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Abstract
Documents published in the latest volume of the series Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) reveal interesting shifts in British views on Finland's odds of survival in the changing post-war geopolitical situation. In 1944–1945, the British government put the maintenance of the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union first and identified its interests in Finland, considered to lie in the Soviet security sphere, very narrowly. However, after this initial period of marked pessimism over Finland's fate, the Foreign Office identified factors and trends which indicated that the Finns could carve a distinct position for themselves in the no-man's land between the emerging Cold War blocs. By 1948, careful, yet guarded, optimism of Finland as a Nordic country capable of retaining its sovereignty and Western connections superseded an earlier view of Finland as an East European country, bound to fall under complete Soviet domination sooner or later. As Finland's position improved, so Britain's interests gradually widened. Were Finland now to fall under Soviet domination, the United Kingdom and the West had more to lose. In the absence of means to match Soviet influence in Finnish foreign policy and domestic affairs, British policy was defined in terms of applying ‘soft power’ to preserve Western interests: cultural and economic relations, propaganda and information campaigns, and the cultivation of personal contacts with leading Finns. Subsequently, pessimism and optimism oscillated in British analyses of the situation in Finland and assessments of how well this soft power worked, or what means of influence were available. At the same time, a determined effort was made to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in Northern Europe to Finland.
Notes
1 The title takes its inspiration from the incisive characterization of Finland in the 1930s and in the Second World War by the Finnish historian Oula Silvennoinen: ‘Finland was an East European country with East European problems’. Silvennoinen, ‘Janus of the North’.
2 Anthony Eden's memorandum ‘Soviet Policy in Europe outside the Balkans’, 9 August 1944, WP (44) 436, CAB 66/53; summarized in Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 123–31, sections on Scandinavia and Finland on pages 130–1; Polvinen, Between East and West, 14. The document is not included in the volume of DBPO discussed here.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 130.
6 Polvinen, Between East and West, 14.
7 For example, Nevakivi, Ystävistä vihollisiksi, 200. Also other historical works generally mention the thesis, if not always the document.
8 Upton, ‘Finland, Great Britain and the Cold War’, 63.
9 The Anglo-Finnish war of 1941–1944 was a phoney war of its kind. The only hostilities were British air raids in the Petsamo harbour area, Liinahamari, in the Arctic on 30 July 1941, where 16 British planes, operating from aircraft carriers, were shot down by German air defence stationed in the area. Although there were some Finnish civilian casualties, damage to the port was minimal. To add to the peculiarity, the hostilities took place several months before the declaration of war. After that, the British did not resume them. The significance of the war was political. Manninen, ‘War between Friends’.
10 Memorandum from Mr. Eden to the War Cabinet, 24 September 1944, CAB 121/363 (No. 2).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. The Swedish name of the Porkkala peninsula (Porkala udd) is misspelled in the document as Porkkala-Ud.
13 Juho Kusti Paasikivi's diary, 6 October 1944; Blomstedt and Klinge, J. K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat.
14 And not only standard, but revisionist accounts too, such as the scathingly critical analysis of Helena Penelope Evans on British policymaking towards Finland in 1944–1947. According to Evans, the British not only wrote off but sold Finland off to the Soviets in 1944, and if not necessarily by design, at least by a ‘series of errors’. Evans, ‘British Involvement in the Finnish Peace’.
15 Shepherd (Helsinki) to Eden, 6 February 1945, FO 371/47369, N1600/33/56 (No. 5).
16 Ibid.
17 On the resumption of the Anglo-Finnish timber and pulp trade, Aunesluoma, Paperipatruunat, 203–10.
18 Shepherd (Helsinki) to Eden, 24 July 1945, FO 371/47393, N9908/356/56 (No. 16); Warr minute, FO 371/47412, N9686/1743/56 (No. 19).
19 Ibid.
20 Shepherd (Helsinki) to Eden, 8 June 1945, FO 371/47408, N6630/1131/56 (No. 11).
21 ‘Soviet–Finnish Alliance’, unsigned. Enclosure in Haigh to Allen, 25 July 1945, FO 371/47408, N8592/1131/56 (No. 18).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Polvinen, Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan, 97, 176–8, 238–9; Nevakivi, Maanalaista diplomatiaa, 72–4; Visuri, Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan, 175–7; Visuri, Puolustusvoimat kylmässä sodassa, 45–52; Visuri, ‘The Making of the Paris Peace Treaty’; Koskimies, Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? Different historians have emphasized somewhat different factors and considerations behind Britain's demands on the limitations of Finland's defensive capability. First accounts on the topic by Polvinen and Nevakivi connected the demands with British interests to limit the military potential of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, and also to the Italian treaty. Later research by Visuri, supported more recently by Koskimies, has however established convincingly that the British believed Finnish military assets would be on the Soviet side in a future war and, hence, it was obvious that the UK sought to limit Finland's defence capability as such. As the Cold War matured, views changed, which could be seen in the subsequent eagerness of UK arms exporters to sell modern weapons systems to Finland.
26 Minute from Warr to Warner, 28 July 1945, FO 371/47412, N9686/1743/56 (No. 19).
27 Magill to Howie (Allied Control Commission), 30 October 1945, FO 371/47450, N17623/10928/63G. Not printed in the DPBO collection discussed here. Magill's reporting and its responses are discussed in Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 6–7.
28 Magill to Howie, 30 October 1945, FO 371/47450. N17623/10928/63G.
29 Warr minute, 11 November 1945. Also minutes by Brimelow, 12 November and Warner, 25 November, FO 371/47450. In his memoirs Magill later admitted that his alarmism had been premature. Magill, Tasavalta tulikokeessa, 106–7.
30 Brimelow minute, 12 November 1945, FO 371/47450. N17623/10928/63G. Not printed in the volume discussed here.
31 Shepherd to Bevin, 24 November 1945, FO 371/47450, N17623/10928/63G (No. 41).
32 On the perception of the Soviet Union, see for example the illustrative memoirs of Frank Roberts. Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, 107–10.
33 Warner to Shepherd, 26 February 1946, FO 371/47450, N17623/10928/56G (No. 53).
34 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
35 Vares, ‘Is this the Top of the Slippery Slope?’. Also Vares, ‘Foes Who Grew Better with Time’, and Vares, ‘Moral and Stability’.
36 Majander, ‘Britain's Dual Approach’.
37 Warner to Shepherd, 26 February 1946, FO 371/47450, N17623/10928/56G (No. 53).
38 Ibid.
39 Shepherd to Sargent, 30 July 1946, FO 371/56786, N10077/140/38 (No. 70).
40 Ibid., Hankey minute.
41 On UK information and propaganda activities, Fields, Winning Finnish Hearts and Minds. On British economic and trade diplomacy, and the rather aggressive UK export interest promotion in particular, Jensen-Eriksen, Hitting Them Hard?
42 Shepherd to Bevin, 15 February 1947, FO 371/65910, N2330/3/56, (No. 86).
43 Ibid.
44 On the trade disputes Jensen-Eriksen, Hitting Them Hard?
45 Etherington-Smith to Hankey, 28 February 1948, FO 371/71447, N3331/78/42 (No. 116).
46 Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 8 April 1948, CAB 128/12, CM(48)27 (No. 132).
47 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 124–5.
48 Ibid., 124.
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