Fragmentation of resource governance along the shoreline of Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe

Abstract

The mid-Zambezi valley where Lake Kariba now lies was transformed at the end of the 1950s from a previously complex integrated knowledge and resource management system that supported the livelihoods of the Tonga people to the existing dysfunctional assemblage of fragmented systems. This fragmentation of resource governance, through a tenure shift in which large areas were designated as protected land, transferred power from local people to the state. Today the valley supports diverse economic interests, to the detriment of the local inhabitants, who have been marginalised. At stake are issues of sustainability and livelihoods. This paper discusses the status of woodland and wildlife and the failure of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources to improve the situation for the local people.

Keywords:

• Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
• common pool resources
• wildlife
• woodland
• Lake Kariba
• Zimbabwe

1. INTRODUCTION

The creation of Lake Kariba is an illustration of how the construction of dams and consequent tenure transformations can negatively affect local communities (World Commission on Dams, 2000). The damming of the Zambezi River fragmented what was previously a vast integrated common resource used by a small population and made it available for exploitation by a wider community. The single purpose of hydroelectric power generation transformed the area into an important national economic resource for fisheries and tourism. Although the Tonga community depended heavily on the multi-functional riverine ecosystem and its surroundings (Colson, 1971; Scudder, 1975; Weinrich, 1977), in 1958 about 5100 km² of the mid-Zambezi valley was inundated, disrupting the ecosystem they depended on, breaking up resource governance in the mid-Zambezi Valley area, and changing their livelihoods and the socio-cultural foundations of their community (World Commission on Dams, 2000).

Two objectives for good governance of the commons are biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation (Turner, 2004). These are a major challenge to achieve in the case of southern African commons, given the exclusion of local users and the increased competition. This paper looks at transitional change in the governance of a large terrestrial ecosystem along the lakeshore of Lake Kariba. It discusses four main issues: the fragmentation of resource governance; how an integrated knowledge and resource management system was replaced by a dysfunctional assemblage of fragmented systems; the dominance of technocratic approaches over more integrated spiritual paradigms; and the costs, and the threats, to resource sustainability and livelihoods. The case study describes a set-up where incompatible resource use activities involving mobile wildlife resources are in juxtaposition, with the result that there are major conflicts over resource use. Efforts to redress the situation through the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) are discussed to show how this has affected the livelihoods of the local communities. The effect of resource governance fragmentation, especially the way changes in land use have affected these communities, is discussed within the dimensions of knowledge and power. It is anticipated that such information could help shape our understanding of the governance of the commons in southern Africa in general, especially with respect to integrated large terrestrial ecosystems.

This discussion is a synthesis of secondary data sources and draws mainly on the baseline studies carried out during the preparation of the Kariba Lakeshore Combination Master Plan of 1998, the Binga Land Use and Wildlife Management Plan of 1999 and resource material prepared for the Integrated Coastal Zone Management training course of 2000. It also draws on the researcher's 14 years’ experience in the study area (1994–2008).

2. GEOGRAPHY OF THE LAKESHORE AREA

Lake Kariba forms the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Figure 1). Its shoreline stretches over 1181 km, with altitudes varying from 490 m to almost 1500 m above sea level on the escarpment. Despite being endowed with abundant natural resources, the area has a high level of poverty, with 91 per cent of the population classified as poor to very poor (Conyers & Hlatshwayo, 1996). This means they are heavily dependent on natural resources (Cumming & Lynam, 1997) and household survival strategies are linked to their use of these resources, although the main source of livelihood is agriculture, which is hampered by inadequate rainfall, infertile soils and poor access to inputs.

Figure 1: Map showing the location of Lake Kariba

3. TRANSITIONAL CHANGES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF LAKESHORE COMMONS

Transitional change in the governance of a large terrestrial ecosystem within the lakeshore area of Lake Kariba is discussed under the headings of three development periods that characterised resource management: the pre-impoundment phase (before 1958), the post-impoundment colonial phase (1958–1980), and the post-impoundment independence phase (1980−today).

3.1 Governance of the mid-Zambezi Valley commons during the pre-impoundment phase (before 1958)

Before the dam was built, this area of the Zambezi River was a vast integrated resource used for multiple purposes by the Gwembe Valley Tonga. Local resource management approaches during the pre-impoundment phase were based on religion and spirituality. A ritual leader initiated and coordinated vital livelihood activities, including resource extraction, agriculture, cutting of thatching grass and fishing in sacred zones, for a neighbourhood comprised of three to seven villages (Colson, 1962).

The communities exercised collective access to animal and plant resources through complex sharing and rotation schemes, controlled by local institutions and bound by tribal laws and knowledge. Traditional authorities played a key role in governing the common pool resources, and significant group control was exerted as well. The basic principle of the land tenure system for the Tonga was the right of a farmer over any land that he or she had brought into cultivation, as the community did not own land but only oversaw it (Reynolds & Cousins, 1993). The influence of the colonial state was minimal because the area was remote and isolated and held no specific attraction for developers.

3.2 Governance of the lakeshore commons during the post-impoundment colonial phase (1958–1980)

The need for hydroelectric power to support industrial growth in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, now Zambia and Zimbabwe, led to the damming of the Zambezi River in 1958. This introduced new opportunities, mainly tourism, fishing and wildlife management. Institutions and authorities involved in tourism became the key stakeholders with economic interest in the area as they increasingly tapped into the opportunities it offered. Today there are many private-sector entities supporting the tourism industry. The development of the artisanal and commercial fisheries also brought in new stakeholders, and tenure complexity increased with the increasing number of black tourism and fishing entrepreneurs. The local people displaced by the dam were unable to take advantage of the new opportunities.

Previously the Tonga had depended on and managed the whole ecosystem, but now they were relocated into the inhospitable semi-arid escarpment. Their livelihoods were markedly affected because they had depended on obtaining meat, edible insects, roots and fruits from the forests. The land where they had practised floodplain agriculture was inundated, limiting them to dryland agriculture, and hunting was stopped. Their indigenous knowledge, which had been based on the Zambezi River habitat, was not useful in inland areas. While there were no immediately apparent local struggles against this subjugation upon relocation, it is possible that the human–wildlife conflicts occurring today are an indication of local resistance to conservation and the usurpation of rights.

Relocation and the deprivation of their ecosystem altered not only the livelihoods but also the socio-cultural foundations of the Tonga community (Colson, 1971; Scudder, 1975; Weinrich, 1977; World Commission on Dams, 2000). The major impact at this stage was the loss of the local socio-institutional systems of managing the commons since the state took over and did not reinstate political and religious authority at the community level (Colson, 1962). The influence of neighbourhood ritual leaders was not transferred to the resettled sites and the relocated chiefdoms lost influence, with the traditional leadership now confined to communal areas where chiefs and headmen had the right to allocate land.

Resource management according to institutional forms and concepts developed in Europe was now based on the intrinsic and recreational values of wild species and spaces. Management focused on habitat and species protection, enforced by legislation and state management that saw conservation as an end in itself (Murphree, 1998). Large tracts of land were set aside for tourism, excised and designated into five wildlife areas and two protected forest areas (Figure 2) that accounted for 40 per cent of the lakeshore frontage (Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute, 1995). Human access to the lakeshore was restricted to 42 designated fishing villages (Sanyanga, 1995) but specifically excluded in a 5 km buffer zone extending from the lake.

Figure 2: Map showing Lake Kariba's administrative areas

It was assumed that this would protect the flora and fauna from destructive human activities (Takfforyan, 1996). Discriminatory regulations and adequate policing ensured that all protected areas remained intact, with limited threat from humans. No recognition was given to indigenous land use systems, which had recognised the whole territory as subject to several overlapping multiple uses. Instead, the state asserted the principle of limited and exclusive use of its property by introducing restrictive legislation. This clashed with the indigenous concept of woodlands and their resources as being integrated with cultural conceptions of space and socio-political organisation. Colonial institutions were imposed and the locus of control over resources was shifted from communities (Murombedzi, 1990). It was notable that all areas rich with flora and fauna became state land, while the local people were confined to relatively poorly resource areas, with limited access to approximately 50 per cent of the resource base that is not contiguous.

Other than physical fragmentation, a sectoral approach was implemented that has had marked implications for resource governance. Sector specific legislation−approximately 14 laws today with implications for the lakeshore commons−was developed, resulting in fragmentation of responsibilities across various government ministries. The main effects have been confusion over boundaries and jurisdiction, overlapping functions and duplication of roles, limited community participation and marginalisation, a lack of coordination over the administration and planning of the commons, and escalation of conflicting interests between users. Benefits to the local people declined because the way the area was developed offered little opportunity for effective public participation. The local people's livelihoods continued to be threatened by the intrusion of other, economically or politically more powerful, land users. Confusion ensued regarding the division of responsibility for monitoring, and badly planned development then became a threat to the resource base.

At this stage, expropriation of the resource base for fishery, tourism and wildlife uses increased its economic value. The high economic demand resulted in communities being restricted to smaller land areas, thus increasing the resource use pressure per unit of area. The traditional livelihood options having been curtailed, the protected resources were now threatened as communities procured them illegally. Resource exploitation was opened to fishing and tourism but was still limited to the white minority, so competition was not particularly intense. Management of Lake Kariba's resources relied on normative, factual scientific knowledge, as it does today. Technocrats are still reluctant to cooperate with users, so their approach still takes precedence over the more integrated indigenous knowledge systems.

3.3 Governance of the lakeshore commons during the post-impoundment independence phase (1980−today)

Since the independent government took over the former resource management regimes and colonial ideologies and institutions, the fragmented land uses designated during the post-impoundment colonial period have not been changed. Instead, local resource management institutions were further weakened when the traditional leaders relinquished their role as custodians of natural resources (Murphree, 1991) and their power shifted to the state. This was implemented through the establishment of democratically elected local government institutions in each district with the responsibility for natural resource management. These institutions now functioned alongside and parallel to traditional authority structures at community level (Nhira et al., 1998).

It has been suggested that organisational structures and institutional principles should be designed to encourage the sustainable use and management of natural resources held in common (Murphree, 1991; Ostrom, 1993). In this case, traditional leaders were the pre-colonial managers of the natural resources but this role was now entrusted to elected systems of local governance. The establishment and granting of authority to these elected bodies created conflicts with traditional structures and systems (Madzudzo, 2000). Since these two systems inhabited the same governance space and had similar roles and responsibilities in the lakeshore area, this further led to unclear or overlapping jurisdictions and mandates. Institutional conflict and struggles for power ensued. The local communities saw the traditional authorities as the appropriate institutions to represent them because the traditional laws focused on allocating land to families and using natural resources to sustain livelihoods, while the elected bodies’ formalised legal system was based on competition and debate. Further fragmentation ensued as there were now two systems of governance here and this had a marked negative impact on resource sustainability and livelihoods.

Resource management remained centralised, with political power still vested in the state to manage through line ministries and indirectly through units of representative local governance. The state was the ultimate source of power and, although its effectiveness has been questionable, it still remains the legitimate source of problem identification, intervention and problem-solving (Keeley & Scoones, 2000). Resource management is centrist and based on prescriptive approaches, which conflict with local perspectives and imperatives, and there is a problem of scale mismatch between jurisdictional, functional and ecological levels (Murphree & Mazambani, 2002); that is, the management institutions are far removed from the communities that use the resources, hence the problems of scale and loss of effectiveness. Management jurisdiction should match on the ecological and social levels (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 2001).

Power from the state, as wielded by the Rural District Councils (RDCs), allowed them to further bring in more stakeholders by leasing land to private tourism venture developers. This was to the detriment of the local people, because no effort was made to institute a shared management policy to allow them controlled access to protected areas to extract resources. Although the demand for resources has escalated due to in-migration, the high unemployment rate and the general decline in the economy, the state has been reluctant to make parts of the designated state lands available for the local people's needs. Effort has not been made to effectively promote the interest of those who live on and from the commons.

Threats to commons and livelihoods became most apparent after independence in 1980. The government's indigenisation programme, which attempted to address the previous land imbalances, made it possible for affluent blacks to take advantage of the potential for tourism investment in the area, which further increased the demand for development. To accommodate this demand, more land had to be converted to private property for the establishment of tourism-related ventures. Unfortunately the state is no longer able to regulate and manage the resource because of financial and personnel limitations, with the result that there is now de facto open access. Communities are increasingly procuring small game meat and firewood illegally. Ineffective policing, increasing demand and the declining economy, which have made people more dependent on the natural resources, have worsened the situation, leading even to illegal settlement in Kavira Forest. Degradation of the area due to demographic pressures and escalating levels of poverty have been notable in the decline of the small game populations (Binga Rural District Council, 1999) and deforestation around human settlements (Magadza, 1986). The community nevertheless still experiences high levels of poverty.

4. RESOURCE FRAGMENTATION AND ENSUING CONFLICTS

The fragmentation of the area into incompatible land use interests and rights (Magadza, 1986) presents a key management challenge that has degenerated into conflicts. This suggests the need to re-establish the interactions and interdependencies among natural resources, different sectors and livelihood requirements. The relationships between the new forms of resource use have led to intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral conflicts. Sport and artisanal fishermen compete over fishing grounds. Safari operators prohibit inshore fishermen from fishing near tourist establishments since this makes the wildlife move away. Hoteliers compete with houseboats for clients. Consumptive and non-consumptive tourism, which are incompatible, are overlapping.

These cases illustrate how failed interactions and interdependencies between sectors sharing the commons can results in conflicts of interest. The three main types of conflicts here are between people and wildlife, between cattle and wildlife, and between natural resource-based commercial enterprises and local institutions in communal areas (Binga Rural District Council, 1999).

4.1 Conflicts between people and wildlife

These conflicts emanate from juxtaposed incompatible fragmented land uses, notably human settlement and safari areas. The absence of physical barriers allows elephant and buffalo from safari areas to encroach on settlements, where they damage crops and kill domestic livestock and even maim or kill people. This is most apparent in the areas sandwiched between Chizarira National Park and the Chete Safari Area but declines with increasing distance from protected areas. The driver of these conflicts is increasing pressure on land as humans and animals contend for the same resources, especially when animals spill over from alienated areas into communal areas. Loss of habitat and conflict with legitimate human interests is now the biggest threat to the survival of wildlife in this area; and as the elephant population increases, conflict between elephants and the communities will escalate and, where carrying capacity is exceeded, habitat destruction will occur (Taylor & Cumming, 1993).

4.2 Conflicts between cattle and wildlife

Previously the mid-Zambezi valley was effectively one consolidated wildlife sanctuary with unrestricted movement of wildlife in areas designated as human settlements prior to tsetse fly eradication in the 1980s (Magadza, 1986). As livelihoods became more dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry, two land use activities that are incompatible with free-ranging animals, boundaries became an issue of contention since the animals do not recognise them. There is also an issue of incompatibility between cattle and buffalo because of the increasing competition for limited grazing resources and the potentially high risk of foot and mouth disease transmission from wild ungulates to livestock. Livestock are important to the local people for draught power, transport and manure, and surety in times of drought, and cattle also play socially important roles, for payments of bride price, for ceremonies and for compensatory payments (Cousins et al., 1989). The ecological challenge is whether the ecosystem can sustainably maintain both a high wildlife population and a high cattle population. The wildlife−livestock conflict is thus an important local political issue that centres on increasing demand for limited resources, which the local people are allowed to use only within communal land.

4.3 Conflicts between natural resource-based commercial enterprises and local institutions

Tourism opportunities offered by the lake and its environs have led to an increasing encroachment of commercial enterprises, to the detriment of local communities. The wilderness experience the eco-tourists and sport hunters require, one devoid of people, essentially drives out agricultural and other productive activities around tourist establishments. This represses and regulates the communities’ livelihood requirements. As the RDCs readily grant leases to private commercial developers since they gain significant revenue from lease fees and bed levies, the local inhabitants’ access rights to forests become increasingly threatened. Such leases for instance allowed hunting concessions to extend into the entire communal areas of Binga in 1999, the only restriction being that hunting was not allowed within a settlement (Binga Rural District Council, 1999). Local people lose to commercial operators the lands they were previously using for economic and social purposes, and their movement and usage of resources within leased areas becomes restricted. As a result, it is the stronger stakeholders who benefit most.

5. EXPERIENCES FROM THE CAMPFIRE INITIATIVE FOR WILDLIFE RESOURCES

The CAMPFIRE programme was instituted in 1991 as an alternative form of wildlife use in communal areas. It was based on the recognition of the need for group ownership and control as the most viable regulatory mechanism and one that could best ensure sustainable use (Murombedzi, 1990). The concept allowed local participation in the management of state-owned wildlife and forestry resources as an incentive to engender sustainable use. The Kariba lakeshore provided an ideal environment due to the presence of large elephant and buffalo populations. The CAMPFIRE experiences are discussed here with respect to three main activities in Binga: safari hunting, wildlife-related tourism and problem animal control.

It was shown that there were discrepancies between quota recommendations made by the communities and safari operators and the approved quotas (Binga Rural District Council, 1999). A comparison of recommended and approved quotas in 1999 for elephant and buffalo in three communities illustrates how the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWMA) drastically reduced hunting quotas (see Figure 3). The discrepancies reflect the differences between the communities’ and the authorities’ resource management perspectives. The communities recommended higher numbers for all animals in all cases. There was, however, a general similarity between communities’ and safari operators’ recommendations, probably indicating a better understanding of the animal populations since they are both based in the area and interact with the animals more frequently. The reductions were based on ZPWMA survey data and consequently disregarded knowledge of the communities living with the animals. A stipulated national elephant quota of 4000 determined by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species also limited the recommended elephant quotas. The local communities’ perception consequently is that the ZPWMA has no respect for their knowledge or opinions and that their involvement in quota setting was only instituted to give an impression to the outside world that the local people have a say in the matter.

Figure 3: Discrepancy among hunting quotas for elephants and buffaloes recommended by three stakeholders

The revenue from safari hunting distributed to households (see Figure 4) was considered by communities to be too little and too erratic to provide economic incentives for sustainable resource use because the dividends they received were insufficient to compensate for damage to crops and livestock or to provide an alternative source of income. This further raises questions of whether the local people are benefiting, since the CAMPFIRE dividend was not perceived as a viable source of income in comparison with crop production and livestock-rearing, activities that are threatened by the presence of elephant and buffalo in communal areas. Generally, studies elsewhere in the Zambezi valley have also shown that the CAMPFIRE dividends do not constitute a viable alternative source of income to agriculture (Bond, 1993; PlanAfric, 1997). The variability of the percentage of safari hunting revenue obtained that is returned to the community (Figure 4) by the RDC also showed that it is not a dependable stable source of revenue for livelihood requirements. Although the CAMPFIRE guidelines recommend a disbursement of 80 per cent of revenue from safari hunting operations, this was not adhered to except in 1993 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Percentage of CAMPFIRE revenue returned to communities between 1993 and 1998

Equitable distribution of power and authority can be further illustrated through issues of problem animal control, an option used in the CAMPFIRE to reduce wildlife damage by either scaring or killing problem animals. Such problem animals are reported to the RDC. Communities considered problem animal control activities to be ineffective because the RDC or safari operators prefer to scare the animals away rather that kill them, to avoid a reduction of the annual hunting quotas finally recommended by the ZPWMA. The response to problem animals by the RDC was considered slow and ineffective and has led to the perception that the local authority cares more about animals and the safari operators than about local communities.

The introduction of the CAMPFIRE programme to address issues of governance over wildlife resources has failed to address issues of equitable distribution of power, authority and revenue (Binga Rural District Council, 1999). The RDCs have retained power and are reluctant to pass it down to lower levels (Murombedzi, 1992). Other than allowing community participation, the CAMPFIRE has promoted further isolation of parts of the area for the benefit of the RDC and commercial tourism enterprises, and this has created negative attitudes to wildlife among the local people.

6. CONCLUSION

The case study illustrates how the power dynamics at play during this evolution process resulted in authority fragmentation. During the pre-impoundment phase the community had power, but this was usurped when national interests for power generation and tourism development were attached to the area. This led to a shift to a state-based centrist technocratic approach based on scientific knowledge, which today operates through dysfunctional assemblages of fragmented systems. State control was further strengthened through devolution of power to Rural District Councils who work through elected structures. Efforts to redress the situation through the CAMPFIRE programme have not been successful. The increased economic value of the resource brought in powerful stakeholders, thus further marginalising the local community.

The key challenge now is to explore how to integrate the natural and social science knowledge and package it in a practical way usable by policy-makers involved with biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. Areas of sectoral interconnections have to be identified and articulated and the required research implemented, after which findings can then be translated into advice for policy-makers.

This special issue was produced with the support of the European Union's Sixth Framework programme through the Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa Project No. 043982. This work does not reflect the Commission's views and in no way anticipates its future policy in this area. The material used to prepare this paper was drawn from studies carried out on Lake Kariba and all of the authors are sincerely acknowledged. The author also wishes to thank Stephen Turner and Kefasi Nyikahadzoi, who assisted during the preparation of this paper.

Notes