How moral adaptability relates to communication and friendship with morally dissimilar others

ABSTRACT

Moral differences hinder communication and relationship formation. However, perceptions and reactions to moral dissimilarity varies. Accordingly, we explored how moral adaptiveness (a flexible application of morality) relates to the intent to communicate with and befriend morally dissimilar others by focusing on moral relativism (believing that morals are subjective) and moral tolerance (believing that one should not condemn/change dissimilar others). We observed adaptiveness’ relationships with the willingness to communicate (WTC) with morally dissimilar others and greater moral diversity in close friendship networks. Surveys of convenience samples of adults recruited through MTurk (N_study1 = 325; N_study2 = 1219) demonstrated partial evidence of a positive link between moral adaptiveness and WTC. By comparison, a consistent relationship between adaptiveness and the moral diversity of friendship networks did not emerge.

KEYWORDS:

• Moral adaptiveness
• moral relativism
• moral tolerance
• willingness to communicate
• personal networks
• close relationships
• interpersonal communication

Individuals’ everyday interactions present opportunities to communicate with both similar and dissimilar others. Although these interactions help people develop sound reasoning and learn how others think (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013), differences potentiate negative reactions (Wright et al., 2013). Notably, researchers debate how acts of communication may worsen the perception of dissimilarity and elicit anger driven by moral differences (Crockett, 2017; Huskey et al., 2018). Such concerns highlight the importance of investigating how people perceive moral “outsiders,” and their willingness to communicate across moral differences.

Given these concerns, we conducted two studies to explore how moral adaptiveness (i.e., a flexible application of morality; Yudkin et al., 2021) influences the intent to communicate interpersonally. We approached adaptiveness by focusing on moral relativism and tolerance. In study 1, we investigated the relationship between moral relativism (i.e., the belief that morals are subjective) and the willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others. Conceptually, those high in relativism reject the generalization of objective moral truths (Goodwin, 2018). Higher levels of relativism can encourage positive interactions between dissimilar others (Skitka et al., 2005), and related constructs (e.g., moral tolerance) help people coexist in culturally-diverse environments (e.g., cities; Collier-Spruel et al., 2019).

Research relating adaptiveness to interpersonal communication and relationships is minimal. As a result, we sought to investigate the relationship in two ways. First, we examined the relationship between relativism and the willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others. Second, we explored the relationship between relativism and the moral diversity of one’s friendship networks. In study 2, we expanded our investigation to include moral tolerance (i.e., the belief that you should not condemn/judge morally dissimilar others; Collier-Spruel et al., 2019). By observing how relativism and tolerance relate to interpersonal communication and relationships, our work extends knowledge on the broader moral adaptability construct.

Below, we review relevant scholarship and develop questions concerning how moral adaptability might influence the willingness to communicate and form friendships with dissimilar people. Then, in study 2, we introduce moral tolerance and test how it predicts our outcomes of interest.

Moral relativism

Moral relativism is the belief that morals are subjective. Historically, empirical research on moral relativism was uncommon (Pölzler & Wright, 2019), but a recent swell of work demonstrates that people tend to be low in moral relativism (i.e., moral relativism is trait-like; Goodwin, 2018). However, relativism varies depending on the situation (i.e., relativism is also state-like; Wright et al., 2013). For example, people tend to act more relativistic in cross-cultural contexts (Sarkissian et al., 2011). In contrast, construing acts as objectively wrong rather than a norm violation (Wright et al., 2013), or believing that everyone thinks an act is wrong (i.e., social consensus; Goodwin, 2018), suppresses relativism.

Most moral relativism research investigates how context influences relativistic tendencies. This type of work is rare in communication and relationship research. An exception is Fisher et al. (2017) who found that some communication goal mindsets (e.g., cooperative) could increase relativistic tendencies compared to others (e.g., competitive). Beyond this, other work examines relativism in particular interpersonal contexts (e.g., working together). Findings show that people are less willing to interact interpersonally with morally dissimilar others compared to similar others when they perceived the topic of dissimilarity as objectively wrong (Wright et al., 2014). Likewise, strong moral convictions can increase a desire for greater social and physical distance from morally dissimilar others (Skitka et al., 2005).

More broadly, research suggests that such moral adaptiveness is dynamic. For example, people become more tolerant of culturally incongruent others as they become more educated (Stouffer, 1955). Similarly, exposure to culturally heterogeneous ecologies (e.g., moving from rural to urban settings) increases tolerance (Bobo & Licari, 1989). Related work grounded in the intergroup contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) shows that communication with outgroup members can reduce prejudice by lowering anxiety about intergroup contact and increasing empathy (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). However, communication may also potentiate moral outrage by triggering reactance to moral norm violations (Crockett, 2017). Therefore, rather than being directional and static, scholars conceptualize tolerance as both a bottom-up (i.e., determined by individual differences) and top-down phenomenon (i.e., determined by meso- and macro-social influences; see Jost, 2017) that is context-sensitive and changes across the lifecourse.

However, research connecting relativism to communication and social relationships is noticeably absent. This omission is curious, given that interpersonal contexts ground moral theories and researchers commonly centralize communication’s role in moral decisions (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). Furthermore, moral theories account for variance in moral beliefs and how individuals perceive/react to others who are morally dissimilar. In particular, moral foundations theory (MFT) argues that people possess a sensitivity to five foundations: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity. Specific (sub)cultures consider some foundations more salient than others. For example, loyalty, authority and purity tend to be more salient among Eastern cultures and U.S. political conservatives, whereas care and fairness tend to be more salient among Western cultures and U.S. political progressives (Haidt, 2012).

However, MFT’s taxonomical account of moral (dis)similarity is not without critique. Some challenge MFT’s claim that the foundations differentiate conservatives and progressives (Schein & Gray, 2015), the accuracy and universality of the taxonomy (Suhler & Churchland, 2011), and the operationalization of the foundations (Iurino & Saucier, 2020). Despite these critiques, MFT remains a dominant and useful moral theory, as evidenced by its adoption in cognate fields such as communication (Hopp & Weber, 2021). In terms of utility, MFT’s multidimensional nature is among its primary strengths. Although the taxonomy may lack a complete account of the dimensions that comprise moral beliefs, the multidimensionality it possesses is useful for distinguishing and evaluating the moral content of communication messages (Grizzard et al., 2020). Finally, accounting for individuals’ moral beliefs using MFT allows researchers to determine the degree to which moral phenomena are independent of (or dependent upon) specific constellations of moral beliefs.

As a result, we leverage MFT to help conceptualize relativism. Because people vary in foundation salience, mismatched values can present barriers to social interactions. For example, those lower in relativism may perceive moral dissimilarity as threatening or disgusting. In contrast, those higher in relativism may perceive such foundation differences as interesting or unimportant. Even if those higher in relativism have high trait salience in the foundations, foundation differences may not intuitively trigger affectively-charged evaluative processes (e.g., fear or disgust of a moral outgroup). Likewise, elaborating upon differences might not motivate unfair moral scrutiny (e.g., unfavorable generalizations/blame attributions, thinking the other is objectively wrong). Relativism’s grounding idea that rejects the belief in moral truth drives the described pattern of responses. Stated simply, someone high in moral relativism should be less likely to evaluate foundation differences as bad in a normative sense. Instead, they would be more likely to merely recognize that the differences exist in a descriptive sense.

To investigate these under-researched possibilities (Clark & Boothby, 2013), we focus on moral relativism’s potential relationship with communication and friendship among morally dissimilar others. To this end, we sought to extend knowledge about the role of moral relativism in social interaction in two ways. First, we observe how relativism relates to the willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others interpersonally. Second, we investigate how relativism relates to moral diversity among friendship networks using MFT.

Moral relativism and willingness to communicate

Research on willingness to communicate (WTC) originally focused on people’s tendencies to avoid/devalue interpersonal communication (Burgoon, 1976). Subsequent work conceptualized WTC as people’s openness to express themselves nonverbally and/or talk interpersonally (McCroskey & Baer, 1985, november) and suggests that it is a central antecedent to an act of communication (Kleinman & Kleinman, 2015). As a component of personality that influences social lives (Richmond & Roach, 1992), scholars explain that trait level WTC motivates people to seek communication opportunities and state WTC predicts the decision to initiate communication (MacIntyre et al., 1999). Generally, people high in WTC are more likely to develop positive interpersonal relationships (McCroskey & Baer, 1985, november).

We focus on the potential relationship between moral relativism and the willingness to initiate communication with morally dissimilar others. In other words, we focus on state WTC in accordance with MacIntyre and colleagues’ (1999) operational definition. Communication with dissimilar others can be beneficial for helping people develop moral reasoning, learn others’ opinions, and anticipate the outcomes of moral disputes (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). Although encountering incongruent moral beliefs may elicit outrage (Crockett, 2017), greater relativism may encourage amicable communication across moral bounds. More specifically, we contend that those higher in relativism may approach communication across differences dialogically (see Nagda & Zúñiga, 2003). In other words, they may consider communication across bounds as an inclusive, reciprocal dialogue. By expressing themselves, hearing others’ perspectives, and productively discussing disagreements, relativists may be more willing to communicate to resolve uncertainties/misunderstandings and foster empathy for morally dissimilar others. Given this, we asked if moral relativism would relate positively to people’s willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others (RQ1).

Moral relativism and friendship network diversity

In addition to promoting communication, moral relativism may relate to the moral diversity of one’s friendship networks. Given that related concepts (e.g., tolerance) emerge from both top-down (e.g., structural effects) and bottom-up influences (e.g., psychological tendencies; see Jost, 2017), similar forces may potentiate moral relativism. For example, relativists may befriend dissimilar others because they perceive differences as non-threatening (bottom-up). Likewise, those embedded in morally heterogeneous ecologies (e.g., cities) may develop relativistic tendencies adaptively (top-down). Regardless, such diversity may be beneficial, as network diversity increases elaboration on political issues (Eveland & Hively, 2009) and decreases radical intentions (Atari et al., 2022). Given this, we investigated the relationship between moral relativism and individuals’ personal networks, which have long been integral to communication (Monge & Contractor, 2003) and interpersonal processes (Parks, 2011).

Existing research on moral beliefs and network characteristics shows that moral belief homophily positively predicts emotional closeness and the likelihood to act altruistically toward friends (Curry & Dunbar, 2013). Similarly, people tend to be socially closer (i.e., a shorter distance between network nodes) to those who share similar moral beliefs surrounding purity (Dehghani et al., 2016). We sought to expand knowledge at this intersection by investigating how moral relativism influences relationships with dissimilar others.

Given that moral adaptiveness helps people successfully navigate social situations (Yudkin et al., 2021), relativists may communicate their values conscientiously. This carefulness could potentiate positive social interactions with dissimilar others that encourage relationship formation (in accord with social penetration theory; Altman & Taylor, 1973). Beyond mere positivity, relativists engaging in dialogic communication may also build alliances with dissimilar others without resolving their differences to enrich their social lives. In this scenario, relativists learn why differences exist, how those differences influence social life, and how to construct bridges across moral divides that preserve each person’s moral idiosyncrasies.

Although this bottom-up explanation is plausible, the diversity of individuals’ social networks may foster one’s moral relativism. We posit this top-down alternative because embeddedness in culturally heterogeneous ecologies can increase tolerance for dissimilar others (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Stouffer, 1955) and communication with outgroup members can reduce outgroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). As a result of these possibilities, the personal networks of those high in relativism should possess more moral diversity than the networks of those low in relativism. Given this, we sought to determine if moral relativism was positively associated with the diversity of moral beliefs in individuals’ friendship networks (RQ2).

Study 1

Our goals in study 1 were to investigate moral relativism’s relationships with (1) the willingness to communicate (WTC) with morally dissimilar others and (2) the moral diversity of friendship networks. We used two measures of moral relativism. An existing one that measures general relativism (Forsyth, 1980) and one we created grounded in Goodwin and Darley’s (2012) conceptualization that measures situated moral relativism. Furthermore, similar to other studies on network heterogeneity (Eveland & Hively, 2009), we focused on the characteristics of individuals (i.e., alters) that surround a focal person (i.e., ego). Accordingly, we operationalized friendship networks using an individual’s perceived closeness to their 8 closest friends. To observe the robustness of our proposed relationships, we included a second operationalization of friendship networks focused on participants’ most moral friends (i.e., eight most moral friends).

Method

Online supplementary materials (OSMs)

The OSMs (tinyurl.com/MoralNets2) provide complete details regarding our operationalization rationales, method, survey instruments, and protocol visualizations.

Participants

325 of 330 people recruited from MTurk (paid $3) completed the study and answered all attention checks correctly (n_female = 185, n_male = 138, n_non-binary = 1; M_age = 41.02, SD_age = 11.09; n_White = 251, n_Black = 23, n_Asian = 18, n_mix = 14, n_{Hispanic/Latino} = 8, n_European = 3, n_other = 6).

Protocol

Following consent, we measured moral relativism. Then, participants viewed either the close network or moral network prompt that asked them to provide names using an ego-centered cognitive social structure name generator design (Marcum et al., 2017). We used a fixed-size network of 8 people to account for potential confounds that can arise from thinking about networks of different sizes (Lee et al., 2020). After listing 8 friends, participants indicated how close they were to each friend (i.e., ego-alter closeness) and how close each friend was to every other friend (i.e., alter-alter closeness). Then, they indicated their personal moral beliefs. Afterward, we described moral foundations theory colloquially and explained that people vary in how much each foundation matters to them. We asked participants to consider this when evaluating the moral similarity between themselves and their friends. After this prompt, we assessed ego-alter moral similarity then alter-alter moral similarity. Last, we measured WTC with morally dissimilar others and demographics (i.e., age, race, and gender).

Measures

Moral relativism. We measured situated relativism using truth-aptness and disagreement, the two methods common in studies on relativism (Pölzler & Wright, 2019; see OSM for complete rationale detailing scale construction), and general relativism using a standardized scale. For situated moral relativism, we adapted the logic grounding Goodwin and Darley’s (2012) measure. We asked participants to identify a behavior or belief that they thought was morally acceptable, but others could think is not morally acceptable (i.e., disagreement). Next, we asked participants to imagine someone else thought the behavior in question was immoral, and that both the participant and the other person agreed why someone would want to do the behavior. Then, we asked participants to indicate the degree to which there was a correct way to judge the moral acceptability of the behavior using a 1 (no correct way to judge) to 7 (definitely a correct way to judge) scale (i.e., truth-aptness). Then, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which the other person was mistaken, using a 1 (neither of us is mistaken) to 7 (the other person is clearly mistaken) scale (i.e., truth-aptness). Afterward, we repeated the questions but reversed the logic (i.e., asking them to identify something they thought was not morally acceptable, but others could think was morally acceptable). We reverse scored and averaged the resulting four values from both question sets to make higher values mean greater moral relativism (Cronbach’s α = .71, M = 3.21, SD = 1.27). Additionally, we counterbalanced the order of the two question sets. Order did not influence responses, t(322) = 1.02, p = .31.

We measured general moral relativism using Forsyth’s (1980) ethics position questionnaire (EPQ). We omitted 4 items and reworded some items to contemporize the scale (see OSM). The EPQ assesses how much people think ethics should be universalized using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. For example, one item asks, “There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of everyone’s ethical code.” The scale was reliable (α = .86, M = 3.18, SD = .87). We presented the EPQ as described to half the participants. For the others, we replaced all instances of the word ethical with moral to determine if this altered responses. A measurement invariance test confirmed that it did not (see OSM).

Willingness to communicate (WTC). To measure WTC, we presented the behavior participants provided for situated moral relativism again (i.e., the behavior they thought was moral that others could think is immoral). Then, we asked them to estimate their WTC assuming that they were going to communicate with three different people independently: their closest friend, someone that they have a moderately close relationship with, and someone they have only met once. For these questions, we told participants to assume the other person thought the behavior the participant listed as moral was immoral. We asked this question three ways. First, “How willing would you be to communicate with them?” from 1 (very willing to communicate) to 6 (very unwilling to communicate). Second, “How difficult would it be to communicate your views to them?” from 1 (very easy to communicate my views) to 6 (very difficult to communicate my views). Third, “How difficult would it be for you to understand them?” from 1 (very easy to understand them) to 6 (very difficult to understand them). We reversed scored the resulting 9 items so that higher values meant more WTC (α = .82, M = 4.29, SD = 1.01).¹

Moral beliefs. The 20-item moral foundations questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) assessed the moral salience of the five moral foundations using a 1 (not at all relevant; strongly disagree) to 6 (extremely relevant; strongly agree) scale. The resulting indices were care (α = .71, M = 4.51, SD = .87), fairness (α = .70, M = 4.5, SD = .76), loyalty (α = .70, M = 3.25, SD = 1), authority (α = .78, M = 3.25, SD = 1.06), and purity (α = .90, M = 3.25, SD = 1.33).

Network diversity. We computed two measures of diversity. First, we measured ego-alter moral diversity (i.e., moral differences relative to the participant) by asking “How similar are your moral beliefs to [friend A’s] moral beliefs?” from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (very similar). We repeated this question to assess the ego’s moral similarity to all alters. We averaged the values of all eight items to compute ego-alter moral diversity (M = 5.27, SD = 0.95).

Second, we measured alter-alter moral diversity (i.e., moral differences among the participants’ friends) by asking “How similar are [friend A’s] moral beliefs to [friend B’s] moral beliefs?” from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (very similar). We repeated this question to assess the moral similarity of all alters to one another. Using the resulting 28 items, we calculated a network density score (M = .54, SD = .31).²

Perceived Closeness. We measured ego-alter closeness by asking “How close are you to [friend X]?” using a 1 (not at all close) to 7 (very close) scale. We repeated this question to assess the ego’s closeness to all 8 alters and averaged the responses (M = 5.84, SD = 0.83).

We measured alter-alter closeness by asking “How close are [friend A] and [friend B]?” using a 2 (not at all close) to 6 (very close) scale. Participants could also select “They don’t know each other” (coded as 1). Using the resulting 28 items, we calculated a density score using the 28 resulting items (M = .28, SD = .23).

Results

RQ1 asked if moral relativism positively related to willingness to communicate (WTC). A positive relationship emerged between WTC and situated moral relativism (SituatedMR), r(163) = .25, p = .001, but not general moral relativism (GeneralMR), r(163) = .14, p = .07 (see Table S1 in the OSM). To test the robustness of these relationships, we conducted a linear regression (see Table 1, Model 1). In the model, we included both measures of moral relativism, ego-alter closeness mean, alter-alter closeness density, the five MFQ subscales (i.e., participants’ moral beliefs), age, gender, and condition as IVs. The DV was WTC. In the model, loyalty salience, purity salience, and SituatedMR (RQ1) had a positive relationship with WTC. However, GeneralMR did not relate to WTC (RQ1). Therefore, we witnessed partial evidence of a positive relationship between moral relativism and WTC. Additionally, loyalty salience related positively to WTC while purity beliefs related negatively.

Table 1. Summary of regression analyses of moral relativism’s (MR) relationships with willingness to communicate and network diversity.

	Model 1 MR & WTC with a Specific Person					Model 2 MR & Network Diversity (ego-alter)					Model 3 MR & Network Diversity (alter-alter)
	adj R^2	F	df	N	p	adj R^2	F	df	N	p	adj R^2	F	df	N	p
	0.11	2.59	12	149	0.004	0.24	9.33	12	308	< .001	0.24	9.41	12	308	< .001
	Model 1 Coefficients					Model 1 Coefficients					Model 1 Coefficients
	B	SE	β	t	p	B	SE	β	t	p	B	SE	β	t	p
Ego-alt closeness	0.15	0.10	0.13	1.43	0.15	0.38	0.06	0.34	5.98	< .001	0.36	0.08	0.26	4.64	< .001
Alt-alt closeness	−0.59	0.38	−0.13	−1.57	0.12	0.69	0.23	0.17	3.02	0.00	1.40	0.27	0.28	5.11	< .001
MFQ harm	−0.02	0.12	−0.02	−0.19	0.85	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.52	0.61	−0.01	0.08	−0.01	−0.16	0.88
MFQ fairness	−0.10	0.12	−0.08	−0.83	0.41	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.98	0.33	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.74	0.46
MFQ loyal	0.29	0.13	0.28	2.31	0.02	0.12	0.07	0.13	1.70	0.09	0.21	0.08	0.19	2.51	0.01
MFQ authority	−0.13	0.13	−0.14	−1.02	0.31	−0.10	0.08	−0.11	−1.25	0.21	−0.06	0.09	−0.05	−0.60	0.55
MFQ pure	−0.23	0.08	−0.31	−2.81	0.01	0.00	0.05	−0.01	−0.09	0.93	−0.08	0.06	−0.09	−1.31	0.19
Age	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.54	0.59	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.79	0.43	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.95	0.35
Gender	−0.12	0.16	−0.12	−0.73	0.47	−0.22	0.10	−0.23	−2.15	0.03	−0.06	0.12	−0.06	−0.53	0.60
Condition	−0.14	0.16	−0.14	−0.89	0.38	−0.02	0.09	−0.02	−0.18	0.86	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.44	0.66
Situated MR	0.20	0.07	0.23	2.83	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.06	1.13	0.26	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.86	0.39
General MR	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.50	0.62	−0.16	0.06	−0.15	−2.61	0.01	−0.13	0.07	−0.10	−1.77	0.08

Note: Gender coded as 1 = Female, 2 = Male. Condition coded as 0 = Closeness, 1 = Moral.

RQ2 asked if moral relativism would positively relate to personal network diversity. Overall, we did not find robust evidence of this relationship. First, the bivariate correlations (see Table S1) revealed an absence of relationships. Second, only one out of four possible relationships emerged across two regression models (see Table 1, Models 2 & 3). In both models, ego-alter closeness mean, alter-alter closeness density, the five MFQ subscales, age, gender, condition, and both measures of moral relativism were the IVs. In model 2, the DV was ego-alter moral similarity. In model 3, the DV was alter-alter moral density.

Model 3 did not demonstrate a relationship between moral relativism and network diversity (RQ2). However, a negative relationship between GeneralMR and ego-alter moral similarity emerged in model 2 (RQ2), meaning ego-alter moral similarity decreased as general moral relativism increased. Independently, this relationship provides evidence that relativism is positively associated with the moral diversity of friendship networks. However, the lack of convergent validity among the analytical models suggests that this finding warrants further investigation.

Discussion

Study 1 provided some evidence of a positive relationship between moral relativism and willingness to communicate (WTC) with morally dissimilar others (RQ1). However, our measures of moral relativism did not display consistent relationships with friendship diversity (RQ2). These findings imply that moral relativists may be more willing to communicate across moral boundaries, but this willingness may not lead to close relationship formation.

Despite these insights, our findings motivated us to conduct a second study to replicate and specify how moral relativism relates to communication and friendship patterns. Specifically, we did not find robust evidence suggesting a positive relationship between moral relativism and moral diversity in core networks (i.e., top 8 close relationships). However, network diversity may manifest in ways that our operationalization (i.e., direct questions about the similarity of friends) did not detect. Consequently, we adopted a different operationalization of network diversity and broadened the types of friendship networks in study 2.

Study 2

In study 2 (pre-registration at: tinyurl.com/MoralNets), our goals were to replicate the observed relationships from study 1 and to investigate the proposed relationship between relativism and friendship diversity further. Therefore, we predicted that moral relativism would have a positive relationship with the willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others (H1). Additionally, we once again asked if moral relativism would have a positive relationship with the moral diversity of individuals’ friendship networks (RQ1).

In study 2, we adjusted some operationalizations to enhance the robustness of our measurement approach while replicating the study 1 findings. Specifically, we replaced the Forsyth measure of general relativism with a more contemporary measure by Collier-Spruel et al. (2019) to broaden generalizability. For willingness to communicate (WTC), we expanded our operationalization to capture individuals’ WTC both with people in general (expanded from study 1) and with a specific person (identical to study 1).

For friendship network diversity, we changed our operationalization to avoid relying upon perceptions of moral similarity among ego-alter and alter-alter pairs. To this end, we asked participants to evaluate the importance of individual moral foundations for each friend independently in study two. As a result, the operationalization no longer depended upon relative similarity among people and instead focused on a fuller picture of each alter’s moral beliefs.

Additionally, we expanded the number of network prompts to better assess the proposed relationship between moral relativism and the moral diversity among individuals’ friendships. In study 1, we found limited evidence of a positive relationship between moral relativism and moral diversity. Although this may have been due to our operationalization (as described above), it may also be due to the nature of the friendship networks people selected (i.e., most moral friends and closest friends in study 1). To evaluate this possibility, we included five additional personal network prompts grounded in moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Our goal was to leverage the added conceptual breadth covered by the five foundations to detect moral diversity in individuals’ friendship networks.

Finally, in terms of conceptual expansion, in study 2, we also included a measure of moral tolerance in addition to our measures of moral relativism to investigate the moral adaptability construct more broadly. Although similar in their practical outcomes, tolerance, and relativism are conceptually distinct. Whereas relativism forms the basis for moral beliefs (i.e., what is right and wrong), tolerance concerns how to treat others. Said differently, those high in relativism reject the notion of a single moral truth. Those high in tolerance reject the idea of condemning or changing the minds of morally dissimilar others (Collier-Spruel et al., 2019). Although both can produce amicable communication among dissimilar others, their differing conceptualizations offer insight into what drives moral adaptiveness in interpersonal contexts.

Work by Collier-Spruel and colleagues (2019) empirically distinguishes relativism and tolerance operationally and in connection to personality (e.g., forgiveness, utilitarianism, etc.). Relevant to our studies, they determined that moral relativists are less likely to centralize morality in their lives (i.e., they do not prioritize moral identity). In contrast, morally tolerant people tend to prize moral virtues and moral identity. As a result, it is possible that an intellectual or social interest motivates relativists to communicate across moral boundaries. By comparison, a sense of moral duty (i.e., kindness) may motivate morally tolerant individuals. Given this, we explored if moral tolerance would have a positive relationship with willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others (RQ2a). Similarly, we asked if moral tolerance would have a positive relationship with the moral diversity of individuals’ friendship networks (RQ2b).

Method

Online supplementary materials (OSMs)

The OSMs (tinyurl.com/MoralNets2) provide complete details regarding our operationalization rationales, method, survey instruments, and protocol visualizations.

Participants

1219 of 1551 people recruited from MTurk (paid $2) completed the study and generated valid data (n_female = 510, n_male = 696, n_non-binary = 2, n_trans = 1; M_age = 34, SD_age = 10.74; n_White = 857, n_Black = 123, n_Asian = 73, n_mix = 52, n_{Hispanic/Latinx} = 45, n_European = 17, n_other = 42).

Design and protocol

Study 2 was part of a broader project on moral beliefs, personal relationships, and social cognition (see OSM and preregistration for a full description of the overall project methodology). Like study 1, we used name generators to elicit friendships for our key measures. Unlike study 1, we did not collect perceptions of alter-alter relationships. In study 1, we investigated moral diversity in friendship networks that people generated based on prompts for participants’ closest and most moral friends. In study 2, we investigated 7 different friendship networks—closeness, morality, and one for each of the five moral foundations. Specifically, we asked participants to list their top 5 friends that were perceived as the most (1) close, (2) moral (3) caring, (4) fair minded, (5) loyal, (6) respectful of authority, or (7) attentive to bodily or spiritual purity.

After gaining consent, we randomly assigned them to 1 of the 7 name generator prompts. After providing names, participants reported on each friend’s characteristics. Next, participants indicated their willingness to communicate (WTC) with a morally dissimilar other. Then, participants indicated their level of moral relativism and moral tolerance. Finally, we assessed moral foundations and demographics.

Measures

Moral Relativism. We measured relativism in two ways. First, we used our situated measure of moral relativism from study 1 (i.e., SituatedMR), with minor changes. In study 1, people answered two truth-aptness questions about a behavior they thought was moral that someone else thought was immoral and two questions about a behavior they thought was immoral that someone else thought was moral (i.e., four total items). In study 2, people answered two truth-aptness questions about a behavior they thought was moral that someone else thought was immoral or about a behavior they thought was immoral that someone else thought was moral (i.e., two total items). We averaged both sets of answers to the two truth-aptness items to create a scale (Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .66, M = 2.83, SD = 1.15; r = .49, p < .001).

We measured general moral relativism using Collier-Spruel et al.’s (2019) 10-item measure of moral relativism (i.e., GeneralMR). An example item reads, “Different people can have opposing views on what is moral and immoral without anyone being wrong.” Participants answered each item using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert scale. We averaged their answers to create a scale (α = .85, M = 3.03, SD = .74).

Moral Tolerance. We measured tolerance using Collier-Spruel et al.’s (2019), p. 10-item measure of moral tolerance. An example item reads, “I do not judge the moral views of others, even if my own views are different from theirs.” Participants answered each item using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert scale. We averaged their answers to create a scale (α = .84, M = 3.55, SD = .70).

Willingness to Communicate. We measured WTC in two ways: relative to a specific communication partner and relative to communication partners in general (Kleinman & Kleinman, 2015). For the specific measure, we asked participants to type the name of someone they disagreed with morally. Participants then answered 5 questions using a 1 (very unwilling) to 5 (very willing) scale. The first three questions asked, if you were given the opportunity to converse with this person, how willing would you be to (1) start a conversation with [person] (2) express your moral beliefs to [person], and (3) understand [person’s] moral beliefs. The last two questions asked, if you were given the opportunity to converse with [person], how willing would you be to (1) seek a middle ground when you disagree and (2) express respect for their moral beliefs. We averaged their answers to create a scale (α = .84, M = 3.32, SD = 1.00).

For the general measure, participants answered 3 questions using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale: I am willing to (1) have conversations (2) discuss controversial issues (3) discuss moral differences with people who have moral beliefs that are very different from my own. We averaged their answers to create a scale (α = .85, M = 3.99, SD = 0.88).

Friend’s Moral Beliefs. Participants indicated each friend’s moral foundation salience to determine their moral beliefs. Our questions were an adaptation of the CMFQ-S used to assess the moral foundations of media characters (Grizzard et al., 2020). We asked how likely was it that each friend would care for the weak or vulnerable (care), treat some people differently than others (fairness), show a lack of loyalty (loyalty), show a lack of respect for authority (authority), and violate the standards of purity and decency (purity). For each of the moral foundations, participants rated each friend using a 1 (extremely unlikely) to 5 (extremely likely) scale. We reversed items as appropriate so that higher scores meant a stronger loading in that foundation.

Moral Network Diversity. We used each friend’s score on the CMFQ-S to measure diversity. We calculated the standard deviation across all 5 friends within each foundation separately. Then, we averaged the 5 resulting standard deviation scores to create a single value for each participant (M = 0.62, SD = 0.40).

Participant’s Moral Beliefs. Participants completed the 20-item moral foundations questionnaire to assess their moral foundation salience. The resulting scales were care (α = .73, M = 4.88, SD = .88), fairness (α = .73, M = 4.84, SD = .86), loyalty (α = .75, M = 3.50, SD = 1.16), authority (α = .79, M = 3.58, SD = 1.20), and purity (α = .88, M = 3.63, SD = 1.42).

Closeness. Participants indicated their closeness to each friend (i.e., ego-alter closeness). We assessed closeness using a 1 (very distant) to 5 (very close) scale.

Results

What relates to WTC in general?

Bivariate correlations (see Table S2 in the OSM) showed that our measures of situated moral relativism [SituatedMR; r (1217) = .07, p = .02], general moral relativism [GeneralMR; r (1218) = .12, p < .001], and moral tolerance [r(1218) = .23, p < .001] produced positive correlations with our general measure of WTC (H1 & RQ2a).

To test the robustness of these relationships, we conducted a linear regression (see Table 2, Model 1). In the model, we entered the dummy-coded conditions, participants’ moral beliefs, mean ego-alter closeness, age, and gender in addition to our central measures of moral tolerance and moral relativism as IVs. For each moral relativism variable, we also included the mean-centered product of moral relativism and tolerance to test for possible interaction effects. We refer to this collection of IVs as the standard set. The DV was our general measure of WTC.

Table 2. Summary of regression analyses of moral relativism’s (MR) relationships with willingness to communicate and network diversity.

	Model 1 MR & WTC in General					Model 2 MR & WTC with a Specific Person					Model 3 MR & Network Diversity
	adj R^2	F	df	N	p	adj R^2	F	df	N	p	adj R^2	F	df	N	p
	0.08	6.77	17	1186	< .001	0.11	9.51	17	1186	< .001	0.13	10.10	19	1184	< .001
	Model 1 Coefficients					Model 1 Coefficients					Model 1 Coefficients
	B	SE	β	t	p	B	SE	β	t	p	B	SE	β	t	p
Care cond	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.94	0.35	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.45	0.66	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.75	0.45
Fair cond	0.13	0.09	0.15	1.40	0.16	0.001	0.10	0.001	0.01	0.99	−0.02	0.04	−0.04	−0.40	0.69
Loyal cond	−0.02	0.09	−0.02	−0.22	0.83	−0.19	0.10	−0.19	−1.84	0.07	−0.01	0.04	−0.01	−0.12	0.90
Auth cond	0.03	0.09	0.04	0.34	0.74	−0.15	0.10	−0.15	−1.48	0.14	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.63	0.53
Pure cond	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.96	0.34	−0.03	0.10	−0.03	−0.30	0.76	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.79	0.43
Moral cond	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.31	0.75	−0.19	0.10	−0.19	−1.83	0.07	−0.01	0.04	−0.03	−0.26	0.80
MFQHarm	0.04	0.03	0.05	1.22	0.22	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.99	0.32	0.02	0.01	0.06	1.63	0.10
MFQFair	−0.005	0.03	−0.01	−0.15	0.89	0.05	0.04	0.05	1.29	0.20	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.54	0.59
MFQLoyal	0.06	0.04	0.07	1.63	0.10	−0.003	0.04	−0.003	−0.06	0.95	−0.03	0.02	−0.08	−1.74	0.08
MFQAuth	−0.06	0.04	−0.07	−1.43	0.15	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.44	0.66	−0.001	0.02	−0.001	−0.03	0.98
MFQPure	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.36	0.72	0.004	0.04	0.004	0.09	0.93	−0.02	0.02	−0.05	−1.12	0.26
Ego-alt c.	0.13	0.03	0.15	5.04	< .001	0.08	0.03	0.08	2.94	0.003	−0.11	0.01	−0.28	−9.90	< .001
Age	−0.02	0.03	−0.02	−0.66	0.51	−0.03	0.03	−0.03	−1.00	0.32	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.52	0.60
Gender	0.14	0.05	0.16	2.72	0.01	0.13	0.06	0.13	2.17	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.11	1.93	0.054
Tolerance	0.16	0.03	0.19	6.05	< .001	0.24	0.03	0.24	7.91	< .001	−0.04	0.01	−0.10	−3.29	0.001
SituatedMR	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.27	0.79	0.09	0.03	0.09	2.88	0.004	0.04	0.01	0.09	3.13	0.002
GeneralMR	0.03	0.03	0.04	1.17	0.24	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.91	0.36	−0.03	0.01	−0.08	−2.36	0.02
Tol*SitMR	−0.003	0.03	−0.004	−0.12	0.90	0.04	0.03	0.03	1.22	0.22	−0.04	0.01	−0.10	−3.62	< .001
Tol*GenMR	0.03	0.02	0.03	1.30	0.20	0.03	0.03	0.03	1.38	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.05	2.16	0.03

Note: Gender coded as 1 = Female, 2 = Male. IVs (except condition dummies and gender) are z-scores. Tolerance abbreviated Tol, ego-alter closeness abbreviated ego-alt c., SituatedMR abbreviated StiMR, and GeneralMR abbreviated GenMR. Italicized items were ultimately excluded in the model.

In the model, because the interaction terms were not significant, we excluded them. In terms of main effects, only moral tolerance, mean ego-alter closeness, and gender produced significant relationships with our general measure of WTC. The more tolerant people were (RQ2a) and the closer they were to their friends, the more they were willing to communicate with morally dissimilar others in general. In addition, men were more willing to communicate with dissimilar others than women. Together, the data showed that moral tolerance (RQ2a), but not relativism (H1), had a positive relationship with individuals’ general willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others.

What relates to WTC with a specific person?

Bivariate correlations (see Table S2 in the OSM) showed that SituatedMR [r (1217) = .16, p < .001], GeneralMR [r (1218) = .15, p < .001], and moral tolerance [r(1218) = .29, p < .001] produced positive correlations with our person-specific measure of WTC (H1 & RQ2a).

To test the robustness of these relationships, we conducted a linear regression (see Table 2, Model 2). Like before, we used the standard set of IVs. In model 2, the DV was our person-specific measure of WTC. Like model 1, we excluded the interaction terms because they were not significant. In terms of main effects, the results demonstrated that moral tolerance, SituatedMR, mean ego-alter closeness, and gender related to our person-specific measure of WTC. People were more willing to communicate with a specific person the more tolerant they were (RQ2a), the higher their situated moral relativism (H1), and the closer they were to their friends. Like before, men were more willing to communicate with a specific morally dissimilar person than women. However, higher levels of general moral relativism did not relate to individuals’ willingness to communicate with a specific person (H1). All considered, these data show that tolerance (RQ2a) and SituatedMR (H1), but not GeneralMR (H1), had a positive relationship with individuals’ general willingness to communicate with morally dissimilar others.

What predicts network diversity?

Bivariate correlations (see Table S2 in the OSM) showed that SituatedMR did not relate to network diversity [r (1216) = .02, p = .51; RQ1]. Unexpectedly, diversity had a small negative relationship with GeneralMR [r (1216) = -.08, p = .01; RQ1] and moral tolerance [r(1217) = -.13, p < .001; RQ2b]. Together, this suggests that moral adaptability does not relate positively to the perceived moral diversity of friendship networks. Instead, we found partial evidence suggesting that greater moral adaptability either encourages people to establish relationships with morally similar others or having morally similar friends encourages moral adaptability. Alternatively, morally adaptive individuals may simply perceive their friendships as more similar given their personal openness to diverse morals.

To further test these relationships, we conducted a subsequent linear regression (see Table 2, Model 3). In the model, we used the standard set of IVs. The DV was network moral diversity. The data revealed two distinct sets of findings. First, moral tolerance and, respectively, both SituatedMR and GeneralMR interacted to predict network diversity. In summary, at the average level of both SituatedMR and GeneralMR, moral tolerance negatively predicted diversity. Full examination of the data revealed that network moral diversity was generally lower for those high in tolerance (RQ2b). At the average level of moral tolerance, SituatedMR positively predicted diversity (RQ1). In contrast, GeneralMR was a negative predictor (RQ1), as was ego-alter closeness. Therefore, our findings present incongruent conclusions regarding the relationship between moral adaptiveness and the moral diversity of one’s friendship network.

To describe the interaction between tolerance and SituatedMR more explicitly, we probed the interactions using simple slopes at +/- 1 SD around the mean of moral tolerance, as well as at the mean as described above (see Fig. S2A in the OSM). The relationship between SituatedMR and diversity was positive for those low in tolerance (B_SituatedMR = .08, p < .001), positive for those at the average level of tolerance (B_SituatedMR = .04, p = .002) and nonsignificant for those high in tolerance (B_SituatedMR = -.003, p = .83). Based on these data, a high level of tolerance nullified the positive relationship between SituatedMR and network moral diversity.

Likewise, to interpret the interaction between tolerance and GeneralMR, we conducted tests of the interactions using simple slopes at +/- 1 SD around the mean of moral tolerance, as well as the mean as described above (see Fig. S2B in the OSM). The relationship between GeneralMR and diversity was negative for those low in tolerance (B_GeneralMR = -.05, p = .001), negative for those at the average level of tolerance (B_GeneralMR = -.03, p = .02) and nonsignificant for those high in tolerance (B_GeneralMR = -.009, p = .60). These data show that a high level of tolerance nullified the negative relationship between GeneralMR and network moral diversity.

General discussion

Across two studies, we investigated the relationship between moral adaptiveness (i.e., a flexible application of morality) and the willingness to communicate (WTC) when moral differences exist between individuals, as well as the relationship between adaptiveness and the perceived moral diversity in friendship networks. We investigated the construct of adaptiveness using moral relativism (i.e., the belief that morals are subjective) and moral tolerance (i.e., the belief that you should not condemn morally dissimilar others). Regarding WTC and relativism, a positive link between relativism and willingness to communicate across moral boundaries emerged. However, the relationship was bounded. Specifically, the relationship did not emerge when using measures of one’s general tendency to be morally relative (i.e., considering incongruent moral behaviors in general). Instead, we detected the relationship when using situated measures of moral relativism (i.e., considering a specific, personally relevant behavior). Furthermore, the relationship occurred when using situated measures of WTC (i.e., speaking to a specific conversation partner) rather than general measures of WTC (i.e., speaking to people in general). This pattern occurred across different study designs and operationalizations.

Compared to relativism, the relationship between WTC and tolerance was more robust and consistent, occurring among all our measures of WTC. These findings suggest that tolerance may explain the nature of interpersonal communication across moral bounds more robustly than relativism. Together, the data imply that moral adaptability, the larger grounding construct we built upon, relates to communication willingness among morally divergent people. To our knowledge, our findings provide the first evidence linking moral relativism and tolerance directly to the intent to initiate communication with dissimilar people.

In contrast, the anticipated positive relationship between adaptiveness and the perceived moral diversity of individuals’ friendship networks did not emerge with clarity or consistency. Instead, we found limited evidence of a positive relationship in study 1. Likewise, study 2 revealed limited evidence of a relationship using different operationalizations, but the directionality was inconsistent. Therefore, the nature of the relationship between moral adaptability and friendship network diversity remains unclear. As a result, the overall takeaway of our studies is that morally adaptive individuals are more willing to communicate with people across moral bounds, but this willingness does not correspond with more moral diversity among one’s close friendships. Below, we propose the implications of these findings, connect our work to existing literature, and make suggestions for future research in this area.

Interpreting the relationships surrounding WTC, it is likely that those high in moral adaptability are socially flexible. Existing work argues that general moral adaptiveness helps people navigate social life successfully (Yudkin et al., 2021). In accordance with this bottom-up explanation, we suggest that morally adaptive people are less likely to perceive moral differences as a barrier to communication. Instead, they may view moral differences as non-threatening, and even an opportunity for personal moral exploration, self-reflection, and a way to find moral common ground. In other words, these individuals may approach communication across moral bounds as an inclusive, reciprocal dialogue (Nagda & Zúñiga, 2003). Considering the opposite, it is reasonable to presume that less morally adaptive individuals think of morally dissimilar others as objectively wrong via exaggerated perceptions of (or heightened sensitivity to) dissimilarity. As Wright and colleagues (2014) explain, the lay understanding of morality tends to be normative (i.e., concerning what one ought to do). When people think of morality in these more objective ways, it may cue right/wrong thinking that makes outsiders appear incorrect, immoral, and even dangerous—potentiating negative affect and interpersonal conflict stemming from fear or moral outrage (Crockett, 2017).

Nevertheless, work in related areas also offers a top-down explanation, positing that people may develop adaptiveness resulting from continued communication with culturally dissimilar others (see Allport, 1954; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Stouffer, 1955). Related to the current findings, regularly embedding oneself in morally heterogenous social contexts may foster moral adaptiveness. From this perspective, the moral incongruency among communication partners may necessitate dialogic communication to promote productive discussions of apparent differences. Continued communication in these contexts may resolve uncertainties and foster empathy that, ultimately, contribute to increased moral adaptiveness (see Nagda & Zúñiga, 2003).

These possibilities generate meaningful implications for interpersonal communication research. First, according to social penetration theory (SPT; Altman & Taylor, 1973), communicating intimate details to another person (i.e., disclosure) encourages intimacy in relationships. Altman and Taylor argue that moral beliefs are among the “deepest” components that comprise one’s personality (pp. 19-20). In other words, people tend to avoid discussing moral beliefs with others until they develop intimacy. However, our data suggest that morally adaptive individuals may think of moral beliefs as more “shallow,” and therefore a viable conversation topic among less intimate company. This possibility presents implications for SPT and similar theories grounded in disclosure. Specifically, incongruent levels of moral adaptiveness may present barriers to reciprocal disclosure. For example, more adaptive individuals may disclose moral beliefs (and solicit information about others’ moral beliefs) faster than someone less adaptive, potentiating discomfort and the conversation’s termination.

The second implication for interpersonal communication research relates to expectancy violations theory (EVT; Burgoon, 2015). According to EVT, unexpected behaviors during interpersonal exchanges prompt evaluations. Positive evaluations tend to improve interpersonal relations whereas negative evaluations harm relationships (Afifi & Metts, 1998). Related to our work, individuals embedded in morally heterogeneous ecologies may, at first, experience many negative evaluations resulting from moral expectancy violations. However, overtime, these individuals should desensitize and start anticipating moral differences, especially when the social interactions confer benefits despite negative expectancy violations. If so, this process should increase one’s moral adaptability. Accordingly, accounting for adaptability may help predict how the valence and strength/importance of expectancy violations relates to incongruent values.

Beyond these implications, finding that tolerance predicted WTC more consistently than relativism aligns with Collier-Spruel and colleagues’ (2019) work that demonstrated how each concept relates to personality differences. In particular, they found that relativists were less likely to endorse moral virtues and moral identity than tolerant individuals. Our data extend knowledge in this area because our operationalization of WTC included measures that assessed the degree to which people were willing to “understand” and “respect” moral beliefs they disagreed with. As a result, our measure of WTC focused on neutral, and possibly amicable, interpersonal communication. Conceptually, this aligns well with our measures, as both tolerance and relativism assume moral disagreement. However, tolerance also assumes that the subject of disagreement is important to the individual, as it entails compromising to endure something disliked (van Doorn, 2014). By comparison, compromise may not apply to relativists, given that they do not necessarily believe their own morals to be more accurate (i.e., truthful) than others’.

Speculating upon these differences, relativistic and tolerant people may seek different outcomes from initiating communication with morally dissimilar others. Those who are tolerant may communicate out of necessity. In other words, they may need to affirm (or establish) the amicable nature of the interpersonal context. Because tolerance assumes the moral difference is associated with negativity (i.e., dislike/discomfort), these individuals may be more willing to communicate as a method of coping with their thoughts and feelings. This may not be the case for relativists because moral differences may not elicit negativity. As a result, relativists may have less of a need to initiate communication. When they do, it may be to serve an intellectual or even self-serving interest (e.g., curiosity or social control/power).

Despite finding positive relationships between both relativism and tolerance and WTC, the measures of moral adaptability did not relate to the moral diversity within participants’ friend networks uniformly. We expected that the personal networks of morally adaptive individuals would possess greater moral diversity due to their willingness to communicate across moral bounds or as a product of being embedded in a moral heterogenous ecology. Across two studies and an array of operationalizations, the data did not support this idea. Although a single analysis in study 1 produced results in the anticipated direction, the analyses in study 2 produced inconsistent results. Thus, our findings align with existing work that highlights the difficulty in maintaining network ties among dissimilar people (Tulin et al., 2021) and the general worldview homogeneity in social networks (Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010). In other words, morally adaptive people may communicate readily when faced with moral differences, but they are not more likely to form close relationships under these circumstances.

Nevertheless, our measurement approach may also help to explain these divergent outcomes. Specifically, in study 1, we operationalized moral diversity as perceived ego-alter moral similarity (i.e., how morally similar are you to friend A) and perceived alter-alter moral similarity (i.e., how morally similar is friend A to friend B). In study 2, the operationalization was the variance in the perceived moral foundation salience of all alters (e.g., to what degree does friend A care for the weak and vulnerable). As a result, it is possible that morally adaptive participants in study 2 reported greater similarity among friends that fit certain moral categories because they had a greater variety of friends to select from. Said differently, morally adaptive people may have been better able to recall morally homogeneous clusters of friends than those who are less morally adaptive. Alternatively, adaptive individuals may have perceived moral dissimilarity in unexpected ways (e.g., perceiving large moral differences as small) that reduced the reliability of our measures.

Finally, we witnessed significant interactions between our measures of moral relativism and moral tolerance for predicting the diversity of participants’ friendship networks. Although our situated measure of moral relativism positively related to network diversity, the general measure of relativism related negatively. High levels of tolerance attenuated both relationships to non-significance. Given the divergent relationships, it is unclear what this interaction implies. In a general sense, it may suggest that the two measures of relativism tap into different ways that people perceive their friend’s moral beliefs, as our measure of network diversity relied on perceptions of morality. Therefore, intolerance (i.e., a lack of tolerance) may simply exaggerate how moral relativism influences one’s perception of the morality of others. Alternatively, these oppositional findings may once again reflect that our measure of network diversity in study 2 operated in unexpected ways that reaffirm the need for further research in this area.

Limitations

A limitation of the current work is its reliance on relational data. Without manipulations related to moral adaptability and willingness to communicate, directional causality cannot be determined (though prior theoretical perspectives suggest both directions can occur). As a result, it is unclear if adaptability encourages WTC (bottom-up), or if a tendency to communicate with dissimilar others fosters an inclination toward adaptiveness (top-down). Likewise, our questions on moral diversity could be reversed. Although moral adaptability may foster friendships with morally diverse individuals, it may be that surrounding oneself with dissimilar friends engenders moral adaptability. Given the relationships observed between moral relativism and tolerance and WTC, our work provides grounds for subsequent experimental work to uncover the direction of the proposed relationships.

Another limitation is our exclusive focus on subjective perceptions and imagined interactions. Our studies asked participants to provide their perceptions of similarity/difference among the friends that come to mind given a specific prompt (i.e., cognitive social networks), which may or may not align with objective measures of moral network diversity. Future work should investigate the links between moral adaptiveness and friendship diversity through other forms of network data collection (e.g., online social network APIs).

Additionally, the loss of reliability in our specific measure of moral relativism in study 2 presents a limitation. The use of two items in study 2 as opposed to four items in study 1 is likely what made the measure less reliable. To help ensure reliability, future work may benefit from using Goodwin and colleagues’ full measure instead of the adapted versions in the present work.

More broadly, the relatively small effect sizes observed also present limitations to the practical significance of the current work. We think this is potentially due to us relying on hypothetical imagined interactions and possible floor effects in our measurement of relativism. Given this possibility, we recommend that future work use more involved interpersonal simulations or actual conversations to observe effects. Similarly, our use of specified moral networks in both studies may have inhibited our ability to detect network diversity. As discussed above, it is possible that people who are more morally adaptive can likely identify more people that fit any given network prompt.

Conclusion

Our studies extend work at the intersection of moral psychology and interpersonal communication by considering how individual differences in moral adaptiveness relate to communication and friendship. Specifically, our findings demonstrate consistent relationships between general moral adaptiveness (i.e., being high in moral relativism and/or moral tolerance) and one’s openness to communicate with others across moral boundaries. Despite this, the personal networks of morally adaptive people were not more morally diverse than those of less adaptive people—alluding to the difficulties that incongruent morals present to close friendship. By better understanding the moral traits that underlie the willingness to communicate in real-world contexts, future work may shed additional light on how morality influences social interactions and relationship processes in an increasingly diverse world.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editor, the assistant editor, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions that helped shape the manuscript. Additionally, we thank C. Joseph Francemone for his help in conducting our tests of measurement invariance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Like situated moral relativism, we repeated this set of questions after reversing the logic (i.e., providing the behavior they thought was immoral and assuming the others thought that the behavior was moral) and also counterbalancing the order. However, an error in our survey code presented the reverse-logic questions incorrectly. Rather than estimating the missing values using imputation, we discarded WTC responses that relied on reverse-logic questions as well as participants who saw the invalid questions first. Thus, analyses that rely upon WTC only use half of our participants. A series of independent samples t-tests showed that the data loss was random, as those who were excluded produced equivalent data for moral relativism, ego-alter closeness, alter-alter closeness, closeness density, moral similarity density, ego-alter moral similarity, alter-alter moral similarity, all MFQ subscales, age, and gender (all p’s > .05).

2 Density is the proportion of linked nodes out of total possible links, or d = 2 m/(n * n − 1), where m denotes the number of edges and n denotes the number of nodes. All edges in participants’ networks were coded dichotomously; edges with ratings above the midpoint of the scale were coded as present (1), whereas edges at or below the midpoint were coded as absent (0). To aid in interpretation, the ego (i.e., participant) was removed from each network. As such, density is 0 in networks in which no friends were viewed as similar to one another, and 1 in networks in which all friends were perceived as similar.