Performative face theory: A critical perspective on interpersonal identity work

ABSTRACT

Power operates not only through ideological and institutional control, but also through everyday interpersonal communication practices that sediment what is and ought to be. However, critical theorizing about power remains scarce within the sub-fields of interpersonal and family communication. To answer questions about operations of power in interpersonal identity work, performative face theory is set forth, which places Erving Goffman’s theorization of face in conversation with Judith Butler’s theory of performativity. Performative face theory suggests that discursive acts cited or repeated in negotiations of face constitute and sometimes subvert naturalized identity categories. Four theoretical principles are provided and an empirical example of childbearing identity is presented. Finally, implications of this novel critical interpersonal and family communication theory are discussed.

KEYWORDS:

• Critical theory
• interpersonal communication
• family communication
• power
• identity

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Dawn O. Braithwaite, Jody Koenig Kellas, Carly S. Woods, Carole Levin, Joshua P. Ewalt, Jordan Allen, and Jenna S. Abetz for their invaluable comments on her dissertation from which this manuscript was drawn. A version of this manuscript was presented at the 2016 annual meeting of the National Communication Association.

ORCID

Julia Moore http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8503-4880

Notes

1. Although many scholars adopt a view of interpersonal communication as occurring exclusively in close relationships (e.g., Miller & Steinberg, 1975; Stewart, 1999), performative face theory is suitable to study everyday practices across contexts regardless of perceived closeness between interlocutors (e.g., family, work, health, service, public, mediated, etc.).

2. Butler (1990, 1993) wrote about gender performativity specifically, but noted that race is also performative. Other scholars have argued that the theory of performativity can be applied to a multitude of identity categories (e.g., Allen & Moore, 2016; Jackson, 2004).

3. Notably, communication scholars have defined “discourse” in many ways, ranging from all spoken and written words to broader social narratives (LeGreco & Tracy, 2009). I define discourses as statements that link power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980), which sustain regulatory norms of how/what certain people should act, say, and desire (Butler, 1990, 1993).

4. Although Brown and Levinson’s articulation of politeness theory is distinct from Goffman’s theorization of face, scholars of face have productively drawn upon Brown and Levinson’s typology to enrich their descriptions and analyses of face threats without engaging all of the propositions of politeness theory (e.g., McBride, 2010).

5. Although Butler (1990, 1993) makes explicit her perspective that identity politics – and intersectionality – are an inadequate and limited form of gender politics, identity categorizations are nonetheless experienced as real with material effects. Therefore, in the constitution and deconstruction of identities, intersections of privilege and oppression are worth exploring in relation to who is – and who is not – able to perform and subvert categorizations at a particular time and place.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by an American Dissertation Fellowship awarded by the American Association of University Women.