Abstract
This paper is a stochastic risk simulation of the impact of proposed federal tonnage limits on US Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) bagged food aid shipments. Only MSF (i.e. federally subsidized carriers/vessels for war, or emergencies) and non-MSF US carriers (therefore, at competitive disadvantage) can compete for such shipments—representing an indirect subsidy to both groups. To compensate, US Congress proposed a financial penalty (loss of voyage subsidy) on MSF carriers for food aid above a certain limit. Accordingly, certain carriers will be policy ‘winners’ (non-MSF—larger food aid shipments), and others ‘losers’ (MSF). By simulating loss-minimizing economic behaviour by MSF carriers—using five stochastic factors—I obtain losses substantially below those claimed by the MSF owners.
Simulated annual-average MSF profits reduction is $3.5 million—within a large confidence interval; if no carriers surrender their subsidies (as claimed by MSF owners), a reduction of $6.0 million. Only 16% of annual MSF voyages are affected by a 2,500-ton limit (3%; 5,000-ton limit). Minimizing losses, 25 (of 41 affected) annual MSF voyages replace 38,000 tons of food aid with 23,000 tons of other cargo—forgoing $2.1 million in yearly direct subsidies. Two assumptions explain most of this simulated loss reduction.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Charles Bausell, Jay Cherlow, Leyla Kazaz, Kendall Schaefer and Celia Thomas of the GAO who shared in the preparation of the September 2004 GAO Report (GAO-04-1065) on the potential impacts of proposed federal bagged food-aid limits on MSF carriers. My paper includes, but extends beyond, the stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulation modeling presented in that report.