Repositioning the urban environment question in Zimbabwe: a review of the context, conditions and processes

Abstract

This analysis is a reappraisal of two perspectives in urban development in Zimbabwe: environmental sustainability and human sustenance. The discussion seeks to reposition the conservation–survival debate by broadening it to the wider urban and national macroeconomic and sociopolitical context. It re‐examines Zimbabwe's environmental problems by examining the challenges posed by urbanisation, industrialisation and informalisation. To these ‘permanent’ strands are added the ‘transient’ phenomena of structural adjustment and indigenisation. The analysis is done within the overall national macroeconomic and sociopolitical environment. The article examines environmental sustainability and human sustenance as the two policy challenges that have to be reconciled in the quest for sustainable urban settlements in Zimbabwe. The analysis stresses that the exercise of striking a balance between the needs of humankind and those of nature has to take cognisance of the complexity of issues and the processes going on elsewhere in the urban and national context.

1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of sustainability concerns itself with three aspects: the physical environment, society, and the economy (WCED, 1987; cf. Kamete, 1992). Ideally, all three are equally important and should receive equal attention (Gilbert et al., 1996; UNCHS, 2000: 16). Any development strategy that underplays the importance, ignores the special characteristics and disregards the requirements of any one of the three sectors is doomed. It is bound to lead to some undesirable consequences (cf. Yiftachel & Hedgcock, 1993: 139; Kamete, 1997).

It is therefore not surprising that early development initiatives that had a bias towards a limited range of components had damaging results on those aspects that had been underemphasised. A classic example is the exclusive focus on the ‘growth and structure of the economy’ (Conyers & Hills, 1984: 45), which adversely affected the environmental and social fabric. Focusing as they did on the achievement of high economic growth through rapid industrialisation, these development strategies in a way contributed to environmental degradation and the creation of cesspools of human misery.

The 1990s seem to have brought a turnaround in emphasis. Goals other than the structure and growth of the economy began to feature prominently in development and management policies and strategies. In the case of Zimbabwe, there is all the evidence that just as early development policy and planning was concerned with economic goals (Government of Zimbabwe, 1983, 1990, 1998), the 1990s witnessed a movement towards the social and environmental goals. Admittedly, the issues are more complicated than this simplistic presentation.

1.1 The urban environment question

In Zimbabwe, two opposing currents have already formed in urban development and management discourse and practice. These currents, which constitute the ‘urban environment question’, are environmental preservation and human sustenance. From a disjointed, poorly developed and incoherent debate at the beginning of the 1990s, this question has been rapidly taking shape (cf. Gore et al., 1992; Kamete, 2002a). The question was propelled onto the policy agenda by ‘preservationists’ (mainly civil society), whose argument has always been that environmental destruction has gone too far. They stated that the crafting and application of technical, regulatory and administrative instruments, complemented by effective policing, prosecution and education, can halt the assault on nature. This prescription was scarcely on the agenda when it began to be counteracted by ‘survivalists’ (mainly poor households), whose main concern was to ensure that the survival strategies of mainly poor urbanites remained unencumbered. The embracing and application in the local context of ‘urban governance’, ‘urban sustainability’ and poverty alleviation have ensured that the conflict grows in complexity and the air remains tense. As a result, the urban environment question remains unresolved and continues to be contentious. Meanwhile, as its implications and latitude keep on widening, there is no sign of agreement in the foreseeable future (Kamete, 2002a).

It is the argument of this discussion that the rift owes its emergence and continued existence to conditions and processes elsewhere in the urban and national context. For example, the mutually reinforcing processes of urbanisation and industrialisation are particularly notorious for exerting pressure on society and nature. Regarded by some analysts as the motor generators of national economic development, cities and towns have become centres of productive activities essential to the economic wellbeing of many developing countries, including Zimbabwe (cf. Payne, 1977; World Bank, 2000; Kamete et al., 2001). However, the very fact that urbanisation and industrialisation are characterised, respectively, by population concentration and heightened productive economic activity, means that these processes inevitably affect the human and physical environments (Merrett, 1995). How the human and environmental components are exactly affected depends, to a large extent, on the macroeconomic and sociopolitical context, as well as the policy framework within which they operate.

This article seeks to probe into this emerging conflict between nature and humankind in the urban centres of Zimbabwe. The goal is to try and achieve analytical breadth and depth regarding the deepening conflict. After examining the concepts of environmental sustainability and human sustenance, an overview of the urban environment question is given. The emergence of the question is discussed within the context of urbanisation. A simplified conceptual analysis is offered, leading to a repositioning of the question in the macroeconomic and sociopolitical conditions encompassing structural adjustment, industrialisation, indigenisation and informalisation.

While structural adjustment and industrialisation are fairly standard terms – and are used as such in this discussion – it is necessary to explain what informalisation and indigenisation mean. In this context, informalisation is a process where urban productive and non‐productive subsystems increasingly move towards the informal sector, which is home to small‐scale, unregistered and largely illegal activities (cf. Rakodi, 1993). In the Zimbabwean sense, indigenisation is a deliberate process towards encouraging and promoting the interests of black Zimbabweans in the economy. This is undertaken due to increasing their stake in key economic sectors which, due to historical imbalances are largely controlled by white and/or foreign‐owned companies (DSEI, 1998).

Having analysed the conditions in urban areas, the article will introduce the processes taking place in Zimbabwean urban society. Dominating these processes is impoverishment that is propelled by declining incomes and increasing unemployment. The article will offer an explanation as to how and why socioeconomic pressures are transplanted onto the physical environment. In the light of this analysis, the urban environment question in Zimbabwe will finally be re‐examined.

2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Side one: environmental sustainability

In addition to being the focus of human activity, the physical environment has also been the focus of debate and policy. The fact that nature is the source of raw materials, the arena of human activities and the sink for various forms of wastes (Woodhouse, 1992) has made humankind realise that they have to use the physical environment prudently. Still, how far humanity can and should go to preserve the environment remains controversial, speculative and uncertain. In a powerful analysis, Merrett (1995) sheds valuable light on environmental protection by identifying two strands of such protection:

	The first strand is preservation, which Merrett (1995: 11) defines as ‘the protection of nature against man (sic)’. This is an aggressive form of environmentalism that is based on the conviction that damage to nature has gone too far and needs to be halted at any cost (cf. Pearce et al., 1990; see also Bojo et al., 1990).
	The second strand of environmentalism is conservation, which focuses on the ‘protection of nature for the benefit of man’. This ‘major redefinition’ (Merrett, 1995: 11) signifies a bold attempt at reconciling humankind and nature, both of which are critical elements in the quest for sustainable development (Gilbert et al., 1996).

2.2 Side two: human sustenance

Human sustenance refers to survival and livelihood. It includes but goes beyond the ‘logistics of day‐to‐day survival’ (Thomson, 1984). Just as environmental sustainability refers to the maintenance of essential ecological balance (WCED, 1987), human sustenance denotes the continued and lasting survival of society within a given environment. The primary endeavour of human sustenance is the satisfaction of basic necessities such as food, shelter and clothing. The chief indicator of sustenance within the urban context is income, which is used to access the aforementioned necessities. In a situation where there is none or not enough of this income, urban poverty results (Nelson, 1979; World Bank, 1991; MPSLSW, 1996; Mubvami, 1996; Kamete, 1997, 2002a). Employment – whether formal or informal, part‐time or full‐time, legal, semi‐legal or illegal – is the chief source of income. To a large extent, human sustenance in the predominantly commoditised urban economy (Moser et al., 1996) is almost exclusively dependent on income from this range of employment types.

3 URBANISATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN ZIMBABWE

The process of urbanisation in Zimbabwe has been going on for over a century, and its nature is best depicted by reference to population growth. Table 1 shows the trends according to national censuses and intercensal projections.

Urbanisation in Zimbabwe, 1969–2000

Year	National urban population	National population	Percentage of national population	Absolute urban	Urban as a percentage of national
1962	764 740	3 657 470	19,83
1969	945 430	4 099 340	18,54	24	−6,51
1982	1 941 610	7 546 071	25,73	109	38,78
1992	3 187 720	10 412 548	30,61	64,18	18,96
2000	4 121 000	12 487 879	33,0	29,27	7,81
Sources: Calculated from CSO (1993); Wekwete (1994); United Nations (2000).

The table provides a picture of intercensal changes in urban growth in Zimbabwe. The intercensal period from 1962 and 1969 saw the contribution of urban population to total national population decline by about 7 per cent, while the total urban population grew by over 24 per cent. In the rest of the periods, both urban population and the proportion of that population to national population experienced marked increases. In fact, in the period between 1969 and 1982, urban population more than doubled, signifying an average annual increase of above 10 per cent. This has been explained by the post‐independence relaxing of racist restrictive laws that were designed to stem the influx of black people into urban centres. This shock rise dropped within the following ten years. However, at an annual average of 6,5, it is still phenomenal. Between 1982 and 1992, Harare and Bulawayo, the two largest urban centres, grew at an annual rate of 6 and 7 per cent, respectively (MPCNH, 1995: 14). This is higher than the African average of 5 per cent (United Nations, 1989). In contrast, most of the developed world is urbanising at rates below 2 per cent per annum (World Bank, 1985).

The potential for urbanisation in Zimbabwe is still very great. In 1990 it was noted that, given that the urban population was still less than a third of the national population, urbanisation in Zimbabwe was then ‘a potent force’ (Wekwete, 1990: 130). At the dawn of the 21st century that population had reached the one‐third mark. However, with an urbanisation level that is way below 40 per cent the potency is still there. At the current rate, the country's urban population will more than double by 2004. By 2020, it will have more than trebled (cf. Devas & Rakodi, 1993).

From this brief discussion, it can be seen that in terms of population alone, Zimbabwe is urbanising at a phenomenal rate. As noted, the potential to sustain this growth is very great given the large numbers of rural populations and the urge to migrate into cities, as well as natural population increase. A further complicating factor is that due to urban primacy, this urban growth is concentrated mainly in a few cities. The capital city accounts for a significant proportion of the growth; a few more large cities make up most of the rest. Harare alone has more than 37 per cent of the national urban population. This translates into 11,42 per cent of the total national population. If Chitungwiza is included, this agglomeration boasts just under half (about 46 per cent) of the urbanites in Zimbabwe, and slightly over 14 per cent of the national population. Urbanisation has brought with it complicated environmental challenges. These are best discussed by positioning them within the arena of human use of the physical environment. As indicated above, human use of the physical environment is threefold, namely source, site and sink (see Merrett, 1995; Kamete, 1997, 2002a). The series of tables comprising Table 2 chronicles these activities and their environmental impacts, and provides examples of some affected areas in Harare.

Use of the environment and impacts in the urban areas of Zimbabwe, with examples of affected areas in Harare

A. Source of raw materials
Activity	Impact	Some affected areas in Harare
Sand abstraction	Siltation, erosion	All major streams and rivers
Clay for bricks	Excavations, dumps	Northern, southern and western outskirts
Firewood, timber	Deforestation, erosion, siltation	Adjoining farmlands near the south‐western high‐density areas
Quarrying for construction stone	Pits, dumps, degradation	Pomona, Mabvuku, Cranborne
B. Site of human activities
Activity	Impact	Some affected areas in Harare
Urban agriculture	Erosion, siltation, chemical pollution	All major streams and rivers
Colonisation of fragile lands	Damaging of river catchment areas	Mukuvisi, Manyame, Mazowe catchments
Housing	Overcrowding, overloading of services	All high‐density and informal and informal settlements
Vending, trading	Congestion, overloading of facilities	City centre
Quarrying and blasting	Noise, dumps, holes and pits	Pomona
C. Sink of wastes
Activity	Impact	Some affected areas in Harare
Disposal of solid waste	Defacing of the landscape through rubbish dumps, human waste, decaying solid matter	City dumps in Warren Park; most open spaces, all high‐density areas; city crop‐fields
Effluent disposal	Pollution of watercourses and water bodies by effluent	All rivers, particularly Mukuvisi and Manyame; Lake Chivero
Hazardous waste disposal	Public health hazard	Pomona
Gaseous emissions	Atmospheric pollution	All industrial sites; the central business district

Table 2 illustrates that human use of the physical environment in urban areas has affected the landscape, soils, flora, water bodies, animal life (particularly water life) and the atmosphere. Some of the most damaging results include loss of amenity, erosion and siltation, as well as land, water and atmospheric pollution. It is not the purpose of this discussion to go into the finer details about these impacts. Some insight can be obtained from other sources, such as Mubvami (1997), Government of Zimbabwe (1998) and Kamete (2002a).

4 ‘ACTORS’, ‘CATALYSTS’ AND ‘REACTORS’ ON THE ENVIRONMENTFRONT

4.1 Actions, effects and reactions

Figure 1 depicts the urban environment scene in Zimbabwe. Basically there are two groups of actors: the formal sector and the informal sector. These are the groups who use the natural environment (the ‘stage’), as shown in Table 2. Figure 1 shows how the actions of these key players trigger off environmental repercussions, as described in Table 2. It is then that the first‐level reactors or catalysts come in. These are environmental groups who observe the bad environmental effects of human activities and become concerned. Because of this concern they react. This first‐level reaction is aimed at convincing and inducing policy makers (national and/or local) to act, and takes the form of persuasion and pressure. This is accomplished through brinkmanship. The groups also target the public from whom they try to garner moral and material support.

Actors and reactors in the urban environmental scene in Zimbabwe

As indicated, the environmentalists target central and local governments. These come in as the second‐level reactors to address the concerns of the catalysts. The response consists of controlling or outlawing allegedly harmful activities so as to protect the environment from the users. The government also responds to the environmental groups in order to placate them. The most common forms of the government's response are criminalisation and regulation, and assistance and sensitisation may also be used (see Gore et al., 1992; Kamete, 1992, 2002a):

	Criminalisation and regulation are preceded by threats and accompanied by legal and regulatory instruments such as laws, directives and by‐laws.
	Assistance is provided as material help. In Harare, for example, urban farmers are allocated the ‘right’ pieces of land for urban agriculture and designated sites have been made available for informal sector economic activities.
	Sensitisation is usually accomplished through public education and awareness campaigns. This is not to say that the state is not a direct (first‐level) reactor. Sometimes state agents notice the damage to the environment and react accordingly without incitement from environmental groups. However, this is very rare.

4.2 Introducing the processes

In the urban centres of Zimbabwe, the scene depicted above is fraught with debates revolving around economic and sociopolitical issues. A very simplified presentation of the processes in urban environmental management follows below.

The actors exploit the environment because of two principal motivations, namely need and greed (cf. Gore et al., 1992; Kamete, 1992, 1997). The ensuing environmental damage is explained condescendingly in terms of ignorance, or antagonistically as a flagrant violation of laws and regulations, and a wanton disregard for the wellbeing of the environment (see Environment 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Whatever the explanation, concerned environmental groups seek an ecological solution which, as noted above, focuses on rescuing nature from human‐induced damage.

The message sometimes reaches the second‐level reactors who are galvanised into formulating a response to the stimulus from the first‐level reactors. In contrast to the ecological analysis of the first‐level reactors, the government sometimes considers sociopolitical dimensions as it shapes a response to the proddings of civil society. Depending on the context, the users or abusers of the environment in the formal or informal sector are viewed as obstacles or assets. Electoral politics feature prominently in these labels. It is these perceptions and considerations that ultimately influence the precise type of response the government chooses to adopt in addressing the environmental issue in question.

The above scenario suffers from two basic weaknesses, namely myopia and bias on the part of both levels of reactors. In most cases, their analyses look no further than the immediate issues. Although this seems convenient, less cumbersome and therefore attractive, it runs the risk of marginalising or obscuring the more important determinants of the urban environment question. The remainder of this article attempts to re‐examine the urban environmental debate within the processes and events in the wider urban and national contexts.

5 REPOSITIONING THE URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE IN ZIMBABWE

Figure 2 repositions the urban environment question in terms of the wider national macroeconomic and sociopolitical events and processes. The diagram shows two categories of national processes:

	The ‘old and permanent’, comprising urbanisation, industrialisation and informalisation
	The ‘new and transient’, namely structural adjustment and indigenisation

Repositioning the urban environment in the national context

Incidentally, the first group is made up of socioeconomic processes, while the second group comprises policy issues. These processes take place within the prevailing macroeconomic and political environment. Figure 2 captures the synergies between these processes and goes on to show how this impacts on socioeconomic conditions, among them employment, incomes and poverty. All these are embedded in the critical issues that revolve around environmental sustainability and human sustenance. The density of detail in the diagram demonstrates that the processes are by no means clear‐cut, distinct and independent. The issues will now be discussed in greater detail.

6 THE MACROECONOMIC SITUATION

For over a decade, the worsening condition of the Zimbabwean economy characterised by persistent macroeconomic instability has been affecting urban economies. This has had wide‐ranging implications on the physical environment and society. The most significant features of the severely strained and persistently underperforming economy include the following (see Zimbabwe Independent, 2001, 2003; NMB, 2001a):

	High interest rates, which hovered around 40 per cent in 2001 and rose to over 100 per cent in 2003
	Inflation, which was more than 175 per cent in 2001 and shot to over 600 per cent at the beginning of 2004
	Unemployment, which rose from 60 per cent in 2001 to over 75 per cent in 2003
	A budget deficit of nearly 20 per cent

With such alarming indicators it is not surprising, then, that the Minister responsible for the management of the economy declared that the economy was in crisis. From mid‐2000, another adversity hit the national economy as foreign currency became scarce. A parallel and black market for the scarce currency began to thrive, which further worsened the already unstable pricing system. Within the first nine months of 2001, prices of basic commodities had more than quadrupled. The net effect of these adversities has been to:

	Boost the overall rates of urbanisation (see below).
	Slow down investment in urban areas despite the spirited crusades by urban governors to attract foreign direct investment. Because of the reduced investment, the pace of industrialisation has drastically slackened (cf. Britten, 1989).
	Increase the loss of jobs and incomes. Table 3 indicates a drop of more than 1 per cent in employee figures for selected urban centres in five years.
	Erode incomes, while at the same time contributing to the perennial increase in the cost of living. Robertson (1998) points out that the value of Zimbabwean money is halved every two years. The government admits that present incomes are less than 10 per cent of what they were in 1990 (see Table 6 later).

Employment trends in specified urban areas of Zimbabwe, 1991–5

	Average annual employment figures (thousands)
Centre	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Harare	349,1	343,2	336,3	351,2	334,3
Bulawayo	156,2	153,1	152,5	155,6	146,1
Gweru	27,6	27,1	26,6	26,9	27,1
Mutare	35,5	35,3	34,9	34	33,8
Kwe Kwe	21,1	19,5	18,4	17,6	17,4
Kadoma	14,3	14,7	14,2	14,4	14,3
Marondera	11,1	10,7	10,2	8,5	9,8
Masvingo	16,4	16,6	16,3	15,3	16
Chinhoyi	8	8	7,9	8,1	8,4
Total	2 630,3	2 620,2	2 610,3	2 625,6	2 602,2
Source: Based on CSO (1997).

All these negative developments have caused the economy ‘to operate under distress’ (Financial Gazette, 2001; NMB, 2001a, 2001b). This, in turn, has resulted in the impairment of livelihoods and accelerated exploitation of the physical environment (see Figure 2). As will be discussed in the following sections, the resultant deindustrialisation and job losses resulting from the unfavourable economic climate have added another prong to the assault on livelihoods that have already been in distress.

7 THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Urban electoral politics has a significant implication for the use or abuse of the urban physical environment. It is common knowledge that in Zimbabwe, populism is rampant among incumbent political representatives and political aspirants both at the local and national level (see Kamete, 2002a). Mbiba (1995) chronicles an interesting event where a Harare City Council technocrat got into trouble after taking action against stream‐bank cultivation, a practice known for causing untold damage to the city environment by triggering off other ecological woes, such as water and land pollution, erosion and siltation. The fact that the official was only enforcing national statutes and council by‐laws did not avert his problems. This is by no means an isolated event.

In March 2001, the city authorities set out to destroy illegal tuck shops and backyard shacks littering the urban landscape. For two days the destruction continued despite the pleas of the central government. Subsequently, the Minister responsible for local government could not take it any longer. He ordered the authorities to halt the demolition, threateningly telling them that they could ‘go’ if they wished (Kahiya, 2001). The ruling party, whose grip on the urban electorate had taken a tumble the previous year, was convinced that the city authorities were saboteurs messing up the party's political prospects, hence the invitation for the commission to go. The Minister ordered the local authority to regularise the illegal structures and land uses forthwith, a demand that was immediately complied with.

A great deal of the inaction in the face of flagrant ecologically destructive survival strategies can be explained by reference to urban electoral politics. Kamete (1997: 9) attributes much of this ‘paralysis of enforcement’ to political indecisiveness. This inaction is due mainly to the fact that the low‐income groups are electoral assets. Disappointing – let alone annoying – them can spell the end of a political career or the death of a political aspiration. There is no better way of committing political suicide than by frustrating the survival strategies of voters. In such cases, appealing to reason regarding environmental conservation makes no difference (see Mbiba, 1995; Kamete, 1997, 2000; Kahiya, 2001). Table 4 chronicles some of the recent political decisions with potentially destructive consequences on the environment in Harare.

Politicking on the environment: the case of Harare

Issue	Technical response	Political intervention
Urban agriculture	1994: Slashing illegally grown crops on stream banks, slopes and fragile lands	Reversed, and head of planning suspended
Squatting on council land	2000: Warning and demolition	Ordered to stop by central government, compensation for destroyed structures considered
Illegal tuck shops	2001: Two‐day demolition blitz	Ordered to stop and regularise the tuck shops
Firewood poaching	Continuing reluctance to enforce regulations	Inaction
Backyard shacks	2001: Demolition	Ordered to stop indefinitely

Urban agriculture and illegal backyard shacks cited above provide vivid reminders. Invariably where conservation issues arise and the voters are involved, the political decision makers habitually side with the ‘perpetrators’ in deed, although they may support environmentalists in word (cf. Tawengwa, 1997a). The fact that environmental pressure groups and technocrats are politically insignificant – as far as their vote is concerned – does not help the environmental cause.

8 THE ‘OLD AND ENDURING’

8.1 Urbanisation

The major feature of urbanisation in Zimbabwe is the population growth, which as of the beginning of the 1990s, stood at about 7 per cent per annum. By 1997, Harare was having some 60 000 new arrivals per year (Tawengwa, 1997b). The figures cited here refer to people who come to cities with the intention of permanently settling there. Thousands more pay ‘temporarily’ visits of up to six months. Because of this influx, population concentrations continue to intensify, thus complementing the significant role of natural increase (Kamete et al., 2001).

The effects of population growth on the physical environment are well documented (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998; Mubvami, 2001). In Zimbabwe, urban population growth creates an added problem in that it has always outstripped the provision and management of infrastructure and services, as well as the creation of new jobs. Overloading of facilities has direct environmental consequences. Frequent infrastructural breakdowns, mushrooming of backyard shacks, the development of slums and illegal settlements in fragile areas, with all their negative implications on the physical environment, are maladies that are now firmly established in urban Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

8.2 Industrialisation

The rate of industrialisation in urban Zimbabwe has not been high enough to satisfy the job requirements of the urban school leavers and the new migrants (see Table 3; cf. Britten, 1989). At its optimum, the urban industrial sector could create about 30 000 new jobs per year, compared with the 300 000 new job seekers churned out annually by the educational and training sector (Kamete, 1998). By the beginning of 2001, the rate of job creation had been decimated as the country entered a phase of deindustrialisation (cf. ZCTU, 1996; NMB, 2001b). In the first six months the manufacturing sector shrank by 5,4 per cent (CSO, 2001), a phenomenon that resulted from the macroeconomic maladies of high inflation, rampant money supply growth and acute foreign currency shortages (Financial Gazette, 2001).

Table 5 summarises the decline of the industrial sector in Zimbabwe. Such was the pessimism that in the third quarter of 2001, expert projections indicated that the sector would have declined by over 20 per cent by the end of the year. The process of decline and stagnation had already begun to settle by the time the first phase of economic structural adjustment came to a close (ZCTU, 1996). It was accelerated after the ‘fast‐track land redistribution programme’ decimated the commercial agricultural sector, a major market and supplier of raw materials to urban‐based industries. Not surprisingly, the real gross domestic product contracted by 5,5 per cent in 2000, 7,5 per cent in 2001 and 5,0 per cent in 2002 (UNECA, 2002).

Deindustrialisation in Zimbabwe – the decline of the manufacturing sector, 1998–2001

Year	Percentage decline
1998	4,8
1999	5,2
2000	10,5
2001	20,4
Sources: CSO (2001); NMB (2001b).

As elsewhere in the world, this slow pace of industrialisation that cannot match the growth in the demand for jobs. The stagnation or decline of the industrial sector caused by an adverse economic environment creates large reserve labour pools hit by unemployment and underemployment (see Rakodi, 1993; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998; cf. Todaro, 1989). As noted above, over three in five (65 per cent) of all economically active people in Zimbabwe do not have a job in the formal sector, a designation that in official terms renders them technically unemployed. In the year 2000 alone, 400 companies closed down and retrenchments were recorded in 750 companies. In total, 9 684 employees lost their jobs (CSO, 2001). The loss and absence of jobs in the urban formal sector have forced people to find alternative means of livelihood somewhere other than the embattled sector. Most of them have found refuge in the shadow economy.

8.3 Informalisation

Informalisation – the establishment and growth of the informal sector – tends to be one of the most attractive and only options available for making a living in urban Zimbabwe. The informal sector, which has been described by one commentator as ‘a common shorthand term for small‐scale, unenumerated, sometimes illegal economic activity’ (Rakodi, 1993: 210), is now the solitary provider of new jobs as it is the only growth industry in the urban sector.

Since the 1980s Zimbabwe has seen the development of a well‐established petty commodity production sector (cf. Burgess, 1985) that is providing a livelihood to many of the unemployed and augmenting the incomes of many of the formally employed (Ndoro, 1996; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998). The stage for the quest for livelihood is the natural environment (see also Figure 1). The quest for sustenance involves the use of the physical environment, as was reflected in Table 2.

In 1991, 1,6 million people making up about 27 per cent of the total national labour force were employed in the urban informal sector (McPherson, 1991). They were scattered in more than 845 000 micro‐ and small‐scale enterprises. By the close of the century, the proportion of Zimbabweans active in the informal sector had risen to more than half the labour force (MLGRUD, 1996; Kamete, 2000). The persistent closure of companies continues to spew out more entrants into the informal sector.

Joblessness is not the only factor leading to informalisation. Eroded incomes also play a significant role in forcing people who are gainfully employed to look for ways to augment their incomes. The escalating cost of living in the face of dwindling real incomes means that incomes in the formal sector are increasingly under pressure and cannot satisfy the basic requirements of the average household. Engaging in what are called ‘piece jobs’ (‘PJs’) has become a necessity for the majority of urbanites. The informal sector in all its various forms provides the bulk of these PJs.

9 THE NEW AND TRANSIENT

9.1 National policy environment

In comparison to the established phenomena of urbanisation and industrialisation, the processes making up the national policy environment are indeed ‘new and transient’. That they are new is indisputable, as they all cropped up after 1990. However, just how transient they are is by no means certain. Some countries have been known to have economic reform programmes that are now several decades old. The process of indigenisation does promise to be another enduring phenomenon. Structural adjustment and indigenisation are relatively transient in the sense that they are ‘human‐made’ and, by implication, can therefore be ‘unmade’.

9.2 Structural adjustment

By the mid‐1990s, Zimbabwe had wound up its first phase of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP I). The nation was set to embark on the second phase of economic reforms (ESAP II), awkwardly called the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). Both programmes had as their principal objectives the redressing of the macroeconomic instability plaguing the country. Due to sponsor dissatisfaction, ZIMPREST was stillborn. Nevertheless, in 2000, the government produced its own truly homegrown policy for economic crisis management, predictably called the Millennium Economic Recovery Plan (MERP) (Government of Zimbabwe, 2000). The contents of the plan suggest it is just another economic reform package analogous to economic structural adjustment.

Economic structural adjustment in Zimbabwe was characterised by the relaxation of government controls, including the following (see Bond, 1998):

	Abolition of price controls
	Removal of subsidies on basic commodities like food, housing, medical care, education and transport
	Liberalisation of labour laws, in particular regarding hiring and firing
	Deregulation of the financial sector
	Relaxation of import controls

The net effect of structural adjustment on human sustenance can best be summarised as the loss of jobs, a dramatic rise in the cost of living, and the resultant erosion of incomes. As was shown in Table 3, the loss of jobs in the formal sector in the ESAP I era in urban centres was about 30 000, representing a loss of one job in every ten. The major cause of the widespread loss of jobs was the process of ‘restructuring’, which in urban Zimbabwe essentially means cutting costs by voluntary or forced early retirement and retrenchments, both of which have been facilitated by the relaxation of labour laws.

The public and private sectors took advantage of the liberalisation of labour laws to shed excess labour, something that was impossible in the tightly controlled labour environment in the days of the command economy. Accompanying the ‘rationalisation’ of labour was the universally applied freezing of posts. This meant that where vacancies could have arisen through retrenchment, resignation, retirement, sacking or natural attrition, there were no openings. The loss of jobs was also a result of the collapse of industries, mainly in the textile sector, due to the influx of cheap imports, thanks to the relaxation of import controls. For example, due to the liberalised labour laws, Cone Textiles, a major employer in Harare's dormitory town of Chitungwiza, was liquidated in the mid‐1990s. Over 6 000 jobs were lost, almost instantly. The same fate has befallen other towns like Chegutu, Kadoma and Bulawayo.

Table 6 captures the changes in the consumer price index (CPI) since 1991, the year in which the first phase of the economic reform programme was inaugurated. The table shows that the cost of living has been rising consistently since the base year. By the end of 1996 the CPI had more than quadrupled. By the end of 2000, the rate had skyrocketed to 15 times that of the base year. While all of the increases cannot be attributed to the liberalisation that came with the economic reform programme, the removal of price controls and subsidies, coupled with the deregulation of the financial sector, certainly made a significant contribution to the impairment of human survival strategies in the face of the soaring costs of living.

Changes in the consumer price index (CPI) since 1990

Year	Consumer price index
1990	100,0
1991	123,3
1992	175,2
1993	223,6
1994	273,4
1995	335,1
1996	406,9
1997	483,6
1998	639,9
1999	1 009,6
2000	1 573,6
Sources: CSO (1997, 2001).

Job losses and increases in the cost of living have put pressure on human survival. The embattled urban populations, especially the low‐income groups, are forced to either find new ways of getting an income or to devise strategies for augmenting their eroded incomes. This pressure is quickly transferred onto the physical environment through informalisation. The expansion of urban agriculture, spiralling deforestation, increases in illegal sand abstraction, the proliferation of backyard shacks and illegal tuck shops, as well as increasing incidents of overcrowding are some of the symptoms of this unrelenting quest for sustenance (Kamete, 2002a). Once again, the question of environmental sustainability comes up amid the equally important issue of human sustenance.

The combined effect of the above scenario has been the creation and/or worsening of poverty in the urban areas of Zimbabwe. In 1991, less than 40 per cent of the urban population was classified as being poor (CSO, 1999). Towards the end of ESAP I, the proportion of the poor had risen to 54 per cent (MPSLSW, 1996). In mid‐2001, over three in every five urban residents were poor (CCZ, 2001). At this time the poverty line was fixed at about Z$17 000 (Z$55=US$1 at the managed rate) – a monumental climb from the 1995 figure of less than Z$2 500.

9.3 Indigenisation

The mid‐1990s saw the central government officially espousing the policy of indigenisation, the purpose of which was to enable ‘indigenous’ (black) Zimbabweans to be economically empowered so as to participate meaningfully in the national economy (DSEI, 1998). The process involves positive discrimination where the government deliberately props up the previously disadvantaged social group. All government agencies, including urban local authorities, have taken up the popular cause. This is seen in the allocation of tenders, contracts, industrial and residential stands, as well as various state aid packages.

The implication of this policy on the urban environment question can be understood by reference to ‘affirmative action’. As discussed above, the informal sector has flourished in all the urban centres of Zimbabwe. The effects of the poorly regulated sector on the physical environment have been chronicled earlier on in this article (see also Government of Zimbabwe, 1998; Kamete, 2002a). That the informal sector is an economic force can be demonstrated by a recent report by the Central Statistical Office, which indicated that the sector had contributed upwards of half a billion Zimbabwean dollars to the gross national product (GNP) in the year in question (CSO, 1997). Clearly then, the sector is a promising vehicle of economic empowerment for the indigenous population (NEPC, 1997).

These facts were quickly used by indigenous pressure groups, particularly the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC), the Indigenous Business Women's Organisation (IBWO) and the aggressive Affirmative Action Group (AAG). The IBDC is a creation of the state presidency, while the AAG enjoys support in high places, hence its ability to behave with impunity. While not explicitly promoting or condoning the destruction of the environment, indigenisation, backed by affirmative action, requires that controls and sanctions on the informal sector (whatever the reasons, including environmental management), be applied ‘wisely’ – obviously with the scales tilting in favour of the informal sector (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

There is thus a delicate line between environmentalisation and indigenisation. Combined with electoral politics (cf. Mbiba, 1995; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998; Kahiya, 2001), indigenisation does pose a potentially strong challenge to environmental sustainability, while at the time it carries promises of salvation for human sustenance. The ‘resolution’ by the central government of the controversy in illegal structures cited above shows just how powerful the cause of indigenisation is. One can also argue that the politicisation of the cause and the government's defiance of reason even where evidence of environmental destruction is presented, spell doom for environmental sustainability. Furthermore, the rise, in the face of ruling party populism and urban electoral politics, of new race‐based ‘organisations’ like the Zimbabwe Tuck‐shop Owners Association, the Zimbabwe Informal Sector Association and the Hawkers and Vendors Association of Zimbabwe, is undoubtedly bad news for the beleaguered urban environment.

Environmental pressure groups provide the solitary counterbalance to the self‐destructive laxity enshrined in the application of the policy of indigenisation. However, the constitution of these groups tends to weaken their cause. The most prominent champions of the ecological cause are mainly (affluent?) whites, the previously favoured group whose members are perceived as not having to struggle for the logistics of day‐to‐day survival (see Thomson, 1984). Hence, they are obviously at the wrong end of the indigenisation equation. It is not surprising, therefore, to note some indigenous pressure groups labelling the urban environmental conservation crusade as an anti‐indigenisation campaign.

10 SUSTAINABILITY AND SUSTENANCE: RE‐EXAMINING THE SCENE

The preceding exposition will now be used to look into the interaction between environmental sustainability and human sustenance in urban Zimbabwe. Figure 3 is a graphic summary of the events and processes taking place around the urban environment question in Zimbabwe. Point A is the ideal balance between the two goals – it is that level of action and reaction that can help achieve both causes. It is at this point that the sustainable utilisation of the natural environment can be said to be attainable. Unfortunately, so far urban Zimbabwe has a void in this area; there is almost total silence. This leaves the scene with two extremes, namely human bias and ecological bias. There is a clear disjunction – which is increasingly becoming openly antagonistic – between the two extremes.

Environmental sustainability and human sustenance – re‐examining the urban environmental scene

The urban low‐income groups are primarily concerned with sustenance. Left alone, they definitely do not pay attention to such ‘abstract’ notions as preservation and conservation. Evidence shows that they hold a strong conviction that they are ‘forced’ to use the environment by the macroeconomic adversities cited above. Their idea of a solution is for ‘those’ who created the economic mess to set things right so that jobs are available, basic necessities are accessible and incomes are ‘realistic’.

Probably because they cannot resolve the economic mess they created, institutions of governance make up for their mistakes ‘in kind’, by not acting when the beleaguered urbanites make a living at the expense of the natural environment. As a result, official facilitation on the sustenance side is characterised by inaction, the condoning of some destructive and illegal practices, permissiveness and leniency in the execution of punishment. The socioeconomic and political realities (unemployment, poverty, rising cost of living and electoral politics) force the policy makers to tread this ground with extreme caution. This is further compounded by the policy environment, the most prominent being structural adjustment and indigenisation. As explained above, the former has already embittered the low‐income groups by hitting at their livelihood, whereas the latter demands that they be the recipients of favourable attention. Electoral politics tilts the balance in their favour.

On the other end of the continuum, environmental pressure groups, most of them non‐governmental organisations, have taken up the cause of environmental sustainability. Evidence shows they are advocates of the version called ‘environmental preservation’ by Merrett (1995), or ‘strong sustainability’ by Pearce et al. (1990). Proponents of these concepts desire to preserve the physical environment even at the expense of human survival. In this, one can easily see the possibility of a looming conflict between these groups and the champions of human sustenance. This is especially probable in the prevailing situation of macroeconomic instability, poverty, unemployment and eroded incomes in the urban context.

Official facilitation on the environmental sustainability side as described above comes in two packages – criminalisation and regulation. They incorporate mild (and reluctant?) controls which may be statutory or regulatory, official threats against misuse of nature, and exaggerated official rhetoric (cf. Tawengwa, 1997a). As noted above, in most cases these responses are devoid of enforcement. The rather half‐hearted official reaction for the cause of the preservationists can be explained within the context of the three phenomena provided above, namely structural adjustment, electoral politics and indigenisation.

As argued in earlier sections of this article, these processes have given rise to volatile socioeconomic and political situations, hence the built‐in biases against the cause of environmentalists. In this case, describing the cause of environmentalists as the line of least resistance is by no means an exaggeration. However, the brinkmanship of these groups (e.g. public processions and petitions) means that some attention has to be paid to them, hence the token official counteractions noted above.

It can be seen from this reconstituted analysis that repositioning the urban environmental debate in the wider context opens up possibilities of depth and width. It explains in more realistic terms why certain things happen the way they do. The implication of this is that more workable strategies that have depth and width can be designed to resolve the current environment–society impasse that is not doing any good to either. Granted, it is not easy to reconcile the two extremes, but a comprehensive analysis can certainly help in the attainment of discernment. Discernment, in turn, leads to wisdom, and the right balance can be struck.

11 CONCLUSION: EMERGING ISSUES

What this article suggests is that the urban environment question in Zimbabwe – and indeed elsewhere in the developing world – is more complex and goes beyond the immediate issues of environmental degradation as shown by various types of pollution and the depletion of natural resources. Similarly, the answer to environmental problems cannot be arrived at by simple regulation and/or criminalisation and enforcement. Urban managers need to ‘get the picture’. That picture involves taking into account the urbanwide, and indeed the nationwide events and processes, as well as the conditions these produce.

The urban environment question, although finding its most explicit expression in environmental terms, is not simply about the physical environment alone. The question has its genesis elsewhere. It is created on the socioeconomic scene; it is mediated on the sociopolitical stage. Further, it is perpetuated and sustained in those arenas. Consequently, it cannot be solved without explicit reference to the socioeconomic and political variables that foment and sustain it.

As the analysis has shown, the urban environment question in Zimbabwe has two sides to it, namely human sustenance and environmental sustainability. The prevailing conditions in urban areas, which are largely created by national socioeconomic events and processes, force the hapless urbanites to turn to nature for survival. As long as these conditions persist, the pressure on nature as source, site and sink will continue. In addition, as long as these conditions persist, environmental sustainability will not be attained overnight by a technically ‘right’ strategy; nor can it be addressed by ‘tough’ legal, regulatory and administrative instruments that revolve around nature as the sole victim. Undeniably, nature is a victim; but if the truth be said, it is a secondary victim, the primary victim being the urbanites whose livelihoods are under siege. Taking these realities into account, it becomes obvious that embedded in the urban environment question is a host of moral, social and political variables, which if left unattended, have the capacity to neutralise any technical solution, however perfect and well formulated it might be.

What this implies is that the urban environment question cannot be single‐handedly solved at the local level. Some of the conditions that foment it are national, not to mention regional and international. So while ‘acting locally’ is all right, ‘thinking globally’ is mandatory. This question can be addressed effectively by partnerships – partnerships where administrators and preservationists admit that they have no exclusive knowledge, capabilities and rights to protect the environment. Administrators and environmentalists cannot address the socioeconomic maladies plaguing urban settlements, let alone the wider nationwide economic issues. Unaided they cannot effectively mobilise the political machinery whose primary preoccupation is to secure tenure by acting in tandem with the wishes of the majority. Brinkmanship, the desired modus operandi of these groups, is at best capable of ushering in short‐term benefits.

Admittedly, this discussion cannot be taken as the hallmark of the environmental debate in the urban centres of Zimbabwe. As the first such attempt, it has the limitations of commission and omission, as well as breadth and width of analysis. Moreover, it is only a discussion at a point in time, and liable to being overtaken by temporal events and processes. However, it is hoped that this journey into uncharted territories will open up debate, which will prise open a deeper and broader understanding of the urban environment question and a deeper appreciation of the systems and subsystems that constitute it.

12 POSTSCRIPT

The urban environment question is increasingly becoming more complex and some new strands are cropping up. Some are new and transient; others appear to be new and enduring. The analysis would not be complete without reference to two of these strands that shot to the top of the agenda after the article had been finalised. These are HIV/Aids (the new and enduring?) and the government's controversial land redistribution programme (the new and transient?).

Urban areas have been severely hit by the HIV/Aids epidemic. On a national scale, the adult prevalence rate (15–49 years) had reached an alarming 33,7 per cent by 2001 (UNICEF, 2001). Urban areas had a prevalence rate of 32 per cent (USCB, 2001). As noted, the most severely affected are sections of the vital economically active population. The decimation of the mostly young breadwinners leaves a large number of dependants, among them orphans and the elderly, having to fend for themselves. Over 780 000 known orphans had been noted by 2001. These victims are mostly unskilled, and the national economy is not able to create jobs, let alone look after the vulnerable. Consequently, the informal sector will definitely continue to receive new entrants, which by extension means a strain on the physical environment.

The land reform programme that began in 2000 has displaced well over 300 000 families with a combined population of about two million (HRF, 2002). Of the 500 000 employed persons in the large‐scale commercial farming sector before the programme, only 80 000 were still employed by the beginning of 2003 (ZCDT, 2003). According to one report, the ‘violence and lawlessness associated with the programme drove many displaced farm workers into the jungle’ (ZCDT, 2003: 1). A few of the victims sought refuge in urban areas. However, because of the prohibitive cost of living and the strict application of property and planning laws in the cities, most of the people ejected from the seized farms do not stay in the large centres for long. Those who become permanent urbanites are the ones who end up in the small towns and rural squatter settlements, as these are more hospitable.

There is no evidence suggesting that urban centres will be swamped by these displaced people. Most of those who trek to towns and cities end up in the easy‐to‐enter informal sector in terms of both settlement and employment. This, by extension, translates into using nature as a source of raw materials, a site of production and a sink for waste. Again, this means an increase in the pressure on the physical environment.

Of the two unfolding developments, then, it would appear that the one that is set to have a major impact on the urban environment debate is HIV/Aids. In the absence of a comprehensive, adequate and working ameliorative package, the epidemic will by its selective decimation and victimisation cause the physical environment to continuously receive a multitude of livelihood seekers. This will ensure that the urban environment question remains on the agenda.

It is not impossible to tell which direction the urban environment question will take. The social, political and economic scene in urban Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate, sometimes dramatically. The downward trend in the economy, which has been accelerating since 2000, has taken a turn for the worse, with all indicators worsening by the day. Poverty continues on its dramatic upward swing. On the political front, virtually all major urban centres have become opposition strongholds, with the ruling party being consistently shown the door in both local government and parliamentary elections (Kamete, 2002b).

The aggravation of socioeconomic conditions, with its attendant deindustrialisation and loss of employment, will unquestionably boost the numbers of urban families taking refuge in nature. At the same time, the loss of urban constituencies by the party in government means that the endless war to win hearts and votes will concentrate on society, even at the expense of the physical environment. The combined effects of socioeconomic affliction and the changing political scene and priorities will certainly see nature being the loser, at least in the short to medium term.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Amin Y Kamete 1

Research Programme Coordinator, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden.

Notes

Research Programme Coordinator, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden.