Abstract
There is a broad consensus on the need for the major expansion of many ports. Traditionally, ports and related facilities have involved significant levels of direct or indirect government ownership or some degree of government financing. Most governments, however, are reluctant to either borrow money to fund the needed additional capital infrastructure or to fund it directly. Public–private partnerships (P3s) are thus an attractive potential option. But are they the answer? This article examines the normative rationales for P3s and presents a positive theory perspective that focuses on the conflicting goals of public and private partners. It argues that the major government impetus for P3s is likely to be for physical port infrastructure with moderate levels of market failure, such as small to medium sized ports, and not for intangible port activities. Furthermore, small to medium sized port P3s are likely to be successful in terms of having relatively low transaction costs and lower total social costs than alternative provision mechanisms. Nonetheless, even in this situation, the different goals of public and private partners may give rise to conflict. Drawing on the global empirical evidence on P3s, this article proposes some institutional design features that will help to ensure P3 success.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge support from the UBC P3 Project and Infrastructure Canada under the Knowledge-Building, Outreach and Awareness Program. They also wish to thank Robert Boardman and Rory Vining for excellent research assistance.