Citizens, subjects or a dual mandate? Artisanal miners, ‘supporters’ and the resource scramble in Sierra Leone

Abstract

There have been developments in the twentieth-century and twenty-first-century history of Africa that scholars and observers have commonly referred to as a ‘scramble’, with no attempt to put them in their proper historical perspective. This paper interrogates the historical concept of a ‘scramble’ to explain the political economy of Sierra Leone's mineral resources. Although the modern-day ‘scramble’ phenomenon might look ‘new’ on the surface, closer examination reveals that it still carries certain genes that were inherited from the nineteenth-century parent organism, making it not so much a ‘new’ scramble as a mutated version of the old. The paper assesses the relationship between artisanal miners, ‘supporters’ and exporters, on the one hand, and the government and other key stakeholders, on the other, in the scramble for diamonds in Sierra Leone. It also examines the economic and environmental consequences, including government and stakeholders' response.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the course of its history, various paradigms have been used to analyse the continent of Africa. The latest in the series to emerge is the concept of ‘scramble’, often with the prefix ‘new’ or ‘second’, suggesting that this is actually a return to an old concept. Newspapers in particular have been liberal in their use of the concept, with headlines such as ‘Vast Mineral Wealth Sparks New “Scramble for Africa”’ (Gogo, 2007), ‘China's New Scramble for Africa’ (The Mail, 2006), and ‘US Seeks Greater Influence in the New Scramble’ (The Nation, 2006). The Institute of Petroleum in Great Britain has even suggested a ‘third’ scramble (Institute of Petroleum, 2003).

While the concept seems to have become ubiquitous in the print media, it did not originate there. It prompted many scholarly debates in the 1960s and 1970s but somehow went out of fashion until it was resurrected in 1991 by Packenham. From the late 1990s the US was not only scrambling for Africa's raw materials, but had significantly increased its political and military interest in the continent through initiatives such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, the African Crisis Response Initiative and the establishment of the Pentagon's African Centre for Strategic Studies (Abramovici, 2004). America's interest was further heightened by the September 11 terrorist attacks, as indicated by the Pan Sahel Initiative, a military assistance programme introduced in 2003, and several other initiatives. The motivation for the US's scramble for Africa seems to have been to ensure ‘unlimited access to the key markets, energy and other strategic resources’ and the safe transport of those resources to the US through, for instance, a future oil pipeline linking Chad and Sudan (Abramovici, 2004).

Lee (2006a) identifies a ‘21st century scramble for Africa’ involving both western and eastern powers, with China as the main Eastern player. Like its nineteenth-century predecessor, Lee argues, the latest scramble has two faces: the Saving Africa face, which ‘projects Africa as a “basket” case that is in need of being “saved”’; and the Naked Imperialism face, ‘because there is no pretence on the part of the external powers, or their African cohorts that African resources are not being exploited’ (2006a:303). She concludes that the Saving Africa face was used to disguise the real imperialist interests of the scrambling countries, which make it seem as though ‘Africa is being partitioned economically and sold to the highest bidder’ and that only the impoverished masses can save the continent (Lee, 2006a:326).

Melber uses the metaphor of ‘old wines in new bottles’ to examine China's (and for that matter India's, Brazil's and Russia's) scramble for Africa's resources, arguing that ‘the criticism raised towards China [by the West] is more an indicator of an increasing fear of losing out on one's own interests than motivated by a genuine concern for the African people’ (Melber, 2007:6; see also Daniel, 2006; Lee, 2006b; MacDonald, 2006; Naidu, 2006; Southall, 2006; Yen, 2006). What scholars such as Alden (2007), Broadman (2007), Manji and Marks (2007), Wild and Mepham (2006) and Hilsum (2005) have failed to do in their contribution to the debate is discuss the historical antecedent of the present wave of scramble. This line of criticism also applies to Packenham's (1991) ‘popular history’ of the scramble for Africa (see Hopkins, 1993).

Referring to the artisanal diamond mining sector in Sierra Leone, this paper seeks to put the concept in proper historical perspective and to argue that the twenty-first-century resource scramble is not so much a ‘new’ scramble as a mutated version of the old. While the modern-day phenomenon might look different on the surface, a closer examination of its characteristics reveals that it still carries certain genes it inherited from the nineteenth-century parent organism. The paper also argues that the relationship between the artisanal miners and their financial supporters has been an exploitative one and, therefore, an unfulfilled ‘dual mandate’ that has resulted in serious developmental challenges, which are illustrated by the worsening of poverty levels for not only the miners but also the local community and national economy.

2. THE ‘SCRAMBLE’ IN HISTORY

The concept of scramble was originally used to describe the race to acquire colonies in Africa, between 1875 and 1900, by the major industrialised states of Europe, who were competing for exclusive control of markets and raw materials they deemed essential to their economic and political survival. The driving force behind that race was the crisis in industrial capitalism and the desire for national prestige and greatness. Although Britain envisioned a mutually beneficial situation or ‘dual mandate’ where the abundant raw materials in their colonies and the technological know-how of the British would be used for the advancement of both societies (Lugard, 1965:18), the scramble eventually culminated in the institutionalisation and legitimisation of highly exploitative economic regimes that could be traced back to the slavery era but that gained a new momentum from 1884 up to the decade of independence. Colonial subjects, as it turned out, essentially served as producers of raw materials (agricultural and/or mineral) for western factories under very unequal terms and conditions set by their colonial masters (Betts, 1972; Boahen, 1987; Chamberlain, 1999).

One important aspect of the history of the nineteenth-century scramble that has been lost in the modern reconceptualisation of the term is the fact that there was no one overall scramble, but rather a series of scrambles in different parts of Africa in which different reasons predominated. As Smith points out, the Fulanis were scrambling in West Africa to maintain the Sokoto Caliphate; Egypt, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali, was scrambling in the northeast over Sudan; Ethiopia, under emperor Menelik, was scrambling in the east to expand its empire of many nations (Smith, 1988). Thus, there were two discernible levels of scrambling going on in the nineteenth century: a European one and an African one. In the case of the artisanal mining industry in Sierra Leone, the key defining characteristic of a modern-day scramble is the stakeholders. Other characteristics of the scramble, such as the driving force and the goals of the participants, are mutated versions of the old.

The nineteenth-century scramble and partition resulted in Britain acquiring Sierra Leone as one of its prized colonies, which guaranteed Britain monopoly rights over the natural resources of the latter. Furthermore, while the outcome of Lord Lugard's ‘Dual Mandate’ – or who subsequently benefited from those resources during the colonial era – has never been in doubt, it is a much more complex question to answer for the modern era. This is what makes the current scramble a mutated version of the old. It is one of the characteristics of the modern-day resource scramble that this paper explores.

3. SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND THE MINING SECTOR

Sierra Leone was created by British philanthropists for freed slaves in the eighteenth century and went on to become a British Crown Colony and Protectorate before gaining independence in 1961. Post-independence Sierra Leone has alternated between multiparty democracy and single-party rule, and between civilian and military governments.

After almost two decades of bad governance under the government of Siaka Stevens, and the development of what Reno refers to as the ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1995), a civil war broke out a few years later that virtually destroyed the country. The civil war lasted from 1991 to 2002. It involved some 70 000 casualties and displaced another 2.6 million people. The war was characterised by widespread atrocities, including abduction of children, amputations and systematic rape (see Human Rights Watch, 1998; Gberie, 2005). The reasons for the war have been largely captured under the greed versus grievance debate (Collier, 2000; Reno, 2000; Smilie et al., 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Kandeh, 2002; Abdullah, 2004; Kabia, 2008). Since emerging from the war in 2002, Sierra Leone has held two successful presidential elections; in May 2002, and in August and September 2007. Nevertheless, addressing the human development problems and rebuilding the economy and infrastructure remain daunting challenges for the government. Sierra Leone is currently ranked 177 (the lowest) on the UNDP's Human Development Index and ranked 102 on its Human Poverty Index (see Table 1).

Table 1: Selected basic indicators of Sierra Leone in comparison with regional and global averages

Region	Human Development Index rank	Human Poverty Index rank	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy (% aged 15+)	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	Maternal mortality ratio (per 1000 live births)
South Africa	121	55	50.8	82.4	55	400
Ghana	135	65	59.1	57.9	68	560
Senegal	156	97	62.3	39.3	77	980
Nigeria	158	80	46.5	69.1	100	1100
Guinea	160	103	54.8	29.5	98	910
Angola	162	89	41.7	67.4	154	1400
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	168	88	45.8	67.2	129	1100
Sierra Leone	177	102	41.8	34.8	165	2100
Developing countries	–	–	66.1	76.7	57	–
Least developed countries	–	–	54.5	53.9	97	–
Sub-Saharan Africa	–	–	49.6	60.3	102	–
World	–	–	68.1	78.6	52	–
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2008).

Sierra Leone is well endowed with mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, iron ore, bauxite and rutile. Diamonds in particular have featured prominently in the country's socio-economic history since the 1930s, when they were first discovered, and continue to play a significant role in the economy. The mining sector is the second largest employer after subsistence agriculture. Mining, which contributes about 20 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, is also the major foreign exchange earner (Ministry of Mineral Resources [MMR], 2004:12–14). Even during the war years, the value of diamond exports alone was more than twice the total value of all agricultural exports (MMR, 2003:4).

Shortly after minerals were discovered in Sierra Leone, the British colonial government passed the first Minerals Act in 1927, which organised and regulated this new industry until 1960, when it was revised to become the Revised Minerals Act. That law survived into independence in 1961 and was adopted by the subsequent independent regimes for the next 30 years until 1994, when a ‘more dynamic and investor-friendly’ version was passed as the Mines and Minerals Decree, which later became the Mines and Minerals Act of 1996 that is in operation today (MMR, 2003:5).

For the first 30 years after the passing of the Minerals Act in 1927, the mining industry was monopolised by Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO), Sierra Leone Chrome Mines, and Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) – all British companies. SLST started mining diamonds in the 1930s in Kono District in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. However, following the discovery of diamond deposits in other areas of the country (e.g. the Bo and Kenema Districts) and the corresponding rush to those areas by prospectors, the British colonial government, in its twilight years, introduced the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme in 1956 to regulate the rush and prevent illicit mining and smuggling. The Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme allowed artisanal miners to participate in diamond mining for the first time, essentially breaking the exclusive monopoly previously enjoyed by SLST (Reno, 1995:45–103). Nevertheless, the colonial government still maintained majority control of the large-scale mines, and it was not until 1970, a decade after independence, that the indigenous government acquired majority shares (51 per cent) in SLST's assets through the newly formed National Diamond Mining Company. Large-scale production of diamonds was not fully state owned until 1984. Following a severe deterioration in its performance, leading to a steep decline in production, the government initiated the liquidation of National Diamond Mining Company in 1992 (MMR, 2003:5).

The size of the mining sector in Sierra Leone is modest by international standards. Further, its structure is complex compared with that of some other countries with successful mining sectors. The latter are usually characterised by large mining sectors focused on a single commodity and with larger mines. In Sierra Leone, the sector is made up of three subsectors: large-scale mining, small-scale mining and artisanal mining.

3.1 Large-scale mining

This sector consists of companies that mine precious minerals (mainly diamonds) and industrial minerals. Koidu Holdings Ltd (previously Branch Energy Ltd) reopened its kimberlite mine in Kono, eastern Sierra Leone, in 2003 after having been shut down during the war. Large-scale mining operations of non-precious minerals either are or were foreign owned, and include Sierra Minerals Ltd (formerly Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company (SIEROMCO)), which mines mainly bauxite, and Sierra Rutile Ltd (SRL), which mines mainly titanium minerals. Mining operations by these companies were shut down in 1994 because the mines were overrun by rebels during the war. They only resumed operations in 2005 (MMR, 2006).

Large-scale mining companies are controlled by the Mines and Minerals Act of 1994 and by special agreements made with the government. Operations by these companies are capital intensive, requiring considerable upfront, pre-production investment [0]beyond the levels that government and local private investors can afford. This explains why all of them are privately owned by foreign groups.

3.2 Small-scale mining

There are several small-scale mining companies, some privately owned (and registered in Sierra Leone under the Company Act Cap 249) and others owned by body-corporates (incorporated in Sierra Leone) with a minimum of 25 per cent Sierra Leonean shareholding (preferably held by the community in which the mining area is located). Many of these companies have international investors with varying degrees of involvement in local operations, and a few are listed on the London or New York Stock Exchange. In 2005, 43 companies held 102 prospecting and exploration licences. A further eight companies held 16 mining leases. They are funded either by private finance or through joint-venture agreements with junior exploration and mining companies. Very few Sierra Leonean investors have the financial capacity to fund prospecting and exploration activities.

3.3 Artisanal mining

Artisanal mining not only led to an increase in diamond production, it also attracted a considerable number of people to the mining sector. Estimates by the MMR put the number of individuals involved in artisanal mining at between 200 000 and 300 000 – a significant percentage of the total labour force (MMR, 2004:5). This subsector, arguably, accounts for the sustenance of the second largest percentage (behind agriculture) of the population (Fischer & Keili, 2005).

Artisanal mining operations are carried out by miners using rudimentary equipment. Licences, which are granted only to Sierra Leonean citizens and cooperatives, are allocated by the Chiefdom Mining Committee before being processed by the MMR. The area covered by an artisanal mining licence should not exceed five acres.

Artisanal mining takes place in over 80 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone, with the highest levels of activity being in Kono District in the eastern region (MMR, 2004:15–16), a region once nicknamed the ‘bread basket’ of Sierra Leone. It was in Tombodu, the headquarter town of Kamara Chiefdom, Kono District, that one of the world's largest diamonds, weighing 98.9 carats, was discovered (Bendu, 2006a). Diamonds dominate the mining sector (see Table 2), and 75 per cent of diamond exports are from artisanal miners. Overall, the mining sector contributes 90 per cent of registered exports (MMR, 2006; Gold and Diamond Office, 2006).

Table 2: Mining exports (US$ million)

Export	1987	1993	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Diamonds	23.4	20.2	10.5	1.25	10.1	26	41.7	149	183	212
Bauxite	22.6	25.2	0.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Rutile	47.3	60.9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Gold	3.7	1.6	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Source: Compiled from MMR (2004, 2006).

4. STAGES OF THE SCRAMBLE

As shown in Figure 1, the scramble of the nineteenth century occurred in distinct stages (Lugard, 1965:16). For the purposes of analysis, the travellers, missionaries and traders would be considered stakeholders rather than participants in the scramble because their interests merely overlapped with those of their imperial governments. Whether driven by curiosity, religion or trade, the information these interested stakeholders furnished their respective governments about the largely unknown continent led to exaggerated hopes and dreams that helped accelerate the race.

Figure 1: Evolution of colonial empires

The European scramble actually started slowly, with agents appointed by their governments entering into ‘partnerships’ with African chiefs who promised to protect them against attack in return for trading rights with their people. It was basis of these ‘protection treaties’ – which, as the Europeans themselves admit, ‘were either not understood or which the ruler had no power to make’ (Lugard, 1965:17) – that the imperial governments proceeded to claim their ‘spheres of influence’ at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference of European nations, where the African continent was first partitioned on paper as a prelude to physical conquest and occupation . How then does this compare with the latest resource scramble? Does it involve signing deceptive treaties, or violent takeovers of territory by foreign imperialists?

5. PARTICIPANTS AND THE NATURE OF THE SCRAMBLE IN THE ARTISANAL MINING SECTOR

Analysis of the modern-day phenomenon reveals some inherited characteristics but also unique differences from the nineteenth-century scramble. There are several stakeholders who have an impact on the operation of the sector today, some of whom would also be considered participants in the scramble. In the original version, the main participants in the rush to acquire a piece of the ‘magnificent African cake’ as Bismarck, the nineteenth-century German Chancellor once put it, were European governments. In the current scramble for diamonds in Sierra Leone, the participants are neither the governments nor predictably foreign; which makes for a very complicated race. The collapse of state institutions in the 1970s opened the way for a few companies and individuals – mainly of Lebanese, Israeli and Canadian origin – to reap huge benefits from the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The outbreak of war in the 1990s introduced regional actors into the picture, such as Charles Taylor, whose interest in smuggling and laundering Sierra Leone's diamonds to fund his own patronage networks matched those of the rebel Revolutionary United Front, who needed the funds from diamonds to sustain their insurgency against the government (Reno, 1995; Smilie et al., 2000:38–63). The case of Sierra Leone, therefore, does not quite fit the mould of oil-rich countries like Nigeria, Chad, Angola or Sudan, and market-favourable countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe or South Africa, where the participants in the scramble for access to markets or raw materials are eastern and western governments and companies. While it is true that the US and China have shown increased interest in Sierra Leone, as they have in the above-mentioned countries, this has not resulted in the ‘naked imperialism’ characteristic of the scramble described by Lee (2006a). Consequently, this paper uses the state-based approach advocated for by Alden (2007:59) to explore the specific nature of the scramble in Sierra Leone while analysing the political economy of artisanal mining in that country.

The artisanal mining subsector has been described as ‘mining by individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no mechanisation, often in the informal (illegal) sector of the market’ (Keili, 2006:1). The participants in this scramble fall into three main categories: the diggers or miners, the dealers or ‘supporters’, and the exporters, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Hierarchy of participants

5.1 Diggers/miners

At the bottom of the chain of scramblers are the diggers, who are either unemployed men from the area or, more often, domestic immigrants to the diamond fields of Kono District in search of their piece of the ‘cake’. This diamond rush usually means ‘boom towns’ spring up overnight, with haphazard or no planning, and working and with living areas overlapping, which creates new social and health problems. The miners, using rudimentary equipment, often have to work very long hours, usually up to the waist in muddy rivers, digging, sifting and washing gravel in search of diamonds that have washed up to just a few feet below the surface. They could dig for days or weeks and not find one. When they do, the precious stone has to be turned over to their ‘supporter’, who pays far less than what the find is worth.

The precarious nature of the miner's role in this process was depicted in the 2006 movie Blood Diamonds where Djimon Honsou's character goes to great lengths to conceal his precious find and ensure that he receives the maximum benefit from it. The VHI documentary Bling'd: Blood Diamonds and Hip Hop, released in February 2007, also illustrates the precarious lives of artisanal miners (MTV Networks, 2007).

In place of the nineteenth-century treaty with African chiefs, a mining licence from the government is now needed to operate legally. While the $1000 cost of a mining licence may be relatively small, the bureaucratic process and lack of transparency in the granting of licences effectively makes the licence cost upward of three times the official declaration, thereby putting it out of the financial reach of most diggers. Consequently, only a few diggers (and cooperatives) operate independently. The cooperative is a small group of diggers who have pooled their resources for the purpose of minimising risk and maximising their share of the profit generated by their labour. The vast majority of diggers, however, work for a ‘supporter’, who also purchases the mining licence. These diggers become heavily dependent for financial support but have very little stake in the operations, except as employees (Keili, 2006:3–4). According to the 2004 issue of Diamond Industry Annual Review, the miners:

operate under a ‘tributor system’ in which they are hired by a ‘supporter’ (a mining license holder) and are provided with food and the simple mining implements needed for alluvial mining. They in turn must sell their finds to the supporter, who usually pays below-market prices for the diamonds, making sure he deducts the costs of his investment and more. The miners always feel cheated but they are stuck because they lack the capital themselves to buy licenses and fund their own operations. (Gberie, 2004:3)

Compensation for the diggers varies. According to diggers interviewed in a survey of five villages surrounding the mining site in Kono,1 some diggers receive daily allowances of 500–1500 leones (approximately $0.17–$0.52) plus food – perhaps two cups of rice – that may or may not be deducted from their share of the receipts. Others, according to some of the dealers interviewed, could receive up to 7000 leones ($2.30) in wages in addition to their daily food ration. Most of the miners interviewed, however, claim there is a one-third split of the gross proceeds between the digger, the licence holder and the ‘supporter.’ As a result of these varying arrangements, the diggers are the last to really understand how their share is determined, which leaves plenty of room for exploitation (CEMMATS Group, 2006). Even when they find a diamond, they have no idea what its true value is. This ignorance, coupled with their unfavourable financial position, makes the diggers feel compelled to sell the stone to their ‘supporters’ – leaving them open to further exploitation (Palmer, 2007:13).

Although they are legal citizens, this de facto ‘subject’ status of miners has led the UN to describe the situation as ‘a system of debt bondage’ and ‘a contemporary form of slavery’ (Gberie, 2004:3). Why then, in spite of the poor remuneration and dreadful working conditions, do these miners not seek alternative employment? First, none is available to them and, second, just as the nineteenth-century scramblers dreamt, and as one analyst from International Alert puts it, ‘diamond and gold mining offers a HOPE, however slim, of making a fortune in a way that farming or ordinary manual labour does not’ (Yahya, 2006).

5.2 Supporters/dealers

In the middle of the chain of scramblers are the ‘supporters’, who are the financial backers for most artisanal miners in Sierra Leone. These are generally businessmen living in the diamond areas, the majority of whom are also dealers or diamond buyers and sellers. There are no legal agreements defining the terms and conditions of a supporter's investment; only an informal obligation on the part of the miner to sell the diamonds to his ‘supporter’. The supporter thus assumes de facto control of a ‘supported’ miner's diamond output. The dealers represent the first level of real expertise in valuation in the diamond chain, allowing them to set the prices they will pay ‘unsupported’ miners for uncut gems while demanding the real market price from exporters. The dealers are the classic middlemen, sandwiched between the diggers and exporters, and are in a position to fully exploit those below them in the chain. To operate as a diamond dealer, a dealer's licence is required. The cost varies depending on whether it is for a citizen, a non-citizen or an Economic Community of West African States citizen. The main players in this ‘support’ system are Lebanese and ‘Marakas’, whose complex identities as sometimes citizen and sometimes foreigner further complicate the nature of the modern-day scramble.

The Lebanese have played a major role in the diamond sector since the introduction of the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme in 1956. Revenue from Sierra Leone diamonds even helped support the various factions in the Lebanese civil war that was waged from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Smilie et al., 2000:43). In 2001, of the 143 diamond-buying shops in Kenema District, 71 per cent (n = 102) were owned by Lebanese – and in Bo District, 65 per cent (Keili, 2001:3). By 2003, the Lebanese domination in Kenema had increased to 90 per cent (Gberie, 2004:5). The Lebanese diamond dealers are also importers of food and consumer items, which they sell either directly or through other Lebanese agents. Although most Lebanese have legally taken up Sierra Leonean citizenship, their failure to re-invest in Sierra Leone despite their stranglehold on commercial activities makes analytical description of this group as ‘citizen’ participants in the scramble quite problematic. This issue is important because their identity has a direct bearing on the driving force behind their participation in the scramble.

Compared with the Lebanese, the ‘Marakas’ are relative newcomers to the scramble and could be described as ‘itinerant’ dealers since very few of them actually set up diamond-buying shops in the country. ‘Marakas’ is the name used by Sierra Leoneans to refer to the West African participants in the resource scramble – often from countries such as Guinea, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. They travel to mining sites in the interior and buy diamonds from miners, which they then sell to exporters in the big cities. During the civil war of the 1990s, the Marakas often clashed with the Revolutionary United Front rebels over the purchase of diamonds from artisanal miners. Some of them are fully fledged dealers; others are mere surrogates for bigger and more established Lebanese dealers; while others operate as independent smugglers.

Like the Lebanese, the ‘foreign’ status of the Marakas is not as clear cut as it appears. First, among the ethnic groups of Sierra Leone are Madingos and Foulahs – groups that are also native to neighbouring Guinea, which makes the issue of exploitation by foreigners harder to determine. Furthermore, while some Marakas may not be legal citizens of Sierra Leone, their length of residence in the country and the extent of the roots they have laid down also complicate the analysis of their role since their status has a bearing on their motives and therefore dictates the nature of their participation in the race.

While the non-citizens in this category may be easier to identify and blame for what ails the sector, citizens with access to resources, particularly local chiefs, have also been scrambling. The chief and his diamond dynasty might have no problem with the de facto exploitation of diggers, instead justifying their actions as ‘providing at least some employment to desperate people with no alternative’ (Polgreen, 2007:A8).

5.3 Exporters

At the top end of the chain of participants are the exporters. This group has been dominated by foreigners for longer than the other two groups. The foreign exporters, who are mainly Lebanese, have close connections to the international diamond-buying cartel. Of the total $126.6 million worth of diamonds exported in 2004, artisanal mining accounted for over $112.7 million (National Revenue Authority, 2004). An export licence fee of $30 000 is required of exporters. Although some exporters are also dealers, exporters generally buy their diamonds from dealers, after which they are required by law to take the stones to the Gold and Diamond Office where they are valued and taxed at 3 per cent before they can be exported. As a performance incentive, citizens who export more than $1 million worth of diamonds, and non-citizens who export more than $10 million worth, pay only 2.5 per cent export tax instead of the 3 per cent (Gberie, 2004; Polgreen, 2007).

6. EMERGING DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

Whereas the nineteenth-century European scramble resulted in partition and colonisation, which, many have argued, contributed to Africa's underdevelopment (Rodney, 1982; Boahen, 1987), the consequences of the modern-day scramble for diamonds in Sierra Leone through artisanal mining include environmental degradation and its attendant health and social problems. Although, in theory, the Mine and Minerals Decree of 1994 clearly states that one condition for granting mining leases is proof of having carried out an environmental impact assessment (MMR, 1994), in practice an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required only for large-scale and small-scale mining operations, not for artisanal mining. For the latter, a rehabilitation fee is collected as part of the licence fees even though nothing is done about environmental issues and degradation. Because of this, the Sierra Leone Government, a key stakeholder and ‘regulator’ of the scramble, is perceived by many in the affected communities to have been preoccupied more with the economic benefits of mining than with environmental health and social development (Bendu, 2006a).

As it turns out, artisanal and small-scale mines collectively cause more environmental damage than large-scale mines (although the visibility of the latter makes them more susceptible to criticism). Artisanal mining normally involves the removal of vegetation and economically viable trees and the diversion of surface drainage. Silted rivers, as a result of mining activities, are a common problem faced by communities living downstream from these mining sites. The stagnant pools and water contamination resulting from artisanal mining activities expose mining area communities to severe health risks. As one newspaper commented:

The cocoa and coffee farms of the east have been left to rodents and miners to pillage … Agriculture which used to be a source of livelihood for the people [of Kono] has been recklessly abandoned in favour of mining for diamonds. As a consequence, fertile lands have been pillaged, cash crops devastated and now there is this huge backlog of environmental issues which remain a threat to the safety of the people. Vast areas within townships that have been dug remain exposed with ponding everywhere. It is no surprise that malaria, which is one of the country's foremost killer diseases, is on the rise. (Kamara, 2005)

To compound the problem, other relevant regulations relating to the environment and community development that would be applicable to the mining industry are scattered across several government ministries and agencies (such as the Ministries of Lands, Country Planning and Environment; Local Government and Community Development; Agriculture and Forestry; Fisheries and Marine Resources; Health and Sanitation; and Internal Affairs), making it next to impossible for well-meaning participants to keep up with and abide by all the laws on their own.

Besides all this, to obtain an artisanal mining licence the applicant must pay a fee to a rehabilitation fund, which is kept by the government to be used for rehabilitating mined-out areas after mining activities are complete. It is unclear how that fund is being used, and to what effect, despite concerns that the fee charged might be too small to begin with. Furthermore, another 3 per cent tax is levied on all diamond exports, of which only 0.75 per cent is earmarked for community development (Keili, 2001:15). Government records show that $112.7 million worth of diamonds was officially exported in 2004, of which the government took in $3.3 million (Table 3). However, in the grand scheme, only $25 378 (or 0.75 per cent) would have gone directly to the mining communities in over 80 chiefdoms around the country. Nevertheless, in a 2006 newspaper commentary, one local resident accused the government of ‘sacrificing [Kono] on the altar of investment’ for being more interested in collecting licence fees than enforcing environmental mining laws that would protect the health and well-being of residents in the unrehabilitated mining areas (Bendu, 2006b; see also Karefa-Smart, 2006).

Table 3: Artisanal diamond exports, 2004

Month	Carats	Value ($)	Price per carat	3 per cent export duty
January	55 347.28	6 723 551.76	121.48	201 706.55
February	57 083.87	7 955 637.96	139.37	238 669.14
March	51 666.19	9 922 298.49	192.05	297 668.95
April	72 589.35	12 219 747.96	168.34	366 592.44
May	49 712.77	9 824 063.16	197.62	294 721.89
June	76 352.00	14 539 283.46	190.42	436 178.50
July	52 150.25	11 607 597.71	222.58	348 227.93
August	43 622.97	8 358 616.25	191.61	250 758.49
September	40 724.98	8 472 238.79	208.04	254 167.16
October	36 931.67	8 524 331.15	230.81	255 729.93
November	39 964.97	7 593 267.37	190.00	227 798.02
December	37 152.33	7 052 410.97	189.82	211 572.33
Total	613 298.63	112 793 045.03	183.91	3 383 791.35
Source: Development Assistance Coordination Office (2007).

Of the three main categories of participants in the resource scramble, the only ‘losers’ because of their lack of financial clout seem to be the diggers or miners. Supporters and exporters have a strong interest in using their resources to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, a major stakeholder like the government (central and local) has the ultimate power to alter the course and outcome of the scramble through reforms that would benefit the mining communities, in particular, and the people of Sierra Leone, who are the ultimate stakeholders.

7. PATTERNS OF GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE

Although the immense contribution of diggers and miners to alluvial diamond production is indisputable, the impact on the mining communities has been less than favourable; a fact that has not been lost on ordinary Sierra Leoneans. The youths have been particularly active in protests against not only the ‘supporters’ and exporters, but also the local chiefs and the central government (Fillie, 2006).

In August 2006, a group of youths from Kono District protested against both local officials, whom they claimed were not promoting the interest of the people but themselves, and a local mining company they said had treated them with neglect and contempt. The youths organised a protest march against the alleged corrupt behaviour of the paramount chief who, they claimed, used the district mines engineer to stop their prospecting exercise at the site because this chief ‘wanted to use the issue of awarding concession for the tailing as a money-making venture’ (Kamara, 2006).

Fillie (2006) argues that there has been no transparency or accountability in the awarding of mining contracts. The chiefs, according to Fillie, ‘are direct beneficiaries of the surface rent fees, government allocations, the 3 per cent tax subsidy from government and all other monetary benefits that are supposed to be duly used for the betterment of the district and its people’. Fillie blames this conduct for the spread of xenophobia in mining communities where the ‘enemy’ or ‘stranger’ has been so broadly defined that it now includes ‘the moderate Konos who attempt to question the irascible character of the chiefs and their “Yes men”’ (Fillie, 2006).

The material conditions of residents in the artisanal mining towns appear to give legitimacy to the protests. People live in substandard dwellings, and depend on dug-out wells for drinking water. Most toilets are pit latrines or nearby bushes or streams. Malaria, intestinal worms, dysentery/diarrhoea, cholera and typhoid are the most common diseases (CEMMATS Group Ltd, 2006). There are very few primary and secondary schools, and the few existing ones lack the basic teaching and learning infrastructure. In the absence of dependable medical facilities, people resort to herbs and quack doctors (CEMMATS Group Ltd, 2006). Many of the socio-economic, political and public health problems, and especially those directly affecting the artisanal miners in the mining towns, are directly attributable to artisanal mining activities (Gberie, 2004; McMahon & CEMMATS Group Ltd, 2007; Ratner, 2007; Discovery Times Channel, 2007).

The Network Movement for Justice and Development is by far the most vociferous of the local non-governmental organisations dealing with the mining sector, and it has been singularly effective in bringing to the attention of the national and international media and international organisations the inequities in the sector and the perceived excesses of the mining companies. The Network Movement for Justice and Development has questioned whether the diamonds truly belong to Sierra Leoneans when mining communities are so poor, and has challenged the government to demonstrate its commitment to resolving the problems by embarking on an urgent review of mining laws (Concord Times, 2008). The media has also been active in amplifying the concerns of the mining communities (see Boyd, 2007; Batey, 2007).

8. POLICY ISSUES AND INITIATIVES

The Sierra Leonean Government has acknowledged the problems of illegal mining, smuggling, environmental damage, poor working conditions and misuse of official positions (Swaray-Deen, 2003). In 2001, in an attempt to redress the inadequacies of resource distribution, the government mandated that a quarter of the 3 per cent export tax be put into the newly established Diamond Area Community Development Fund, which was to be used for the development of local mining communities. The MMR, local government officials, the community, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations are all responsible for monitoring how the funds are used (Swaray-Deen, 2003). Since its inception, about $2 266 940 has been allocated to communities annually. However, aside from the modest amount of the allocations, it is still unclear how the funds were used, as the communities remain mired in their substandard existence.

Similarly, to resolve the problem of the exploitation of diggers and the poor income distribution, the government, with financial support from USAID, formally launched the Peace Diamond Alliance initiative in Kono District in 2003 to improve the communities’ ‘ability to manage, regulate and police diamond activities’ in their various areas (Kabbah, 2003). Implemented in partnership with Management Systems International, the USAID pilot scheme aims to provide an affordable alternative source of financing to artisanal miners and to provide them with marketing expertise. Preliminary assessments of the scheme, however, suggest its success has been limited (Keili, 2006). According to Maconachie and Binns, ‘if meaningful rural development is to be achieved … development strategies must be based on a detailed understanding of the nature of inter-locking livelihoods in the agricultural and mining sectors’ (2007b:1).

To combat smuggling, the government has signed on to the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, which was put together in 2003 to regulate the international trade in rough diamonds. Initially created to deal with the impact of ‘blood diamonds’ on international market sales, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme has made a significant dent in the problem of smuggling in Sierra Leone. From less than $1 million in 2000, when the civil war was still ongoing, the total worth of diamond exports rose to $142 million just two years after the scheme started. In spite of this obvious success, however, it has not eliminated smuggling. If anything, there seems to have been a resurgence of smuggling in the country (Standard Times, 2006), and this has been blamed on weak internal government controls, lack of a mechanism to suspend a non-compliant participant, and lack of capacity to conduct spot checks and third-party audits of diamond companies (Partnership Africa Canada, 2006).

One study has revealed that, besides not adequately addressing issues of investment, health, safety, environmental and social development, the 1996 Mines and Mineral Act, which governs all MMR operations, also fails to adequately define ‘responsibility, and the Ministry cannot certify its officers as fit to enforce or apply the law’. In short, the law is so ineffective that the only remedy is to craft a new statutory framework to guide operations in the mining sector (Government of Sierra Leone/Department for International Development, 2005:paras 5–6).

9. THE RESOURCE SCRAMBLE: THEN AND NOW

While the twentieth-century scramble for resources in Sierra Leone could not be described as ‘sudden’ – which is how Boahen describes the nineteenth-century European scramble for Africa – its exploitative consequences have been just as ‘catastrophic’ (Boahen, 1987:1–26) for certain segments of society while enriching others at the same time. As mentioned earlier, the diggers continue to live in abject poverty as bonded ‘subjects’ with no viable economic pursuits in the ‘decentralised despotism’ of the postcolonial state and its urban ‘citizens’. In this system, scrambling supporters and exporters come to resemble feudal lords controlling mining fiefdoms across the country, aided by a weak, ambiguous and inefficient statutory and bureaucratic framework. Maconachie and Binns (2007:104) have argued that alluvial diamond mining could provide the impetus for post-war reconstruction ‘if future policies are based on a detailed understanding of the relationships between diamond mining and rural development at the local, regional and national levels’. In the Sierra Leonean version of the modern scramble, while the government, the ultimate arbiter of the scramble, received a genuine mandate through the ballot box to ensure that the resources are used for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone, it has failed to do this, despite its official pronouncements. The mining sector has, so far, failed to significantly reduce poverty for the miners, their local communities or the national economy, principally because government has failed to:

• create conditions that induce and foster the organisation of artisanal miners in associations and cooperatives;

• establish a process by which representatives of local communities, not just chiefs, are involved in the granting of artisanal and small-scale mining licences;

• develop or strengthen innovative training programmes and marketing opportunities for artisanal miners; and

• formalise the activities of middlemen (supporters) and subject them to a system of progressive reporting of their activities, including the miners they are supporting and the mining areas for which they hold (or control) licences (McMahon & CEMMATS Group Ltd, 2007).

There has also been a failure to rehabilitate mined-out areas. It is as though, according to Mamdani (1996), the scramble for diamonds in Sierra Leone has brought participants and stakeholders together in a trifurcated process that has not only made subjects out of citizens, but also created ‘citizens’ with differential rights and privileges.

Notes

¹A total of 210 respondents were sampled from the five settlements. Data were sought on selected socio-economic variables such as household demography, economic activities and income, social services and the interviewees' perception of the probable impact mining operations will have on their lives and communities. Data were obtained by administering face-to-face questionnaires and conducting focus-group interviews of various community members, including vulnerable project-affected persons such as women and youth groups.