The Unruly Buffer Zone

Abstract

This article discusses the province of Ingria, part of Sweden from 1617 until 1704, and its position in the Swedish Kingdom in the late 17th century. The main purpose is to examine how Sweden implemented its centralization and unification policy in Ingria and what reactions it triggered at the local level. Court records and other administrative documents have been used as source material. Ingria was a borderland that was primarily of military importance for Sweden as a buffer zone against Russia. A strong defence was also essential in order to secure the profitable Russian transit trade, in which the Ingrian towns of Narva and Nyen played a pivotal role. Sweden’s centralization and unification policy, which peaked in the middle of the 1680s, aimed particularly at strengthening its military presence in Ingria. Resources were obtained by confiscating fiefs and later privatizing the administration of manors, to be handled by leaseholders. Tax farming resulted in peasant unrest, and eventually the Crown had to regulate the taxation. Ultimately, the Crown was not strong enough to carry out a coherent integration policy. Ingria remained a borderland province that formed a link between the core areas of Sweden and the Baltic provinces.

Keywords:

• Ingria
• state formation
• integration
• tax farming
• peasant unrest
• transit trade
• borderland

Introduction

The province of Ingria (Sw. Ingermanland), at the far end of the Gulf of Finland, was ceded to Sweden in the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617 together with Kexholm County. Nowadays, Ingria has largely been forgotten, which is reflected in the fact that the name of the former Swedish province has disappeared from modern maps. In the same manner, most historical research on 17th-century Ingria is insufficient and outdated.¹ However, a considerable amount of original source material has survived. Hence, this study is largely based on administrative documents, such as court records and correspondence between the Crown’s officials.

This article examines the position of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom by concentrating on Sweden’s centralization and unification policy regarding Ingria at the end of the 17th century. The significance of the province is also investigated by discussing Ingria as a border region and by analysing commercial developments in Ingria. The focus is, first, on the Swedish Crown’s aim to unify its provinces and, second, on how the Ingrian population reacted to such measures. The article sheds new light on state formation in early modern border regions.

Ingria as a problematic border region

First, it is necessary to discuss Ingria from a geographical standpoint. Ingria was a relatively problematic border region for Sweden. These kinds of problems, though, were actually typical of peripheral border regions in early modern Europe.² However, just what types of problems did the Swedish Crown face in Ingria in the early modern period and how did the territory emerge?

Ingria was a part of the Swedish Kingdom from 1617 until 1704, when it was conquered by Russia (de jure ceded in 1721). While under Swedish rule, Ingria was a turbulent region with great ethnic and cultural diversity. The population spoke different languages and consisted of several ethnic groups. The indigenous people, Izhorians and Votes as well as Russians, professed the Orthodox faith. During the 17th century, a significant influx of Lutheran Finns from the Karelian Isthmus and Savonia (Sw. Savolax) changed the ethnic structure of the population. Altogether, the Ingrian population was characterized by great mobility, which created certain problems for the authorities. Indeed, authorities continuously ran up against different kinds of problems in Ingria. Hence, it was often described as a ‘troublesome’ province by the governors-general.³

Previous research, especially Finnish and Swedish historiography dating back to the late 19th century, described Ingria in colourful terms. Ingria was, for example, called the ‘Swedish Siberia’, which is a reference to the social problems caused by extensive migrations and even deportations to the region, as in Siberia or the American west in the 19th century. In addition, the inhabitants were more or less depicted as ignorant barbarians or criminals.⁴ According to the English scholar Michael Roberts, Ingria was ‘a dumping-ground for undesirables’, who often were ‘turbulent individuals’ avoiding taxes or contract labour service.⁵ But were the migrants really deported criminals or unusually restless individuals, as the rhetoric of the ‘wild east’ suggests?

It is evident that a significant number of migrants moved to Ingria illegally in an attempt to avoid paying taxes or arrears to the Crown or to avoid conscription or local conflicts of some kind.⁶ Crown officials in Ingria had no illusions about the inhabitants in the province. Governor-General Göran Sperling noted that the people were difficult to handle and, therefore, needed to be disciplined. He also described the people as cunning and fierce.⁷ Indeed, Ingrian peasants used the border in a tactical manner in order to avoid various obligations to both the Crown and various manors. They frequently moved to new holdings and benefitted from a system that promised exemption from taxes during the first three years on a new holding. Desertion was also common. If the tax burden became too heavy, it was easy to slip over the border into Russia. The Swedish–Russian border was highly permeable, like many borders between early modern states. The people in Ingria, Karelia, and eastern Finland were also used to moving around, mostly because they were accustomed to burn beating.⁸ Overall, the mobility of the Ingrain population made it very difficult for the authorities to control the region.

Nevertheless, most of the migrants were not criminals. The number of deported individuals was quite low. In fact, the majority of migrants simply sought an easier way to make a living in a time characterized by heavy tax burdens, a harsh climate, and indirect religious discrimination. At the same time, many migrants were surely tempted by the vast amount of uninhabited holdings in Ingria. Migration to Ingria was intense, especially after the Ingrian War (1610‒1617) and the Russo-Swedish War (1656–1658), which decimated entire villages in the region.

Ingria was a borderland, but also a transitional region, characterized by the gradual movement from one cultural norm to another.⁹ Actually, Ingria was part of a more extensive border region, comprising Ingria, Kexholm County, Viborgian Karelia, and the area of Savonia in eastern Finland. Thus, the entire eastern part of the Swedish Kingdom shared common features. Here, western and eastern elements met, most evidently the Lutheran and Greek Orthodox faiths. Symptomatically, one of the most difficult problems faced by Swedish authorities in 17th-century Ingria, as well as in Kexholm County, was how to integrate the Orthodox peasants with the Crown. Throughout the 17th century, the Swedish Crown tried to convert the Orthodox population to Lutheranism, mostly by persuasive methods.¹⁰ This problem remained an unresolved issue throughout the period of Swedish rule in Ingria.

Ingria can be described as an unruly borderland, referring to a model developed by Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel. According to them, the social dynamics of a border region are dependent upon the mutual power relations between the state, the local elite, and the common people. Depending on the nature of the power relations, the borderland can be described as quiet, unruly, or rebellious. Ingria was neither quiet nor rebellious: on the one hand, the power relations were not coherent, while, on the other, the common people and local elite did not actively challenge state control together. The middle category, unruly borderland, is characterized by less coherent power structures, in which neither the state nor the local elite have established a commanding position over the local population. The entire region is therefore difficult to control, and the state often appears weak when it tries to enforce its sovereignty. Military forces are stationed in the area to enforce state rule.¹¹ This concept describes the situation in 17th-century Ingria quite well.

In addition, both Charles Tilly and Brian M. Downing have argued that, in general, the process of state formation was driven by military demands. Because of international competition, especially war and preparation for war, rulers had to increasingly extract resources for their armies and navies through a more effective, centralized, and uniform state apparatus. Consequently, the modern state developed somewhat as a byproduct.¹² As for Ingria, the military aspects of the Swedish centralization policy are clearly visible: the province was an important buffer zone for Sweden. Harald Gustafsson has noted that the process of state formation was also influenced from below. The use of various communicative channels, uprisings, and the risk of peasant unrest often resulted in compromises.¹³ This perspective offers a fruitful approach in the case of Ingria. Moreover, Gustafsson uses the concept of the conglomerate state, which can be applied to 17th-century Ingria. As Gustafsson has stated, a conglomerate state comprised different territories that had varying relationships with the Crown.¹⁴

The integration of Ingria

The Swedish integration policy for Ingria is a particularly good research topic as the aims of a central government emerge especially clearly in border regions.¹⁵ Thus, it is essential to examine how the Swedish Crown tried to integrate Ingria into the realm. Previous studies explained the integration of Ingria in a straightforward manner, particularly for the years following the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617. Moreover, this interpretation strongly influenced the image of Swedish Ingria throughout the entire 17th century. However, was the process that simple?

Ingria was not part of the actual realm (Sw. riket), but was instead governed as a province. Nonetheless, the rights of Ingria were relatively similar to those of the core areas, at least when compared to the German (notably Pommern and Bremen-Verden) and Baltic provinces (Estonia, Livonia, and Ösel). Though the inhabitants of Ingria were under Swedish law, they were not represented in the Swedish Diet. Consequently, Ingria belonged to a middle category compared to the other Swedish provinces.¹⁶

Previous studies often claimed that Ingria became integrated with the Swedish Crown immediately after the Peace Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617. When analysing this process, it is evident that the conclusions of Jerker Rosén influenced earlier research particularly strongly. According to him, the Crown implemented a policy of uniformity with respect to both judicial administration and the privileges of the nobility immediately after the Treaty of Stolbova.¹⁷ Prior research also suggested that it was possible to achieve such uniformity because an administrative tradition did not exist in Ingria. Moreover, the nobility in Ingria was unable to oppose the Swedish central government when it undertook different kinds of actions in the region after the Treaty of Stolbova. It has even been argued that Ingria lacked local and judicial administration and a local elite before 1617.¹⁸

However, these arguments are misleading. First, they fail to take the Russian bayors (ryssbajorer) into consideration. This group consisted of a few Russian noble families who entered Swedish service during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century. As local elite, the bayors were allocated various intermediary assignments by the Swedish Crown. In return, they received large land grants and were incorporated into the Swedish House of Nobility. The Russian bayors were not as powerful as the Noble Corporations (Ritterschaft) in Estonia (Estland) and Livonia (Livland), but they did oppose some of the central government’s actions.¹⁹ Binding local elites to the state was, of course, typical for rulers during the early modern period. It was almost impossible for a centralized power to rule without state servants, who controlled the collection of local taxes and were familiar with local conditions, particularly in peripheral border regions.²⁰

Second, administration in the Novgorod region of the Muscovite state during the 16th century was in fact relatively well developed.²¹ Interestingly, local administration in this area was quite similar to local administration in Sweden. Taxation, however, was different. It was not fixed; instead, the tax was estimated every year. In addition, large parts of Ingria were leased during the first years of Swedish rule.²²

It is misleading, therefore, to claim that the central government’s actions aimed at unifying Ingria completely and making it part of the realm. The actions of the Swedish central government were not particularly resolute or consistent, as its objective was not to unify the province with the core of Sweden but rather to organize the administration of Ingria to run as smoothly as possible.²³ In fact, the case of Ingria is a quite typical example of state formation at the time. Integrative actions were rarely preceded by well-planned visions; rather, they stemmed from the need for concrete actions in critical situations.²⁴

Swedish provincial policy towards the eastern Baltic provinces (Ingria, Kexholm County, Estonia, Livonia, and Ösel) was more or less passive in the middle of the 17th century.²⁵ In the late 17th century, however, the Crown started to impose more demands and heavier burdens on the provinces. This was mostly caused by the desperate financial situation of the Swedish state following the Scanian War (1675‒1679). At the same time, Charles XI sought to restrict the power of the Swedish high nobility, who opposed a more integrative provincial policy.²⁶ Similar integration processes occurred elsewhere in Europe during this period. Competition between European states forced rulers to centralize and unify their territories because larger armies and different kinds of military reforms demanded yet more resources. At the same time, the political situation in Europe was relatively stable, which made it possible for many states to concentrate on domestic reforms.²⁷

Reduction, tax farming, and the manorial economy

Sweden’s provincial policy towards Ingria in the late 17th century consisted of many administrative reforms. The reduction of estates, launched in Ingria in 1675, formed the basis for its integration and centralization policy. It is important to stress that centralization and unification were not the ultimate goals; instead, they were measures taken to strengthen Ingria’s financial situation and, above all, to bolster its military strength. These aspects appear distinctly in the reduction efforts and the initiation of tax farming and the Ingrian manorial economy, all of which are discussed in this section.

The reduction of estates (Sw. reduktionen) formed the basis for Sweden’s integration policy with respect to all its eastern Baltic provinces.²⁸ In Ingria, a commission led by Commissioner Daniel Tilas began reclaiming the various fiefs for the Crown in 1675. The most important aim was to improve the military capacity and preparedness of the province, especially with respect to supplying the fortresses. The commission operated in the province until 1679. In total, the commission restored approximately one-third of the cultivated land to the Crown.²⁹ This process was part of the so called fjärdepartsreduktionen (‘quarter reduction’) and was based on the reduction law of 1655, which stipulated that certain parts of the donated fiefs should be returned to the Crown.³⁰

The implementation of the fjärdepartsreduktionen was not an easy task for the commission because the Ingrian nobility had by this point become a powerful force to be reckoned with in Ingria. The nobility had become more organized when the Ingrian Noble Corporation (Ritter und Landschafft), including the noblemen from Kexholm County, was founded in 1642. It had a Baltic-German character and operated in the German language, as the number of noblemen of Baltic-German descent in Ingria had increased due to the enfeoffment policy adopted by Queen Christina. During her reign, vast areas of land had been donated as fiefs to officers and officials. The Ingrian nobility resisted the reduction efforts and sent a deputation to Stockholm in protest. However, King Charles XI and the central government refused to cancel the reduction. Instead, they decided to decrease the political power of the Ingrian Noble Corporation. In the beginning of the 1680s, the Diets (Lantdag) of the Ingrian Noble Corporation ended.³¹

The reduction of 1675 slightly eased the financial situation in Ingria, but it was the extension of the reduction and the initiation of tax farming that really improved the economy of the province. In 1680, the Great Reduction was implemented in Sweden. In 1683, it reached Ingria, and soon after that approximately two-thirds of the land in Ingria was confiscated by the Crown. This had a great impact on the province’s fiscal situation.³² Governor-General Sperling informed the king in 1684 that the province was now able to support itself for the first time.³³ In 1695, the land restored to the Crown provided the province with almost 90,000 dalers (daler silvermynt) in income. At that point, all of the land belonging to the Crown was leased.³⁴

Instead of creating a tax collection system of its own, the administration of the manors was privatized and the job assigned to leaseholders (Sw. arrendator). This was not a new phenomenon in Sweden: during the 1620s and 1630s, tax collection had been almost entirely privatized.³⁵ The first contracts between the Crown and those leasing the Crown manors in Ingria were signed in 1677.³⁶ However, the outcome was still far from clear, as Crown officials and Charles XI debated for almost a decade over how best to administer the fiefs confiscated by the Crown. Peasant representatives were also permitted to state their opinion. The peasants were very clear on one point: they hoped to get rid of their former landlords and remain under the Crown.³⁷

In addition, taxation was debated. In Ingria, as well as in Kexholm County, taxation was based on a non-fixed rent (Sw. arvning, Fi. arviovero). The taxable property and crops of the peasants were assessed annually and the taxes set based on the results of the assessment. The peasants did not in general like this system, as it lacked any form of stability. The peasants could not know how much tax they would have to pay the following year.³⁸ It is worth mentioning that the peasants were allowed to present their own arguments in various non-institutional negotiations. Later, Governor-General Sperling discussed in detail the non-fixed rent with the peasants at different locations in Ingria and Kexholm County.³⁹

Governor Henrik Piper, who was mainly responsible for economic matters, argued strongly for a solution that would satisfy the peasants, claiming that a fixed rent was absolutely necessary and that, ultimately, tax farming contracts should be cancelled. Piper initially had the support of Charles XI, but things changed when Göran Sperling was appointed governor-general in 1683. Sperling shared Piper’s view on the need for fixed rent because then the Ingrian people would be more closely connected to the Swedish Crown. However, Sperling preferred tax farming, in contrast to Piper. Sperling did not think that the Crown should collect the taxes or that conscriptions for the army were suitable in Ingria. The issue concerning the collection of taxes was resolved in 1684, when the Chamber College (Sw. Kammarkollegiet) ordered that the confiscated manors should be leased. Eventually Piper was made subordinate to and outmanoeuvred by Sperling, which ended Piper’s promising career.⁴⁰ A decade later, when Piper was working as an inspector at an iron works plant in Dalarna, he still complained about how Sperling had ruthlessly and relentlessly persecuted him (‘omilda, och hårda förföllielse’).⁴¹

Both Henrik Piper and Göran Sperling also argued for other kinds of reforms to be implemented in Ingria. The reforms aimed at integrating Ingria more closely with the core of the realm: Sweden and Finland. Piper suggested that, for example, local sheriffs and constables (Sw. läns- och fjärdingsmän) should work in the local administration, as in the core areas.⁴² Many of the economic reforms suggested by Piper had military aims. Carbines and pistols should be manufactured and manors should produce articles for the fortress garrisons.⁴³ Piper’s proposals strived for more or less total uniformity, while Sperling did not go that far in his suggestions. Like Piper, he aimed for integration, but in some respects he argued for arrangements that were more typical of provinces, with the foremost being tax farming and garrisons manned with conscripts from the core areas. Sperling’s suggestions were probably more attractive to the Crown; they did not require as much financial investment as did Piper’s model. It is important to bear in mind that one of the main goals of Sweden’s provincial policy was to improve the fiscal situation of the provinces. The central government emphasized on many occasions that Ingria had to be financially self-supporting rather than a fiscal burden for the state.⁴⁴

The centralization and unification policy in Ingria peaked in the middle of the 1680s. It consisted mainly of administrative reforms in judicial and city administration as well as a conversion policy targeting the Orthodox population. In addition, the Ingrian Noble Corporation was suppressed by the Crown. On a symbolic level, every nobleman, priest, and burgher in Ingria and Kexholm County had to swear an oath of loyalty to Charles XI in 1688.⁴⁵ According to the Estonian scholar Jaak Naber, the Swedish integration and centralization policy in the eastern Baltic provinces began in Ingria, which became a testing ground for later centralizing efforts taken in Estonia and Livonia.⁴⁶

The conversion policy was probably the most characteristic example of Sweden’s integration policy with respect to Ingria during the 1680s. The desire to achieve religious uniformity affected primarily the Izhorians and the Votes. They professed the Orthodox faith, but spoke Finno-Ugrian languages and did not usually understand Russian. Superintendent Johannes Gezelius and Governor-General Sperling initiated measures to segregate this group of people from the Orthodox Church. According to Gezelius, the Izhorians and the Votes were not ‘true Russians’ (rätte Ryssar) and had to be converted to Lutheranism.⁴⁷ However, the conversion policy led to protests among the Orthodox population. In addition, the tsar of Russia sent a note to Charles XI in August 1685 demanding he put a stop to such religious persecution. Consequently, Gezelius and Sperling had to ease up on the policy. Mika Sivonen concludes that the conversion policy can be described as a form of indirect discrimination; but it did not in the end destroy the Orthodox tradition.⁴⁸

The actual aims of Sweden’s provincial policy in the late 17th century have been discussed in previous studies. Jonas Nordin emphasizes cultural homogenization as an important means of promoting uniformity. Nordin, as well as Jerker Rosén and Stellan Dahlgren, stresses that the aim of integrating the provinces into the actual realm was implemented as a conscious effort.⁴⁹ Aleksander Loit has also called attention to the integration aspect of Sweden’s provincial policy and even suggested that the relation between the Crown and the eastern Baltic provinces included colonial elements.⁵⁰ Torbjörn Eng, in turn, has claimed that only political, administrative, and judicial homogenization were relevant at the time. However, the conglomerate state as a form of state was ultimately too weak to carry out such a demanding task.⁵¹ Kimmo Katajala, as well as Nils Erik Villstrand, has pointed out that there were considerable differences in how the provinces were governed, with the method varying on a case-by-case basis. In addition, Katajala has shown that the issue of creating cultural uniformity was not so simple. Regarding Kexholm County and Ingria, the migration of Lutheran Finns and the decision to subordinate Ingria to the Court of Appeal in Åbo (Turku) were both measures aimed at integrating Ingria more closely with Finland and, thereby, with the core of Sweden. Therefore, Finnification actually meant Swedification from the central government’s viewpoint.⁵²

In the case of Ingria, it is evident that the Crown strove to a degree for cultural uniformity, at least for confessional uniformity. In 1685, Charles XI was generally pleased that most issues in the province were being implemented according to ‘Swedish manners’ (Swenskt bruuk och maneer).⁵³ Likewise, administrative and judicial uniformity were on the agenda. However, the process was quite problematic. In many respects, Ingria still differed from the core territories of the Swedish Kingdom and was governed by methods typical of the eastern Baltic provinces.⁵⁴ It is also important to bear in mind that an integration process was put into practice throughout the Swedish Kingdom in the late 17th century.⁵⁵

The military aspects of Sweden’s provincial policy are of crucial importance, and clearly demonstrated in the correspondence of the Ingrian governors. The governors constantly emphasized the need to strengthen the fortresses and garrisons as Ingria was a border province and served as a buffer zone.⁵⁶ After all, Sweden’s defensive strategy in the eastern Baltic provinces relied on strong fortresses.⁵⁷ However, Ingria’s fortresses were in a state of disrepair and out of date at the beginning of the 1680s. In 1681, the Swedish fortification specialist Erik Dahlberg observed that both Narva and Nyen (Nyenskans, Fi. Nevanlinna) were in very bad condition.⁵⁸

Military arguments were explicitly made in relation to the reduction and the initiation of tax farming. The reduction order of 1675 stated that the income should be used to supply the fortresses and the troops stationed there.⁵⁹ In a border region like Ingria, it is evident that resources were supposed to serve the purposes of war or the preparation for war.⁶⁰ In other words, this confirms the arguments of Charles Tilly, Brian M. Downing, and Harald Gustafsson, among others, that the process of state formation was mostly driven by military demands.

The reduction and the initiation of tax farming meant that the Crown decided to rely on a manorial economy in order to extract monies earmarked mostly for military needs. Thus, the leaseholders were responsible for the collection of taxes and, in a way, functioned as the acting authority for the Crown. Most of the leaseholders were officers, civil officials, or former bailiffs.⁶¹ Ingria was the first province in the Swedish Kingdom in which tax farming was initiated; later, Kexholm County, Estonia, Ösel, and Livonia followed. Besides the eastern Baltic provinces, though, tax farming was not implemented in other parts of the Swedish Kingdom.⁶²

The changes made in the agrarian system in the 1670s and 1680s resulted in a somewhat original manorial economy in Ingria. During the last decades of Swedish rule, the number of manors (called in Sw. hov, Ge. hof or Fi. hovi in Ingria) and leaseholders increased and, all in all, the manorial economy became more intensive.⁶³ The manorial system in Ingria represents a mixture of the concepts of Grundherrschaft and Gutsherrschaft (demesne lordship), which are often used as a theoretical framework when researching manorial economic systems.⁶⁴ In Ingria, the fields of the manors were cultivated by peasants obligated to perform statute labour, which characterizes Gutsherrschaft. However, the economy of the manors still relied on rents paid by the peasants, which was typical of Grundherrschaft. In addition, the landlords and tax farmers had no judicial power over the peasants. The activities of leaseholders were regulated by the leasing contracts, even though the Crown could not control the tax farmers completely. Though the work done by the peasants was extensively controlled by the manors, they were not serfs. Swedish law forbade this.⁶⁵

An interesting issue in the Ingrian manorial economy is the position of the manorial officials and the degree to which they used violence against their tenants. The role of the manorial officials in the manorial economy and in the relations between peasants and authorities in general has often been overlooked.⁶⁶ Still, they played a key role in the manorial economy, as most of the landlords and some of the leaseholders did not reside on their manors. The manorial officials in Ingria consisted of three groups: inspectors (called inspector or hopman), bailiffs (amtman) and supervisors of a lower rank (kubias or solvanek). They represented a kind of intermediary lordship (Ge. Vermittelte Herrschaft), standing somewhere between a superior and a subordinate. The German scholar Otto Ulbricht has emphasized that the bailiffs handled most of the interactions between the manor and peasants, especially in periods of crisis.⁶⁷

For manorial officials, it was of the utmost importance to maintain strong authority over the peasants.⁶⁸ Still, the officials faced many challenges when balancing between different loyalties. Conflicts arose especially with respect to labour service. The peasants were not highly motivated to perform statute labour, and therefore the officials often had to resort to violence, which was allowed to a certain degree. Domestic discipline (Sw. husaga, Ge. Hauszucht) was used in Ingria in a similar manner as in other Baltic provinces. When peasants were treated violently, contemporary people spoke of the ‘Livonian practice’ (livländskt sätt) of exercising domestic discipline. In saying this, they were referring to the arbitrary methods often used by lords and superior manorial officials in Estonia and Livonia, who mostly were of Baltic-German descent (livländare).⁶⁹

The Baltic-Germans have been judged harshly in the historiographical literature. Historians have written about the ‘brutal rule of the German nobles in the Baltic provinces’ and even called them ‘a gang of robber barons’.⁷⁰ It is evident that fief holders in Ingria aspired to control their peasants in a similar manner to the nobility in Estonia and Livonia. Landlords were primarily irritated by deserting peasants and the mobility of the Ingrian population in general. Officials working for the central government could, however, prevent the attempts of the Ingrian nobility to increase their power over the peasants. In fact, the Swedish authorities regarded the ‘Livonian practice’ as a threat, especially the severe domestic discipline meted out via corporal punishment.⁷¹ During Charles XI’s integration policy, criticism of the ‘Livonian practice’ increased, and the Crown implemented many reforms in the eastern Baltic provinces aimed at improving the position of the peasants, even though serfdom itself was not abolished.⁷²

Interestingly, the peasants shared the fear of the Swedish Crown. In 1686, Ingrian peasants complained to the king that they were being treated in a ‘Livonian practice’.⁷³ It is, however, important to bear in mind that the ‘Livonian practice’ of treatment did not necessarily refer to the landlords’ ethnic origin, but rather to the unregulated arbitrary methods of coercion used in the manorial economy. Prior studies have found that many landlords and manorial officials of Swedish origin adopted the ‘Livonian pratice’.⁷⁴ This was also the case in Ingria, where the majority of the tax farmers and manorial officials were of Swedish or Finnish origin.⁷⁵

The reduction, and especially the initiation of tax farming, resulted in some changes in the manorial economy. The manorial economy became more intensive and control increased at the local level. From the Crown’s perspective, the aim was above all to improve the fiscal-military situation in the province. According to Ingrian account books (Sw. guvernementsböcker), military expenditures increased tremendously after the reduction, notably with respect to fortifications.⁷⁶ The transition to tax farming can be seen as a centralizing measure of the Crown, as resources were mobilized to benefit the manorial economy using tax farmers. Consequently, the centralization policy in Ingria was partly implemented through decentralization.

Peasant unrest

The people of Ingria reacted quite strongly to the effects of the centralization and unification policy. During the 1680s, there were numerous quarrels between peasants and Crown leaseholders, which the authorities investigated thoroughly. Moreover, the Orthodox population protested against the conversion policy. But could the peasants affect the integration measures initiated by the Swedish Crown, and what was the attitude of the authorities towards the peasant resistance? In short, what was the relationship between peasants and authorities in Ingria?

For the peasants, the reduction did not provide any relief, as the authorities became more visible than before. Tax farmers controlled their subordinated peasants more firmly and had an interest in collecting the taxes as stringently as possible; otherwise, their own economy would be at risk. After all, the tax farmers’ living was dependent upon the surplus received after paying the fixed annual sum collected from the peasants to the Crown.⁷⁷

Before the troublesome period of the 1680s, at least a few quarrels did occur on Ingrian manors. Unfortunately, not much is known about these earlier quarrels because, first, peasant unrest in Ingria has not received much scholarly attention and, second, the court records from Ingria have survived only from the year 1684 onwards. It seems, however, that unrest occurred almost immediately after the fjärdepartsreduktionen was launched in 1675. Not all of the quarrels took place on Crown manors. Interestingly, relations between peasants and authorities were also tense in some fiefs.⁷⁸

One of the most dramatic struggles took place on the Orboina manor in Koporje County, a fief administered by Lieutenant Gustaf Casimir von Spankow (Spandekow). The quarrel between Spankow and the peasants of Holopovitsa village was caused by a boundary dispute, which had been going on since at least 1668.⁷⁹ In the spring of 1682, the quarrel escalated to become a minor riot. Apparently, the peasants of Holopovitsa had been gathering hay and chopping wood on a disputed piece of land. Spankow responded by confiscating the villagers’ cattle. Soon afterwards, the peasants, armed with guns, axes, and spears, liberated their cattle by force. During the riot, Spankow was struck on the shoulder with an axe, while his servant fired some shots at the peasants.⁸⁰

After the riot, the quarrel continued for approximately five years. The case sheds light on many aspects of peasant unrest. The dispute was complicated precisely because the power structures at the local level were complex. The important role played by the manorial officials is clearly visible. The peasants of Holopovitsa were more or less defended by their bailiff (amtman), Henrik Orduska, which irritated both Spankow and Orduska’s superior, Inspector and Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Skantzenstierna. The court case also sheds light on how the ‘Livonian practice’ appeared in Ingria. Many peasants provided testimony in court of Spankow’s arbitrariness. According to the peasants, Spankow had beaten many of them. In addition, he had confiscated wood, hay, tools, and livestock, he had shot cows and one dog, and had tied some peasants up and hung them from the wall in handcuffs. Spankow used some of these methods to find out which of the peasants had attacked him during the riot. The court also tried to ascertain just who had participated in the riot. Ultimately, the peasants revealed the names of the participants together with bailiff Orduska, showing a good sense of tactical awareness. They blamed the peasant Tuomas Makkonen (Thomas Mackoin) for everything. The peasants of Holopovitsa attested to the fact that Makkonen had persuaded the others to free the cattle by force. For the peasants, Makkonen was a suitable scapegoat as he had already fled Ingria.⁸¹ The measures adopted by the peasants in court are a clear example of how the peasants took advantage of the location of the province near the border.

Regarding peasant resistance on leased Crown manors in Ingria, the so-called ‘Töllikkö trouble’ (Töllikes oväsende) must also be mentioned. The aged peasant Yrjö Töllikkö (Jören Töllickö) was one of most active peasant leaders in the mid-1680s. Töllikkö initially submitted a complaint to Governor-General Sperling in 1684, in Narva, complaining about inspector Lars Gamberg, who leased Putila (Putilova) manor in Loppis pogost, in Nöteborg County. When the complaint came to nothing, Töllikkö decided to complain to the king. He submitted a letter of grievance to the king in the autumn of 1685, in Stockholm. The complaint was written on behalf of all the peasants of Nöteborg County. The peasants complained about the arbitrary methods of Inspector Gamberg and others, indicating that the local officials likewise did not do justice to them. The peasants begged for help and support from the king and requested that a fixed rent be implemented. This time the Crown ordered a thorough investigation by the district court in Nöteborg County.⁸²

The complaints submitted by Yrjö Töllikkö were investigated in 1686. During the court case, Töllikkö revealed that he had talked with other members of the peasantry on many occasions, for example after performing service for the church, about the importance of obtaining a fixed rent. The court case also included numerous dramatic incidents. After one of the sessions in court, Töllikkö was stabbed by a drunk Gamberg. The wound was not serious, but the incident caused disorder among the peasants. Ultimately, Töllikkö was sentenced to run the gauntlet, and thereafter, to exile in Courland (in present-day Latvia) for issuing complaints that could not be proved and for instigating the people to revolt. The sentence did not, however, discourage Töllikkö. Instead, he returned to Ingria in the summer of 1687, apparently accompanied by many peasants along the road from Narva to Nyen. Shortly thereafter, Töllikkö once again travelled to Stockholm to complain in person. However, this is where the sources fall silent. It is unlikely that he ever returned to Ingria.⁸³

In addition to the complaints submitted by Yrjö Töllikkö, a great number of other complaints from Ingria were handed to the authorities in the mid-1680s, mostly to the governor-general in Narva. Usually the peasants complained about their leaseholders, although the Orthodox population also protested against the conversion policy. In addition to Töllikkö, the most important peasant leaders were the assistant vicar Matthias Moisander and his sidekick, Huotari, who was an Orthodox peasant. They mostly protested against the conversion policy, but also against the arbitrariness of the tax farmers and the non-fixed rent.⁸⁴ Interestingly, even though Moisander was a Lutheran vicar, he devoted himself to the cause of the Orthodox peasants. In the autumn of 1686, Moisander and Huotari submitted an extensive complaint to the king in Stockholm. The complaint consisted of 31 paragraphs and was signed by 181 peasants.⁸⁵

The numerous complaints from Ingria upset Governor-General Sperling. Charles XI required an explanation for the continuous criticism. The king also recommended that Sperling put a stop to the peasants being treated like slaves. Sperling admitted that some leaseholders had treated their peasants in the ‘Livonian practice’, but at the same time he labelled Moisander an agitator and the peasants disrespectful. However, the governor-general suggested that a commission should investigate the complaints.⁸⁶ A commission finally arrived in Ingria in the autumn of 1688 and dealt with a great number of complaints. After this, the situation in Ingria seemingly calmed down, even though conflicts on Ingrian manors still occurred. Another reason for the relative calm was that Huotari and Matthias Moisander were sentenced by the king to lifetime imprisonment and forced labour on Ingrian fortresses. In addition, Governor-General Sperling proclaimed in the summer of 1686 that the annually assessed non-fixed rent was to be abolished.⁸⁷

Thus, the countermeasures taken by the Crown were partly repressive, but at the same time the Crown made some concessions to the peasants. After a thorough investigation, the authorities implemented a kind of fixed tax, even though the most important leaders were convicted and given heavy sentences. This kind of ambivalence was typical of the Swedish central authorities, who were equally contradictory in their reactions to peasant unrest in the core areas of the Swedish realm.

When analysing the resistance in Ingria, it is evident that peasants used both legal and illegal methods when trying to obtain a fixed rent and to do away with the tax farming system. One typical legal method was to write complaints. However, there were many forms of illegal resistance, ranging from collective strikes to violent assaults and even minor riots. Yet the most common form of illegal resistance was passive protest. Typically, peasants mixed legal and illegal forms of resistance, for example by simultaneously submitting complaints and relying on passive protest.

The relationship between peasants and authorities in Ingria can, in turn, be analysed within the framework of the long-standing point of debate in Nordic historiography as to whether early modern peasant society was suppressed by the state machinery or whether it can be characterized as an interactive process.⁸⁸ The situation in Ingria demonstrates that bargaining was an essential part of the political culture in the Swedish provinces. Crown officials negotiated with the peasants and took their opinions into account. The protests also led to some positive results for the peasants. It is, however, evident that the state always had the upper hand.⁸⁹ The military aspect should be further emphasized. The Swedish military state was, above all, organized to supply the army and the navy.⁹⁰ To acquire the necessary resources, however, the state had to bargain with its subjects.

When further analysing the political culture of Ingria, it should be noted that there nevertheless were some significant differences compared to the situation in the actual realm. As the Ingrian peasants did not have access to the Diet, interaction between the peasants and the authorities relied to a greater degree on temporary institutions, such as commissions and different kinds of gatherings and assemblies. Submitting complaints was also an important feature of the local political culture. As a whole, the peasants were highly organized. In particular, trips to Stockholm required a great deal of planning and organization, as has been observed in previous studies.⁹¹ In addition, regional co-operation was extensive, as the peasant leaders collaborated with their peers in Karelia.

Overall, peasant unrest in Ingria bore major similarities with the riots in Kexholm County.⁹² Since both regions were unruly borderlands, the political culture comprised more elements of threat and violence, especially as domestic discipline was strict. Peasants, in turn, consistently took advantage of the permeable borders and were able to decrease the risks of illegal resistance by means of escaping to another region. In fact, borders were one of the most effective political weapons for the peasants. Desertion was not only a way to escape in difficult situations, but also a latent threat that the peasants employed to keep the taxes and duties at a bearable level.

Peasant unrest in Ingria was directly caused by the problems connected with the manorial economy. The non-fixed rent, the obligation to provide statute labour and the arbitrariness of the manorial officials especially irritated the peasants. Even though one of the objectives of Swedish provincial policy was to improve the position of peasants,⁹³ the Crown was not strong enough to replace the manorial economy and the system of privatized tax collection with an administration overseen by Crown officials. The system of tax collection in Ingria remained unstable because the peasants did not regard tax farming as a legitimate form of taxation. Indirectly, however, the aim of the Swedish Crown to strengthen its military presence in the province through a policy of centralization and unification can be seen as the fundamental reason behind the conflicts. Thus, tax farming provided a clear link between peasant unrest and state formation. The reduction, tax farming, and peasant unrest all contributed to the same array of problems, as Kimmo Katajala has suggested.⁹⁴

Commercial development

The position and significance of Ingria in the Swedish Kingdom can also be examined through the development of commerce and trade in the last decades of Swedish rule in Ingria. The commercial policy was one way for the Crown to strengthen Ingria fiscally, but it had consequences for the whole eastern part of the Baltic. How did the central government try to intervene with commercial development? What was the relationship between the military and trade objectives of the Swedish Crown?

For Sweden, control of the Baltic Sea was one of the most important objectives during its so-called Age of Greatness. Sweden’s central government tried to steer the transit trade between Russia and western Europe through the Ingrian towns of Nyen and Narva, and away from the trading routes of Archangelsk and the White Sea. This economic programme, called the Derivation policy, was a programme planned by Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna.⁹⁵

The cities of Narva and Nyen were key to the success of the Derivation policy. The Swedish Crown had high expectations for the development of these towns. Both Narva and Nyen were situated in excellent locations for trading purposes. For instance, in 1664 Counsellor Lorentz Creutz emphasized the ideal situation of Nyen because, according to him, there was no other town or port in the realm better situated for the Russian trade.⁹⁶ The broad hinterland of Nyen extended all the way to Karelia and north-western Russia. Overall, both Narva and Nyen were ethnically and linguistically quite heterogeneous, like Ingria in general. In both towns, however, the most powerful burghers came from a German or Baltic-German background.⁹⁷

The commercial aims of the Crown were partly fulfilled in the late 17th century. The central government tried to improve the conditions for trade through different kinds of tax and customs relief measures. Actually, the eastern part of the Baltic evolved into a free trade zone, as Nyen, Narva, and Reval constituted a common customs region with low customs tariffs. At the same time, there was a great demand for timber and other shipbuilding material (naval stores) in western Europe. Additionally, Sweden made some agreements and treaties both with Russia and the Netherlands during these years.⁹⁸

The burghers of Narva and Nyen had close contact particularly with the Netherlands. With the help of Dutch capital and professionals, new fine-blade sawmills and shipyards were established along the Narva and Neva rivers to make more timber available for shipment to the Netherlands. Consequently, timber exports and shipbuilding greatly increased, particularly in the 1690s.⁹⁹ According to the Sound Toll Registers, some 80 ships from Narva and 30 ships from Nyen sailed yearly through the Sound between 1681 and 1703. They were loaded with shipbuilding material and sailed mostly to Amsterdam, but also to England. Compared to other towns around the Gulf of Finland, approximately 40 ships sailed yearly from Reval during the same period, while only a dozen left the harbour of Viborg.¹⁰⁰ In addition, ships also sailed to other Baltic ports, particularly to Stockholm and Lübeck. In Nyen, roughly half of the ships that yearly left the port were Russian vessels (lodja) coming from Novgorod and other parts of north-western Russia, underscoring the pivotal role of Nyen in transit trade.¹⁰¹

Sweden’s unification policy in Ingria in the 1670s and 1680s also affected the towns. Nyen and especially Narva had a relatively strong German character as they were dominated by burgers of German or Baltic-German descent. To decrease the German influence, a ‘Swedification’ policy was implemented. Half of the city court judges (Sw. rådman) were supposed to be Swedes, and the Swedish language was supposed to be used during court sessions.¹⁰² The policy could be reinforced because both towns followed Swedish city law. In addition, Nyen had been founded on the Crown’s initiative and thus had no old privileges.¹⁰³

Narva and Nyen were thus judicially integrated Swedish towns and more or less administrated like other towns in Sweden and Finland. However, the Crown implemented a common commercial policy based on the Russian transit trade in Ingria and the Baltic provinces. In addition, the burghers were not represented in the Swedish Diet.¹⁰⁴ With respect to commerce and city administration, Ingria was partly integrated into the actual realm, but, at the same time, governed by methods typical for the eastern Baltic provinces.

The strategic position of Narva and Nyen for trade and military purposes was equally important, as they represented different sides of the same coin. This was clearly evident in a resolution made by Charles XI in 1679. The fortress of Nyenskans was to be strengthened in order to secure the kingdom, but also to increase trade.¹⁰⁵ The military presence secured the preconditions for trade. At the same time, strong and wealthy burghers benefited the Crown, for example by generating customs incomes and providing possibilities to loan money in times of crisis. Overall, military and economic factors were intertwined, like in many commercially important border cities.

The position of Ingria

Ingria was of pivotal military importance for Sweden as a buffer zone against Russia. The Ingrian fortresses were supposed to protect Finland as well as the Baltic provinces from a Russian attack. Consequently, the income that the state gained from the reduction and from initiating tax farming was almost entirely invested in Ingrian fortresses. A strong military presence was also essential for securing the preconditions for trade.

Clearly, the actions of the Ingrian peasants had consequences in terms of how state power was manifested at the local level. In Ingria, their contribution led to modifications of the taxation system and also affected the way in which tax farming was regulated and helped moderate the state’s religious policy. This supports the findings of Harald Gustafsson, who has claimed that competition between states was the main driving force in the state-building process, but that it was ‘common people’ who shaped such competition.¹⁰⁶ In addition to staging protests, the peasants also participated in non-institutional negotiations with the authorities. Hence, the Ingrian peasants were extended political power.¹⁰⁷ Negotiations were important for the legitimacy of the Crown, while they gave the peasants a chance to speak up, particularly since they lacked representation in the Swedish Diet. Even though the state dominated the negotiations, the ‘common people’ certainly played a role in the process.

The Crown needed resources to maintain and improve its military power, but it was done in continuous negotiation with the subjects of the king. Therefore, the Swedish state can be described as a bargaining military state (Sw. förhandlande militärstat). Unlike the traditional view of the state-building process, it was expressly the peasantry who challenged the intentions of the central government in Ingria, instead of the local elite. The Ingrian nobility did oppose some of the central government’s actions, but it was particularly the mobility of the local peasants that posed problems for the authorities. In this respect, Ingria can be characterized as an unruly borderland.

In the 1670s and 1680s, the Crown attempted to integrate Ingria more closely into the realm. Uniformity was sought both in terms of administration and the judicial system, as well as at a cultural level. Still, the main goal was to strengthen the province militarily and fiscally. It was important that Ingria should be financially self-sufficient. The Crown was nevertheless not strong enough to carry out a coherent integration process, which is clearly demonstrated by the initiation of tax farming.¹⁰⁸ Thus, Ingria was still treated as a province; but in another respect, it occupied a continuously changing position between the actual realm and the provinces. The intermediary position of Ingria appears, for example, in regard to commerce and the administration of the Ingrian towns. Both Narva and Nyen followed Swedish city law, but they were not controlled as closely as towns in the core areas of the realm. The position of Ingria as a link between the core areas of Sweden and the Baltic provinces is also quite visible with respect to the manorial economy, in which Swedish law collided with the ‘Livonian practice’ of exercising domestic discipline.

Previous studies have treated Sweden as a representative example of a power state. In Ingria, the Crown succeeded in increasing revenues, mostly through the reduction and tax farming. In addition, authorities managed to resolve the turbulent situation existing in the mid-1680s. However, the Swedish Kingdom also exhibited certain symptoms of a powerless state on its periphery. The successful integration of the Orthodox peasants into the realm remained an unresolved issue. First and foremost, authorities faced constant difficulties in controlling the peasants, particularly because of their great mobility and use of borders.

Archival sources

Finnish National Archives, Helsinki (FNA)

• Avkortningsböcker för Ingermanland 1678, 1688–1696, vol. 9735, 9759–9791.

• Guvernementsböcker för Ingermanland 1674–1688, 1695, vol. 9723–9757, 9785.

• Riksregistraturet 1685 (copy).

• Koporje district court, Kaprio KO a 1–KO a 2.

Swedish National Archives, Stockholm (SNA)

• Livonica II: vol. 183, 186, 188 (microfilm, FNA).

• Livonica II: vol. 209, 215, 484, 651.

• Kammarkollegium 263, mf.

• Reduktionskollegium E II:2.

• Livländska donationskontoret D I c:3.

• Dahlbergska samlingen B:6a, E 3498.

Swedish Military Archives, Stockholm (SMA)

• Försvars- och befästningsplaner 7.

Databases

Sound Toll Registers online. www.soundtoll.nl

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kasper Kepsu

Kasper Kepsu, born 1978, is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki. He completed his PhD thesis, Den besvärliga provinsen. Reduktion, skattearrendering och bondeoroligheter i det svenska Ingermanland under slutet av 1600-talet, in 2014. Address: Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 59, Unionsgatan 38 A, FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland. [email: [email protected]]

Notes

1 Compare, e.g., Öhlander, Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning; von Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista.

2 Compare Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 450; Lamberg and Hakanen, ‘Afterword: Beyond Space’, 376–8.

3 Swedish National Archives (SNA). Livonica II: 183, mf, Governor-General Jacob Johan Taube to Charles XI, 17 July 1678 and 23 June 1679; SNA. Livonica II: 188, mf, Governor-General Göran Sperling to Charles XI, 26 September 1689.

4 See particularly Öhlander, Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning, 15, 25–6, 165, 196; von Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’, 410; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, 54–5. See also Roberts, Swedish Imperial Experience, 89–90. Michael Roberts describes Ingria as ‘Sweden’s Botany Bay’.

5 Roberts, Swedish Imperial Experience, 86.

6 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 75; Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 273–4, 310–12, 338, 382, 398–9, 449; Saloheimo, ‘Inkerinmaan asutus ja väestö 1618–1700’, 73–4.

7 SNA. Livonica II: 186, mf, Governor-General Göran Sperling to Charles XI, 20 March 1684; SNA. Kammarkollegium 263, mf, Governor-General Göran Sperling to the Chamber College, 3 February 1688.

8 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 48, 83–90; Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 249, 279, 309–11, 371.

9 Newman, ‘Lines that Continue’, 150–1.

10 Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’. 84–90.

11 Baud and Van Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’, 219, 227–9.

12 Tilly, ‘Entanglements of European Cities’, 10–11; Downing, Military Revolution, 3–14, 56–83, 254; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 14–31.

13 Gustafsson, Makt och människor, 12–13, 151–7, 170–82, 212–14, 226–7. Charles Tilly also stresses the importance of bargaining; see Tilly, ‘Entanglements of European Cities’, 10–11; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 99–103.

14 Gustafsson, Makt och människor, 12–14; Gustafsson, ‘Conglomerate State’, 193–7.

15 See Persson, Gränsbygd och svenskkrig, 11.

16 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 55–8. For more on the structure of and terminology used to describe the Swedish conglomerate state, see also Gustafsson, ‘Sverige som partner’, 10‒22; Katajala, Suurvallan rajalla, 13–20, 224–38; Eng, Det svenska väldet.

17 Rosén, ‘Statsledning och provinspolitik’, 238–9, 249.

18 Compare, e.g., Sandberg, ‘State and the Integration’, 21–2; Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk, 73; Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, 42; Roberts, Swedish Imperial Experience, 89; Lundkvist, ‘Experience of Empire’, 43; Rosén, ‘Statsledning och provinspolitik’, 238–9, 249.

19 For a more thorough discussion, see Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 58–63, 300–1. See also Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Iz Rostova v Ingermanlandiju’.

20 Norrby, Ordnade eliter, 28–31; Lappalainen, Suku, valta, suurvalta, 17–20; Baud and Van Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’, 217–18; Reinhard, ‘Introduction: Power Elites’, 6–7; Mączak, ‘Nobility-State Relationship’, 189, 198–206.

21 Löfstrand, ‘Sverige och Novgorod’; Bodin, Idéer och identiteter, 131.

22 Katajala, ‘Differentiering och unifiering’, 146–50, 160; Katajala, Suurvallan rajalla, 22–8, 236; Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Iz Rostova v Ingermanlandiju’, 370; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, 81–5; Melander, Kuvaus Suomen oloista, 68–71.

23 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 57-63.

24 Villstrand, Sveriges historia, 147–8; Gustafsson, Makt och människor, 115, 146.

25 For the provincial policy, see, for example, Tuchtenhagen, ‘Kapitulationen von 1710‘; Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 327–30.

26 Tuchtenhagen, ‘Kapitulationen von 1710‘, 46‒53; Laidre, Segern vid Narva, 37.

27 Gustafsson, Makt och människor, 113–15; Tilly, ‘Entanglements of European Cities’, 10–11; Downing, Military Revolution, especially 56–83; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 14–31, 76–84.

28 Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, 120.

29 For more on the implementation of the fjärdepartsreduktion in Ingria, see Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 111‒25, 133‒4. This part of the reduction has not been examined thoroughly in earlier research. Apart from the author of this article, Arne Munthe has also written about the reduction in Ingria in 1675; see Munthe, Kristinas och reduktionens historia, XII, 134, 307–14.

30 For more on the fjärdepartsreduktionen, see Munthe, Kristinas och reduktionens historia, 111–12.

31 Kepsu, Mellan Moskva och Stockholm, 94‒101, 138‒51; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 70–1, 97–8, 109–10, 114–32.

32 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 157–62.

33 SNA. Livonica II: 186, mf, Governor-General Göran Sperling to Charles XI, 17 April 1685.

34 Finnish National Archives (FNA). Leasing contracts in Ingria, Guvernementsbok för Ingermanland 1695, vol. 9785, 392, 662, 978; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 157–61.

35 Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu.

36 FNA. Leasing contracts in Nöteborg County, Avkortningsbok för Ingermanland 1678, vol. 9735, 108–25.

37 SNA. Reduktionskollegium E II:2, Proposal by the peasants in Nöteborg County, 10 March 1676; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 134–42.

38 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 104‒6.

39 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 281–2; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 101.

40 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 82, 149–54, 158; Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 429–32; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 89–92.

41 SNA. Dahlbergska samlingen B:6a, E 3498, Governor Henrik Piper to Field Marshal Erik Dahlberg, 21 July 1696.

42 SNA. Livonica II: 215, Memorandum by Governor Henrik Piper (undated).

43 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 153–4.

44 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 100, 114–15 with references; Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, 179; Lundkvist, ‘Experience of Empire’, 22–3.

45 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 92‒9, 292.

46 Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, 120. Jonas Nordin presents similar arguments; see Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk, 430–1.

47 Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, especially 90–128. See also Laasonen, Vanhan ja uuden rajamaastossa, 169–91, 254–5; Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik.

48 Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’, especially 225–6.

49 Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk, 430–8. See also Dahlgren, ‘Der schwedische Absolutimus’, 24–7; Rosén, ‘Statsledning och provinspolitik’. On different dimensions of the integration policy, see Lerbom, Mellan två riken, 18.

50 Loit, ‘Die baltischen Länder’, 74–81.

51 Eng, Det svenska väldet, 45. Karl Bergman presents similar results; see Bergman, Makt, möten, gränser, 366–7. In a similar manner, Ralph Tuchtenhagen stresses the consolidation of the Swedish political system as the main goal; see Tuchtenhagen, ‘Kapitulationen von 1710‘, 62.

52 Katajala, ‘Differentiering och unifiering’, 147–59. See also Villstrand, Sveriges historia, 314.

53 FNA. Riksregistraturet 1685, 224–224v, Charles XI to Governor-General Göran Sperling, 2 May 1685.

54 Compare Katajala, ‘Differentiering och unifiering’, 159–61; Katajala, Suurvallan rajalla, 233–6.

55 Bergman, Makt, möten, gränser, 362.

56 Compare, e.g., SNA. Livonica II: 651, Memorandum by Governor-General Simon Grundel-Helmfelt to the Ingrian Noble Corporation, 10 January 1660; SNA. Livonica II: 651, Memorandum by Governor-General Jacob Johan Taube to the Ingrian Noble Corporation, 27 May 1678.

57 Laidre, Segern vid Narva, 34–6.

58 Swedish Military Archives (SMA). Försvars- och befästningsplaner 7, Report by Director-General of Fortifications Erik Dahlberg, 10 December 1681. See also Lappalainen, Sadan vuoden sotatie, 130–1.

59 SNA. Livländska donationskontoret D I c:3, Charles XI to the Reduction College, 22 July 1675.

60 Forssberg, ‘Final Argument’, 172; Lappalainen, Jumalan vihan ruoska, 60; Nilsson, De stora krigens tid, 9.

61 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 141–5; Katajala, ‘Peasant Unrest and Political Culture’, 178.

62 Katajala, ‘Peasant Unrest and Political Culture’, 178.

63 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 170, 307.

64 Cerman, ‘Demesne Lordship’, 239–40, 257; Sundberg, Stat, stormakt och säterier, 20–1.

65 For a more thorough study of the manorial economy in Ingria, see Kepsu, ‘Godsdrift och tjänstemän’.

66 Sundberg, Stat, stormakt och säterier, 295; Ulbricht, ‘Von Vogt zum Bittsteller’, 123.

67 Ulbricht, ‘Von Vogt zum Bittsteller’, 137–9.

68 Haikari, Isännän, Jumalan ja rehellisten miesten edessä, 52–3, 176–7.

69 Soom, ‘Fogden och herrgårdsmiljön’, 87‒9. For more on the violence against peasants in the Baltic provinces, see Seppel, ‘Vägivalla piirid pärisorjuslikes suhetes’.

70 Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, 199; Mączak, ‘Nobility-State Relationship’, 202.

71 See, e.g., SNA. Livonica II: 209, Governor-General Göran Sperling to Charles XI, 29 January 1687; SNA. Livonica II: 186, mf, Governor-General Göran Sperling’s proposal for organising the economic conditions in Ingria, 18 April 1684. See also Kujala, ‘Swedens’s Russian Lands’, 550–1; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 83‒5; Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 349‒50; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 101–3; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, 100‒2.

72 Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 207‒15, 322‒3; Zetterberg, Viron historia, 206‒13; Seppel, ‘“Aadel ei voi türanniseerida talupoegi nii nagu tahab”’, 19−35. The position of the peasants in the Baltic provinces during the last decades of Swedish rule has been much debated.

73 SNA. Livonica II: 209, Complaint of Assistant Vicar Matthias Moisander and Ingrian and Karelian peasants to Charles XI (undated, received 11.11.1686).

74 Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 149; Zetterberg, Viron historia, 207; Roberts, Swedish Imperial Experience, 114.

75 Of the tax farmers, slightly more that 40% were of German or Baltic-German origin, while scarcely 20% of the superior manorial officials were of German or Baltic-German descent. See Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 182‒4, 306.

76 FNA. Guvernementsböcker för Ingermanland 1674–1688, vol. 9723–9757. During the years 1674–1682, the expenditures for fortifications were annually about 17,000 silver dalers, while in 1683 expenditures had increased to 25,000 and in 1688 to 59,000 silver dalers. See also Kujala, ‘Viipurin Karjala’, 428.

77 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 307; Katajala, ‘Peasant Unrest and Political Culture’, 178‒9; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 88, 96–7, 121–3.

78 For example, the persistent struggle between Lieutenant Simon Örtken and the peasants of Haapakangas began in 1677; see Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 238–43; Forsström, Kuvaus Inkerinmaan oloista, 117–19.

79 FNA. Kaprio KO a 1, Koporje district court, Quarrel between Lieutenant Gustaf Spankow and the peasants from Holopovitsa, 1–34. Holopovitsa village was not a part of Spankow’s fief; instead, it was included in a fief that belonged to the heirs of count Ture Gabrielsson Oxenstierna.

80 FNA. Kaprio KO a 1, Koporje district court, 11 July 1682, 1; FNA. Kaprio KO a 2, Koporje district court, 17 December 1685, 283v.

81 FNA. Kaprio KO a 1, Koporje district court, Quarrel between Lieutenant Gustaf Spankow and the peasants from Holopovitsa, 1–34; FNA. Kaprio KO a 2, Koporje district court, 20–25 July 1685, 193v–197; FNA. Kaprio KO a 2, Koporje district court, 17 December 1685, 286v–290; Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 181‒2, 189‒210.

82 SNA. Livonica II: 186, mf, Complaint of Yrjö Töllikkö to Governor-General Göran Sperling (undated); Complaint of Yrjö Töllikkö to Charles XI (undated); Governor-General Göran Sperling to District Judge Philip Magnus Rosenlindt, 9 December 1685. All documents annexed to Governor-General Göran Sperling’s report on Yrjö Töllikkö to Charles XI, 12 October 1687. See also Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 250–7.

83 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 258–69, with references.

84 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 243‒9, 266‒78. The protests against the conversion policy are well researched. Compare Laasonen, Vanhan ja uuden rajamaastossa, 169–91, 254–5; Sivonen, ‘Me inkerikot, vatjalaiset ja karjalaiset’; Isberg, Svensk segregations- och konversionspolitik.

85 SNA. Livonica II: 209, Complaint of Assistant Vicar Matthias Moisander and Ingrian and Karelian peasants to Charles XI (undated, received 11.11.1686).

86 SNA. Livonica II: 209, Governor-General Göran Sperling to Charles XI regarding the complaint of Assistant Vicar Matthias Moisander and the Ingrian and Karelian peasants, 16 December 1686; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 196‒7.

87 Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 280‒94; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 407.

88 This debate is also connected to the question of why no large-scale peasant revolts took place in Sweden (including Finland) after the Club War in the 1590s. For the discussion, see Kepsu, Den besvärliga provinsen, 29‒36; Haikari, Isännän, Jumalan ja rehellisten miesten edessä, 18–24; Katajala, ‘Changing Face of Peasant Unrest’, 160‒1.

89 See especially Villstrand, Sveriges historia, 259‒60.

90 Forssberg, ‘Final Argument’, 172; Lappalainen, Jumalan vihan ruoska, 60; Nilsson, De stora krigens tid, 9.

91 Seppel, ‘Liivi- ja Eestimaa talupoegade kaebereisid Stockholmi’; Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 183, 401–2.

92 Compare Katajala, ‘Changing Face of Peasant Unrest’, 178‒81; Katajala, Nälkäkapina.

93 See Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 209‒15.

94 Katajala, Nälkäkapina, 88, 173–4, 397–409.

95 Troebst, Handelskontrolle; Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 280–2; Kotilaine, Russia’s Foreign Trade, 145–78.

96 SNA. Livonica II: 484, Counsellor Lorentz Creutz to Charles XI’s Regency Council, 14 June 1664.

97 Troebst, Handelskontrolle, 159–64; Lotman, ‘Die Kirchenstreit’, 11–12, 21–2; Küng, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen’, 92, 103; von Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’, 408–10.

98 Tarkiainen and Tarkiainen, Provinsen bortom havet, 281–6; Küng, ‘Die schwedische Ostseepolitik’; Zetterberg, Viron historia, 215, 225–8.

99 Küng, ‘Die schwedische Ostseepolitik’, 94–9.

100 Sound Toll Registers, www.soundtoll.nl (accessed 28 April 2017).

101 FNA. Avkortningsböcker för Ingermanland 1688–1696, vol. 9759–9791, Portorium records for Nyen.

102 Naber, Motsättningarnas Narva, 102–42.

103 Lotman, ‘Die Kirchenstreit’, 22; Küng, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen’, 98–9.

104 Sandberg, ‘State and the Integration’, 22–4; Küng, ‘Die Entwicklung der Stadt Nyen’, 99–100.

105 Charles XI’s resolution, 4 June 1679, in von Bonsdorff, ‘Nyen och Nyenskans’, 479–84.

106 Gustafsson, Makt och människor, 12–13, 151–7, 170–82, 212–14, 226–7; te Brake, Shaping History, 7–8, 112, 164–5, 188.

107 Compare with Bergman, Makt, möten, gränser, 280.

108 Compare with Eng, Det svenska väldet, 45.