ABSTRACT
Aim: The present study was designed to investigate how behavioral (dual-action) demands in dual tasks are mentally represented in older adults and how these representations might contribute to the practice-related improvement of dual-task performance. Three different theoretical representation accounts were empirically tested: a structuralist account, a holistic account, and a contextual change account. The first account assumes that component tasks remain structurally intact when combined with another task while the second account assumes that dual-action requirements in dual tasks are represented holistically and entirely distinct from its component (single-action) requirements. The final account assumes that a change in context (e.g., from single to dual requirement) might generally impede response retrieval, similar to repeating a response when the task context switches.
Methods: To address this issue of dual-action representations in older adults, we assessed trial-by-trial effects in a single/dual switch paradigm (involving a randomized mix of single- and dual-task trials within blocks). In detail, we re-analyzed a large set of practice data involving seven sessions, in which an auditory-vocal task was combined with a visual-manual task.
Results: At the end of practice, the current results were largely consistent with the structuralist account.
Conclusions: We conclude that dual-action requirements in the present dual-task setting are mentally represented in a predominantly structuralist fashion at the end of practice in older adults. The results are discussed in the context of other theories on practice-related mechanisms of improved dual-task performance in this age group.
Notes
1. Note that the data patterns in all trial-by-trial analyses were similar when excluding trial sequences with exact stimulus repetitions (in one or both component tasks; e.g. visual-manual task requiring a left response followed by another visual-manual task requiring a left response). This suggests that the effects were not solely driven by trial-by-trial identity priming mechanisms.