Turning towards the inland sea? Swedish ’soft diplomacy‘ towards the Baltic Soviet republics before independence

ABSTRACT

The period of relative openness in the Soviet Union from the mid 1980s provided an opportunity for Sweden to establish contacts with the neighbouring Baltic Soviet republics. The political situation on both sides did not allow any direct diplomatic relations, and all endeavours had to be taken with utmost care. While modest at first, even programmatically so, these initiatives served to establish links with the independence movements in the Baltic republics. Besides the Local consular branch of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Leningrad, often acting without clear instructions from Stockholm, the Swedish government preferred to channel its first contacts with the Baltic republics through its primary institution for cultural and public diplomacy, the Swedish Institute (SI), later supplanted in this role by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). In their low profile, these activities can be analysed as early examples of the ‘soft diplomacy’ which have characterized later Baltic-Nordic ‘new regionalism.’. Drawing upon archival materials of the SI, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and interviews with key actors, this article shows how Swedish outreach to the Baltic republics was probed by Swedish diplomacy under considerable uncertainty of the development in the Eastern Baltic Sea region.

KEYWORDS:

• Baltic republics
• soft diplomacy
• Soviet Union
• Sweden
• Swedish Institute

Introduction

Cold War Swedish neutrality implied foreign policy activism, under Social Democratic as well as centre-right governments. Swedish diplomatic activity and development aid frequently addressed global North-South issues. Key issues involved national liberation across the Global South, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-free zones, environmental issues and human rights in Europe and elsewhere.¹ Yet, in its position on East-West tensions – especially in its immediate neighbourhood around the Baltic Sea – Sweden took a more cautious stand, not only in recognition of regional Soviet supremacy but also in an explicit ambition to not imperil global super power détente by unsettling the regional balance-of-power system – the so-called ‘Nordic balance.’²

Despite this Swedish circumspection, Swedish–Soviet relations took a turn for the worse from the early 1980s onwards during the so-called second Cold War.³ A variety of bilateral issues – ranging from Swedish concerns with submarine intrusions, industrial espionage, fishing rights and border disputes in the Baltic Sea to Soviet suspicions of clandestine Swedish intelligence and military collaboration with USA and NATO⁴ – continued to trouble Swedish–Soviet relations under the successive Social Democratic governments of Olof Palme (1982–1986) and Ingvar Carlsson (1986–1991), respectively.⁵

However, since the mid-1980s General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sought to alleviate Soviet dilemmas through external détente and internal reforms opening up the space for protest movements across the Soviet Union, not the least in the Baltic republics.⁶ The delicate Soviet–Swedish relationship clamoured for renegotiation and for the first time since the end of the Second World War, Sweden had to officially reconsider the status of the Baltic republics as well as its own position in the wider Baltic Sea Region. This situation involved opportunities as well as risks, reflecting not only global and regional security issues but also deep divides within Swedish domestic politics and public debate regarding Sweden’s international role.⁷

Given that the eventual outcomes of both Gorbachev’s reforms and the calls towards Baltic independence were highly uncertain at this point, the Swedish government sought to tread carefully, ostensibly to not interfere in the internal affairs of the neighbouring superpower. In the Nordic co-operation, relations with the Baltic republics were not mentioned until around 1990/91, evidently with some consideration of ‘the Finnish reservation’ [förbehåll].⁸ Some observers – often of liberal or conservative leanings – have compared this cautious approach with the enthusiastic Swedish support for national liberation in Namibia, Nicaragua, Palestine and South Africa in the same time period. It can also be contrasted with the remarkable extension of Swedish commitment to the independent Baltic states by later Swedish governments of Carl Bildt (1991–1994), Ingvar Carlsson (1994–1996) and Göran Persson (1996–2006) once the Soviet Union/Russia pulled back.⁹

This article, by contrast, shows how Swedish outreach to the Baltic republics had been probed by Swedish diplomacy already since the mid-1980s. Having established sub-consulates in the Baltic republics, formally under the Leningrad office which could be used for contacts with various segments of Baltic civil society,¹⁰ the Swedish government additionally sought to develop new channels to the Baltic republics through its primary institution for cultural and public diplomacy, SI. As the level of engagement increased, and the prospects for independence increased towards 1991 the SI was supplanted in this role by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). Admittedly, these initiatives were low-level and carefully organized to not provoke the Soviet Union into clamping down upon the Baltic independence movement or to cut off its burgeoning ties with the West. Nevertheless, these modest measures arguably contributed to shoring up the international links of the independence movements in the Baltic republics.¹¹

In their low profile, these activities can be analysed as early examples of the ‘low politics’ and ‘soft diplomacy’ (see below) which has characterized later Baltic-Nordic ‘new regionalism’.¹² In addressing the course of this process on the Swedish side, the aim of this article to uncover the complex relationship between official Swedish positioning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the development of various forms of soft diplomacy in the Swedish outreach to the Baltic republics as handled by the Swedish Institute. First, the backdrop of Baltic–Swedish relations and the institutional setup of Baltic-Swedish contacts at the close of the Cold War is outlined. Second, the evolution and coordination of soft diplomacy measures between SI, SIDA and the Swedish MFA is followed. Third and finally, the evolution of these contacts as a case study of small state soft power in an era of profound geopolitical change and regional regime uncertainty is analysed.¹³

Theoretical discussion

Unlike an ordinary policy analysis, this study is focusing on a mediator of messages in the form of contacts, visits, exchanges and information, the Swedish Institute and eventually the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). Being institutions formally, but indirectly, linked to the Swedish government through its ministries, they acted in concertation with the Government, mainly through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its local representatives working from Leningrad who often had to make decisions under volatile situations without clear instructions from Stockholm. On the political Swedish side, the hierarchy and formal ’pecking order’ is far from clear – and this was also used in order to make the Swedish Institute seem more independent than it was, at the same time as the rapid and volatile development in the Baltic Republics opened for improvisation.

The means to perform a policy towards the Soviet republics was, however, mainly through what can be called soft power. In his book, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, underlines that in international politics, the resources that produces soft power arise in large parts from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the example set by its international practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Nye also emphasizes the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society in the success in soft power.¹⁴

In his article (2008), Nicolas J Cull, mentions five constituent parts of a Public Diplomacy; listening; analysing the receiving part, advocacy; to communicate one’s ideas, culture; to promote art and humanistic values, exchange; of people, and international broadcasting.¹⁵ While Cull is mainly prescriptive, Nye and followers are analysers of actual behaviour. In the present case, evidence will show how much of decisions were made against a judgement of risks and possibilities. In a way, the incrementalism model advocated by Charles Lindblom seems appropriate to describe the situation, but secondary sources (Ahlander and particularly Fredén) indicate that the MFA and the Government rarely made a consistent strategy analysis for its Baltic policies, rather corresponding to Lindblom’s concept of ‘muddling through’.¹⁶

In the following, the background to the Swedish handling of relations with the Soviet Baltic Republics until 1986 will be discussed, followed by a study of the decisions and actions taken during the last years of Soviet power in the Baltics, focusing on the role of the Swedish Institute as a mediator of ‘soft power’.¹⁷

Forgotten neighbours: probing Baltic–Swedish relations in the shadow of the cold war

Baltic–Swedish relations at the close of the Cold War were fundamentally determined by historical events as well as experiences of migration. After 1940, Sweden de facto and de jure accepted the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states. The Soviet offensive in 1944/45 led to an almost total exodus to Sweden of ethnic Estonian Swedes,¹⁸ as well as the escape of Estonians, Latvians and some Lithuanians to Sweden – some 40,000 persons in total.¹⁹ Among the Axis military personnel interned in Sweden in 1945, there were some hundred Balts, mainly Latvians who had voluntarily or involuntarily joined the German forces. Upon Soviet demand, they were extradited by Sweden to the Soviet Union in January 1946 under strong protests from themselves and from Swedish media. Sweden accepted the Soviet point of view that civilian ethnic Russians, ‘Ingrians’ (i.e. Soviet Finns from the Leningrad area) and Balts were Soviet citizens, but Sweden defended their right to decide if to return or not. The majority either stayed or emigrated further ‘West’.²⁰ While Swedish intelligence services initially sought to maintain contacts with the opposition in the Baltic states, contacts forged already during the German occupation,²¹ these attempts soon faded and the exiled Balts in Sweden generally kept a low political profile in the postwar years (with Swedish governmental pressure), while establishing socio-economically successful exile communities in Sweden.²²

Most Baltic refugees in Sweden were of Estonian origin. Estonia, as well as the other Baltic republics, were largely isolated from contacts with the ‘Western world’, including Sweden. When the Soviet Union suggested a treaty of cultural exchange with Sweden in 1960, the Swedish government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén, defended the independence of the cultural sphere, wary of earlier Soviet initiatives such as Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Sea of Peace’ rhetoric in the mid-1950s.²³ Instead, the Swedish Institute (SI) was given the responsibility to sign programmes of cultural and educational exchange with other countries, particularly so-called states of state-run economy, i.e. socialist or communist countries.²⁴ The resulting programmes were negotiated and signed every two to four years, and typically included stipulations on cultural and educational exchanges, grants, scholarships and paragraphs on exhibitions.²⁵ Furthermore, in 1968, 1975 and 1980, respectively, several Swedish academies (formally separate from the state) entered into agreements on scientific exchange with the Soviet Academy of Science. None of these made any specific mention of the Baltic republics, however.²⁶

In the meantime, a modest semi-official institutional infrastructure concerned with Baltic issues emerged in Sweden. In 1970, for example, the Baltic Institute was founded as an independent and non-political Swedish organization, receiving grants from government ministries,²⁷ from 1985 through regular government funding.²⁸ In 1980, the Centre for Baltic Studies was inaugurated at Stockholm University, based on a government grant.²⁹ The Centre concentrated upon scientific matters, while the Institute focused upon the culture of the Baltic states and its diaspora.³⁰

During this time, explicit support for Baltic independence was mostly heard from Baltic exiles groups in Sweden. While sympathy for the occupied Baltic countries was initially widespread in the early Cold War, these sentiments were gradually marginalized to Swedish political groups on the right. The political aspect of Swedish–Soviet relations and the right-wing connection made Baltic topics even more sensitive in Swedish public debate. The central organizations of the Estonians and Latvians in Sweden had relatively weak contacts with the parliamentary parties of Sweden, despite certain exile and second-generation members of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, such as Johannes Mihkelson and Brūno Kalniņš for example. The only explicit mention of Balts in Sweden to be discussed in the Swedish Parliament during this time concerned the question of dual citizenship, as the Soviet Union considered exiled Balts as Soviet citizens.³¹

Baltic independence played an insignificant role in Swedish public debate – with at least one notable exception: On the national day of independent Estonia on 24 February 1980, the chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party – then in opposition – former Prime Minister (1969–1976) Olof Palme made a speech condemning the deprivation of Baltic independence by a great power, mentioning also that Estonians would rather prefer a nuclear power station than having certain foreigners on their soil.³²

Following this bold statement, discussions about Swedish policies towards the Baltic republics increasingly became subsumed under the growing tensions between the strongly anti-Soviet Moderate Party and the ruling Social Democratic Party. To the former, Swedish national security interests were best guaranteed by making a firm stand against Soviet assertiveness. To the latter, Soviet–Swedish relations needed to be seen in the light of regional Nordic balance and global superpower relations. Here, Swedish firmness against the Soviet Union was assumed to result in Soviet pressures towards Finland, unsettling the balance. Additionally, the Social Democrats maintained some expectations that the state-controlled economies in the Soviet orbit would provide Sweden export opportunities, especially in the wake of the second oil crisis. Thus, from the Swedish government’s perspective, recent Soviet glasnost and perestroika provided both political risks for the Nordic balance as well as opportunities for commercial and cultural contacts with the Soviet Union, and not the least with the proximate Baltic republics.³³

First steps: formulating Swedish soft diplomacy towards the Baltic republics

When a new program of cultural and educational exchange between the Swedish Institute and the Soviet Union was discussed at the MFA in the beginning of 1984, Soviet–Swedish relations were thus highly complicated. Nevertheless, there were also possible opportunities at hand. The Head of the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of Information, Dag Sebastian Ahlander, suggested that the Swedes should seek to emphasize the importance of contacts with areas close to Sweden under Soviet control, i.e. ‘Baltikum’,³⁴ in the new program to be negotiated in Moscow.³⁵ At the negotiations in January 1985 about the program for 1985/86 wishes for an improvement of institutional contacts with especially Tallinn and Riga were verbally presented to the representatives from the Cultural Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.³⁶ In 16–22 September 1985, the Director of the Swedish Institute, Anders Clason, accompanied by Board Chairman Lennart Larsson visited Moscow to negotiate the program.³⁷

In the same year, Minister of Environment Birgitta Dahl and her husband, Enn Kokk, both prominent Social Democrats, visited Kokk’s birth village near Tallinn on a private journey, after approval by Prime Minister Olof Palme. The Soviet Estonian government sought to make their visit official and arranged a meeting with foreign minister Arnold Green, but the Swedes insisted that no official visits should take place with the Baltic Soviet governments.³⁸ At the same time, high-level Soviet–Swedish negotiations were in progress. For example, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (kabinettssekreterare) Pierre Schori travelled to the Soviet Union in January 1986 to prepare for Olof Palme’s Moscow visit scheduled for 7–11 April 1986.³⁹

These high-level exchanges also affected low-level contacts. At a meeting on 4 February 1986 between representatives of the Foreign Ministry, including Dag Sebastian Ahlander, and the Swedish Institute the forms of cultural and educational exchange with Eastern Europe were again put under discussion. The Swedish Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Ilmar Bekeris (of Latvian origin), addressed the issue of Swedish cooperation with Baltikum. Bekeris underlined that there was a great interest among cultural institutions and organizations in Baltikum for an increase in contacts with Sweden, but that there was also great suspicion among the political leadership in Moscow and in Tallinn against such thoughts. While there was also a considerable interest in Sweden for an increase of Swedish-Baltic contacts, obviously, little could be done without Moscow giving Baltikum the right to have direct contacts with Sweden in this field.⁴⁰ Caution prevailed. When, for example, Ahlander suggested that the SI would convene a meeting with Swedish cultural and educational organizations to ask for their wishes concerning contacts with Eastern Europe, the SI representative Nils-Gustav Hildeman answered that the SI had apprehended that it should be passive and not pro-active. Hildeman asked the Foreign Ministry for guidance concerning exchange with Baltikum. In response, Ahlander – later to become appointed Swedish Consul General in Leningrad in 1989 with responsibility also for the Baltic republics – suggested that a memorandum on the matter should be drafted by the MFA Political department and its Information Bureau to be submitted to the SI.⁴¹

In the resulting memorandum of 1 March 1986, SI officer Ingegerd Grundstedt noted that informal probing had already been made by the SI concerning cultural exchanges with Estonia and Latvia in the past. For example, an exchange of cultural visits with Latvia took place in April 1978 and January 1979, including a Latvian adjunct minister of culture and the SI director [Göran Löfdahl], but with no further results.⁴² At an information conference in Vienna on 17–19 March 1986 with representatives of the Swedish embassies in Eastern Europe, Ilmar Bekeris from the MFA and Anders Clason, the Director of the Swedish Institute, the CSCE principles were discussed, as well as the possible use of the Swedish Institute programmes of cultural and educational exchange to reach out to ‘countries with state-planned economies’. The SI Director complained that the ‘Eastern’ [European] states demanded formal programmes, a procedure that from a Swedish point of view was not effective. At this point, there was no mention of the Soviet Union or its Baltic republics.⁴³ Nonetheless, on 17–21 November 1986 a Swedish film week was organized in Riga, with the SI Director among the attendees, the film screenings also resulting in opportunities for discussions with ‘representatives of Latvian ministries, the City of Riga and cultural life’.⁴⁴

At that time, the only way to approach the Baltic republics was thus through the Soviet central administration in Moscow. However, things would change very rapidly in the following months. In the resulting Swedish-Soviet programme on cooperation, signed in Moscow on 17 December 1986, by SI Director Anders Clason and Vadim Makarov, Head of Humanitarian and Cultural Contacts of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, the preamble included a statement:

Referring to the principles, provisions, and objectives in the final document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [Stockholm 1986] the parties confirm their ambition for a deepened cultural and scientific exchange between Sweden and the Baltic Soviet Republics.⁴⁵

While modest, this document marks the beginning of a new era of direct relations between Sweden and the three Baltic Soviet Republics, relations that had to be handled with great care as neither of the involved actors – Soviet, Baltic and Swedish – could foresee how these events would influence the developments that gradually lead up to the formal independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in August 1991.

Fuzzy states: expanding Baltic exchanges by the Swedish institute

The institution chosen to conduct this probing outreach, the Swedish Institute, had been established at the close of the Second World War in 1945 as a joint venture between the Swedish state and private organizations. Its purpose was to improve and maintain Swedish cultural, educational and societal relations with other countries and to spread information about Sweden. In the time covered by this article, the Institute board was appointed by the government, including representatives from the MFA and one or two of the other ministries, plus members representing universities, the cultural scene, media, commerce and industry. While formally a foundation, the finance at this time came from a number of yearly government allocations through different ministries, but mainly from the MFA. The board chairman usually had some affiliation with the ruling political party, while the director was appointed on other merits from the cultural and/or academic field. While formally separate from the MFA, the SI cooperated with Sweden’s embassies and other representations abroad, supplying information and publications.⁴⁶

This duality could sometimes result in difficulties in combining foreign policy objectives with the needs of cultural outreach and educational exchanges programmes. For example, at the SI board meeting on 3 February 1987, the acting Head of the Department for cultural exchange at SI, Jan Nordlander (on ’loan’ from the MFA) commented:

The programmes for cultural exchange with Eastern Europe are always underfinanced. The SI strives for a status quo, which is unfortunate. The balance between the trustees’ [huvudmän] wishes for priorities based on foreign policy evaluations and the real demands of cultural life can be difficult.⁴⁷

At a board meeting half a year later, on 24 August 1987, the Director Anders Clason reported about a film week launched in Vilnius on 31 August to 10 September which he attended together with Dag Sebastian Ahlander and Lennart Frick. The Swedish cultural presence also included, as in Riga and Tallinn before, an art exhibition and information distribution efforts as well as opportunities for SI representatives to discuss with academics and representatives of different cultural organizations. ‘As a summary’, the SI Director noted, ‘it can be said that it feels very urgent for the SI to make further efforts in the Baltic republics, there is a strong interest in Sweden, and the need for contacts across the Baltic Sea feels very urgent.’⁴⁸

Already by October 1987, discussions concerning increased cultural exchange had been held with the cultural attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm.⁴⁹ A cultural delegation from Latvia did in fact visit Sweden in 17–26 November 1987, focusing upon music and literature, ‘in order to establish and maintain contacts within Swedish cultural and societal life and within the educational sphere’ (see also Piirimäe’s article in this volume).⁵⁰

Following this initial flurry of activities in 1987, there are only occasional accounts of cultural contacts with the Baltic republics in the SI board meeting minutes, evidently because they became quite frequent. However, on 25 August 1988 Jaak Viller of the Estonian State Cultural Committee visited the SI as well as the Baltic Institute to inform about the planned visit to Estonia by a Swedish delegation of representatives of Swedish cultural and societal circles in December that year. Viller explained that Estonia would prefer a bilateral agreement with Estonia, thus in spirit adopting the idea of sovereignty that would be formally declared by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR on 16 November 1988. The Swedish December visit to Estonia was preceded by another visit of the Estonian State Cultural Committee to Sweden on 19–21 October, including meetings at the Swedish MFA and the SI. SI head of division Thomas Lundén notes in his account of the October 1988 meeting that ‘scientific and educational questions still need to be handled through Moscow’.⁵¹ In spite of this, the Swedish 14–17 December 1988 visit to Estonia resulted in a ‘protocol of the discussions between the Swedish and Estonian delegation’, to which ‘an attachment with proposals for different project of cultural exchange’ was added.⁵²

As a result, the SI together with the MFA allocated specific funds amounting to 1 million SEK for initiating exchange with Baltikum, especially Estonia. Swedish institutions were the main initiators, with cultural activities dominating, especially exhibitions, art and theatre. In addition, SI also used its ordinary budget means for the contacts. In spring 1989, the MFA further allotted SEK 2 million for cultural exchange with Baltikum, with the SI as a partner in the selection committee, with choirs, archives and contacts with the formerly ethnically Swedish areas of Estonia (rannarootslased) as dominating subjects.⁵³ Apparently, no systematic reports were written, and it seems that the 1989/90 activities are to be considered as an experimental activity. Yet, it is also clear that the MFA gradually began to regard these low-level cultural exchanges as instruments in a wider stabilizing activity in regard of the unstable situation in the Baltic Sea Region following the Soviet reforms and Baltic calls for independence. For example, at a meeting at the MFA on 15 February 1989 about exchange of culture and experience with Swedish cultural councilors and SI heads of department, MFA ambassador and SI board member Bo Heinebäck asked if ‘peace money’ might be used for the activities directed at the Baltic states and the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

Indeed, during spring 1989, increasingly high-level visits followed, including Vice Prime Minister of Estonia, Rein Otsason in 21 March 1989 and the Minister of Culture of Latvia, Raimonds Pauls, on 5 April 1989.⁵⁵ These visits were reciprocated on both cultural and political levels in September 1989. On 5–10 September 1989, the Director of the SI led a delegation to Estonia with author Astrid Lindgren, whose works were widely read across Soviet Union, painter and drawer Ilon Wikland (of Estonian origin and well-known in Sweden as the illustrator of author Astrid Lindgren’s books) and Lars Fredén (MFA) to open a Wikland exhibition in Tallinn and to discuss questions of exchange with the Estonian government and different cultural representatives. On 18–20 September 1989 a Swedish cultural delegation visited Riga, invited by the Latvian Minister of Culture. SI was represented by the three Heads of Department for information, culture and education (Svensson, Martinsson Uppman and Lundén) plus SI board member Bo Heinebäck (MFA). Even more significantly, in late September 1989, Minister of Environment Birgitta Dahl led the first Swedish official ministerial delegation after Rickard Sandler’s visit in 1937 to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (plus Leningrad).⁵⁶ The visit was arranged by each republic as government visits to three different countries. This visit had been prepared through informal contacts with the Estonian and Soviet Ministers of Environment Tiit Nuudi and Nikolai N. Vorontsov, respectively. The Baltic Ministers of Environment were in their turn invited to Stockholm for meetings in January–February 1990.⁵⁷

From the SI board meetings of autumn 1989, it is evident that a certain sense of confidence regarding the Baltic-Swedish exchanges was beginning to emerge, despite the overall uncertainty about the developments in the Baltic republics. On 21 September 1989 the SI Director and Thomas Lundén visited Minister of Education and Culture Bengt Göransson to discuss ‘Baltic questions’. The purpose was to try to get some quick funding for short-term visits to Sweden by Baltic scholars within academic fields, which were not prioritized by Moscow, such as humanities, social sciences and the geosciences. The proposal was to enable Sweden to select scholarship holders welcome to Swedish academic institutions without Moscow’s interference. The minister eventually provided an extra budgetary resource which enabled some ten Baltic scholars to stay in Sweden for around one month each.⁵⁸ On 13 October 1989, the SI board concluded that ‘cooperation particularly with these countries in Eastern Europe is judged as a priority to be extended and deepened within the next years’.⁵⁹ Indeed, in autumn 1989, the SI received three letters from the Information section of the Press and Information Department of the MFA, ordering the SI to allot specified amounts of money to different activities in Baltikum, indicating an increasingly intimate relationship between the formally independent foundation, the SI, and the MFA regarding Swedish outreach to the Baltic states.⁶⁰

On 20 December 1989, the Director Anders Clason and the Chairman of the Board Allan Larsson sent a formal letter to the MFA, asking for funding for extending activities in Eastern Europe, especially for ‘educational programs reflecting Swedish problem-solving within different societal areas for participants from the Soviet Union, not the least from the Baltic States’.⁶¹ The higher level of attention to these outreach efforts is evidenced by this address under preparation within the Cabinet Office. In February 1990, it was reported to the SI board that the Cabinet Office coordination group for Eastern Europe affairs would be reporting to the Parliament and that a Swedish cultural delegation would be visiting Lithuania in April 1990, to be headed by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Pierre Schori. Given Schori’s prominence as specialist in North–South issues such as national liberation and a leading representative of Palme-style active foreign policy, it is indicative of both the Swedish government’s higher degree of attention given to the sensitive matter of Baltic independence and greater willingness to channel contacts through the ordinary diplomatic activities of the MFA. But making the prominent diplomat Schori head an explicitly ‘cultural’ delegation also signals the perceived need to tread carefully, in view of the uncertain outcome and Soviet reactions upon the recent independence declaration of Lithuania on 11 March 1990.⁶²

In the Budget and Action Plan 1990/91 (Budget och verksamhetsplan of the SI), this cautious pairing of cultural and political aspects can be traced. Within the ordinary budgets, screening of Swedish film would be performed in Eastern Europe, but seminars on environmental protection, labour market policy, municipal self-government and multi-party system, directed towards Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic republics were to be conducted as well. For the programme on Cultural exchange the Budget and Activity Plan specifically mentioned ‘a massively increased increase in individual exchange, characterizes the plans for different parts of Eastern Europe, with Baltikum in need of active efforts from the Swedish side’. While the programme on Scholarships only mentions Eastern Europe in the formal exchange programmes with e.g. the Soviet Union, the programme on Swedish language teaching mentions the new lectureships in Tartu, Riga and Vilnius, which were to be financed through decreasing funding channelled towards Poland.⁶³

Enter SIDA: developing Baltic assistance via SIDA

While the SI thus received both a wider responsibility and a bigger budget for the contacts with the Baltic republics, the Swedish government during summer 1990 also envisaged another conduit of outreach to the region, through development aid.⁶⁴ By decision of 21 June 1990, the Government commissioned BITS (Agency for International Technical and Economic Co-operation) to be responsible for cooperation with Eastern Europe based on development financing amounting to SEK 150 million for a 3-year period. This move also provided the SI with yet another source of some 4.3 million SEK for its activities towards Eastern Europe, including the Baltic republics, to be transferred from BITS to SI, as per a letter of 7 September 1990.⁶⁵ Peeter Horm, BITS officer at the time, writes (2016) that BITS received this assignment for two reasons: First, because BITS (in contrast to SIDA) had experience with aid to more developed countries. Second, because BITS maintained direct contact with Swedish enterprises, authorities and organizations to further cooperation. These contacts were in itself an explicit goal for the cooperation with the Baltic neighbours, within the prioritized areas (that is studies benefitting development towards democracy, market economy and environmental conservation (miljövård).⁶⁶ Krister Eduards (2004) – an official at SIDA and the Swedish MFA, tasked with evaluating the Swedish cooperation with the Baltic countries and Russia – comments that the Government in the three-year 1990–1992 programme for Eastern Europe emphasized the Baltic area and put special effort into courses in [public] administration and market economy. In practice, Eduards claims, these efforts anticipated an eventually more autonomous or even independent position of the Baltics in relation to the Soviet Union, in advance of any official Swedish recognition of these strivings.⁶⁷

In parallel with the increasing coordination between BITS and SI for the Baltic outreach efforts, the government had further through a decision of 21 June 1990, given the Swedish International Development Cooperation Authority (SIDA), responsibility for cooperation with the countries in Eastern and Central Europe (except Poland) with a budget of SEK 60 million for a 3-year period. SIDA in turn gave SI the assignment to accomplish a programme of cultural exchange between Sweden and Eastern Europe during 1990/91 within a frame of 4 million SEK.⁶⁸ Pursuing this task, on 10–12 September 1990, Anders Clason and Thomas Lundén participated in a large delegation journey to Lithuania, again under the direction of Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Pierre Schori. Among other things, this visit resulted in negotiations concerning a treaty on Lithuanian-Swedish cultural cooperation.⁶⁹ The symbolic soft power value of such international negotiations in legitimizing the new state should not be underestimated. Schori, in his speech in the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) indicated a hope that the number of states in Europe would soon be increased.⁷⁰

As the funds allotted for Swedish outreach continued to grow during summer and autumn 1990, it also gradually became evident that Swedish development cooperation with Eastern Europe would inevitably be concerned with ‘the transformation process in Eastern Europe towards democracy and market economy’. The Baltic republics, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were to be prioritized, and the means given to SI for this purpose divided into two pockets, one for Poland, the other for Eastern Europe. The primary intention was to help these countries in their political and societal transition. Key components here would be the SI ordinary guest scholarship programme as well as the special financial means via BITS and SIDA for expert exchange programmes.⁷¹

The prospect of Baltic independence naturally also called the attention of the other Nordic countries, but there is little, if any evidence of any attempts from Sweden to co-operate on a state-to-state level.⁷² The Nordic Council sent delegations to the area around 1990–1991 but each state (with the exception of Iceland)⁷³ was careful not to forestall a recognition of independence.⁷⁴ As a means of coordinating efforts, a working group was set up at the Nordic Council of Ministers consisting of representatives of each state’s organizations responsible for scholarship exchange with Baltikum. SI appointed Thomas Lundén as its representative in this context. At the SI board meeting on 13 November 1990, the Director discussed the government’s proposal to establish a Swedish information office in Vilnius, possibly encouraged by the opening of the Danish information office in Riga, but also by the Lithuanian rejection of the Swedish solution of the Tallinn and Riga missions under formal authority of the Consulate General in Leningrad.⁷⁵ It was therefore imperative that such an office should maintain an independent position vis-à-vis the MFA administration. For this reason, employer responsibility (huvudmannaskap) could be assigned to the Swedish Institute, again indicating the close level of consultation and collaboration, but also caution, in early Swedish outreach efforts.⁷⁶

These first steps were both promising and beset with practical problems even in the prioritized areas of studies and exchange, such as languages in the Nordic states, Nordic-Baltic history with neighbouring disciplines, societal administration, education and disciplines represented by (joint) Nordic research and university organizations. For seminar on university, researcher and student exchange with Baltikum taking place on 15 November 1990, SI officer Thomas Lundén wrote a paper entitled Problem med studieutbyte med Baltikum [Problems with studies exchange with Baltikum], expressing personal views. Among the challenges, Lundén shortlisted technical, linguistic and cultural problems in communication, organizational conflicts, remuneration structures as well as lack of knowledge about each other’s academic traditions and disciplinary fields. Nevertheless, Lundén concluded that SI’s experiences with the exchange program had been good.⁷⁷ In a subsequent report issued in February 1991 SI officer Birgitta Lönnell, evaluated different types of support for exchange until January 1991, ranging from expert exchange, information, cultural exchange, scholarships, university courses, teaching of Swedish as well as the activities initiated with BITS (courses in local government, land registration, taxation administration, water purification, etcetera) and SIDA funds (especially cultural exchange). Apart from this, several large trade union and environmental protection organizations as well as the union of farmers had received large amount for agreements. In addition, Radio Sweden, the international services of Sveriges Radio, initiated 15-min broadcasts in Estonian and Latvian on 1 October 1990, and programmes in Lithuanian were introduced in the beginning of 1991.⁷⁸

This increased level of engagement directly reflected the Swedish Government’s increasingly optimistic, yet cautious assessment of the developments in the Baltic states. The Government budgetary bill 1990/91 noted under the heading ‘Bilateral research cooperation’:

The political development in Eastern Europe implies substantially increased possibilities for research cooperation with the countries in question. There are above all new possibilities for direct, more informal contacts between individual researchers and between universities and colleges in Sweden and in our neighboring countries around the Baltic Sea. […] The research cooperation to be established shall in the first hand cover our proximate area in Eastern Europe; that is Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Northwestern Soviet Union.⁷⁹

The bill proposed 15 million SEK for bilateral research collaboration in 1991/92, out of which 2,5 million were destined to the SI, 2,5 million kept by the Government and the rest divided between the 11 Swedish research universities and colleges. Besides this relatively modest direct allocation – in comparison to the funds disbursed through BITS and SIDA – these innocuous formulations referring to typically unpolitical topics such as research cooperation nevertheless betray a growing governmental interest in – and commitment to – Sweden’s ‘proximate area’, a previously highly contentious and politically sensitive issue in Swedish domestic and foreign policy debate. This new level of commitment was also reflected in next years’ Budget och verksamhetsplan for 1991/92 of the SI, which was accepted on 2 September 1991. By this, Eastern Europe was for the first time included in the prioritized area of activities. The budget’s temporary provisions for development cooperation with Eastern Europe would be lower than the year before, but only to be increased with ordinary budgetary means to achieve the highest possible effects.⁸⁰ It should be noted that the de facto independence of the three Baltic States had occurred on 20–21 August 1991. However, the Swedish government decisions about allowances related to Baltikum were taken months before. After independence, direct bilateral relations could be initiated without the fear of the USSR intervening.

Internal evaluations

In analysing the growing Swedish commitment to use soft cultural diplomacy and low-level research collaboration, initially as a result of caution and concern but later as a preferred method due to the actual needs of newly independent states and transitioning economies such as the Baltic countries, an undated and unsigned paper with the title Svenska institutets verksamhet i Östeuropa [The Swedish Institute activities in Eastern Europe] gives some important data and comments about the activities in the period 1990–1991. The paper seems to have been written in late 1991. Noting that the objective for Swedish development cooperation has been to ‘normalize’ cultural and experience exchange with the countries in Eastern Europe, the paper concluded that the aim would be to pursue activities in Eastern Europe including the newly independent Baltic states in the same way as before in Western Europe. To this end, the SI had established an intensive cooperation with ministries, institutions and organizations in the prioritized countries, especially regarding university cooperation (see Table 1). Outreach in form of expert exchanges as well as scholarships had principally been focused on Estonia, and ‘societal questions (with relevance for the process of democracy) have been clearly dominating’, the paper noted.⁸¹

Table 1. Preliminary survey of the scholarship programme from 1990–09–01 to 1992–06–30 including decided scholarships.

Country	Scholarships	Months
Estonia	18	91
Latvia	8	40
Lithuania	12	73
Soviet Union (except Baltics), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary	36	184
Total	74	387

Source: Svenska institutet, Svenska institutets verksamhet i Östeuropa (Stockholm: Svenska institutet, 1991).

Another way of assessing the scope of these efforts is to study incoming and outgoing mail, telex, and other communications. Before 1991, these were registered by the SI under the geographical code Soviet Union. From 1991 the three Baltic States received individual codes, plus one for the three in common. In 1991 the approximate distribution was Estonia 140 cases, Latvia 50, Lithuania 35 and Baltikum 45.⁸² The cases refer to very different initiatives, but the distribution still gives an indication of the spatial distribution of contacts.

Conclusion

Despite these assessments, it is impossible to evaluate the total number of expert visits, arrangements and scholarships financed by the SI during the time leading up to the independence of the Baltic States. In the case of scholarships, a few had been awarded already before the sentence mentioning the Baltic States was added to the Swedish-Soviet treaty on December 1986. While most scholarships for studies in Sweden suggested by the Soviet Union and accepted by SI were awarded to researchers within the natural sciences and technology, a few were given to scholars in Scandinavian history and languages, including people from Tartu, Estonia. After 1986, Soviet authorities allowed even people without Party affiliation, and even on scholarship grants not included in the formal programmes with Soviet authorities. The SI evidently also used their means proactively to support Baltic scholars beyond these formal programmes.

As for the efficacy of cultural, educational and experience support towards the Baltic republics, still under Soviet dominance, Sweden showed a surprising willingness to give allowances, and to bypass the Soviet formalities. Some actions, e.g. the ‘gift’ by the minister of Culture and Education on 21 September 1989, for some ten Baltic scholars were highly unconventional, bypassing Soviet bureaucracy, while others were done after careful but quick treatment by government and parliament.

As for the implementation of the programmes, some problems are indicated above. It was difficult to find persons suitable for the prioritized subjects for the simple reason that these were the areas intentionally neglected by the Soviet Union. The statistics on the distribution of support to different countries in ‘Eastern Europe’ shows that the Baltic republics account for about half of all scholarships and months, Estonia and Lithuania being the main receivers. The latter country may seem unexpected, as Sweden had extremely few personal contacts though immigration or other contacts, while Latvia, despite a considerable diaspora, fared less well in applying for means. This imbalance in exchanges resembles the contacts in the inter-war period, when Lithuania clearly exceeded Latvia in its relations with Sweden.⁸³

The administrative and budgetary processes leading to exchange with the Baltic Soviet republics are complex and thus difficult to discern. The role of the SI as a foundation financed by the government through a series of different budgetary posts through three different ministries (MFA, Culture and Education), in addition to through SIDA and BITS, make any estimation of the SI’s relevance as a conduit of Swedish foreign policy objectives in an era of geopolitical change difficult to assess. With the Government proposition of 1989/90 giving a large sum of money to SIDA and BITS, the Swedish contribution changed shape from ‘soft policy’ to ‘foreign aid’. However, until an independence for the Baltic Republics seemed a possibility, the mere existence of the SI, formally independent from direct steering by the government, obviously enabled a politically unanimous nation to extend its involvement with the peoples of Baltikum, yet at a formal distance from the state. This can be regarded as a specific employment of the so-called ‘arms-length principle’, a key notion in public diplomacy since the 1960s, whereby the instruments of public diplomacy should be cautiously and carefully distanced from the foreign policy objectives of high diplomacy, in fact one of the cornerstones of Nye’s concept. The Swedish actions also met some of Cull’s characteristics of public diplomacy, culture; to promote art and humanistic values, exchange; of people, and even international broadcasting, with Radio Sweden’s government-sponsored transmissions in the languages of the Baltic states, around the new year of 1991.

Swedish outreach efforts to the Baltic republics during Soviet times and early contacts with the growing independence movements across these three captive nations at a moment of profound geopolitical shift in Baltic Sea Region have been faulted for being late and too cautious. However, a closer look at the actual means and ways through which the Swedish government of Ingvar Carlsson sought to navigate the sensitive issue of Sweden’s position vis-à-vis not only the emerging Baltic states but also the crumbling Soviet empire made cultural diplomacy a preferred means of soft power in a region where Swedish presence had been a mere chimera.⁸⁴

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thomas Lundén

Thomas Lundén is emeritus professor of human geography at Södertörn University and former director of its Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, CBEES. His latest book is Pommern - ett gränsfall i tid och rum (Pomerania - a border case in time and space), Lund: Lund University 2016 and his scholarship includes articles in political and social geography, border interaction and the history of geopolitics and Baltic relations, e.g. ‘Geopolitics and religion – a mutual and conflictual relationship. Spatial regulation of creed in the Baltic Sea Region’, International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie, vol. 25:2, July 2015, 235-251 and ‘Border twin cities in the Baltic Area – Anomalies or Nexuses of Mutual Benefit?’ in Twin Cities Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time, eds John Garrard and Ekaterina Mikhailova, New York & London: Routledge, 2019, 232-245.

Notes

1. Mikael af Malmborg, Neutrality and statebuilding in Sweden; Bjereld and Ekengren, “Cold War Historiography in Sweden,” 143–175; Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred; Glover, “Neutrality Unbound.”

2. Makko, Ambassadors of Realpolitik; for a discussion, see also Mart Kuldkepp’s contribution to this special issue.

3. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War; Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War; see also discussion in Bandeiraand Alberto, The Second Cold War Geopolitics and the Strategic Dimensions of the USA.

4. Agrell, ”Strategisk förändring och svensk-sovjetiska konflikter i Östersjöområdet efter 1945,” 217–233, 293.

5. Tunander, Cold Water Politics; Holmström, Den dolda alliansen.

6. In the text, the concept of the ‘Baltic republics’ refers to the three Soviet republics, while the concept of the ‘Baltic states’ refers to the independent Baltic countries. See e.g. Samuelsson, Svensk syn på Baltikums frigörelse 1988–1996.

7. Schori, Minnet och elden: En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter, 426.

8. email information (2017–06–20), from Bengt T. Ohlsson, secretary October 1986 – October 1988 for the Swedish Social Democratic group in the Nordic Council. Ohlsson remembers that the group was utterly restrictive in any statement related to foreign policy – in particular questions on security policy and relations to the Soviet Union. ’The Finnish reservation’ was still valid. There was evidently a consensus in the Council not to endanger Finland’s sensitive relation to Soviet Estonia and the Soviet Union. But already in September 1989 the former prime minister of Denmark Anker Jørgensen suggested a small group of MP’s from the Nordic Council to visit Moscow and the Baltic capitals in October 1990. Representatives from the Baltic republics participated in the Nordic Councils’ 39^th session in Copenhagen at the end of February 1991. Nordiskt samarbete [https://www.norden.org/sv/information/nordiska-radets-historia]. The efforts of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers from 1989 to independence are presented in Kharkina, From Kinship to Global Brand.The Discourse on Culture in Nordic Cooperation after World War II, 81–88.

9. Küng, Estland vaknar; Nilsson, Den moraliska stormakten: En studie av socialdemokratins internationella aktivism; Küng, Ett liv för Baltikum: Journalistiska memoarer, for the extent of Swedish Baltic outreach, see Eduards, Sveriges stöd till de baltiska ländernas omvandling 1990–2003; for witness reports on Swedish views at the time, see Lundén and Nilsson, eds., Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse.

10. For further details, see Fredén, Förvandlingar: Baltikums frigörelse och svensk diplomati 1989–1991; Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum; see also Mart Kuldkepp’s contribution to this special issue.

11. Cf. Ritvanen in this special issue, see also Rausmaa which covers similar – if even lower key – policies in Finland to engage with Estonia using cultural policies through the Ministry of Education. Rausmaa, Kyllä kulttuurin nimissä voi harrastella aika paljon. Suomen ja Viron poliittiset suhteet keväästä 1988 diplomaattisuhteiden solmimiseen elokuussa 1991.

12. The literature on new regionalism is vast. Key texts include Joenniemi, ed., Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region; Joenniemi, ed., Neo-Nationalism or Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim; Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Theories of New Regionalism; Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” 543–571; and Warleigh-Lack, Robinson and Rosamond, eds., New Regionalism and the European Union: Dialogues, Comparisons and New Research Directions.

13. For the role in using exchange programmes as an instrument of soft power, see Medalis, “The Strength of Soft Power: American Cultural Diplomacy and the Fulbright Program during the 1989–1991 Transition Period in Hungary,” 144–163.

14. For his pioneering and highly influential account of the concept, see Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics; references on p. 8, 13, 17. See also James Pamment’s overview in Pamment, “Introduction: New Dimensions in the Politics of Image and Aid”, 1–22.

15. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” 31–54.

16. Lindblom, “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” 517–526.

17. A study on Swedish public diplomacy, a case study on the Swedish Institute, and focusing on how its public policy has changed over time, is concentrated on the time period after 1991, but contains flashbacks based on interviews with Hans Peter Lepp and Thomas Lundén: Åström, Svensk offentlig diplomati i förändring. En fallstudie om Svenska insitutet.

18. Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum: Från mellankrigstid till efterkrigsår: En översikt, 59–69.

19. Ibid., 70–84.

20. Runblom, “Baltutlämningen: Aktörer och beslutsfattare,” 87–93; Byström, Utmaningen: Den svenska välfärdsstatens möte med flyktingar i andra världskrigets tid; and Notini Burch, A Cold War Pursuit: Soviet Refugees in Sweden, 1945–54.

21. Oredsson, Offentlig fruktan i Sverige under 1900-talets första hälft; Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War 1945–54 Understanding Neutrality; Ericson Wolke, “Exodus och underrättelseinhämtning: Det svenska försvaret och Baltikum, hösten 1943–våren 1945,” 83–127; see also Ininbergs, “Det svenska spionaget i Baltikum 1943–1957: En studie av ett fiasko?”

22. Rebas, “Sverigeesternas politiska verksamhet.”

23. For a good discussion of East-West relations in the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War, see Fredrik Stöcker, Bridging the Baltic Sea: Networks of Resistance and Opposition during the Cold War Era.

24. The SI was originally formed in 1945 as a joint venture between the Swedish state and private organizations, after 1970 a state organization, formally a foundation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on annual government grants.

25. Hildeman, Upplysningsvis. Svenska institutet 1945–1995, 57–58; Åkerlund, “The Impact of Foreign Policy on Educational Exchange: The Swedish State Scholarship Programme 1938–1990,” 401–402, 405–406; and Åkerlund, “The Slow Reunification of Development Assistance and Public Diplomacy: Exchange and Collaboration Activities Through the Swedish Institute 1973–2012,” 143–167.

26. Loit, “Kulturförbindelser mellan Sverige och Estland efter andra världskriget,” 67–68.

27. Interview with Hans Peter Lepp (2017–09–12).

28. Information sheet from the Baltic Institute, Anders Clason’s arkiv Riksarkivet; see also Loit (1988), 58–59.

29. Fredrik Stöcker, “Cracks in the ‘Iron Curtain’: The Evolution of Political Contacts between Soviet Estonia and the Estonian Emigration in Sweden before Perestroika,” 81.

30. Loit, “Kulturförbindelser mellan Sverige och Estland efter andra världskriget,” 80–81, see also Motion till Riksdagen 1985/86:kr279 Hadar Cars m. fl. (fp).

31. Rebas, “Sverigeesternas politiska verksamhet,” 111.

32. Küng (1991), 153–154; Küng, Ett liv för Baltikum: Journalistiska memoarer, 121.

33. For details, see Fredrik Stöcker, “Paths of Economic ‘Westernization’ in the Late Soviet Union: Estonian Market Pioneers and their Nordic Partners,” 447–476.

34. The Swedish word ‘Baltikum’ (also used in German) stands for the spatial area of the Baltic states without clear delimitation, sometimes (but not here) including the Russian exclave oblast’ of Kaliningrad. It will be used untranslated in this paper. For details, see the discussion in Holt, Stockholms skandinavistsymposium: Två rapporter: ’Hur nordiskt är Baltikum’ och ’Svensk kultur sedd utifrån’.

35. Interview with Dag Sebastian Ahlander (2017–12–09); see also Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum, 30.

36. Ingegerd Grundstedt, PM 1986–03–01.

37. SI board meeting minutes for September 26, 1985 § 3. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

38. Interview with Birgitta Dahl and Enn Kokk (2017–12–12); see also Dahl, I rörelse. Minnen från ett innehållsrikt liv, 120–122.

39. Schori, Dokument inifrån: Sverige och storpolitiken i omvälvningarnas tid, 123.

40. Bekeris was responsible for the Swedish handling of the CSCE-process and in an interview in Svensk Tidskrift December 1986 by Levi Mauritzsson, Bekeris was asked if CSCE documents could be used in creating possibilities for the peoples of Baltikum to increase their reach beyond the borders. While pointing to the CSCE as a promotor of confidence, he denied any rapid changes for the better. The acceptance of the CSCE process was inserted into the preamble of the Swedish Institute exchange programmes with the Soviet Union and other states. Mauritzsson, ”Samtal med Ilmar Bekeris,” 471–477.

41. Utrikesdepartementet 1986–03–10, Promemoria 3, Anders Clason’s arkiv Riksarkivet.

42. See note 36 above.

43. Utrikesdepartementet memo concept 1986–05–03, Riksarkivet: Anders Clasons arkiv.

44. SI board meeting minutes for December 4, 1986 § 3. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

45. My translation. Loit, “Kulturförbindelser mellan Sverige och Estland efter andra världskriget,” 68; Riksarkivet: Svenska Institutet: Avtal med Sovjetunionen.

46. See Hildeman, Upplysningsvis. Svenska institutet 1945–1995, for two insightful studies of the public diplomacy efforts in the context of SI:s institutional history and Swedish foreign and trade policy, see Glover, National relations: Public diplomacy, national identity and the Swedish Institute 1945–1970; and Åkerlund, Public diplomacy and academic mobility in Sweden: The Swedish Institute and scholarship programmes for foreign academics, 1938–2010.

47. SI board minutes, February 3, 1987, attachment 3. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

48. SI board minutes, August 24, 1987. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

49. SI board minutes, October 21, 1987. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

50. SI board minutes, December 9, 1987. Riksarkivet: Svenska institutet: Styrelsprotokoll med bilagor.

51. Thomas Lundén’s notes.

52. Besides the formal meetings, the large Swedish delegation – which included MFA ambassador and SI board member Bo Heinebäck, plus SI heads of division Sonja Martinsson Uppman (culture) and Thomas Lundén (education) – also visited libraries, art institutions, the singer stadium and Tartu University. SI board minutes, February 2, 1989. Svenska institutets arkiv.

53. Lönnell, Kultur-, informations- och akademiskt utbyte med BALTIKUM. The Government Proposition 1994/95, Sveriges samarbete med Central- och Östeuropa mentions that in 1989 the Government iniated a Swedish program for co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe, of one billion Crowns. ‘The progress of the Baltic independence movements opens for a forceful Swedish support.’ SI is mentioned as responsible for expert exchange, cooperation within higher education and research, and cultural contacts. (Regeringens proposition 1994/95:160, 15). In the Proposition 1997/98:70 Att utveckla ett grannlandssamarbete Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Central- och Östeuropa år 1999 2001, the first program initiated in the autum of 1989 is mentioned as having its centre of gravity on the development of knowledge, which was judged to have the greatest strategic importance in relation to the amount of money granted.

54. See note 51 above.

55. SI board meeting minutes, April 18, 1989. Svenska institutets arkiv.

56. Sandler’s visit to the Baltic states in 1937 was one of the few indications of a Swedish political interest in the area in the inter-war period. See Lundén, “The dream of a BaltoScandian Federation,” 21–28.

57. Dahl, I rörelse. Minnen från ett innehållsrikt liv, 219–222. See also Dahl’s witness report p. 20–23 in Lundén and Nilsson, eds., Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse.

58. The first beneficiary of these scholarship was Lithuanian archaeologist Vytautas Kazakevicius, Svenska institutet: Forskarstipendienämnden minutes February 27, 1990. The reason for Lithuania being the first republic to make use of the scholarship seems to be the May 17, 1989 Agreement concerning cooperation in the field of science and education between Uppsala university and Vilnius University, which caused SI officer Thomas Lundén to inform Vilnius University in a letter of October 13, 1989 about the new opportunity (copies in SI archive).

59. SI board meeting minutes, October 13, 1989. Svenska institutets arkiv.

60. SI 603. Svenska institutets arkiv.

61. SI 600/30–34. Svenska institutets arkiv.

62. SI board meeting minutes, February 1, 1990; Svenska institutets arkiv. See also Schori’s own account of the aims, background and outcomes of this visit in Schori (1992); Schori (2014).

63. SI, Budget och verksamhetsplan 1990/91 (Budget and Activity Plan 1990/91).

64. Budgetpropositionen 1989/90:100. See also Sveriges stöd till de baltiska ländernas omvandling 1990–2003, Bilaga Statsmakternas riktlinjer, Sida (2004), 130–132.

65. The details of the transfer of money was discussed between BITS represented by Marika Fahlén and SI at a meeting on August 21. SI was asked to request the money with reference to the government letter of June 21. Thomas Lundén’s notes.

66. Horm, Med glimten i ögat, 62.

67. Eduards, Sveriges stöd till de baltiska ländernas omvandling 1990–2003, 19.

68. SI board meeting minutes, August 23, 1990 §4. Svenska institutets arkiv.

69. The protocol was issued in both Swedish and Lithuanian, entitled Protokoll över samtal angående svensk-litauiskt samarbete på kulturområdet i samband med ett besök i Vilnius av en svensk kulturdelegation den September 10–12, 1990.

70. Information to the Swedish delegation after Schori’s speech. Thomas Lundén’s notes.

71. SI research committee minutes, September 20, 1990 §4; see also SI board meeting minutes, November 13, 1990 §5. Svenska institutets arkiv.

72. Krister Wahlbäck, political scientist and diplomat, served in the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki 1986–1991. His book Baltisk Befrielse – Svenska insatser för friheten Stockholm: Jarl Hjalmarson Stiftelsen, 2012 is mainly about the period after the Baltic independence, but, he refers to Finlands particular interest in Estonia, but also to the special concerns in handling official relations to the Soviet Union and to Sovet Estonia. (Wahlbäck, 2012, 16ff). In his witness statement (Lundén & Nilsson, 2008) he refers to a case during Lithuania’s declared independence (of March 11, 1990) where at a meeting prime minister Harri Holkkeri by coincidence was placed next to Lithuania’s Kazimiera Prunskiene, risking to be pictured next to her. The situation was soon remedied, but afterwards, Wahlbäck asked a Finnish colleague from the Foreign Ministry about why the situation was so sensitive. The answer was that a independence of the Baltic states historically never was in Finland’s interest, because of the geopolitical pressure then put on Finland in the Bay of Finland (Lundén & Nilsson, 38f). Fredén (2004, 260) also refers to a Finnish hesitation towards a rapid process towards independence. See also Bergman, ‘Adjacent Internationalism. The Concept of Solidarity and Post-Cold War Nordic-Baltic Relations, Cooperation and Conflict’.

73. Iceland recognized Lithuania’s independence on February 11, 1991.

74. email information (2017–06–20), from Bengt T. Ohlsson then political expert in the MFA. However, Denmark in December 1990 and Sweden in January 1991 allowed Baltic information centres to open in each capital (see e.h. Kharkina, 2013, 79, note 222, based on Must “The Formation of Estonian Diplomacy: the Estonian Foreign Delegation in Stockholm in 1918 and the Estonian Information Office in Stockholm in 1991,” 8. At the same time, the Nordic Council of Ministers opened Information offices in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius (see Kharkina, 2013, 86f).

75. For details of the Danish involvement, please see Lars Grønbjerg’s article in this special issue.

76. SI board meeting minutes, November 13, 1990 §7. Svenska institutets arkiv. The office was eventually not opened until the final independence of Lithuania in 1991 and it was not associated with the SI. The idea was mentioned in the Protocol on Swedish-Lithuanian cooperation within the cultural field signed in Vilnius on September 1990, saying the practical aspects would be studied. The MFA and SI had different ideas about the planned activities, while Lithuania did not except anything else than a diplomatic representation, which was bluntly rejected by Moscow. See Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum, 230–233.

77. Lundén, Problem med studieutbyte med Baltikum [Problems with studies exchange with Baltikum].

78. Lönnell, Kultur-, informations- och akademiskt utbyte med BALTIKUM.

79. Budgetproposition 1990/91:100, Bil.10, 210.

80. SI, Budget och verksamhetsplan 1991/92 (Budget and Activity Plan 1991/92). Svenska institutets arkiv.

81. SI, Svenska institutets verksamhet i Östeuropa.

82. Slips of incoming mail and telex, Svenska Institutets arkiv.

83. Lundén, Problem med studieutbyte med Baltikum [Problems with studies exchange with Baltikum], 25.

84. Balanced evaluations of the Swedish policy 1986–1991 under conditions of utter uncertainty are made by Fredén (2004, XXII, 241–248) and by Hans Ohlsson and Krister Wahlbäck (in Lundén and Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse).