Stochastic simulation of sequential game-theory voting models

ABSTRACT

We discuss the use of stochastic simulation as a tool to learn about optimal behavior and Nash equilibria of a sequential voting model proposed by Osborne, related to Duverger’s law. We introduce a graphical Java applet, which implements such simulations and investigates its properties. We show that in an appropriate setup, the applet is guaranteed to eventually find behavior, which is within ε of being optimal.

KEYWORDS:

• Game theory
• Multiple parties
• Nash equilibrium
• Stochastic simulation
• Voting model

MATHEMATICS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION:

• Primary 91A06
• Secondary 62M05, 62F10, 91F10

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Martin J. Osborne for introducing him to this topic and for many helpful discussions, and thanks the anonymous referee for a careful reading and many excellent suggestions.

Funding

This research was partially supported by NSERC of Canada.