Can the state perpetuate the marginalisation of the poor? The socio-economic effects of the state's ban on minibus ‘callboys’ in Malawi

Abstract

Malawi is a southern African country that has a huge informal sector due to high levels of unemployment. One of the ways people earned income in this sector was minibus-calling. This considerably reduced the vulnerability of many who would otherwise have been excluded economically. However, the state has recently declared such acts illegal and anyone found minibus-calling is now arrested. This paper critically investigates the socio-economic impacts of this ban on the former beneficiaries' livelihoods. A survey and interviews conducted in Zomba Municipality and Blantyre City (supplemented by various newspaper articles) show that the ban has adversely affected the socio-economic status of these marginalised Malawians.

1. INTRODUCTION

Minibus-calling used to be one of the most well-known informal activities in the urban centres of Malawi. However, in January 2006 the government declared the activity illegal and went on to arrest anybody caught in the act. This paper analyses the socio-economic impacts of the ban. The callboys were already an economically and socially marginalised group, and this paper argues that the ban has perpetuated their marginalisation.

Taking into consideration that studies on minibus callboys are almost non-existent, the paper relies mainly on primary data gathered through interviews with police officers, former callboys, current illegal callboys and city and municipal officials, the Minibus Owners' Association officials and randomly selected members of the general public. The interviews were conducted in Zomba Municipality and Blantyre City. Some relevant newspaper articles supplement the interviews.

The paper begins by discussing the minibus phenomenon in Africa, and this is followed by an analysis of poverty levels in Malawi and the size of the informal sector. It then discusses the concept of minibus callboys, their marginalisation, the financial advantages of minibus-calling and the consequences of the government ban. In conclusion, the paper analyses the coping mechanisms developed by these callboys.

2. THE MINIBUS PHENOMENON IN AFRICA

In Malawi, as in many African countries, the state has long been the sole provider of public transport. Rizzo (2002:136), writing about Tanzania, comments that a ‘highly interventionist state placed itself at the centre of the development agenda’. As a result transport services were nationalised, with state companies having ‘exclusive license to operate public omnibuses’ (Rizzo, 2002:136). Also writing about Tanzania, Tripp observes that only government-owned buses could operate legally. However, with time the state-run public buses proved a failure as they were ineffective and inefficient and the ‘transport problem began to reach crisis proportions’ (Tripp 1997:161). There were several reasons for this failure. First, as observed by Muller, due to ‘economic crisis and severe government budget deficit, the buses were poorly maintained and in fact they were on the verge of unsafe’ (2005:50). Second, the ‘existence of the informal sources of transport forced the government to legalize [them]’ (Tripp, 1997:161). Third, the escalation of urban migration meant that there were ‘no longer enough buses to fill the demands of the increasing urban population’ (Muller, 2005:50) as the ‘transport needs of the population far exceeded the available services’ (Tripp, 1997:161). And, finally, most African countries were required to deregulate and privatise to fulfil aid conditions imposed by donor institutions, notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Governments throughout Africa have therefore privatised public transport and legalised the private operation of minibus taxis. According to Rizzo (2002), they reasoned that privatisation would reduce state fiscal deficits through the sale of loss-making state-run bus companies, the broadening of the ownership of economic assets, increased productivity, and improved efficiency in redistribution. As a result, minibus taxis have become a predominant mode of transport in Africa: ‘the minibus taxi operation occupies an important place in the new urban transport market, as taxis have the single largest share of the African commuting market, sky rocketing from virtually a zero share some twenty years ago’ (Khosa, 1997:18). Called by different local names – dala dala in Tanzania, minibus-taxi in South Africa, matatu in Kenya, mdulamoyo in Malawi, car-rapide in Senegal, poda poda in Sierra Leone, and tro tro in Ghana – minibuses are a common feature of African roads and are favoured by passengers for many reasons. Tripp says minibuses ‘go almost anywhere passengers [are] heading and [do] not follow strict routes’ (1997:161), and Sekhonyane and Dugard (2004) says passengers like minibuses because, unlike other public transport options, they

• run late-night services,

• travel to out-of-the-way places,

• pick up commuters from their homes and drop them back there,

• charge reasonable fares,

• make convenient stops on long distance routes, and

• cut down time spent in long queues at bus and train stations.

However, the service is not without problems. The BBC, for example, noted that ‘public minibuses throughout Africa have the notorious reputation for driving at high speed with reckless abandon, putting their passengers’ lives at risk' (BBC News, 2004). The problem is that minibuses compete for passengers, speeding to collect as many as possible. There is fierce competition for passengers – to the extent that in South Africa, for example, it leads to bloody ‘taxi wars’. According to Sekhonyane and Dugard, at the ‘heart of the problem is the persistent struggle over control of this multi-billion rand industry that carries over 60 per cent of South African commuters’ (2004:13), and Wines reports that:

In the past two decades, thousands of South African taxi owners, drivers and passengers have been wounded. The combatants are rival cartels that control thousands of low cost minibuses or ‘combis’ that haul a large share of South Africa's urban commuters and much of the nation's intercity traffic. The cartels have fought for many years over control of lucrative routes and the drivers who serve them. (Wines, 2006)

Moreover, Prozzi et al. (2002:iv) say that ‘financial problems in the minibus jitney1 industry have led to increasingly old, dilapidated, uncomfortable and unsafe vehicles, resulting in higher energy consumption and GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions’. A large proportion of the minibuses are very old, infrequently maintained, and unroadworthy. The problem is that spare parts and the minibuses themselves are too expensive for poor owners to be able to afford replacements.

3. POVERTY LEVELS IN MALAWI AND THE SIZE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Poverty in Malawi is ‘widespread, deep and severe’ (Government of Malawi, 2002:x). According to the last Integrated Household Survey of 1998, 65.3 per cent of the Malawian population is poor (National Statistical Office, 1998). A series of World Bank reports and the United Nation Development Programme Human Development Reports indicate that Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. The latter's index ranking shows that Malawi has been declining since 1991 when it was ranked 138 out of 178 countries, followed by 141 in 1992, 153 in 1993, 157 in 1994, 157 in 1995, 158 in 1996, 161 in 1997, 161 in 1998, 163 in 2000, 162 in 2003, 165 in 2004 and 166 in 2007. This scenario has also largely contributed to the growth of the informal sector.

Informal sector activities in Malawi date back to colonial days. During the one-party autocratic rule of Dr Kamuzu Banda, informal activities were frowned on, and even ruthlessly suppressed. Dr Banda created what was known as the Malawi Young Pioneers to encourage the unemployed youth to work in the fields or take up vocational training. Although in later years the Malawi Young Pioneers became well known as the paramilitary wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party, it played a critical role in reducing unemployment in the country (Phiri, 2000). Commenting on its role during a political rally in April 1975, Dr Banda said:

I organised the Young Pioneers so that the youth would make useful citizens of the country. I did not want our youth to roam the streets of Zomba, Blantyre, and Lilongwe, loafing with their hands in their pockets … parasites leaning on their parents, depending on their parents to give them everything while they just sat and ate, doing nothing. No, they had to be taught first and foremost, discipline and respect for their elders; then respect for manual labour. (Dr Banda, quoted in Phiri 2000:2)

However, in 1993 when the Malawi Congress Party-led government was waning in authority, with calls for a multi-party system of governance, the Malawi Young Pioneers was disbanded through the Malawi Army Operation Bwezani.2 In 1994 the constitution was amended to allow for multi-party elections and the United Democratic Front took over government, led by Bakili Muluzi. Unlike Dr Banda, he encouraged the growth of the informal sector – to the extent that he even stated that he was ‘Minister of Vendors’ or ‘patron of the vendors’ – and facilitated the creation of the Small and Medium Enterprise Fund, which the Reserve Bank of Malawi coordinated. This was meant to be a revolving fund that would provide start-up funds for those engaged in the informal sector.

The growth of the informal sector in Malawi is attributed to several factors besides the availability of funds and the relaxation of regulations, such as unemployment due to the Structural Adjustment Programmes' related conditionalities such as privatisation, and retrenchment in the public sector (see Madziakapita, 2003; Jimu, 2005; Richards et al., 2006). To give an idea of the size of the informal sector, Richards et al. (2006:24) observe that only 12 per cent of the total workforce in Malawi is in the formal sector; the remaining 88 per cent being either in smallholder agriculture or the informal sector. More specifically, the World Bank in the 1999/2000 period estimated that the informal sector in Malawi contributed 40.3 per cent to the country's Gross National Product (Richards et al., 2006:24). These figures make it clear that Malawi's informal sector is as large as that of other developing countries in the region. Minibus callboys constitute a significant proportion of this sector.

4. WHAT ARE MINIBUS CALLBOYS?

Minibus callboys are touts who lure passengers to board minibuses. Although they are commonly referred to as ‘callboys’, it is not only boys but also elderly men who most commonly ply the trade. In some cases they are men who have families and weighty responsibilities. On one occasion the police arrested 23 minibus callboys ranging in age from 12 to 35 years (Masingati & Botomani, 2006). In most cases the boys who are touting are only frontliners, with big men behind them – older men who wait to take the proceeds from them. These men are like ‘chiefs’ or ‘managers’ who do not work but have some boys working for them. Qualifications to be a ‘chief’ include age, length of service in the trade, and the degree of influence and control. In most cases these ‘chiefs’ are callboys aged 25 years and over who have been touting for a long time. Nation says that the ‘chiefs’ did not ‘report for duty at all but received proceeds every day and, in return, paid the touts’ (2006:3). The share the ‘chief’ gives the callboy is obviously smaller than his own.

The Nation reporter adds that ‘minibus touting was a chaotic business yet well organised’ (Nation, 2006:3). The minibus touts formed informal associations comprising the national committee, regional committees, district committees and station committees. These committees had office bearers and worked to discipline fellow touts who abused the trade by stealing from passengers or using drugs. Based on interviews conducted, it was learnt that originally, due to heavy competition, the minibus owners employed the touts to help them get customers quickly. However, as more and more touts became engaged in the practice, it became highly competitive amongst the touts themselves, with the more powerful controlling the weaker and forcing them to work for them. Minibus owners now discovered that they could not get any passengers without the support of the touts. The touts, realising their importance, increased their demands, draining the minibus owners' income in the process.

5. ARE CALLBOYS A FORMALLY MARGINALISED GROUP?

The interviews revealed that callboys are generally a marginalised group who have not been absorbed into the formal economy. Most do not have enough educational background to obtain formal employment. The survey conducted in Zomba revealed that none of the callboys the authors interviewed have the technical skills or secondary school education that would enable them work in the formal sector and get reliable jobs (see Table 1). This leaves them with minibus-calling as the only work they can do.

Table 1:  Callboys' educational background

Educational background	Number	%
No formal education	7	4.6
Primary school dropout	43	28.7
Finished primary school	72	48.0
Secondary school dropout	28	18.7
Finished secondary school	0	0
Total	150	100.0

Moreover, 100 per cent of the callboys interviewed had previously tried other ways of earning a living but they could not make progress. As a result, they found minibus-touting the most viable economic activity they could embark on. Table 2 presents the touts' previous ways of earning a living.

Table 2:  Callboys' previous activity

Previous activity	Number	%
Thief	6	4.0
House boy	14	9.3
Street vending	66	44.0
Subsistence village farmer	45	30.0
Straight from school	11	7.3
Begging	8	5.4
Total	150	100.0

A small percentage of the touts had previously been thieves. During the interviews one commented that ‘bola kuitanila maminibasi kusiyana ndi kuba chifukwa akakugwira utaba umakavutika ku ndende’ (‘touting is better than stealing because if caught as a thief one suffers in prison’) and another that ‘kuba ndi koipa chifukwa amene wam'berayo amakhala kuti wavutika poti apeze katundu wamberayo’ (‘stealing is bad because one steals from somebody who has worked hard to get what he has’).

About one-tenth of them had been houseboys before resorting to touting. They said they had quit this job because their masters were ill-treating them and they were not well paid, earning from MWK1500 to MWK20003 a month for working the whole day without a chance to rest. They said they were now better off as they could earn more than this in a single day.

A little less than one-half said they were previously small-scale street vendors, selling sweets and other food items and cigarettes on the streets, but had left this trade as it was not profitable: they could work the whole day with few sales, and the profit margin was too small to meet their needs. As a result the trade was mainly hand-to-mouth and they could not make any meaningful investments to further their businesses.

About one-third said they used to be small-scale subsistence village farmers, but had to begin touting because farming proved to be an expensive undertaking. It required quantities of fertiliser that a poor villager could not afford, so their crops did not do well and they had to look for other means of survival. Moreover, their produce was only meant for household consumption, but erratic rains and changing weather patterns meant they could not harvest enough even for this, and they did not have enough land or capital to venture into commercial farming, so they resorted to touting in an attempt to get money for household necessities and food for their families in the village.

A little less than one-tenth reported that they had come straight from school at different levels to join touting. These commented that ‘ife tinangoona kuti talephera sukulu ndipo tinaziwa kuti chathu palibe nchifukwa tinangoyamba kuitanila maminibusi. Nanga angamulembe ntchito wa eyiti ndani?’ (‘when we could not continue with our education we knew that we could not be employed and we resorted to touting. Who is prepared to employ a primary school graduate?’).

Lastly, a small percentage said that previously they were just begging, but turned to touting to start earning their own income. One of these said ‘bola kuitanila maminibusi kusiyana ndi kupempha chifukwa umadya ndalama yomwe waikhetsela thukuta wekha’ (‘you are better off touting than begging because you use the money that you have earned and worked hard for’).

6. ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF MINIBUS-CALLING

For many people, minibus-calling was a job and a source of steady income. The touts were supposed to be paid by the minibus conductors an amount equivalent to the minibus fare of one passenger per trip. Touts operate for both long-distance and short-distance minibuses, the former being more rewarding for higher fees and the latter for increased frequency of trips. For instance, for a long-distance trip from Blantyre to Lilongwe whose minibus fare is MWK1000 per person, a tout could be paid MWK1000. One tout could work on an average of five minibuses a day, earning MWK5000 (although of course the ‘chief’ would take the lion's share). On the other hand, for a short-distance city trip from Blantyre to Limbe with a bus fare of MWK50 per person, they could earn MWK500 a day after working on 10 minibuses. Considering that the tout needs only his voice and there is no investment capital involved, minibus-calling was a viable venture for most economically marginalised groups. Tables 3 and 4 present the financial advantage of short-distance and long-distance minibus-calling as compared with a newly recruited Grade 3 teacher's salary of MWK6000 per month.

Table 3:  Economic advantage of minibus-calling for short-distance buses (MWK)

Route	Minibus bus fare per person^a	Callboy payment per trip	Average payment, 5 minibuses per day	Approximate payment per month
Blantyre–Limbe	50	50	500	15 000
Lilongwe city centre–Area 18	70	70	700	21 000
^aUSD1 = MWK141.00 (Malawi kwacha) as of 29 October 2007.
Note: For comparison, Grade 3 (T3) teacher's monthly salary = US$6000.

Table 4:  Economic advantage of minibus-calling for long-distance buses (MWK)

Route	Minibus bus fare per person^a	Callboy payment per trip	Average payment, 5 minibuses per day	Approximate payment per month
Blantyre–Lilongwe	1000	1000	5000	150 000
Zomba–Lilongwe	800	800	4000	120 000
Blantyre–Mzuzu	2000	2000	10 000	300 000
Lilongwe–Mzuzu	1000	1000	5000	150 000
Blantyre–Zomba	250	250	1250	37 500
Blantyre–Mangochi	500	500	2500	75 000
^aUSD1 = MWK141.00 (Malawi kwacha) as of 29 October 2007.
Note: For comparison, Grade 3 (T3) teacher's monthly salary = US$6000.

7. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF MINIBUS CALLBOYS

As explained above, minibus-calling was a viable economic activity for many people who would otherwise have been economically disadvantaged. As is the case with any person who is formally employed and earning, the money realised from minibus-touting was used for such things as household consumption and school fees for their children. Malawi has a large number of orphans as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The interviews revealed that some touts are providing for orphans as part of their extended families. With the money realised from touting they are able to raise their own children and these orphans. In other cases, touts have relatives in the village who solely depend on them for farm inputs and other necessities. It was also reported that in some instances touts could invest the money realised from touting. The interviews revealed that some of the minibus callboys have a culture of saving.

8. DOES THE STATE'S BAN ON MINIBUS-CALLING PERPETUATE THE MARGINALISATION OF THE POOR?

8.1 The ban

When the state banned minibus-calling in January 2006, the argument was that this informal economic activity was illegal. The officials cited the various city or municipal by-laws that are against the activity, and the police were deployed to all cities and towns where it was prevalent to arrest any person found minibus-touting. The long arm of the law was invoked and the culprits were given fines ranging from MWK3000 to MWK5000 or up to 3 months' imprisonment. Those who were caught twice or more were imprisoned without any option of a fine.

8.2 No access for redress

The minibus touts felt that the government decision to ban their trade was unfair and that they were being denied the right to economic activity. As a result they sought an audience with government officials, including the President, to present their petition on the matter. Their aim was to influence the government to change its decision and allow them to formalise the trade or at least operate freely. However, the government has closed all the doors for negotiations. The Chairperson for Southern Region Minibus Touts indicated that his group ‘had tried to petition the President when he visited Chiradzulu during the Chilembwe Day Celebrations on Sunday but that they were blocked and sent back by armed police five kilometres to the venue’ (Masingati & Botomani, 2006:3). Moreover, the Minister of Transport Henry Mussa has also many times refused to talk to the touts.

8.3 The community's reaction to the ban

The members of the general community received the news of the ban on minibus-calling with mixed feelings. Some were concerned about the former touts' economic well-being, while other others worried about their own security because they were afraid most touts would turn into robbers and criminals. Others said they would miss the touts' services, as they used to help passengers who did not know how to read to catch the right bus going in the right direction. The reaction of some was that the government was banning minibus-touting not because it was an illegal activity but because touts did not pay tax. They argued that President Mutharika was an economist who wanted every activity to yield returns to the government: ‘Mutharika is saying do meaningful businesses from which government can tax you and provide social services in return. Government made nothing from this business’ (Nation, 2006:3) and hence banned it.

On the other hand, some people applauded the government's ban, arguing that callboys were thieves who caused disorder. They claimed that touts used to steal money from unsuspecting passengers, and many regarded them as very rude youngsters who forced passengers to board minibuses. However, interviews with the former Zomba Minibus Touts Chairperson revealed that ‘people fail to distinguish between the callboys and thieves. Thieves were not part of the callboys. In fact callboys assisted the public by identifying thieves’. He added that, moreover, callboys were well organised and kept strict discipline so that they would not have thieves or troublemakers in their midst. The Southern Region Minibus Touts Chairman, Isaac Osman, ‘denied allegations that many minibus callers were involved in criminal acts and passenger harassment, saying they respect passengers and that it would be self-destructive for them to steal from them’ (Masingati & Botomani, 2006:3).

In addition, some citizens have welcomed the removal of minibus touts from the streets, arguing that the cities and townships are cleaner now that the touts are gone. The Minibus Owners' Association official (representing the owners) and a municipal officer agreed that the callboys encouraged drivers to disrupt the normal flow of minibus operations, thereby creating disorder in the cities and townships. Other commentators agreed that ‘the country's cities and townships have become cleaner than a year ago … [and] that order and sanity have returned to Malawi’ (Nation, 2006:3).

Lastly, the minibus owners themselves are happy with the ban. The Zomba Minibus Owners official added that minibus touts ‘drained a lot of money as minibus conductors had to pay them a handsome amount of money every trip and as a result this reduced our profit’. However former touts argued that minibus conductors are the ones who destroyed the callboys' image, because they were informing the minibus owner that they had paid a lot of money to the callboys, while in reality it was a small amount and they were pocketing the extra money for themselves. Moreover, the owners could not police this activity, as most minibus drivers do not issue receipts. However, taking into consideration the amount the callboys are paid (see Section 6, above), it is clear that their argument that they are paid small amounts cannot be justified.

8.4 Extent of economic vulnerability

The removal of minibus callboys from the streets has increased their financial problems. For many, lacking the educational background that would enable them enter the formal economy, it was their only way of earning a living. Moreover, jobs are very scarce in Malawi, with an estimated unemployment rate of about 70 per cent. This means that even with some education only a few would make it into the formal sector. The ban therefore meant zero earnings for the former touts. Isaac Osman worried that ‘no one cares where they will get their bread’ and said ‘his group was very concerned that government was giving a blind eye to their economic plight by chasing them from the streets where they earn their living’. He said that ‘just like every Malawian they too have the right to employment and no one has the mandate to deny them their right to economic activity without offering a better alternative’, and added that ‘we feel that government is not being sensitive enough to our woes and we want to bring that to the attention of the President. He might not be aware of what is happening’. He said many of the minibus callers did not have favourable education qualifications to get a job, and working on the streets was their only means of earning a living. It was therefore unreasonable for the government to chase them from the street without providing them with a better way of making money (Masingati & Botomani, 2006).

8.5 Extent of social vulnerability

The economic vulnerability caused by the ban on minibus-calling has also culminated in social problems. In the first place, most former touts are failing to fend for their families, leading to family breakdowns as some family members, including wives, have been sent back to the village. This has also affected the education of their children who have been relocated to the village. In addition, those who were keeping orphans can no longer support them. This has forced the orphans to go back to the village too. In cases where village life has become unbearable, these children return to the city and become street kids. Some callboys used to stay in rented houses, but the ban on their trade has meant they cannot raise enough money to pay their landlords and as a result they have been evicted and become homeless.

9. CALLBOYS' COPING MECHANISMS

Since the state banned minibus-calling without providing the former touts with a way of earning a living, they have had to create their own coping mechanisms, such as illegal minibus-calling, stealing, street vending, begging, loitering and charcoal-making.

9.1 Illegal minibus-calling

It was reported that some people are still minibus-touting, but now illegally. In a bid to earn a living, those with no alternative have gone back to the streets to continue with their business. They survive in the trade by allowing themselves to be arrested if found, or by bribing the police.

Mchazime observes that ‘despite the arrests, the touts are slowly emerging in some spots’ (2006:2). However, the police have intensified the arrests. Minibus callers in Blantyre planned to ‘march and petition President Bingu wa Mutharika over their continued arrests by police’ (Masingati & Botomani, 2006:3). In a space of only three days (27–30 January 2006), 500 minibus callers were arrested. In Mchinji District alone, 23 touts were arrested at Kamwendo Trading Centre. Those arrested are mostly brought to the magistrates' courts to answer charges of touting. At the time of writing, about 1000 touts were being arrested every 3 weeks for minibus-touting.

However, arrests and fines are not a deterrent. Even after being arrested or fined, when released minibus touts return to the streets to continue their business. When rearrested they are not given the option of a fine. For instance, Blantyre Magistrates' Court fined 12 minibus callers MWK3000 each and imprisoned one for 3 months without the option of a fine for repeating the offence. However, of the 12 minibus callers who were fined, only three had the money to pay. The nine who could not pay were sent to prison and would be released upon paying the fine.

Since minibus-touting was the main occupation for some people, quitting it overnight has proved to be difficult. In an attempt to continue with the trade but at the same time avoid being arrested, minibus touts have resorted to bribing the police, who will then just ignore or shield the callboys. Touts are thus dishing out money to the police to buy protection. This led the Minibus Association Chairperson to complain that ‘we are being blocked in phasing out the illegal touting business because policemen receive “commissions” from the callboys and they can't do anything’. He added that ‘touts can't get out of the roads because police officers are close to them’ (Mchazime, 2006:2). Citizens trying to stop the minibus touts carrying on their illegal trade faced heavy resistance from the touts because they were getting support from the police. Moreover, some touts even declare that people cannot stop touting ‘because not even your 9974 can come here to get me. Above all even the government knows that this is how we survive’ (Mchazime, 2006:2).

9.2 Stealing

The people interviewed commented that many former minibus touts are now thieves, since they have nothing to do and can get some money to live on only through robbery. Some police officers interviewed said that crime rates have increased since minibus-calling was banned. Moreover, the police officers said most of the crime suspects are found to be former minibus touts. They added that the crimes they commit range from loitering, minibus-calling and petty theft to drug abuse and robbery.

9.3 Street vending

Selling various items along the streets became an alternative way to earn a living for the minibus touts. However, the government has also banned street vending and allocated all vendors to designated markets. This worries the former touts because many customers do not go to these markets, and since most of the items they sell are also found in groceries stores and shops, the customers only buy from them if they meet them conveniently in the streets. This situation prevents them selling anything. During the interviews one former tout said that ‘trading in markets is as good as just staying at home as we cannot sell anything in these markets’.

9.4 Begging

Begging has become a coping mechanism for some former touts, who go about the streets and stand outside shopping centres asking for alms. However, while a few people would condone begging and give beggars some money, many are not prepared to offer them anything. The argument is that ‘in a country where the majority of the people are poor and what they do for a living is a mere alternative of begging and stealing, beggars are mostly people that are lazy and lacking in initiative and innovation’ (Tambulasi & Kayuni, 2005:156). It is not surprising, therefore, that many former touts who have turned to begging have not succeeded. They complain that ‘good Samaritans’ are very hard to come by and most people rebuke them, telling them they should go back to the village as they have nothing to do in town.

9.5 Loitering

Other former touts, their trade having been declared illegal and considering the risks involved if caught touting, prefer doing nothing. These people just loiter around in town hoping that by chance and luck they may meet some old friend who can offer them a job or give them some money. However, in a recent operation they say is aimed at keeping the cities clean, the police in the cities have started arresting people they deem to be loitering. They argue that ‘this exercise is normal and is undertaken by the police from time to time and it is provided for in the laws of Malawi’ (Kashoti, 2007:3). The suspects are charged with roguery and vagabondage. They mainly arrest people who seem to be doing nothing. For instance, in December 2006 the police rounded up 92 people found loitering in the city of Lilongwe (Botomani, 2006). By the end of the morning of 22 February 2007 alone, 15 alleged loiterers were picked up and put in jail (Kashoti, 2007). Most of the people arrested were found to be former minibus touts. In December 2006 the police noted that 11 of the 92 suspects arrested for loitering ‘were identified as minibus callboys’ (Botomani, 2006:3).

9.6 Charcoal-making

Charcoal-making is another coping mechanism for the former touts. Some respondents stated that some former minibus touts burn wood to make charcoal (commonly used for cooking in most low-income households), which they sell in the townships. Although a common business venture, this activity is illegal in Malawi. If officials from the Department of Forestry or the police find them they confiscate the charcoal. The argument is that charcoal-making leads to deforestation and hence environmental degradation, so former callboys who pursue this trade say they do it at their own risk.

10. CONCLUSION

Minibus-calling came into being on account of the poor socio-economic situation in Malawi. The soaring unemployment rates and high poverty levels made it seemingly one of the best alternatives for the vulnerable groups. Despite some negative outcomes of the activity, it was undoubtedly a survival safety net for many marginalised Malawians, as it did not need any capital outlay. But rather than offering a viable alternative to the callboys when it banned the activity, the government seems to have been concerned solely with eradicating this group. Alternative options were neither identified nor discussed. Although the group, through their leaders, were willing to discuss the matter with the government, the government did not respond. One possible alternative would have been to formalise the activity and ensure that proper regulations were instituted that each and every callboy would have to abide by. This would have meant that the city and municipal officials, in order to monitor the activities of callboys, could have employed some of them rather than relying on the police. The callboys could also have been handy in controlling the minibuses themselves so that the city and municipal bus stations would not experience the chaotic scenes that often engulf such places when minibuses are parked wrongly. However, instead of looking for a constructive way to handle the situation, the government has destroyed the callboys' livelihood and perpetuated their marginalisation.

Notes

¹The US and Canadian term for a share taxi.

²Literally ‘Give back’ (Chicheŵa), and in this context it meant ‘Surrender the weapons’.

³US$1 = MWK141.00 (Malawi kwacha) as of 29 October 2007.

⁴A heavily armed police squad that arrests criminals.