Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes

ABSTRACT

Nondemocratic regimes are built on coercive state mechanisms that are designed to suppress popular demands for democratization. Nevertheless, in practice, they display different patterns of civil liberties restrictions. This study makes a novel contribution to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and human rights by providing an account of the impact of failed coups on civil liberties restrictions in non-democratic regimes. We argue that failed coups lead to more than targeted repression of coup plotters and potential challengers. After facing coup attempts, nondemocratic leaders have stronger incentives to retain their power by averting not only future coups but also future revolts. As such, they restrict civil liberties in order to prevent the emergence and mobilization of dissent in society. Analyzing 70 nondemocratic regimes during the period of 1976–2016, we find that civil liberties restrictions are more likely to increase in the wake of failed coups.

KEYWORDS:

• failed coups
• civil liberties restrictions
• nondemocratic states
• winning coalition
• inter-elite dynamics

Notes

¹ It should be noted that even though there is a difference in the degree of repression employed between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, repression is also observed among democracies. Goldstein (2001), and Rapoport and Weinberg (2012) show that democratic rulers do not refrain from using repressive methods against their political opponents. Rejali (2007) stresses that in some democracies certain torture techniques are used that leave no physical evidence on the victim.

² Throughout the paper, we use the winning coalitions and elites interchangeably. However, we specify that while the winning coalition consists of elites, there are also elites outside the winning coalition. For different compositions of winning coalitions, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).

³ All nondemocratic countries for which complete data are available are included in the analysis.

⁴ For the updated data, see Coups d’état, 1950 to Present. http://www.uky.edu/%7Eclthyn2/coup_data/home.htm

⁵ In our dataset, there are a number of differences between states that registered failed coups and those that did not. States that witness failed coups have lower respect for civil liberties, smaller population size, lower GDP per capita, and higher inflation rate than states that do not have a history of failed coups.