Together Again: Anglo-Norwegian relations and the early Cold War

Abstract

This article discusses the archival materials published in the volume The Nordic Countries: From War to Cold War, 1944–1951 within the context of the existing literature on early Cold War relations between Britain and Norway. While many of these sources have been exploited by Norwegian historians for well over a quarter of a century, the publication of a judiciously selected body of documents significantly adds to our understanding of in particular the conceptual framework of the main actors, their misperceptions and the networks providing information. The roles of Trygve Lie and King Haakon merit particular attention.

Keywords:

• Norway
• Great Britain
• Cold War
• NATO
• foreign policy
• security
• Scandinavia
• Sweden
• Denmark
• fisheries

Notes

1 Insall and Salmon, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

2 Some of these works merit inclusion here, particularly those written in English. For the latest historiographical survey, see Pharo, ‘Post-Cold War Historiography in Norway’; for a previous survey, Pharo, ‘The Cold War in Norwegian and International Historical Research’. The standard work on Norway's foreign relations in English is Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations. Works in English on Scandinavia and the early Cold War by Norwegian scholars include: Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War; Pharo, ‘Scandinavia’. As far as Norwegian foreign and security policies are concerned, the two Norwegian language volumes in the history of Norwegian foreign relations dealing with this period are, vol. 4, Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, and vol. 5, Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering; see also the history of Norwegian defence, Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred: 1940–1970, vol. 4 in the history of Norwegian defence.

3 The chronologically organized information on the various individuals in the List of Persons varies considerably in terms of both time span and richness of information. I realize, of course, that it would have been impossible to create any kind of systemic consistency, but a few words on the criteria employed would have been helpful. As for the corrections, Halvard Lange took office as Norwegian Foreign Minister in 1946, not 1945. I assume this is a typo. More curiously, why is Mogens Fog a professor and not Jacob Worm-Müller? And it is Worm, not Wørm. But these are negligible blemishes.

4 Letter from Sargent to Hollis, 10 March 1944, FO 371/43248, N1586/1586/30 (No. 1); despatch from Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, FO 371/865535, NN101518 (No. 212).

5 Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, 154–82.

6 Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 116, 143; Pharo, ‘From Reluctant Participant to Avid Contender’.

7 Despatch from Collier to Bevin, 1 July 1946, FO 371/56302, N8703/30 (No. 66). In a footnoted comment on this despatch, Christopher Warner, Assistant Under Secretary noted: ‘It is, I am afraid, inevitable and natural that the Scandinavian countries should take up a “neutral” or “straddling” attitude in public. The most we can hope for is that they shd. not in practical affairs carry any appeasement of the Soviet Union so far as to become satellites – to the detriment of their own real interests in defence and economic matters, and of ours. But even in public speeches, spokesmen of small nations shd. not talk nonsense about “mediating” between great powers or “building bridges” between them.’ For a very different interpretation of Lange's speech, see Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 405–17. London was generally more condescending than the embassy.

8 Mordt, Arne Ordings dagbøker, 118–19, 547.

9 Despatch from Collier to Bevin, 2 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2083/345/30 (No. 49).

10 Letter from Collier to Warner, 12 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2485/345/30 (No. 51).

11 Pharo, ‘Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction’, 128–30; Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, 201–44.

12 Lundestad, Arbeiderpartiet og forsvaret 1935–1939.

13 Øyvind Tønnesson, a doctoral candidate in the research project ‘The Norwegian Peace Tradition’, is working on the role of Christian L. Lange in the promotion of a durable peace in the first quarter of the 20th century. Lange was a long time Secretary General of the Interparliamentary Union. The dissertation will be submitted in the spring of 2012.

14 For Norwegian foreign policy attitudes and newspaper opinion, see Eriksen, DNA og NATO; Alstad, Norske meninger, 90–6.

15 Despatch from Collier to Bevin 20 March 1946, No 84, FO 371/56284, N4417/219/30 (No. 55).

16 Insall, Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship.

17 Arne Ording's Diary 27 June 1946, Manuscript division, Norwegian National Library, Oslo. As quoted in author's translation in Pharo, ‘Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction’, 128.

18 Letter from Collier to Warner, 12 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2485/345/30 (No. 51).

19 It is certainly not absent in Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken; or in Skodvin, Norden eller NATO; but the fears come out more clearly in this collection.

20 Collier also seems to have underestimated the number and strength of centre-right sceptics, whom Knut Einar Eriksen and I have dubbed the national conservatives, see Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering; also Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken.

21 Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, 284–90; Pharo, ‘Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction’.

22 Despatch from Collier to Attlee, 15 January 1948, FO 371/71449, N637/637/63 (No. 107), footnote 2; also Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, 284–5; Eriksen, DNA og NATO, 19–33.

23 The first indication that the British take note of a possible Norwegian move. Letter Collier to Hankey, 27 December 1947, FO 371/71485, N34/34/20 (No. 105).

24 Letter from Collier to Warner, 12 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2485/345/30 (No. 51).

25 Letter from Collier to Hankey, 24 January 1947, FO 371/66021, N122458/30G (No. 84); Leading Personalities in Norway, 23 June 1949 (extract), FO 371/77434, N5959/1012/30 (No. 195), presents Lange as the key person in bringing Norway into the Atlantic pact, portraying him as having shown great skill and determination. While in the first few years he had been seen as rather weak and indecisive, he was now ‘a European figure, head and shoulders above the foreign ministers of the other Scandinavian States, while his reputation with the Norwegian public rivals that of M. Gerhardsen’.

26 Eriksen and Skodvin, ‘Storbritannia, Nato og et skandinavisk forbund’.

27 Record of a meeting chaired by Mr. Bateman, 22 October 1948, FO 371/71454, N11864/637/63G (No. 152).

28 Ibid.

29 Letter from Hankey to Collier, 25 January 1949, FO 371/71485, N3492/34/30 (No. 172); for the literature on the Hankey Plan, see Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, 317; Eriksen and Skodvin, ‘Storbritannia, Nato og et skandinavisk forbund’, 489–92.

30 With regard to Spain, see Haraldstad, Franco-Spanias fiende nummer en?; on Greece, Tandberg, ‘Norsk FN-politikk’; Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken, 215–20, 245–56.

31 As quoted in Pharo, ‘Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction’, 137.

32 Both in ibid., 151.

33 Telegram from Collier to Bevin, 16 September 1948, FO 371/71488, N10065/128/30 (No. 146). Collier reports that Lange was ‘apologetic throughout’ when informing Collier of the Storting resolution. To what extent Lange was sincerely apologetic we shall probably never know. But we may assume that in common with his predecessors in the interwar period, he thought the Storting was acting rashly. Throughout the interwar period Norwegian cabinets found themselves in a difficult position with regard to the fisheries limit, between a quite aggressive Britain on the one hand, and equally aggressive parliamentarians and press in Norway on the other. See Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 77–107.

34 There is evidence in Collier's valedictory despatch that with regard to fish, he understood Norwegians. Despatch from Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, FO 371/86535, NN1015/18 (No. 212): ‘It is only when the Norwegian thinks his material interests to be vitally concerned that he shows unreasonable obstinacy, as in the dispute on fishery limits.’

35 Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 358–9, discuss the issue briefly. The fisheries dispute clearly ought to be taken up in a monograph or major article.

36 The moral issues, in various guises, are a major concern of the project ‘The Norwegian Peace Tradition’.

37 Despatch from Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, FO 371/86535, NN 1015/18 (No. 212).

38 Ibid., 563.

39 Letter from Collier to Warner, 12 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2485/345/30 (No. 51).

40 Telegram from Bevin to Collier, 30 January 1946, FO 371/56293, N882/539/30 (No. 47); see also letter from Collier to Sargent, 15 November 1945, FO 371/47528, N16016/716/30 (No. 40); and despatch from Collier to Bevin, 2 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2083/345/30 (No. 49); Collier was disposed to doubt that Lie was the indispensable Atlanticist in the Cabinet: commenting upon Lie's departure he stated: ‘[I] doubt that we shall see much difference here: the Cabinet as whole will be even less ready than it was before to take any but a negative decision on a question of foreign affairs.’ Letter from Collier to Warner, 12 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2485/345/30 (No. 51).

41 Despatch from Collier to Bevin, 2 February 1946, FO 371/56302, N2083/345/30 (No. 49)

42 Letter from Collier to Hankey, 22 April 1948, FO 371/71485, N5347/34/30G (No. 136).