¹⁴⁴ and these kind of methods were later resorted to by the UK in order to treat Ireland less favourably economically.¹⁴⁵ More specifically related to the Commonwealth itself, Ireland’s participation in most aspects of Commonwealth coordination (although not vis-à-vis the management of Sterling) was de facto suspended including consultation on certain post-war plans such as in civil aviation.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Ireland’s albeit ambiguous Commonwealth association re-emerged post-war including through its participation in 1947 in functional meetings concerned with Commonwealth trade,¹⁴⁷ the Sterling Area¹⁴⁸ and nationality and citizenship.¹⁴⁹ However, Ireland used the latter meeting to solidify its own unique treatment through approval in principle of a special scheme whereby ‘citizens of Eire’ were held not to be ‘British subjects’ but it was nevertheless stated that they ‘should not have the status of aliens’¹⁵⁰ within the Commonwealth. As regards engagement with Commonwealth agencies, Ireland was alone in refusing to recommence participation in the shipping and economic committees when they restarted in 1947 (despite a plea from the latter for reconsideration)¹⁵¹ and, although it did continue within the agricultural bureaux, it also uniquely did not join either the Commonwealth Air Transport Council or the Commonwealth Communications Council.¹⁵² There were also increasing calls within Irish politics for the ERA to be repealed.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the advent of a Fine Gael-led Government in 1948 brought new hope for Ireland’s future relationship with the Commonwealth. The UK Representative to Ireland Lord Rugby expressed relief at his understanding that the ERA was now safe,¹⁵⁴ Commonwealth Relations Office officials saw an opening for further Irish participation in Commonwealth organisations¹⁵⁵ and the UK and Ireland agreed to confirm and extend their 1938 Trade Agreement on an understanding of continued mutual Commonwealth association.¹⁵⁶ However, Ireland’s announcement in September 1948 of an intention to repeal the ERA and explicitly secede from the Commonwealth clearly put an end to such understandings which, as the initial expectation that the pledge to secede might be reversed indicated, were also broadly shared by other Commonwealth Governments.

In sum, it is clearly true that Ireland’s relationship with the Commonwealth prior to late 1948 was not (as with the UK and EU) simply one of reluctant membership but rather had become one of a sui generis association, a position which Ireland had sought to formalise through adoption of a new constitution via referendum in 1937. To a much greater extent than the UK pre-Brexit, these developments had enabled Ireland to prepare the ground for an evolving relationship going forward. Ireland’s most significant external relationships and, in particular, its principal economic linkages by far were with the UK. Nevertheless, it was the albeit rather contested association between Ireland and the Commonwealth which had enabled Ireland to participate in intra-Commonwealth citizenship, economic and functional cooperation frameworks and this association had been integral to securing crucially important arrangements with the UK especially in the area of trade and citizenship rights. The decision in 1948–49 to end this association put all these and related links at permanent and direct risk and thereby did constitute a fundamental breakpoint in Ireland’s Commonwealth relationships.

Was the Commonwealth in 1948 in Any Way Comparable to the EU in 2016?

It may nevertheless be argued that the Commonwealth can in no way be likened to a tightly knit association such as the EU and that therefore deploying Brexit as a heuristic and organising comparator to the Irish cession from it cannot be helpful. Looking at the current reality today, this incomparability is undoubtedly correct. Although the Commonwealth Realms remain symbolically close as a result of their common allegiance to the Crown, Commonwealth membership as such entails little beyond notional adherence to the Commonwealth’s declarations (including the Commonwealth Charter¹⁵⁷), participation in inter-governmental consultations and (comparatively extremely small¹⁵⁸) monetary contributions to Commonwealth Secretariat activities.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, realities were very different in 1948 especially vis-à-vis citizenship, trade and monetary relations. Regarding citizenship, the then universal allegiance of Commonwealth nationals to the Crown entailed a ‘common status of British subject’. The right of each State to shape its ‘own electoral and immigration laws’¹⁶⁰ severely tempered any necessary practical consequent of this and was sometimes associated with profound and racially motivated discrimination. Nevertheless, Commonwealth status established the foundation for all preferential treatment of citizens from other parts of the Commonwealth which, as regards the UK and to a much lesser extent Australia, New Zealand and Canada, were of high importance to Ireland at a practical level. Economically, Commonwealth countries had established ‘the most extensive functioning system of tariff discrimination in the world’.¹⁶¹ Admittedly, these special economic arrangements rested on a ‘multiplicity of agreements’¹⁶² negotiated between individual Commonwealth members, supplemented by unilateral preferences based on Commonwealth status which were granted by individual countries. Nevertheless, all these arrangements, including those concerned with the UK market which was crucial to Ireland’s economic interests, rested on Commonwealth association. Indeed, as late as 6 August 1948 during the adjournment debate on the updated UK-Irish trade agreement, the Irish Taoiseach John Costello had stated:

The right of preferential treatment in the matter of trade with Great Britain and the other nations of the Commonwealth is one which we enjoy, so long as we are associated with that league of nations known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. We have enjoyed that since 1922, and we are still enjoying it by virtue of our free association with that league of nations known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a valuable right from the point of view our people.¹⁶³

Monetarily, all Commonwealth States other than Canada were tied to Sterling through a common dollar pool and systems of exchange control which permitted ‘the maximum freedom of transfer within the area and an absolute control of external transactions’.¹⁶⁴ Admittedly, a small number of non-Commonwealth countries similarly tied their currencies to Sterling. Nevertheless, the ‘conduct’ or management of the Area was a ‘wholly Commonwealth affair’¹⁶⁵ and explicitly encompassed the entire grouping whilst excluding all others. Thus, despite being outside the Sterling Area, Canada participated in the multilateral fora such as the Sterling Area Statistical Committee which coordinated this mechanism whereas the few non-Commonwealth States tied to Sterling such as Iceland did not.

In sum, and in contrast to the present day, the Commonwealth in the late 1940s provided a coordinating framework for fundamental aspects of citizenship, trade and monetary relations and thus can bear broad comparison with the EU. This wider framework was integral to Ireland’s relationship with the UK in all these areas and so the issues which arose cannot be conceptualised as purely bilateral. Admittedly, pan-Commonwealth arrangements were considerably less mandatory, rule-based and juridical than those of the EU in 2016. Moreover, even these rather flexible links were coming under considerable wider strain by 1948. Most notably, India was directly challenging the common allegiance to the Crown which had been understood to be the bedrock of the organisation since its crystallization at the end of the First World War. As previously stated, by the end of April 1949 this had been accommodated through a new formula whereby India recognised ‘The King as symbol of the free association’ and ‘as such the Head of the Commonwealth’ and remained a member on that basis whereas ‘the basis’ of membership for the other States was asserted to be ‘not hereby changed’.¹⁶⁶ Undoubtedly, these developments would have made it easier for Ireland to seek to fashion a continuing formal Commonwealth association had it been minded to do so (although, even then, a further repudiation of the Crown could well have had certain consequences vis-à-vis Northern Ireland).¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, this does not change the reality that in choosing the path of full cession Ireland, similarly to the UK as regards Brexit, put at risk central aspects of its citizenship, economic and Northern Irish relationships. Moreover, although the much looser nature of the Commonwealth generally remained helpful to Ireland when addressing these risks, that was not universally the case. Most notably, except in relation to the consultation on changing the Royal Title, it led to the exclusion of Northern Irish issues within a multilateral setting. The UK was thereby able to exercise a largely unilateral hand and, as seen above, that led to a strengthening of Northern Ireland’s links with Great Britain and a concomitant weakening of those between it and Ireland.

Was Ireland ‘Only' Concerned with Symbolism During its Commonwealth Secession?

Finally, it might be claimed that Ireland was only concerned with symbolism during its full Commonwealth secession which, assuming that Brexit was significantly driven by demand for practical changes especially in relation to free movement between the UK and the rest of the EU, might also place into question the use of this comparator. In fact, much of Brexit may also be seen as concerned with the quasi-symbolic abstraction of ʻtaking back control', with little or no consensus as to how any such new autonomy might be utilised in most practical areas.¹⁶⁸ In addition, certain Brexit issues, such as returning to a traditionally designed ʻBritish' Passport,¹⁶⁹ were more unequivocally symbolic. Nevertheless, matters of obvious symbolism such as unequivocally ending ‘association with the institution of the British Crown’, which was stated by Taoiseach John Costello to have been ‘long and tragic’,¹⁷⁰ were of more weight in the case of Ireland’s Commonwealth secession. Even so, this republican aversion to monarchical symbols clearly had practical consequence. Not only was it incompatible with formal Commonwealth association (including, insofar as recognition of The King as the symbolic Head of the Commonwealth still entailed a link to the Crown, after the London Declaration in April 1949) but it enabled Northern Ireland to successfully argue that their position within the Crown’s dominions required further solidification. This in turn led to the constitutional guarantee for Northern Ireland within the UK’s Ireland Act 1949 which was one of the most significant practical results of Ireland’s secession.

Mapping the contours of symbolic demands is, in any case, far from clearcut. For example, according reciprocal citizenship rights to another country’s nationals may be considered profoundly symbolic although it also entails significant practical results. Similarly, Francine McKenzie has found that the Commonwealth’s attachment to preferential trading arrangements reflected as much their ‘emotion and political symbolism’ as any ‘tangible’ effect.¹⁷¹ It is striking, but not straightforward, that Irish politicians were generally willing to treat even reciprocal citizenship rights as a purely practical matter although, at least under the surface, certain more symbolic matters such as what was meant by the term ʻalien' or, at least, not ʻforeign' remained contested. For example, in response to Costello’s announcement that even after exit each other citizens would not be regard as foreign, Fianna Fáil Senator Margaret Pearce stated:

I am very sorry that we are not to be aliens. Why? Because we are aliens. I always like to be what I am. If I am rich, I do not want to be called poor, and, if I am poor, I do not want to be called rich. If I am Irish, I do not want to be called English, and, if I am English, I do not want to be called Irish. We are either Irish or English, and, if we are Irish, we are aliens. I look on myself as an alien to England, as much as I am an alien to France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland or any other country.¹⁷²

Beyond these conceptual points, certain unmistakeably practical matters related to secession were the subject of contestation within Irish politics in 1948–49 and Ireland also elected to prioritise specific practical issues during its negotiations on its Commonwealth cession. It is true that, in contrast to UK Government’s attitude to issues such as freedom of movement during Brexit, the majority of the Irish Government were broadly content with the practical as opposed to symbolic impact of Ireland’s Commonwealth relationships at the time of exit and were therefore willing to continue with these. However, it was Fine Gael which most strongly held this viewpoint, and it was not necessarily shared at all by the other groupings which made up the coalition or interparty Government. This divide is clearest as regards Ireland’s links with Sterling. As stated in the second main section of this article, the Sterling Area was essentially a Commonwealth arrangement and Seán MacBride, as leader of Clann na Poblachta, had been particularly vocal in advocating for a fundamental readjustment of Ireland’s relationship with Sterling:

We have handed our purse to England. She utilised it to fight a war and is now using it to rehabilitate herself. We must now get back our purse and utilise it to rehabilitate our own country.¹⁷³

Nevertheless, this understanding was not included in the interparty agreement of 1948, an outcome later justified by MacBride as follows:

As a minority party in the coalition I didn’t feel that we had the right to make these major demands and anyway I felt that the logic of the situation would propel us towards the implementation of those policies without making a political issue of them.¹⁷⁴

Such demands were also not immediately pressed during the formal process of Ireland’s Commonwealth exit which lasted until April 1949. However, they remerged in the September of that same year when Sterling came under severe pressure and was forced into a 30.5 per cent devaluation. Led by MacBride, the Clann urged that Ireland should not follow this devaluation and should patriate its Sterling assets, outcomes which would clearly have placed Ireland’s membership of the Sterling Area in severe doubt. However, the Department of Finance was strongly in favour of the link with Sterling¹⁷⁵ and this radical practical shift in Irish monetary relations was rejected by the Irish Cabinet.¹⁷⁶ Later that year, MacBride further propagated his viewpoint through a series of published lectures entitled Our People  – Our Money which pointedly claimed that ‘Sterling, instead of proving a power of strength, has been disintegrating steadily and rapidly’.¹⁷⁷ These lectures earnt the ire of the Governor of the Irish Central Bank who criticised them within internal government circles as ‘a public censure of the Central Bank’.¹⁷⁸ Irish policy held firm and it was not until March 1979 that full linkage with Sterling, including through parity between the Irish and British pounds, was abandoned when Ireland (but not the UK) joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.¹⁷⁹

Secondly, although the Irish Government were happy to maintain the practical effect of Ireland’s Commonwealth association as regards both trade and citizenship, they gave clear prioritisation to the latter and, in fact, had received many letters in this regard from citizens resident in particular in Great Britain.¹⁸⁰ Many nationals were dependent on special Commonwealth arrangements to live and work overseas, a precarious position exacerbated by the fact that until 1956 any Irish citizen of majority who became a citizen of another country automatically ceased by that same act to be an Irish citizen.¹⁸¹ Concerns in this regard led Ireland to make some potentially far-reaching commitments in the area of citizenship rights. As the UK Lord Chancellor Lord Jowitt briefed the British Cabinet on the Paris negotiations, the Irish Ministers ‘had made clear that in the last resort they would be prepared to forgo the [trade] preferences, from which they expected to derive no material advantage for some years to come’ but ‘[t]hey attached more importance to the existing arrangements for the treatment of nationals’.¹⁸² McBride acknowledged during the Dáil debate on the Republic of Ireland Act that this reflected a recognition that ‘[m]illions of our people have made their homes in Britain and other Commonwealth countries’. Although Britain was clearly a particular focus, the other parts of the Commonwealth which MacBride had in mind were ‘countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Canada’, in all of which Ireland was stated to occupy ‘the position of a mother country’.¹⁸³ As explored in the previous main section, the Commonwealth Governments negotiating with Ireland were, to a greater or lesser extent, genuinely concerned that providing Ireland with far-reaching but ad hoc arrangements in areas such as citizenship would conflict with their existing legal obligations and would also undermine the future cohesion of the Commonwealth group. It is also clear that the UK Government was minded to explicitly threaten Ireland and its citizens with the prospect of being treated as entirely foreign but faced the opposition of the other negotiating Governments, and in particular of Australia, in this regard. Thus, even when the practical issues arising primarily concerned Ireland and the UK alone, the wider Commonwealth context remained of vital importance in the negotiations. This again is made clear in Jowitt’s memorandum:

It thus became clear to us that, if we persisted in the view that Eire must be regarded as a foreign country once the External Relations Act was repealed we should find ourselves alone in maintaining that view. It was plain that Canada, Australia and New Zealand, like Eire, wished to follow the contrary view; and that they all felt so strongly on this point that it seemed likely that they would press it to the point of public disagreement with the United Kingdom Government. This would have been so serious a development that we thought it right, without committing ourselves to final agreement, to explore the possibility of devising a legal means of supporting the argument that Eire and the Commonwealth countries would not, despite the repeal of the External Relations Act, become foreign to one another.¹⁸⁴

This did indeed reflect the reality, as recognised by MacBride, that the segment of the population extracted from the departing State in all these countries was large enough to be of clear electoral and cultural significance. This factor, as well as the absence of a powerful central entity empowered to articulate and defend the Commonwealth’s collective interests and cohesion, tempered the nature of the trade-offs which Ireland was forced to confront (and thereby further distinguished them from those which accompanied Brexit). Nevertheless, all the negotiating Governments shared the UK’s concerns to some extent and, reflecting in part the very importance of population flows with Ireland, all also supported improving the legal position of their own citizens within Ireland. Given Ireland’s own concern to maintain its special citizenship privileges, Commonwealth negotiating delegations were able to successfully pressure the Irish Government into making a number of commitments to ‘maintain and strengthen’¹⁸⁵ its citizenship arrangements. In the first place, notwithstanding that Ireland’s primary concern was with the UK and additionally with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it agreed to be willing to make reciprocal citizenship arrangements with all parts of the Commonwealth including new members such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Secondly, Ireland also agreed to accord these citizens not mere discretionary exemption from ordinary aliens control but rather positive (even if only comparable as opposed to identical) rights entitlements. Thirdly, it undertook to place such rights on the footing of primary Statute during a future reform of Irish nationality law.¹⁸⁶ Although many of these commitments were later resiled upon by later Governments during a period when the Commonwealth continued to fragment, they were in principle weighty commitments with far-reaching (albeit at the time largely unrecognised) implications, especially as regards the potential for significant immigration into Ireland from the global South.

Thirdly, and again showing some similarity to Brexit, Ireland’s own concern to maintain a connection with various Commonwealth and associated bodies led it to seek to negotiate new relationships in this regard. As previously noted, in light of its sui generis association, Ireland had not included itself in the full panoply of relevant bodies even prior to 1948. Nevertheless, continued engagement with all of the bodies with which it currently held membership was seen by the Irish Government to be of continuing practical value. Although the rather flexible nature of Commonwealth organisation presented Ireland with a number of opportunities, various trade-offs still arose and have already been detailed in the previous main section. Given that it was not leaving the Sterling monetary system, Ireland was particularly keen to remain within the multilateral Sterling Area Statistical Committee¹⁸⁷ and, despite contrary early indications, this did not initially prove problematic. Nevertheless, a confidential protocol was in fact drawn up to potentially exclude Ireland from certain information flows¹⁸⁸ and (with continued Indian membership of the Commonwealth clearly resolved) at the end of 1954 this committee was merged into the Commonwealth Liaison Committee¹⁸⁹ from which Ireland had already been excluded and so it lost all its participation rights here. Despite its contrary wishes, Ireland later found itself similarly fully excluded from the 1958 Commonwealth Economic Conference, notwithstanding its practical engagement with the Commonwealth preference system and with the Sterling Area.¹⁹⁰ In the case of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, Associate status with very significantly reduced participation rights but also more limited monetary contributions was negotiated and proved generally satisfactory. In contrast, Ireland’s new Associate status within the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association was far less hospitable as it resulted in Ireland being prevented from the raising controversial issue of Ireland/Northern Ireland Partition at Commonwealth Parliamentary Conferences.

Conclusions: Ireland’s 1948–49 Exit as the Brexit Isles’ Alter Ego?

At first blush, seeking to reanalyse Ireland’s final Commonwealth exit in 1948–49 using the UK’s departure from the EU in 2016–20 as a heuristic and organising comparator may appear misconceived. Well beyond the sort of reluctant membership which characterised the UK’s relationship with the EC/EU and indeed Ireland’s initial relationship with the Commonwealth from 1922 to 1932, Ireland had already become a de facto semi-detached Commonwealth ʻassociate' and had itself sought to formalise this through the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in 1937. In any case, the Commonwealth was much less of a cohesive, rule-bound entity than the EU, many of the significant practical aspects which did exist were anyway under significant challenge in the aftermath of the World War II and the most pressing external issues which confronted Ireland only directly related to its relationship with the UK alone. As compared with Brexit some seventy years later, Ireland’s Commonwealth exit was therefore considerably less salient for the departing member, the remaining members and indeed for the organisation itself.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth at this time was providing a coordinating framework for fundamental aspects of citizenship, economic and monetary relations. Notwithstanding its semi-detached status, Ireland remained deeply enmeshed within these arrangements and these remained integral to its relationship with many countries including, most importantly, the UK. In order to live and work overseas, hundreds of thousands of Irish people relied on special citizenship provisions in the UK and other Commonwealth countries and, these, in turn, found justification in Ireland’s Commonwealth association. Ireland’s special trade agreements with the UK, as well as with Canada and South Africa, formed part of the Commonwealth’s preferential arrangements which had originally been crafted at the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference 1932. Moreover, over 90 per cent of Irish exports and 55 per cent of Irish imports were with the Commonwealth although these overwhelmingly involved one member, namely, the UK. Monetarily, Ireland pegged its currency to the British pound and was a member of the Sterling Area which encompassed all the Commonwealth other than Canada (as well as a few non-Commonwealth States) and whose multilateral bodies exclusively compromised all of the Commonwealth States. Commonwealth membership including, in particular, the link to the Crown was also seen as a potentially valuable common linkage between Ireland and Northern Ireland. In the lead-up to 1948, those who supported Ireland’s Commonwealth association pointed to the importance of these connections, whereas opponents argued that a break was needed to ensure full national independence. Finally, the commitment to a complete secession put all these links in jeopardy and was made without a detailed analysis of either the risks arising or how they would be responded to. All of this broadly chimes with the situation confronting the UK at the time the commitment to Brexit was made.

Analysis of the processes and outcomes of Ireland’s Commonwealth exit also reveals the value of such a comparator. It is true that, in contrast to UK Government’s desire during Brexit to fundamentally modify practical arrangements at least as regards freedom of movement, the Irish Government broadly sought to continue with the status quo as regards citizenship, trade and monetary relations. However, this was not without significant political dissention even within the Government. In particular, as the leader of Clann na Poblachta party, the Minister for External Affairs Seán MacBride strongly argued that fundamental readjustment of Ireland’s link to Sterling and the Sterling Area was a necessary concomitant to full autonomy. However, he was overruled in this regard and the link with Sterling including full parity between the Irish and British pound was maintained until 1979. Raising even louder echoes with Brexit, the remaining Members who negotiated with Ireland were keen to ensure that any new arrangements were compatible with their existing legal obligations, responded to their own concerns and preserved cohesion within the remaining group. Admittedly, a majority of these Members included diaspora populations extracted from the departing Member which were large enough to be of cultural and electoral significance and the Commonwealth itself lacked a powerful central actor empowered to articulate and protect the organisation’s common interests and cohesion. These factors undoubtedly helped establish a relatively hospitable environment for Ireland during its secession which, in turn, enabled it to selectively maintain a number of particularly valued concomitants of its former association. Nevertheless, Ireland was still confronted with significant trade-offs between accepting more common arrangements and gaining potential advantage thereby or giving both up. In particular, other Members successfully tied continuing trade and especially citizenship preferences to the Irish Government agreeing to offer reciprocal citizenship arrangements to all Commonwealth countries, to establishing these in terms of positive rights as opposed to discretionary exemptions and to committing to place them under the guarantee of primary Statute. Although their implications were only cursorily examined and were significantly resiled on by later Governments as the Commonwealth continued to fragment, Ireland agreed to these significant commitments as a result of its own strong practical desire to maintain existing arrangements especially as regards citizenship.

Ireland also saw engagement with all the Commonwealth and associated bodies with which it currently enjoyed membership to be of continuing value. However, and also somewhat similarly to the situation confronting the UK at the time of its EU exit, it was required to negotiate from a starting point which denied it any right of continued participation. In the purely economic area, continued membership of the Sterling Area Statistical Committee did not initially prove problematic as the UK Government was prepared to treat this body as formally autonomous from the Commonwealth (although it did surreptitiously establish arrangements to potentially limit information flows to Ireland). This reflected the relatively informal nature of Commonwealth-related organisations, the UK’s understanding that Irish involvement would be of value and, more especially, a UK desire to establish a precedent for non-Commonwealth participation should India ultimately decide to leave the association. However, in 1954 and with Indian and other Commonwealth uncertainties resolved, this Committee was merged into the Commonwealth Liaison Committee from which Ireland had already been excluded and Ireland likewise found itself unable to attend the 1958 Commonwealth Economic Conference even as an observer. Associate status was obtained within both the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux (CAB) and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) but, whereas this proved satisfactory in the former case which involved research and the interchange of scientific information, in the latter more directly political arena non-involvement in CPA decision-making resulted in Ireland finding itself barred from raising the question of Partition at Commonwealth Parliamentary Conferences. Much more concretely related to Ireland’s ambitions as regards Partition, Northern Ireland (which was benefiting from considerable goodwill arising from its sacrifices in World War II) was able to use Ireland’s secession to obtain a special residence qualification for Northern Ireland constituencies in the Westminster Parliament and to secure a formal constitutional guarantee of its position under the Crown and within the UK. These changes, which lasted to 2014 in the former case and as regards the latter continue (in modified form), tended to strengthen Northern Ireland’s relationship with Great Britain as compared to Ireland. That they originated entirely from within the UK, without even consultation with the wider Commonwealth expect as regards an abandoned attempt to change the Royal Title, demonstrates that the flexibility of the Commonwealth and the discretion which thereby remained in Members' hands including that of the UK was not always to Ireland’s advantage. Whilst the modalities are clearly different, the overarching outcome on Northern Ireland chimes with the difficulties which have confronted Northern Ireland’s relations with Great Britain as a result of the special Protocol agreed during the Brexit negotiations.

The strong commonalities as well as the contrasts between Ireland’s final Commonwealth cession in 1948–49 and the UK’s exit from the EU in 2016–20 highlight the broadly comparable nature of these two projects. Indeed, at the time of secession itself and as regards interactions concerning The Isles themselves, Ireland’s final Commonwealth departure can broadly be seen as the alter ego to Brexit. Thus, rather than being a doppelganger, an alter ego is a type of second self which is as much an alternative as it is a mirror of the other. Moreover, it is this dual characteristic of sameness and difference which can make a comparison valuable. The existing literature on the Irish exit has tended to focus on the fact that Ireland was able to retain many of the citizenship and trade advantages of Commonwealth association without the obligations of membership. Use of Brexit as a comparator also highlights the price Ireland paid for secession including as regards a public commitment to generally available reciprocal citizenship rights arrangements, a strengthening of Northern Ireland’s links with Great Britain and a loss of Irish participation rights in key fora including those concerned with the Commonwealth preference and Sterling areas within which it continued to operate. The ultimately limited significance of that price can only be fully explained by examining the way in which both Ireland and the UK engaged in a fundamental reorientation of their focus away from the Commonwealth and towards Europe during subsequent decades. That perspective provides a strong rationale for looking more broadly at Ireland’s post-World War II association with the Commonwealth which, although neglected in scholarship, was clearly consequential into the 1970s and retains echoes today including in the UK-Ireland Common Travel Area¹⁹¹ and youth mobility schemes between Ireland and Australia, Canada and New Zealand.¹⁹² In looking only at the exit negotiations and their aftermath, this article has merely scratched the surface of that wider experience. It nevertheless can, and is intended to, provide the jumping off point for further work which will take the story forward into the succeeding decades.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful for feedback which I received when presenting an earlier version of this paper at the Cambridge Centre for Public Law as well as from a number of individual academics including, in particular, Martin Daunton, Saul Dubow, Jason Knirck and Pedro Ramos Pinto.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In this period, Ireland (at least in Commonwealth circles) was generally referred to by its Gallic name, Eire and prior to 1937 was officially styled the Irish Free State. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth was often referred to as the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, in light of the aims of the project overall to explore relationships up until the 1970s and beyond, reference to ʻIreland' and ʻCommonwealth' will be preferred to ʻEire' and the ʻBritish Commonwealth' except as regards direct quotes.

2 Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, 331.

3 Ireland Act 1949, s. 1 (3).

4 Ibid., s. 6.

5 A nomenclature which was popularised by Davies, The Isles.

6 McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–49, 14.

7 Mansergh, “Ireland: From British Commonwealth towards European Community”.

8 Wynne, ʻIreland, 1949–73 – a Closet Member of the Commonwealth?'.

9 McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–49.

10 See Mansergh, “Ireland: The republic outside the Commonwealth”, 277–91; O’Brien, “Ireland’s departure from the British Commonwealth” and chapter 15 of Mansergh, The Unresolved Question.

11 Bongiorno, “H. V. Evatt, Australia and Ireland’s Departure from the Commonwealth”.

12 McEvoy, “Canada, Ireland and the Commonwealth”.

13 Fanning, “The Response of the London and Belfast Governments”.

14 GEN. 186/2nd Meeting, 9 June 1947, TNA, CAB 1/45.

15 C. R. (48) 3rd Meeting, 27 July 1948, TNA CAB 1/46.

16 C. R. (47) 3, 15 September 1947, TNA, CAB 1/46.

17 C. M. (48) 59th Conclusions, 10 September 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

18 ‘Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet “Schedule B”’, 11 October 1948, NAI, Item 2, GC 5/38, S14387, Accessed 21 May 2023, https://www.difp.ie/volume-9/1948/cabinet-minutes/4764/.

19 C. R. (48) 10, 11 October 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

20 McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland, 1948–49, 57. The papers in the UK archives do not in fact indicate that such an invitation was extended and it, therefore, seems more likely that the South African Government was merely informed and consulted.

21 C. P. (48) 258, 17 October 1948, p. 2, TNA, CAB 1/46.

22 Ibid., 4.

23 Ibid., 5.

24 C. P. (48) 262 (Annex II), 10 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

25 C. M. (48) 72nd Conclusions, 13 November 1948, p. 89, TNA, CAB 1/46.

26 C. P. (48) 272 (Annex A), 17 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

27 Ibid. (Annex B), 10.

28 Ibid. (Annex B), 13–14.

29 Aliens (Exemption) Order SI 80/1935.

30 C. P. (48) 74th Conclusions, 18 November 1948, p. 105, TNA, CAB 1/46.

31 [Inward] Telegram No. 523 from UK High Commissioner to New Zealand, 24 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA, CAB 1/46.

32 [Inward] Telegram No. 1023 from UK High Commissioner to Canada, 24 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA CAB 1/46.

33 [Inward] Telegram No. 4053 from UK High Commissioner to India, 23 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA, CAB 1/46.

34 [Inward] Telegram No. 403 from Acting UK High Commissioner to South Africa, 23 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA, CAB 1/46.

35 [Inward] Telegram No. 609 from UK High Commissioner to Ceylon, 23 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA CAB 1/46.

36 [Inward] Telegram No. 1419 from UK High Commissioner to Pakistan, 22 November 1948, C. P. (48) 280, TNA, CAB 1/46.

37 Dáil Debates, 113, no. 3, 24 November 1948.

38 The UK confirmation of its intention not to treat Ireland as foreign or Irish citizens as foreigners was given by a statement made by Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 25 November 1948. See UK House of Commons, Debates, 25 November 1948, col. 1414. Earlier that day, the UK Cabinet had queried the reference to ‘comparable’ treatment in Costello’s statement. It had been recognised, however, that identical treatment such as regards the franchise was not intended or desired but that ‘[t]he essence of the plan was the right conceded by one country to the citizens of other should be broadly comparable, taken as a whole’ C.M. (48) 75th Conclusions, 22 November 1948, p. 120, THA, CAB 1/46.

39 See C. P. (48) 272, 17 November 1948, p. 5, TNA, CAB 1/46.

40 Extract from a Note of a Meeting, 7 January 1949, TNA, DO 35/3992.

41 C. P. (49) 4, 7 January 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

42 C. M. (49) 1st Conclusions, 12 January 1949, p. 7, TNA, CAB 1/46.

43 Letter from Boland, 1 April 1949, TNA DO 35/39921.

44 Department of External Affairs memorandum for Government ‘Irish Participation in Inter-Parliamentary Meetings’ Dublin, 9 June 1949, 340/12/66, NAI, TSCH/3/S4756B, Accessed 21 May 2023, https://www.difp.ie/volume-9/1949/irish-participation-in-inter-parliamentary-meetings/4941/.

45 Namely, the Commonwealth Institute of Biological Control, the Commonwealth Institute of Entomology, the Commonwealth Mycological Institute and the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau (see NAI DFA 6/408/29/1 and NAI S100074B).

46 C. M. (48) 74th Conclusions, 18 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

47 C. M. (48) 75th Conclusions, 22 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

48 C. M. (48) 81st Conclusions, 15 December 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

49 GEN. 262(M) 2nd Meeting, 6 January 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

50 Ireland Bill 1949, cl. 1(2).

51 Ibid., cl. 2.

52 Ibid., cl. 1(3).

53 C. P. (49) 47, 4 March 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46. During the passage of the Ireland Bill an attempt was made to adopt the wording ‘Irish Republic’ in Statute. However, this was defeated 227 to 79. See House of Commons, Journal, 16 May 1949, p. 243.

54 Ireland Bill 1949, cl. 1(1).

55 Ibid., cl. 1(2).

56 C. P. (49) 47, 4 March 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

57 Ibid., s. 6.

58 Statute of Westminster 1931, Preamble.

59 C. P. (49) 47, 8 March 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46. Technically, Liaquat Ali had asked for further clarification in this regard (C. R. (49) 3, 4 February 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46) so it must be assumed that the UK Government was reluctant or perhaps even unable to provide this.

60 Minutes of Meeting on 27 April 1949, TNA, FO 468/79.

61 Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet ‘Schedule A: Aide-Mémoire’ Item 1, GC 5/90, S14528, NAI, TSCH/2/2/10, Accessed 21 May 2023, https://www.difp.ie/volume-9/1949/british-ireland-bill-1949-aide-memoire-to-british-government/4914/.

62 Dáil Debates, 115, no. 6, 10 May 1949, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1949-05-10/42/.

63 Seanad Debates, 36, no. 11, 11 May 1949, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/1949-05-11/.

64 The Commonwealth, London Declaration, 1949, Accessed 21 May 2023, https://thecommonwealth.org/london-declaration-1949.

65 Clann na Poblachta, “Clann na Poblachta Policy[.] Mr Sean MacBride at Carlow”.

66 Rafter, The Clann – Clann na Poblachta, 117–18.

67 Power. “The Chronicle of a Death Foretold.” The Irish Times, December 30, 1998, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/the-chronicle-of-a-death-foretold-1.229823.

68 Gael, “Summary of Heads of ʻFine Gael Policy'”.

69 McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland, 1948–49, 27.

70 Ibid., 13.

71 Gael, “Political Searchlight”.

72 Mullen, “Freedom and the Commonwealth”.

73 Dáil Debates, 107, vol. 1, 24 June 1947.

74 Gael. “Threats and Promises”.

75 In contrast, the UK never joined the Euro prior to Brexit and in 2020 only 41.9 per cent of its exports and 50 per cent of its imports were within this grouping. See Ward, Statistics on UK-EU trade, 26.

76 Ireland, Central Statistics Office, Statistical Abstract (1949), 86.

77 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: Volume Two, 41.

78 Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925–68, 104.

79 Ibid., 104.

80 See Imperial Economic Conference, Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, 1932. Appendices, 174.

81 Eire (Confirmation of Agreements) Act 1938.

82 See McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939–48.

83 Trade Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom, Dublin, 31 July, 1948.

84 See especially C. P. M. (48) 1st Meeting, 6 October 1948 and C. P. M. (48) 20, 7 October 1948 in TNA, CAB 1/46.

85 See C. P. (48) 280, 24 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

86 C. P. (48) 272 (Annex B), p. 15 (and p. 11), 17 November 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

87 However, at least aside from the UK, the numbers of such citizens remained small at this time. A rough proxy of numbers can be found by the birthplace records from the 1946 census (not published until 1952) which found there to be only 715, 542 and 176 people born respectively in Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well as 1,267 in India and 434 in South Africa. In comparison some 73,722 out of the 98,877 born outside of Eire had been born within the current borders of the UK, representing 2.5 per cent of the total population. See Ireland, Central Statistics Office. Table 1A: – Birthplaces of Persons Residing in Ireland on 12th May 1946.

88 C. R. (49) 3, 4 February 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

89 House of Lords, Debates 15 December 1948, cols 1092-93.

90 See Letter from Morley to Tory, 20 January 1950, TNA, FO 571/448.

91 See Letter from Boland to Prichard, 1 April 1949, TNA, DO 35/3992. This committee was formally styled the Commonwealth European Recovery Programme Liaison Committee in 1948–9 but from 1950 obtained a broader mandate and become the Commonwealth Liaison Committee simpliciter.

92 Commonwealth Relations Office, ʻMemorandum – Commonwealth Liaison Committee', 3 December 1954, TNA, DO 35/5645.

93 See ʻProvisional Notes on Ireland’s attendance at Commonwealth Conferences', 8 March 1965, NAI, 96/3/91.

94 CAB was not officially restyled from its former title of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux until 1 January 1949. See Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, Annual Report 1947–48, 3.

95 The CPA was officially styled the Empire Parliamentary Association throughout 1948, although a name change was unanimously approved at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in October 1948. The General Council finally ratified this change on 3 May 1949, backdating this to 1 January 1949. See Grey, The Parliamentarians, 48 and 51.

96 See Letter from Howard to Maclellan, 7 April 1949, TNA, DO 35/3992.

97 See Memorandum from Howard to Executive Council of CAB, 23 September 1949, TNA, DO 35/3992. Associate status was in principle accepted. For the detailed financial arrangement which was later arranged see Department of Agriculture, Memorandum for the Government – Proposals for future association with Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux 15 June 1950 (and associated Cabinet Minute 16 June 1950), NAI, S100074B.

98 Department of Agriculture, Memorandum for the Government – Proposal that Ireland withdraw from Associate Membership of the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau 10 March 1977 (and associated Draft Cabinet Minute 15 March 1977), NAI, 2007/116/49.

99 Grey, The Parliamentarians, 28.

100 Ibid., 71

101 Ibid., 79.

102 Analysis of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, Report of Proceedings from 1952 to 1983 inclusive shows active Irish participation in 1963 and 1968 and further attendance in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1977. These records indicate a similar level of United States’ participation until this ended (somewhat earlier) in 1973.

103 See Federico Fabbrini (ed.), The law and politics of Brexit. Volume IV.

104 See Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 42–43.

105 Rafter, The Clann, 133.

106 For a detailed account of internal governmental discussions on the Northern Ireland issue see Fanning, “The Response of the London and Belfast Governments to the Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948–49”, 103–14.

107 C. P. (49) 5, 10 January 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

108 Had such legislation not been generally required, it seems certain that Northern Ireland’s concerns would have been accommodated only through a declaration, albeit one adopted on an all-party basis, which would not have been dissimilar in nature to that which accompanied adoption of the 1937 Eire Constitution. See following main section.

109 C. P. (49) 47, 4 March 1949, TNA, CAB 1/46.

110 Interestingly, the debate on this saw no Unionist opposition but did result in the Nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party MP Mark Durkan raising some concern about the dangers of this leading to abusive double registration and voting in border constituencies, North and South. See House of Commons, Public Bill Committee, Debates, 16 July 2013, cols. 10–11.

111 Ireland Act 1949, s. 1(2).

112 C. M. (49) 1st Conclusions, 12 January 1949, p. 5, TNA, CAB 1/46.

113 Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet ‘Schedule A: Aide-Mémoire’, 7 May 1949, Item 1, GC 5/90, S14528, NAI, TSCH/2/2/10, https://www.difp.ie/volume-9/1949/british-ireland-bill-1949-aide-memoire-to-british-government/4914/.

114 Dáil Debates, 115, no. 6, 10 May 1949, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1949-05-10/42/.

115 Seanad Debates, 36, no. 11, 11 May 1949, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/1949-05-11/5.

116 Ibid.

117 House of Commons, Journal, 16 May 1949, 253.

118 Hennessy, A History of Northern Ireland 1920–1996, 207.

119 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, s. 1. Earlier that year, and under Unionist pressure, a border boll had been held which resulted in general boycott by non-Unionists and 58 per cent of registered voters supporting staying in the UK. See Hennessy, A History of Northern Ireland 1920–1996, 216.

120 House of Commons, Journal, 17 May 1948, 243.

121 Dáil Debates 112, no. 9, 28 July 1948, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1948-07-28/2/. These and related statements by MacBride were noted with concern in a UK Cabinet paper as early as August 1948. See C. P. (48) 295, 17 August 1948, TNA, CAB 1/46.

122 Final text of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, 6 December 1921, https://www.difp.ie/volume-1/1921/anglo-irish-treaty/214/.

123 Harkness, The Restless Dominion, 163–64.

124 Knirck, Afterimage of the Revolution, 198.

125 Harkness, The Restless Dominion, 143.

126 Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act 1922, art. 66.

127 For a full account of the Privy Council issue see Mohr, Guardian of the Treaty.

128 Wall, Reluctant European.

129 In light of the strong people-to-people movements within The Isles, Ireland itself joined the UK in the last opt-out.

130 Irish Free State (Special Duties) Act 1932.

131 The latter severely impacted UK-Irish trade with the percentage of Irish imports coming from the UK dropping from over 80 per cent in 1931 to just over 50 per cent in 1937. See Ireland, Central Statistics Office, Statistical Abstract (1938), 87.

132 Whilst Ireland’s sovereign ability to effect this abolition was confirmed by the Privy Council in 1935 (notwithstanding the Irish Government’s refusal to participate), the Council acerbically remarked that ‘the Statute of Westminster gave to the Irish Free State a power under which they could abrogate the Treaty, and that, as a matter of law, they have availed themselves of that power’ (Moore v Attorney General for the Irish Free State 1935 AC 484 at [499]).

133 See Sexton, Ireland and the Crown, 1922–1936, 154–5.

134 Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act 1933.

135 See Constitution (Amendment No 27) Act 1936. The office of Governor-General was itself retrospectively abolished through the Executive Powers (Consequential Provisions) Act 1937.

136 Constitution of Ireland 1937, art. 29 (4).

137 Constitution of Ireland 1937, arts. 2 and 3.

138 See Document 14/6 (Minutes of an Informal Meeting of Principal Delegates held at Prime Minister’s Room, House of Commons), 14 June 1937, TNA, FO 468/71.

139 ‘British communiqué’, The Times, 30 December 1937.

140 See Eire (Confirmation of Agreements) Act 1938.

141 See C.P (108) (38), 1 May 1938, TNA, CAB 21/1835.

142 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 241–42 and 246–47.

143 See W. P. (G) (39) 79, 7 September 1939 and W. P. (G) (39) 102, 20 November 1939, TNA, DO 35/1107/10.

144 W. P. (G) (39) 102, TNA, DO 35/1107/10.

145 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 243–44.

146 Ibid., 230.

147 Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet ‘Reduction of tariffs and elimination of preferences: Proposed conference in London in March 1947’, 7 March 1947, Item 1, GC 4/239, S13915, NAI, Cab 2/9, https://www.difp.ie/volume-8/1947/british-irish-trade-negotiations/4398/.

148 Report of a meeting between James J. McElligott, S.P. Murray and Ernest Rowe-Dutton held on 5 September 1947 London, 6 September 1947, NAI, DT S14134A, https://www.difp.ie/volume-8/1947/british-irish-discussions-on-the-sterling-convertibility-crisis/4501/.

149 Aide-mémoire to the British Government concerning proposed changes to British nationality legislation Dublin, 1 February 1947, NAI, DT S14002A, https://www.difp.ie/volume-8/1947/british-nationality-legislation/4385/.

150 British Commonwealth Conference on Nationality and Citizenship – Report with Appendices, p. 5, February 1947, TNA, CAB 133/6.

151 See Letter from Department of Industry and Commerce, 9 October 1947, NAI, DFA/5/207/10.

152 See Memorandum, 4 December 1948, TNA, DO 35/3992.

153 McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–49, 20–21.

154 See telegrams from Rugby to Machtig of 9 and 18 February 1948, which represented a serious modification of Rugby’s pre-election understanding in telegrams of 27–28 January 1948 where he stated that the ERA ‘will not provide the bridge to closer association, as was once hoped’ and annulment ‘will not be long delayed’. Both in TNA, CAB 134/118 (file currently missing but quoted in McCabe, A Diplomatic History of Ireland 1948–49, 25 and 27).

155 See Letter from Prichard to Archer, 26 May 1948, TNA, DO 35/3992.

156 See John Costello’s remarks at Dáil Debates 112, no. 13, 6 August 1948, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1948-08-06/3/.

157 Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Charter, Accessed 22 May 2023, https://thecommonwealth.org/charter.

158 In 2021–22 the core Commonwealth Secretariat budget was just £9.21m, complemented by contributions to voluntary funds of £11.3m. See Commonwealth Secretariat, Annual Results Report October 2021–July 2022, https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/Commonwealth%20Secretariat%20Annual%20Results%20Report%202021–2022.pdf, p. 54.

159 Commonwealth Secretariat, Joining the Commonwealth, Accessed 22 May 2023, https://thecommonwealth.org/about/joining.

160 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: Volume Two, 136.

161 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939–1948, 14.

162 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: Volume Two, 41.

163 Dáil Debates, 112, no. 13, 6 August 1948, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1948-08-06/3/.

164 Walker, The Commonwealth, 259.

165 Ibid., 274.

166 The Commonwealth, London Declaration, 1949, https://thecommonwealth.org/london-declaration-1949.

167 For a recent analysis of the nature of the Commonwealth generally in the late 1940s and 1950s see Prior, “This Community Which Nobody Can Define”.

168 Payne, “Brexit Day: A Moment of Symbolism, Not Change.” Financial Times, January 31, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/98a08986-4422-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c.

169 See British Government, Blue passport to return to return after EU exit, 22 December 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/blue-uk-passport-to-return-after-eu-exit.

170 Dáil Debates, 113, no. 3, 24 November 1948, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1948-11-24/51/.

171 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 265.

172 Seanad Debates, 15 December 1948, 36, no. 3, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/1948-12-15/3/.

173 Clann na Poblachta, “Clann na Poblachta Policy[.] Mr Sean MacBride at Carlow”.

174 Quoted in Rafter, The Clann – Clann na Poblachta, 97.

175 Ibid., 106.

176 Ibid., 117–18.

177 MacBride, Our People – Our Money, 29. The lectures themselves demanded a patriation of Sterling assets and a review of the provisions which compelled parity between the Irish and UK pounds but argued that this did not necessarily involve an exit from the Sterling Area itself.

178 Ibid., 118.

179 Power, ‘A Chronicle of a Death Foretold'.

180 Bongiorno, “H. V. Evatt and Ireland’s departure from the Commonwealth”, 546–47 (quoting from letters in NAI, DT S14387 A-B).

181 Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and the Republic of Ireland, 971.

182 C. P. (48) 272, 17 November 1948, p. 3, TNA, CAB 1/46.

183 Dáil Debates, 113, no. 5, 26 November 1948, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1948-11-26/5/.

184 C. P. (48) 272, 17 November 1948, p. 3, TNA, CAB 1/46.

185 John Costello in Dáil Debates, 24 November 1948.

186 Ibid.

187 See Memorandum from Frederick H. Boland to Seán MacBride (Dublin). ‘Report to Minister for External Affairs on talks between officials in London, 6/7th January, 1949’. Dublin, 7 January 1949, UCDA P104/4512, https://www.difp.ie/volume-9/1949/report-of-talks-in-london/4826/.

188 See Letter from Morley to Tory, 20 January 1950, TNA, FO 571/448.

189 Commonwealth Relations Office, ‘Memorandum – Commonwealth Liaison Committee’, 3 December 1954, TNA, DO 35/5645.

190 See ‘Provisional Notes on Ireland’s attendance at Commonwealth Conferences’, 8 March 1965, NAI, 96/3/91.

191 See Ryan, ʻThe Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland' and Maher, ʻThe Common Travel Area'.

192 Citizens Information, Working Holiday Visas for Irish Citizens. Accessed 22 May 2023, https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/moving_country/moving_abroad/working_abroad/working_holidays_for_irish_citizens.html.