Deep adaptation to climate change in the maritime transport sector – a new paradigm for maritime economics?

ABSTRACT

In recent years a significant body of work has been established on climate change adaptation by ports. Like climate change mitigation, work towards adaptation has stalled on the same collective action problem, whereby public and private sector actors avoid commitment to necessary investments. Recently the concept of ‘deep adaptation’ has appeared, which suggests that, rather than climate change bringing simply incremental challenges that can be adapted to in a piecemeal fashion, in fact, we should expect ‘disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war’. However, current port and shipping forecasts continue to predict uninterrupted growth with only minor incremental policy changes already known to be insufficient for mitigation and adaptation. Thus, this paper argues that actors in the maritime transport sector need to consider greater threats than those currently identified and also prepare for a more advanced adaptation timetable.

KEYWORDS:

• Maritime transport
• seaports
• shipping
• climate change
• deep adaptation
• mitigation
• neoliberal
• policy
• regulation
• maritime economics
• emissions

1. Introduction

An economic theory that treats the natural world as external to its model cannot fully understand how the degradation of the natural world may damage its own prospects. Rethinking Economics & The New Weather Institute: Theses for an Economics Reformation (2017)

The discipline of economics is in crisis. Dissenting voices are becoming more vocal and it is time to reconsider recent approaches that have been applied uncritically. 33 theses ‘for an economic reformation’ were recently symbolically ‘nailed to the door’ of the London School of Economics (LSE) by Rethinking Economics & The New Weather Institute, demanding that the discipline of economics takes notice. This paper aims to consider some of these theses by application to the maritime transport sector, such as ‘No economic goal can be separated from politics. Indicators of success represent political choices’ and ‘Markets are also more complex and less predictable than may be implied by simple relationships of supply and demand.’ This paper addresses these two axes: first, that economic judgements are explicitly political, and second, that the natural world must be explicitly included in all economic models, as we have paid lip service to internalising external costs for too long without taking action.

Similarly, a recent report by the Group of Independent Scientists reporting to the UN made some strong statements about the way the natural world is included in economics (Järvensivu et al. 2018). Some of their key statements are the following:

• Economies are for the first time in human history shifting to energy sources that are less energy efficient.

• While economists typically emphasize carbon pricing as a policy tool for tackling climate change, natural scientists and multidisciplinary environmental research groups argue for more profound political engagement and proactive governance of economic transition.

• The economic models which inform political decision-making in rich countries almost completely disregard the energetic and material dimensions of the economy.

• Today’s dominant economic theories, approaches and models were developed during the era of energetic and material abundance.

• It can be safely said that no widely applicable economic models have been developed specifically for the upcoming era.

• Because renewables have a lower energy return on investment (EROI) and different technical requirements, such as the need to build energy storage facilities, meeting current or growing levels of energy need in the next few decades with low-carbon solutions will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus, there is considerable pressure to lower total energy use.

• International freight transport and aviation cannot continue to grow at current rates, because of the need to cut emissions and the lack of low-carbon alternatives to current technologies.

Taking these statements as an inspiration, the aim of this paper is to advance a more radical approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation in the maritime transport sector. The following section discusses recent evidence that the current status of climate change is already far more advanced than previously thought and we are already headed towards what would recently have been considered worst-case scenarios. Yet neither policymakers nor industry in the maritime sector are considering the situation sufficiently seriously. The small but growing body of work on climate change effects in ports has revealed some limited awareness, mostly to do with sea level rise and storm surges, but only few cases of concrete action (Becker et al. 2018; Ng et al. 2016). Yet, climate change impacts are already occurring. For example, in 2017 the world’s busiest container port Shanghai was closed more than 50 days as a result of extreme weather events (Wallenius Wilhelmsen Ocean 2019). While both politicians and industry actors continue to advocate incremental pathways to sustainable transport, Benson and Craig (2014, 777) state that ‘it is time to move beyond the concept of sustainability … the continued invocation in international talks, development goals, and other policy discussions ignores the emerging realities of the Anthropocene’.¹ Sustainability has become an ‘empty signifier’ (Brown 2016) that cedes any ability for disruptive action and results in empty actions such as ‘justificationism’ and market-based solutions (Wainwright and Mann 2013) that are known to be too weak to change market behaviour sufficiently, thus preserving dominant interests (Swyngedouw 2010). The argument in this paper is that a new paradigm is necessary, but market mechanisms based in current economic thinking are insufficient to achieve this shift.

Policymakers frequently seek policies that can maintain current practices (Marsden and Docherty 2013), as these decisions take place within a larger paradigm of what they interpret as societally acceptable and would incur limited political risk. As a result, choices are narrowed and radical change becomes difficult (Monios 2017). Marsden and Docherty (2013, 53) rightly state that ‘If change is conceived as only possible at the margins, then it is axiomatic that it is politically acceptable to plan only for marginal change.’ Even if a certain policy instrument is applied, the level of the incentive or penalty is frequently not strong enough to effect the desired change. Marsden et al. (2014) provide cases where policymakers knew the instruments (at least at existing levels of reward/penalty) would not achieve the goal. Rather than seeking to maintain the current situation, policymakers can look to evidence of how societies cope with disruption. Marsden and Docherty (2013) used examples of disruptions, strikes and major sporting events such as the Olympics to show that people do adapt to changes when they happen, therefore there is no need to fear major policy intervention. Useful examples in the maritime sector stretching from the Plimsoll Line in the 1870s² to the IMO SECA regulations in the 2000s show that industry will adapt.

Tennøy (2010) questions whether policy failure derives from how planners frame the problem, drawing on the policy frames theory of Schön and Rein (1995) regarding how stakeholders use values and theories to frame a concept. We could also draw on well-known theories such as Kingdon’s (1995) ‘multiple streams’ framework investigating the influences that lead an item to the top of the political agenda, and note how climate change adaptation has not yet made it to the top of the agenda for various reasons. Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin (2015) discuss the politically contested decisions behind possible climate adaptation pathways. Vigar (2017) identifies two ends of a spectrum, in which at one end the technocratic approach is criticised for its overly optimistic assumptions of rational actors and at the other end political decisions are criticised for being ‘unserious’ and not taking enough account of technical work. There comes a point where judgement is needed by synthesising both approaches, particularly through multi-method approaches such as scenario building; taking decisions by extrapolating from the past leads simply to replication of the same problems.

Drawing on Geels (2012), Lyons and Davidson (2016) consider the role of deep uncertainty in transitioning from one ‘regime’ or way of life to another, and the resulting inadequacy of existing forecasting and planning tools, partly because these tools always assume growth. For example, in the maritime sector, a recent forecast by McKinsey (2017) predicts uninterrupted growth in container transport for the next 50 years, without a single mention of climate change or any related geopolitical challenges. Lyons and Davidson (2016) identify two policy pathways: regime-compliant and regime-testing. The former aims to maintain current lifestyles and practices with minor incremental change, while the latter recognises signs of regime transition and seeks to act accordingly. Roberts and Geels (2019) show that, while policymakers are risk-averse and locked into the incumbent policy regime, they can change to the emerging regime under certain political conditions, such as the mobilisation of actor coalitions, shifts in public opinion and technological change. Later sections of this paper discuss these two pathways and seek to explore influences on the need for breaking out of the incremental policy pathway to enable deep adaptation to climate change.

If we accept the latest science regarding the imminent and nonlinear approach of climate change (see section 2), then it follows that global supply chains will be massively disrupted, beyond what can be adapted to while maintaining current systems. Thus, the primary aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of deep adaptation to the study of maritime transport. Deep adaptation exists on a continuum stretching from mitigation to adaptation to transformational adaptation to deep adaptation. While there are some clear overlaps, particularly as regards necessary actions (e.g. switching to renewables is necessary for mitigation as it reduces emissions, but also for adaptation as it reduces dependence on long distance energy supply chains), it is important not to conflate mitigation and adaptation. While mitigation seeks to prevent climate change by reducing carbon emissions, adaptation accepts the likely consequences and aims to protect critical infrastructure. Critically, regular adaptation assumes smaller changes such as increasing coastal defences, whereas the next level of transformational adaptation goes beyond this, envisioning major structural changes such as moving infrastructure and abandoning some locations but still expecting to maintain current systems. Finally, deep adaptation can be defined as adaptation predicated upon collapse, where current systems collapse in a short timescale in chaotic and unpredictable ways (Bendell 2018; Read 2019). Under this scenario, maintaining current practices is likely to become impossible; adaptation to such changes will involve forced and unplanned transitions, likely to more local systems. Deep adaptation is a new concept introduced by Bendell in 2018, thus it has not yet been fully explored or theorised and no body of work exists as it does for other kinds of adaptation.

This paper takes an inductive rather than a deductive approach. Section 2 summarises the current state of knowledge on climate change, particularly the growing realisation that effects are arriving sooner and will be more severe than predicted. Section 3 reviews the current state of mitigation and adaptation actions in the maritime sector. Section 4 introduces the concept of deep adaptation, which argues for an understanding that neither mitigation nor piecemeal adaptation are sufficient to deal with the drastic effects already beginning to arrive and the high chance of major system collapse as indicated by the review of the latest climate science in section 2. Section 5 argues for a new paradigm of deep adaptation in the maritime transport sector, while section 6 reflects on some reasons why this paradigm change has not been forthcoming, touching on issues such as market structure and policy inertia. Section 7 concludes with a call for decision-makers, whether government, industry and other sectors such as academia, to recognise the need for a paradigm change as the beginning of a new research agenda.

2. The current status of climate change

It is worse, much worse, than you think. David Wallace-Wells (2019)

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the planet is already on course for at least 1.5 degrees of warming and we must halve emissions by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050 if we are to keep the planet below this threshold. Their most recent report estimated that this temperature increase would lead to as much as 110 cm sea level rise (SLR) by 2100, 12 cm higher than their 2014 prediction (IPCC 2019). The latest report (22) also states that ‘extreme sea level events that are historically rare (once per century in the recent past) are projected to occur frequently (at least once per year) at many locations by 2050.’

It is equally true that the IPCC reports are very conservative (Hansen 2007) and due to the time lag of research, their periodic reports become quickly out of date—for example, in 2007 it was found that seas were rising at 3.3 mm per year not the 2.2 mm per year predicted in the 2001 IPCC report (Rahmstorf et al. 2007). There are two problems with relying on the IPCC baseline. First, we are not on course to reduce emissions by 2030 (Wallace-Wells 2019), so the planet is definitely on course for more than 2 degrees, quite possibly more. Second, while the IPCC suggests that under the do-nothing scenario (RCP 8.5) the planet is on course by 2100 for 5 degrees warming and 110 cm SLR, there is increasing evidence that we may head this way even if we stop at 2 degrees. This is due to snowballing effects that were not previously understood, such as seas warming 40% faster than the IPCC predicted (Cheng et al. 2019) and a better understanding of the feedback loops of ice melt and methane release. Many top climate scientists believe we have already reached the tipping point and are now on what they call a ‘hothouse trajectory’ of planet warming of 4–5 degrees (Steffen et al. 2018). Over a decade ago, James Hansen (2007), the NASA scientist who started the global conversation about climate change warned of the potential for up to 5 m SLR by 2100. A recent study suggests that up to 238 cm is possible by 2100 (Bamber et al. 2019).

Yet the calculation for 2100 is only the beginning, as 5 degrees will eventually fully melt the ice caps. If this happened, the SLR would be over 60 m (National Snow and Ice Data Center n.d.). The last time the level of CO₂ in the atmosphere was similar to now—over 400 ppm—was 3 million years ago, and seas were 6–9 m higher (Dutton et al. 2015). Thus, as pointed out by Lynas (2007), we have probably already put enough carbon in the atmosphere to lead to this level, even though if we stopped now it may take centuries for it to happen due to the time lag. The question now is the timescale, as there is increasing evidence that what the IPCC predicts for 2100 may come in the next decades. This is mostly to do with runaway climate change and methane release. The former is due to losing the albedo effect; as sea ice depletes, we lose its reflective ability, which melts more ice and so on. Moreover, melting ice is wet and darker which has less albedo effect than dry white ice. Ice melt is already far in advance of predictions a decade ago. Second, there is increasing evidence of the danger of methane release from permafrost and sea beds. Twice as much carbon as is already in the atmosphere is trapped in the Arctic permafrost in the form of methane which is a much stronger greenhouse gas than CO₂ (Shakhova et al. 2010). If this is released, it could lead to a very fast mass extinction which is what happened at the end Permian age. The question is not so much if but when. Lynas (2007) points out that the end-Permian greenhouse effect took at least 10,000 years, whereas our rate of carbon emissions is 100 times faster. Wallace-Wells (2019) notes that in the past the planet’s temperature has changed by as much as 5 degrees within 13 years, so such accelerated warming is possible.

Such levels of SLR will mean that many coastal cities and infrastructure like ports will be abandoned or irrevocably changed (cf. Figure 1). This will affect ports directly but also the wider economy as a result of massive migrations of coastal populations, relocation of economic activities, loss of jobs and countries spending billions on adaptation, all of which may influence demand for shipping and ports. Already, in 2017, 18 million people were made homeless by weather events (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2018). Globally, 145 million people live within one metre above the current sea level (Anthoff et al. 2006) and almost 1 billion people live in low-elevation coastal zones (Neumann et al. 2015). Other related effects will be droughts (the global demand for fresh water by 2050 is expected to increase by 55%, with 40% of the world’s population living in areas of severe water stress—OECD 2012) and crop failures (resulting not just from increased temperatures but soil degradation, salination [Goodell 2018] and insect species collapse [Sánchez-Bayo and Wyckhuys 2019]) leading to mass migrations that will likely cause local and regional conflicts and even war, which will equally affect shipping. For example, container port throughput in Syria has fallen from 685,000 TEU to 105,000 TEU annually, an 85% reduction (World Bank 2019a). More conflicts can be expected, given that Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) found that ‘warmer temperatures or extremes of rainfall can be causally associated with changes in interpersonal violence and in civil war.’ The International Organization for Migration estimates 200 million climate refugees by 2050 (IOM n.d.). According to the World Bank (2018), climate change will push tens of millions of people to migrate at least within their own countries by 2050. It projects that 143 million people (2.8% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America) ‘could be forced to move within their own countries to escape the slow-onset impacts of climate change.’ Studies have shown that food shortages due to climate change could result in 529,000 adult deaths per year by 2050 (Springmann et al. 2016), and push 100 million people into extreme poverty by 2030 (World Bank 2016). These upheavals will certainly produce localised conflict at least, which will further disrupt global supply chains.

Figure 1. Sea level rise impact for 2C and 4C in New York and Shanghai

Source: Climate Central (2019).

3. Climate change mitigation and adaptation

3.1. Climate change mitigation

While the topic of this paper is not mitigation but adaptation, a brief section on the former is necessary for three reasons. First, many actions (e.g. increased use of renewable energy sources) are necessary for both mitigation (reduce emissions) and adaptation (reduce reliance on long distance energy supply chains) so it is important to be aware of the current status. Second, a key element of the paper is to consider the policy process/transition and its relation with adaptation. As adaptation is only in its early days, we can use the evidence as regards mitigation to explore the policy issues experienced thus far. Third, evidence of the lack of successful introduction of mitigation actions demonstrates that the climate effects discussed in the previous section will not be avoided and we are on a pathway towards runaway climate change that will lead to a state where deep adaptation becomes necessary.

According to the OECD (2018), there are three main groups of mitigation measures: technological (light materials, slender design, less friction, waste heat recovery), operational (lower speeds, ship size, ship-port interface) and alternative fuels/energy (sustainable biofuels, hydrogen, ammonia, electric batteries, wind assistance). A full review of the literature on emissions mitigation measures in shipping lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive recent review, readers are referred to Bouman et al. (2017, 418) who concluded that 75% reduction on 2010 levels by 2050 could be possible ‘by swift adoption and combination of a large number of individual dependent and independent measures’ but crucially this scenario requires no growth of demand.

Fuel is obviously the primary area for emissions reduction, given the sector’s reliance on fossil fuels. LNG is the only serious alternative to fuel oil currently commercially available, with potential to save around 20% carbon emissions during combustion (although much of this gain may be lost due to upstream emissions when considering a full life cycle perspective) but vessel orders for LNG ships remain very small and moves to roll out widespread bunkering points have progressed slowly. thus, it is unclear that the industry is planning to switch to LNG in large numbers. In any case, given that LNG is still a fossil fuel, it can only be considered a bridge to decarbonisation. Other forms of propulsion being trialled include sails as well as onboard solar panels and wind turbines which can provide a percentage of the power required. Even studies that propose hydrogen and ammonia as serious fuels recognise that they are decades away from commercial availability (OECD 2018).

Both climate change and local air quality are leading some ports to take action on emissions and other negative externalities in the port area (Bergqvist and Monios 2019). One of the most well-known options is installing cold ironing to reduce emissions from ships in berths, in some cases more to save the NOx, SOx and PM which are dangerous to the health of local populations than to save carbon emissions (Innes and Monios 2018). LNG-powered generators are also an option. Some ports are using electric-powered machinery in the port area to reduce their emissions (Spengler and Wilmsmeier 2019) and there is increasing focus on generating energy onsite through wind turbines and even tidal energy (Acciaro, Ghiara, and Inés 2014). Some ports are also looking into requiring vessels to use LNG and/or slow steaming within the port area (Winnes, Styhre, and Fridell 2015; Styhre et al. 2017).

Neither the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 2005) nor the 2015 Paris Agreement included targets for the reduction of emissions from shipping (OECD 2018). While shipping emissions per tkm are lower than other modes due to economies of scale, the large volumes of goods transported mean that the total emissions from the sector are large. In 2007–2012 shipping accounted for 2.8% of global GHG emissions or double the level produced by air travel (IMO 2014). In terms of policy actions, the main IMO policies added to MARPOL Annex VI are the emission control areas (ECA) which arrived in 2010 and the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) agreed in 2011 (Cullinane and Bergqvist 2014; Lister, Taudal Poulsen, and Ponte 2015). In terms of CO₂, policy remains weak.

As an alternative to regulation, the IMO explored the potential of market-based mechanisms (MBMs) to reduce CO₂ emissions, such as emission trading schemes and bunker fuel levies (Franc and Sutto 2013; Kosmas and Acciaro 2017). According to the World Bank (2019b), ‘introducing greenhouse gas mitigation measures, such as carbon prices applied to bunker fuels in the range of 10 to 50 USD/ton of carbon dioxide, might increase maritime transport costs by 0.4 percent to 16 percent. However, this would only marginally increase the import prices of goods (by less than 1 percent).’ MBMs were under discussion by the IMO during 2010–2013 when discussion was discontinued, although they remain listed as a potential ‘mid-term measure.’

In April 2018, the IMO announced a commitment of the shipping sector to reduce emissions by 50% of 2008 levels by 2050. Establishing a target for the first time is a positive step but careful analysis reveals that the target is flawed in three ways. First, if the sector were serious about its efforts to reduce emissions, the base year would be 1990 levels, in line with international CO₂ reduction targets (in 1990 GHG emissions from international shipping were 70% lower than 2012—DGIPPA 2015). Using a peak year as the base year for a reduction target is clearly dissimulation considering that Cariou, Parola, and Notteboom (2019) estimate that the liner shipping sector annual CO₂ emissions have already decreased by 33% since 2007 as a result of slow steaming. Similarly, in 2018 the largest operator Maersk announced that their CO₂ emissions have been reduced by 46% compared to 2007 (World Maritime News 2019), also certainly as a result of slow steaming. Second, the IPCC target is carbon neutrality by 2050, not a reduction by 50%. Third, while such reductions based on the current volume of shipping seem achievable, if shipping grows as predicted (potentially up to 250% growth in current emissions by 2050—IMO 2014) then the volume of emissions needing to be reduced becomes impossible. Anderson and Bows (2012b) noted that, even if all possible mitigation measures are put in place, they cannot deal with the emissions of future growth, thus demand reduction becomes necessary, but this option has not been taken up by maritime economists or policymakers.

Despite many academic, government and industry articles on possible reductions (Shi et al. 2018), there is remarkably little critical discussion of this apparent greenwashing, regarding the fact that the IMO has actually not set an ambitious target at all and very few commentators have highlighted the obvious conclusion. Notable exceptions include Anderson and Bows (2012: 624) who remarked that ‘the IMO needs to either rapidly implement measures for reducing its absolute emissions or openly renege on its high-level commitments,’ Bows-Larkin (2015, 691) who described current policy for mitigation of GHG in maritime transport as ‘woefully inadequate considering the scale and urgency of the 2 C goal’ and Psaraftis (2019) who noted that significant GHG reductions from shipping are ‘only a wish at this point in time.’

3.2. Climate change adaptation

You can look at this as “We need seawalls,” or you can look at this as “We need to retool our approach for human security, economic security, for economic equity.” New York mayor Bill de Blasio (quoted in Goodell 2018)

There are many indications of the impact of climate change on the coastal economy that will affect ports both directly and indirectly. Nicholls et al. (2008) estimated the value of assets in large coastal cities exposed to climate change at 3 USD trillion in 2005, and predicted a rise to 35 USD trillion or 9% of global GDP by 2070. To take just one example, the east coast of the USA is a high-profile example of the coastline of a rich country with serious danger for sea level rise. In particular, the city of Miami in Florida is one of the more high-profile large cities already experiencing regular floods but large buildings continue to be built right on the shoreline without any change in building regulations. In Florida alone, a report estimates that 15 USD–23 billion of real estate could be underwater by 2050, rising to 680 billion USD by 2100 (Goodell 2018). Another report estimates that 300,000 homes in the US housing 550,000 people and worth 117 USD.5 billion and 14,000 commercial properties worth 18 USD.5 billion are at risk of chronic flooding by 2045 (Union of Concerned Scientists 2018). A recent report found property value losses already of nearly 16 billion USD from coastal flooding in 17 east coast American states from 2005 to 2017 (Kusnetz 2019).

The reality of adaptation is starting to be felt already and some actions are being taken. Goodell (2018) reported that planning is underway to build a sea wall to protect the lower end of Manhattan in New York, for an estimated cost of 20 billion USD, and the state of Louisiana is considering 50 billion USD to protect its threatened shoreline. Goodell notes that the US federal government has already spent large sums purchasing houses from residents in endangered areas to allow them to move away (USD 2.8 billion spent on 40,000 homes since 1989). But he points out that if sea level rises 1 m, more than 4 million Americans would need to move, and the government is not going to buy all those houses. If a wealthy country cannot manage this migration, how much more difficult will it be for other countries? A UN report recently calculated that by 2050 poorer countries would require at least 500 billion USD per year to adapt (United Nations 2016). In most parts of the world, there is no direct action being taken to move cities back from the coast and even some preliminary discussions of adapting existing cities through raising buildings, building walls or adding ‘sponge’ parks and depressed areas to soak up incoming water are in very early stages and would only delay the effects rather than allow long-term survival. The Paris Agreement did in fact include reference to adaptation and some funding mechanisms are being developed to help Least Developed Countries.

Turning to the focus of this paper, in recent years a significant body of work has been established on climate change adaptation by ports (Becker et al. 2018; Ng et al. 2016). The primary threats are sea level rise, stronger storm surges, flooding and erosion. Working with an older IPCC estimate lower than the recently increased level, Christodoulou, Christidis, and Demirel (2019, 484) found that ‘64% of all seaports are expected to be inundated according to the projected global mean sea levels and combined effects of tides, local waves, and storm surges …. The number of seaports to be exposed to inundation levels higher than 1 m is projected to increase by 80% from 2030 to 2080.’ It is not simply the rising sea level but the frequency and intensity of storm surges that can force a port to close for significant periods of time and disrupt supply chains The Port of New York and New Jersey was closed on 28 October 2012 as a result of Hurricane Sandy and not fully reopened until a week later, during which time 25,000 containers were diverted to other ports. The storm surge inundated coastal infrastructure and buildings and caused not just immediate damage but widespread power cuts which disrupted operations and prevented resumption for some time, with a total cost directly to the port authority of around 170 USD m (Smythe 2013). In 2005 Hurricane Katrina destroyed one-third of the port of New Orleans, causing around 100 USD m in direct damage to the port, which took 3 months to get back even to half capacity. In both cases the damage and related costs to port-related infrastructure and businesses in the wider area reached into the billions. If the IPCC is correct that such once-per-century storms will become once-per-year storms by 2050, then such levels of disruption and cost must be expected.

A related issue is the reliance of current port throughput on high volume rail shuttles. Rail infrastructure is predicted to be seriously impacted by climate change effects, particularly floods, increasing costs by as much as 80% by 2040–50 (Doll, Klug, and Enei 2014), which would negatively impact port capacity as well as lowering demand by reducing access to global trade by inland regions. Moreover, the interconnectedness of transport with other essential systems such as water, electricity and ICT remains under-addressed—loss of power and essential information can cause indirect disruptions to transport systems via breakdown of signalling, traffic control and resource management (Markolf et al. 2019).

Various responses are possible, ranging from increased coastal defences and raising quays to moving facilities and managed retreat (Becker et al. 2018; Yang et al. 2018). Yet as with mitigation, work towards adaptation has in most cases stalled on the same collective action problem, whereby public and private sectors pass the buck and avoid commitment to necessary investments (Ng, Monios, and Zhang 2019). While the threats of frequent and severe storms and sea level rise are recognised, the uncertainty of if/when they will arrive in a particular location prevents market-based rationality from attributing a clear risk and reward valuation and hence action plan for stakeholders (Ng et al. 2018).

Understandably, research is focused on port infrastructure, whereas shipping services have not been considered directly from the perspective of adaptation. Obviously ships are mobile and sea levels do not affect them, but increased storms will. The real threat to carriers that shipping analysts should be considering is changes in future production and consumption as a result of climate change but the topic remains remarkably absent from academic literature. As discussed above, adaptation is not just about emissions but the impact of migration, war, disruption, lack of demand, etc. on the structure and nature of maritime transport. All the research discussed in the previous section on future vessels with alternative fuels that may be commercially viable in a couple of decades equally ignores the reality of adaptation and both the natural and economic environment in which these vessels would be operating.

4. Introducing the concept of deep adaptation

The review of the latest climate science presented in section 2 demonstrates the imminent and nonlinear approach of climate change effects. The implication of these findings is that global supply chains and transport systems will be massively disrupted, which raises the question of whether and how current systems can adapt. As stated in the introduction, a continuum may be observed from mitigation to adaptation, which have both been considered in section 3. This section moves further along the continuum to discuss transformational adaptation and deep adaptation.

Transformational adaptation has been posed in opposition to incremental adaptation, requiring fundamental changes to the nature of a system (Park et al. 2012; Mushtaq 2018), which may involve changes that are at a much larger scale, those that are truly new to a system or those that transform places and shift locations (Kates, Travis, and Wilbanks 2012). Transformational adaptation involves moving beyond business as usual but still assuming a high degree of continuation of current demand and trade profiles, essentially transforming the system to maintain functionality. For example, given the increased costs and delays of more frequent major port disruption (e.g. the billions of dollars in damage caused by Sandy and Katrina), at what point does maintaining such systems become more than the cost of reshoring production for certain sectors? More research is needed on such topics. Deep adaptation, by contrast, goes beyond these questions to consider the breakdown of functionality.

The term ‘deep adaptation’ was coined by Bendell (2018) and defined by Read (2019) as ‘adaptation premised upon collapse.’ Bendell (2018, unpaginated) writes that ‘The evidence before us suggests that we are set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation, destruction, migration, disease and war.’ These changes can include physical changes (pulling back from the coast, closing climate-exposed industrial facilities, planning for food rationing, letting landscapes return to their natural state) as well as cultural shifts, including ‘giving up expectations for certain types of consumption.’ Both of these have clear applications to the maritime transport sector and supply chain. The former relates more to port facilities and planning for future geographical changes, while the second relates to shipping less. This does not mean as a result of voluntary reduction of consumption which is clearly not going to occur, but from disruptions to trade as a result of the various issues raised in section 2 of this paper.

The key difference between transformational adaptation and deep adaptation is the notion of collapse, in which a parallel can be drawn with the emerging body of work on ‘collapsology’ (Servigne and Stevens 2015). While it is not possible to predict exactly how severe the coming collapse of current systems will be, the evidence presented in section 2 suggests that it could involve hundreds of millions of deaths and in many places the end of certain ways of living. Accordingly, Servigne and Stevens (2015) argue that it is not appropriate to use terms such as ‘transform’ or ‘transition’ to describe this level of upheaval. The term ‘collapse’ does not imply that human civilisation will end but that the upheaval will be on a par with a world war, a collapse of our current hyper-connected systems. Thus, the goal becomes no longer to avoid the collapse but to begin to change practices as early as possible in order to rebuild and transition during and after the collapse.

Significant overlap exists between mitigation and adaptation because, while mitigation measures will not prevent climate change effects and the need for adaptation, nevertheless, the system disruptions to which we must adapt include challenges to long distance supply chains and energy systems. A brief list of some of the main actions needed would include rapid decarbonisation of current processes, large investment in extreme weather-resistant infrastructure, migration of port infrastructure away from current locations, and a change to systemic thinking beyond physical transport infrastructure, including water, energy and communications systems. Reducing exposure to long distance supply and energy chains may necessitate a system rescaled to local and regional level. For example, a move towards more local power generation, preparation for frequent severe storms meaning less shipping, sea level rise affecting port locations, and significant reduction in demand for (at least global) shipping due to drought, food shortages, migration and conflicts. Most mitigation strategies are also appropriate to adaptation because they lead to less reliance on fossil fuels, although switching from fuel oil to LNG would continue exposure to this globally stretched system. It would be more resilient not to need any fossil fuel and rely more on local power generation. The advantage of renewables is that they can be produced closer to the source of need. Thus, it may not be a case of voluntarily reducing global shipping but it will be forcibly reduced due to disruptions, delays and rising costs, as well as other trends favouring an increase in regional trade which lie beyond the scope of this discussion (cf. Wilmsmeier and Monios 2020). Current ports deciding on investment would do well to consider where their berths will be located and the large increase in daily operational costs in 50 years or even 20.

It is clear that both the business-as-usual scenario and the currently projected possibilities of incrementally increasing use of alternative fuels such as LNG, improving efficiency of vessel design and operation are not going to reach the required levels of mitigation. In terms of adaptation, even scenarios beyond business-as-usual remain in their infancy. It is necessary to change the conversation from small adaptations aiming to continue business-as-usual to analysing scenarios such as relocating ports, reducing shipping, switching not just to greener fuel but locally produced electricity for short-range vessels and a focus on trade carried out at shorter shipping distances. In order to make real progress in defining and moving towards a new regime pathway of climate change adaption, two broad axes are necessary, which will be outlined here and then discussed further in the subsequent section on new paradigms.

First, we must recognise the reality of the need for regime transition and plan for it. This new paradigm does not mean sustainable development and lower emissions but a radical transformation of the economy to be both greener but also less stretched, less dependent on geographically extended supply chains, more local, ready for a radically transformed planet, to ‘break our dependence on volatile, expensive and ultimately declining fossil fuels’ (Bendell 2018). As over 30% of all maritime transport is carrying petroleum or petroleum derivatives (UNCTAD 2018), decoupling development from fossil fuels would also reduce demand for shipping by the same amount, which would directly convert to emissions reductions. We must also recognise that this is not just a political wish list but a response to the reality that evidence is showing us is rapidly arriving—business as usual is no longer possible, sustainable development is no longer possible. We will be forced to adapt to a new paradigm involving less shipping and a radically transformed world.

Second, this regime transition needs a public push to gain traction. As stated by Gramsci (1930, 34): ‘the old system is dead but the new one cannot yet be born.’ That is the role of key actors now, whether public or private: to recognise the climate emergency, to take adaptation seriously, develop a vision and take steps towards achieving it. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards this discussion and inspire colleagues in maritime economics to do likewise.

5. Deep adaptation as a new paradigm based on regime transition in the maritime transport sector

The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones. John Maynard Keynes (1936)

There is a large literature on the topics of path dependence and institutional change, including some applications to the maritime sector. Authors have demonstrated how port development is both path dependent—heavily constrained by past actions and institutional design—and contingent—influenced by private investment and public planning. Ng and Pallis (2010) showed how port governance is largely determined by place-specific institutional characteristics, despite attempts to implement generic governance solutions. Notteboom, de Langen, and Jacobs (2013) applied the concept of institutional plasticity to port development, and argued that, while port development is path dependent, a port authority can achieve governance reform by a process of adding layers to existing arrangements. In this way, the port authority does not need to deviate from the existing path of development, but can develop new capabilities and activities via a process of ‘institutional stretching’. Jacobs and Notteboom (2011, 1690) asserted the need for an evolutionary perspective, drawing upon the economic geography literature to define the movement from critical moments to critical junctures, concluding that port authorities experience windows of opportunity in which collective action is possible. They highlighted an unanswered question regarding ‘to what extent critical moments require institutional adaptations in order to materialise into critical junctures.’

As the focus in this paper is more closely related to wider issues such as society actions and government policy than just industry change, the kind of analytical framework needed can be found in regime transition studies (Geels 2012), for example the framework developed by Lyons and Davidson (2016) which compares two policy pathways (regime-compliant and regime-testing). The former pathway aims to maintain current lifestyles and practices with minor incremental change, while the latter recognises signs of regime transition and seeks to act accordingly. One of the key factors in the framework is the role of uncertainty. In response to an uncertain future, it is common to rely on extrapolation of past data and attempt to continue the current system. Analyses of shipping, particularly when dealing with environmental issues, exhibit this incremental trend, taking the current system as a starting point and examining how the environmental performance can be improved while maintaining current levels of service, performance and, of course, cost. All forecasters are inevitably subject to bias, all the more so in an industry such as shipping with so much strategic importance for the global economy and such high levels of finance involved. As a result of concealing this uncertainty within traditional ‘predict and provide’ solutions, alternative options score poorly in a cost-benefit analysis against current incremental solutions. Instead, the authors argue that what is needed is ‘decide and provide’, which entails identifying the future scenario and backcasting steps to achieve it. If the desired goal is zero emissions, then current measures being discussed will not achieve it. Neither small efficiency gains in current vessels nor switching to LNG, nor MBMs will achieve zero emissions.

Reactive policymaking is also blind to evidence of approaching major disruptions. Are national economies ready for disrupted global supply chains that may sever their links with current customers? How will we cope if our global food supply chains are broken? How many countries are self-sufficient in food and energy? How much money will be required to deal with coastal defence and inland migration within countries, not to mention dealing with hundreds of millions of international migrants? Transport policy decisions have a long legacy effect due to the enormous sunk costs. Decisions taken now must take into account at least the next 50 years, and the mounting evidence is clear that the next half-century will bear little resemblance to the previous one.

Obviously, there exist several challenges in taking a strong policy lead. But as public pressure increases, some countries and cities are beginning to take a stronger stance. For example, some cities are banning use of fossil-fuelled vehicles from 2025–2030 and some countries are banning sales of fossil-fuelled vehicles from 2030. This kind of bold lead to ban fossil fuels in shipping will not come from the IMO as international consensus of the members will not be possible. Even MBMs are not currently on the table at the IMO, let along anything more serious. Moreover, even if such a policy were pursued, it would require years to be agreed, then many countries would not ratify (from the US who pulled out of the Paris agreement to China who lobbied against MBMs on the basis of unfair costs falling on developing countries), and even then it would be years before such a policy entered into force. On the other hand, individual countries could simply ban fossil-fuelled ships from calling at their ports, as difficult as that is to imagine. French president Emmanuel Macron has recently called for an EU target of carbon neural by 2050 to meet the IPCC target. If all countries in the EU followed such a policy, it would prevent traffic leaking to other EU ports, but neighbouring countries could potentially take advantage. If countries do put such targets into place and, importantly, if they include maritime transport in the target, then major shifts could be forced on the maritime sector, and it needs to be prepared. The IPCC report calls for a mobilisation of resources as was seen during the second world war, drawing on societal memories of what can be achieved in a short space of time once the need for a new paradigm has been accepted.

Market forces are moving towards renewables as carbon fuels become more expensive, but a full transition through market forces will take decades, therefore the paradigm discussed in this paper involves using policy to accelerate the ecological transition (Roberts and Geels 2019). While liberal economists are correct to be wary of government forcing a particular market direction because we cannot know what will be the best fuel in the long term, simply banning fossil fuel but not mandating what must replace it would leave the solution to the market. Moreover, decentralisation of power supply and an increase in local and regional transport are very much in keeping with liberal economics.

6. Challenges to the new paradigm and a return to liberal economics

This section considers some of the challenges in transitioning towards the new paradigm, particularly as they derive from currently dominant economic theories, which, as mentioned at the outset of this paper, are due for reconsideration. Since at least the Plimsoll line, operators have complained that regulation kills business. It was the same with SECAs and is always the same with any ‘interventionist’ policy. As with the concept of regulatory capture, whereby regulators become too close to the actors they are regulating and consciously or subconsciously agree with them and thus are insufficiently stringent, we may term this problem ‘media capture’, whereby the neoliberal viewpoint has crowded out alternatives (Monios 2019). Large firms and political donors exert considerable influence over public dialogue, with the result that the Overton window of what is considered politically acceptable has moved to the right (cf. Marsden and Docherty 2013 discussed in the introduction). A recent study found that ‘the five largest publicly traded oil and gas majors (ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, BP and Total) have invested over 1 USD billion of shareholder funds in the 3 years following the Paris Agreement on misleading climate-related branding and lobbying’ (InfluenceMap 2019). Similarly, these incumbent energy providers attempt to legitimize themselves through investments in renewable technologies while simultaneously maximizing their revenues from fossil fuel technologies (Patala et al. 2019).

One of the first scientists to point out the reality of climate change, James Hansen, has been one of the leaders in pushing the media to report accurately on climate change. His 2007 article on ‘scientific reticence’ notes that, while science must be sceptical and proceed only in small concrete steps rather than through speculation and extrapolation, ‘we may rue reticence, if it serves to lock in future disasters’ (Hansen 2007, 1). As pointed out by Funnell (2018), it is common for major broadcasters to repeat the government’s assurances of taking action without scrutinising the results of these policies and holding governments to account. A study of UK media and public attitudes to economic policy found that ‘popular attitudes regarding austerity are influenced by media (and wider elite) framing’ (Barnes and Hicks 2017). Alternative paths that are more disruptive (e.g. much faster timescales for transitioning away from fossil fuels) are not treated seriously by the media, if they are even acknowledged. As Chomsky (1992, 79) put it: ‘The basic principle, rarely violated, is that what conflicts with the requirements of power and privilege does not exist.’ Krugman (2018) points out that ‘ideology is also a factor: If you take environmental issues seriously, you are led to the need for government regulation of some kind, so rigid free-market ideologues don’t want to believe that environmental concerns are real.’ Thus, academics have a responsibility to steer the debate where possible and point out that current trends are not on target to meet the stated goals. According to Anderson and Bows (2012b, 626): ‘As long as this misleading situation continues, those with the power to deliver change will remain ill-equipped to develop appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies. By contrast, if academics communicate plainly the stark implications of failing to address short-term mitigation, sectors such as international shipping would be required to recast their polices away from incremental and towards step-change responses to climate change.’ Anderson and Bows (2012a) go further and note that prevailing economic theories have constrained the efficacy of warnings from climate scientists, and they state the need for a new paradigm. This paper aims to answer that call by identifying the new paradigm as deep adaptation.

Roe (2013) discussed the challenges of making interventionist policy in the face of footloose multinational shipping lines, and Lister, Taudal Poulsen, and Ponte (2015) showed that ship owners have lobbied actively against IMO regulations such as SECAs. A recent study found evidence that shipping industry organizations such as the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the World Shipping Council (WSC) and the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) have actively obstructed the development of climate change policies by the IMO (InfluenceMap 2017).

Currently, both public and private sectors are focused only on market solutions rather than systemic change. Davies (2017, 22, 23) says that: ‘the key institution of neoliberalism is not a market as such, but particular market-based (or market-derived) forms of economization, calculation, measurement and valuation … . neoliberalism is typically less concerned with expanding markets per se, than in expanding the reach of market-based principles and techniques of evaluation.’ The fatal flaw of MBMs is that they incentivise only small optimisations that merely delay the required structural transition away from fossil fuels (Lohmann 2008). A measure must have some relation to the goal—if the goal is to reduce use of carbon by a certain amount and increase use of commercially available yet more expensive fuels, then such policies may work, but if the goal is to stop carbon use entirely and transition towards different fuels not currently on the market, then they cannot work unless the level is set so high as to be effectively a ban. It seems that, faced with operational challenges, policymakers apply only tactics but there is no strategy, which is why the tactics fail.

While some MBMs (e.g. cap and trade or a carbon tax) have been attempted by some countries, they remain priced far too low to make any difference. Psaraftis (2019) points out that a carbon tax high enough to make significant difference would need to be at least in the level of three figures per tonne of oil. This is a common problem with policy (cf. Marsden, Monios discussed in the introduction) whereby policies are only accepted at a level known to be too weak. Krugman (2018) notes that ‘claims that a carbon tax high enough to make a meaningful difference would attract significant bipartisan support are a fantasy at best, a fossil-fuel-industry ploy to avoid major action at worst,’ which indeed goes back to the ‘empty signifier’ concept raised in the introduction. MBMs are a classic ‘empty signifier’, which serve to allow decision-makers to postpone action through ongoing debate about technical aspects and price levels. A notable failure of COP24 in 2018 was the inability to achieve agreement on standards for market mechanisms. As Chomsky (1998) puts it: ‘strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum.’ Finally, whether or not MBMs would work for maritime transport is a moot point since they have proven impossible to implement—IMO discussion on the matter stopped in 2013 without agreement.

While early neoliberal economists were well aware of the limits of a free market to manage issues such as environmental pollution, this position has been abandoned by their successors. According to Hayek (1944, 38–39, 84): ‘To prohibit the use of certain poisonous substances, or to require special precautions in their use, to limit working hours or to require certain sanitary arrangements, is fully compatible with the preservation of competition … . They do not conflict with liberal principles so long as they are intended to be permanent and are not used to favour or harm particular people.’ Davies (2017, 48) points out that ‘Hayek was cognizant of the various public goods, such as transport infrastructure, that the price system was not suited to deliver. This recognition that the market had certain technical and moral limits was prominent in neoliberal debates up until the 1950s.’

According to MacKay (2017), one of the main features of our overuse of resources and inability to make rational decisions in the face of species extinction derives from our oligarchic mode of governance: ‘in states worldwide, political decision-making is controlled by a numerically small, wealthy elite. This form of government serves to lock in patterns of conflict, oppression, and ecological destruction … . Oligarchic control compromises a society’s ability to make correct decisions in the face of existential threats. This explains a seeming paradox in which past civilizations have collapsed despite possessing the cultural and technological know-how needed to resolve their crises. The problem wasn’t that they didn’t understand the source of the threat or the way to avert it. The problem was that societal elites benefitted from the system’s dysfunctions and, prevented available solutions.’ This is evident today in not just continuing use of fossil fuels but actually subsidising them at the level of 5 USD trillion annually or 6.5% of global GDP (Coady et al. 2017).

This discussion of oligarchy neatly returns us to the need for a new economic theory mentioned in the opening of the paper. Certainly, quasi-oligopolistic market structures are observed in many transport markets, particularly in maritime transport, with anti-trust exemptions in the container segment defended by economists. The link between neoliberalism, ordoliberalism and oligarchy deserves wider discussion among economists and is highly pertinent to maritime transport economics. Ordoliberalism³ is a type of social liberalism that was active in postwar Germany through the Freiburg School. They believed in the free market but also with a strong role for the state. They stressed the necessity of the price mechanism, whereby firms must compete in the market, thus monopolies were not allowed on principle and had to be broken up. This view is arguably closer to the original neoliberal position of Hayek; however, Davies (2017) argues that the later Chicago School neoliberals Friedman and Coase disagreed, which led towards the acceptance of the theory that large firms are more efficient overall from a system perspective. According to Davies (45–46): ‘The ordoliberal school … identified cartels as a necessary precondition of Nazi political economy, and consequently advocated legislative attacks on economic power as a central component of any revitalized postwar liberalism … . This had the benefit of defending the liberal properties of markets from monopoly and cartels, but it also had the benefit of restraining the state from imposing goals, plans or “conscious” direction on society.’ He argues that ordoliberalism is thus closer to the early neoliberal thought of Hayek, but later ‘the Chicago School became preoccupied with the dangers of state power, and increasingly downplayed the dangers of monopolies’ economic power.’ These issues are leading towards a much larger discussion than is possible in this paper, indicating the link between politics, economics and the environment that is in dire need of closer attention by maritime economists.

7. Conclusion

It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. Machiavelli (1513)

As stated in the introduction, this paper is not a deductive analysis of current or potential actions but an inductive discussion. The paper began by identifying the disconnection between the latest climate science and the statements, actions and visions of actors from government to industry to analysts, and then considered some reasons for this disconnection. The paper introduced a continuum from mitigation to adaptation to transformational adaptation to deep adaptation. It is clear that we know what actions are needed for mitigation, namely complete decarbonisation which will include a large reduction in shipping, but such actions are not even on the table. Allied to this inaction on mitigation, decision-makers, both public and private, are only beginning to think seriously about adaptation, while the radical restructuring of the economy required for transformational or deep adaptation is even further off the agenda. Market solutions have been shown to fail, thus the only potential solution is strong regulation on environmental performance for mitigation and radical restructuring of cities, ports and economies for adaptation.

As far as mitigation is concerned, if we believe the latest climate science then neutral observers should reject the IMO target of 50% and only support the IPCC target of 0% carbon emissions by 2050 in order to meet the Paris Agreement aim of keeping the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. Such a target can only be reached by banning fossil fuels in shipping by 2050, which would provide certainty to industry and a 30-year planning horizon. MBMs could be used to accelerate this transition and avoid operators waiting until the 2040s to act, but such measures must be linked to a clear ban on usage by 2050 otherwise they will be ineffective.

However, the argument of this paper is that, regardless of whether mitigation action is taken, deep adaptation will be forced on government, industry and public alike. The advent of even some of the many obstructions to trade detailed in section 2 may require radical changes in supply chains and a reduction in shipping capacity as a result of smaller vessels, shorter distances and contracted supply chains. Given the emergent nature of the science and the difficulty of projecting forwards, providing simple recommendations regarding what industry should do in the face of deep adaptation is not a simple matter and requires new research regarding the future shape of production and consumption in climate-ravaged cities and new supply chain structures. This research agenda will require that maritime economists embrace heterodox economics related to degrowth as well as more interdisciplinary approaches.

The clear implication arising from the predictions of climate scientists is that industry decision-makers should plan for a future of expected regulations on activity and a drastically altered production and commercial landscape with less global transport and higher costs. The rational response by some industry actors may be to continue with business as usual until the point where the business becomes unprofitable, either through increased regulation or major disruptions that increase costs and/or reduce demand, at which point they may exit the maritime sector.

Analyses of the maritime transport sector and future predictions cannot continue to be based on extrapolation from the past. Economists, the very raison d’être of whose profession is the concept of scarcity, continue both to recommend and predict endless growth while all the scientific findings present overwhelming proof of resource depletion. The two main inhibitors in moving this agenda forwards were identified above and are in fact closely linked: the incremental policy paradigm and the Chicago School neoliberal market-based approach, the latter supported by media capture and a departure by modern neoliberals from earlier forms of liberal economics. As noted by Herman and Chomsky (1998), journalists self-censor because they want to advance their careers and they know it is not popular to publish ‘scare stories’. That is starting to change as climate change slowly rises up the agenda due to activists such as Extinction Rebellion and the international school strikes. Are academics the same? Do we self-censor in order to advance our careers? If all our research simply agrees with all actions of the maritime industry and minor incremental policy by government and never challenges either then it would suggest that we do. Media capture is further reflected in the fact that major reports by government, industry and other organisations do not discuss the extent of required adaptation challenges. As academics, we have the responsibility to identify these failings rather than continuing to endorse incremental solutions that we know will fail: ‘the uninterrupted production of positivity has a terrifying consequence: if negativity engenders crisis and critique, absolute positivity, for its part, engenders catastrophe, precisely through its incapacity to distil the crisis’ (Baudrillard 2002, 3).

The argument for an ecological transition is based firmly on the principles of liberal economics and is not inconsistent with neoliberalism according to Hayek. Maritime economists must remember that liberal economics is in favour of government intervention in situations of market failure, such as environmental protection. It is time for liberal economics to return to its roots and away from the currently dominant Chicago School neoliberalism. Who better to lead this task than maritime economists, whose work in shipping and ports is situated precisely at the interface between the market and the environment?

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. While the Anthropocene is not yet formally recognised as a geological period, the term is increasingly used to denote the period during which the actions of humanity have exerted a notable impact on the planet.

2. See Stopford (2009) for an interesting discussion of the industry outcry that preceded this policy.

3. Much of the discussion about ordoliberal vs neoliberal is indebted to Davies (2017).