Policy evolution and dynamics of governance at the Lake Kariba kapenta fishery

Abstract

At independence, Zimbabwe's major challenge in managing its natural resources was to create an equitable, sustainable and democratic society. In the case of the Lake Kariba kapenta fishery, the government's main concern was to eliminate the inequalities of the colonial era, without compromising the integrity of the resource. Macroeconomic development policies, which were formulated during several socio-political periods, determined the redistribution strategy at any given point in time. Within each development period, a configuration of narratives, and the requirements of conflicting and contradictory state, market and community discourses, directed the process of redistribution. This paper uses an actor-oriented approach to discuss how redistribution affected the governance of fishery, and the political−ecological conflicts the redistribution generated, and a storyline methodology to show how redistribution of rights from white to black entrepreneurs polarised the fishing industry.

Keywords:

• Policy evolution
• macroeconomic development policies
• governance of resources
• fishery
• kapenta
• Kariba

1. INTRODUCTION

This article takes as its starting point Turner's (2000) argument that finding lasting solutions to commons degradation in Africa means finding ways to identify, reproduce and encourage existing positive practices. A first step in this process is to be familiar with the governance system in question, and, in particular, to understand the evolution of the policy process that forms it. This is important in the case of Zimbabwe, which, at independence in 1980, faced the challenge of eliminating extreme inequalities generated by discriminatory regulations created during the colonial era, without compromising the integrity of the resource. The transition from colonial to post-independence Zimbabwe was encumbered with contestations between policy discourses and political and economic interest groups.

This paper uses an institutional perspective combined with an actor-oriented approach to understand the policy processes as being driven by interests, networks and alliances, discourses (dominant ways of thinking) and narratives (received wisdom). It uses a historical storyline to explore actors' strategies and coalitions and to uncover interests and conflict structures among the actors, and the effect of these on governance structures. The evidence presented in this paper is based on research conducted by the authors over the past 10 years, together or individually participating in research projects dealing with the kapenta fishery in Zimbabwe, including a PhD study by Nyikahadzoi (2006). In carrying out the research we conducted altogether about 75 in-depth semi-structured face-to-face interviews covering all stakeholder groups. We also followed the evolution of the policy process through the media, and attended public meetings on the subject. Official documents have been an important source of information, particularly documentation provided by the Zambia−Zimbabwe SADC Fisheries Project (ZZSFP) and the Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute in Zimbabwe.

2. SHARING A COMMON POOL RESOURCE

Limnothrissa miodon, known locally as kapenta, is shared between Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is a very resilient species capable of sustaining high levels of fishing effort (Marshall, 1991; Jul-Larsen et al., 2003). The correlation between government interventions and the generating capacity of the resource is very weak.

A high-cost fishing vessel was developed for kapenta fishing in Lake Kariba, but a rig like this was unaffordable for poor blacks who wanted to enter the fishery. Unsurprisingly, at independence the industry was dominated by whites who had access to borrowed finances. A series of policies and strategies adopted at independence, designed to address the imbalances, created the ownership structure presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Changes in ownership of access rights between 1979 and 2001

	1979		1985		2001
	Companies	Rigs	Companies	Rigs	Companies	Rigs
White	22	61	33	156	39	172
Black	0	0	0	0	19	41
Cooperatives	0	0	0	0	31	65
Local governments	0	0	0	0	3	10
Total	22	61	33	156	92	288

In 1990, the governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe established a cooperative arrangement for managing kapenta, to ensure that ‘yield from kapenta is ecologically sustainable and economically viable within an equitable framework’ (ZZSFP, 1997:25). However, equitable distribution of access rights among nationals remained a major management issue in Zimbabwe. Difficulties in determining the optimal rate of exploitation caused a split in the industry over how inequalities could be redressed. This polarised the industry between whites advocating for broader access and the new entrants supporting the redistribution of existing access rights.

3. EVOLUTION OF CO-GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS

An adaptive management approach, based on scientifically driven facts, was adopted from inception up to the first 5 years into independence. Under this approach, fishing licences were issued progressively and the effect on the biomass was carefully monitored (Marshall et al., 1982). When no significant decline in mean length and catch per unit of effort was observed, more licences would be issued (Sanyanga, 1990). Before independence, only white operators benefited from the increase in licences. After independence, licences were issued to war veterans and ex-detainees organised as cooperatives, as a way of extending the socialist principles that had been adopted by the new government (Nyikahadzoi, 2002). Only a few astute, well-informed persons with a sufficiently high level of political connections took advantage of the changing political situation and acquired fishing licences (Nyikahadzoi, 2002).

White domination within the fishing industry continued well into the mid-1980s, as black entrepreneurs were finding it difficult to set up fishing companies (Nyikahadzoi, 2002). The cooperation between kapenta industry and fisheries management authorities (largely whites) engendered during the colonial era was strengthened. Nyikahadzoi (2006) notes that the interpersonal relationships between white operators and the state fisheries management authority were good, possibly because they had a common culture and language and value system. This homogeneity enabled a high level of cooperation with respect to stock assessment and a high degree of acceptability and compliance with the regulatory measures (Nyikahadzoi, 2006).

3.1 Redistribution through the market

A slight downward trend in catch per unit of effort that occurred in 1985 was interpreted as an early indication of overfishing (Sanyanga, 1990). At about the same time, Zambia, which had stopped fishing, resumed fishing following the cessation of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (ZZSFP, 1989). The decline in catch per unit of effort was taken to confirm globally shared wisdom that if a fishery is left alone, it will be overfished. The governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe stopped recruiting more fishing companies into the industry and commissioned joint scientific research under the auspices of the ZZSFP (1989). The main objective of the research was to determine the size of the biomass and the optimal level of fishing effort. While awaiting the research results, the Zimbabwean government resorted to redistributing access rights from white operators to black entrepreneurs.

As there was no policy dealing with the kapenta fishery, the state relied on the broad guidelines covering the approach to land resettlement in Zimbabwe, laid down during the Lancaster House talks in London (Moyo, 1995), which led to independence as the basis for transforming access rights. Under this arrangement, a willing buyer was supposed to acquire one of the specially developed kapenta fishing vessels (rigs) from a willing seller through the market. The government would then automatically issue a fishing licence to the new entrant. The proposal tied a licence to a rig in the hope that second-hand rigs would be cheaper and also to ensure that the disinvesting company could get some form of compensation (Nyikahadzoi, 2002). To ensure stability in catch and employment levels, access rights could only be transferred as and when the investing person was ready to take over rigs from the disinvesting company (Jul-Larsen et al., 1998).

The redistribution through the market was designed to sustain the confidence of the white minority population, to halt a mass exodus of skills necessary to operate the modern economy and to ensure stability in kapenta production and employment levels. According to Nyikahadzoi (2006), to avoid situations where established companies with good credit facilities would buy up most of the small companies, the government was supposed to identify suitable buyers to take over the rigs. It seems that during this period the state was not active as far as redistribution was concerned and whites wrongly perceived that they could strengthen their privilege. As a result, a small racial class continued to have a monopoly over natural resource fisheries a decade after independence, which reflected an unchanged legacy of the colonial rule. Key informant interviews and literature identify several factors that contributed to the persistent inequality.

Firstly, the progress of transforming the fishing industry was constrained by the Lancaster House Constitution, which put a 10-year moratorium on the redistribution of national assets. The constitution entrenched the interests of the whites, and prohibited compulsory acquisition of access rights to resources. These legal constraints, combined with government's desire to ensure a smooth transition and thus avoid sudden capital and skills flights as experienced by Mozambique,1 slowed down the redistribution process.

Secondly, the state policies had conflicting priorities that worked against effective redistribution of access rights. For example, the state's response to an increased demand for kapenta in the 1980s2 was to issue more fishing licences. The state gradually issued more licences to new and existing companies irrespective of race. Key informant interviews revealed that large companies were favoured, partly because they had well-developed technology and therefore guaranteed the production of more kapenta to meet a sudden increase in demand. During the first 10 years of independence, the Zimbabwean government was more concerned with national food security issues than correcting racial imbalances, and it seems that this ‘not killing the goose that laid the golden egg’ premise was part of the state rhetoric. This put the white-owned companies in a strong economic and political position a decade after independence.

Thirdly, the confrontations between conflicting policy discourses gave established companies legal grounds for challenging institutions that did not support their economic positions. For example, some white-owned companies underwent internal restructuring that included acquiring new black shareholders in compliance with the policy of black economic advancement. These companies would always claim that the redistribution sought by government had already been carried out. Shareholding was not a favourable option for the government, which was intent on creating new black entrepreneurs who could start new businesses and create new jobs (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981).

3.2 Redistribution in the light of the economic structural adjustment programme

The expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution in 1990 removed one of the constraints for redistribution of access rights to natural resources. One would have expected the state to use its capacity to transform ownership patterns. However, at about the same time, the collapse of communism forced the state to abandon its socialist rhetoric in favour of the World Bank-sponsored, market-oriented Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).

The ESAP was designed to reduce government's role in economic and social development and allow markets to determine the pace and direction of development. The government was required to reduce fiscal deficits, liberalise trade and deregulate domestic markets (Government of Zimbabwe, 1990). The momentum to restructure the industry declined considerably in the early 1990s, as the macroeconomic policy did not support equity issues. The emphasis on the market as the single most important regulatory mechanism was informed by the capitalist assumption that those black entrepreneurs who had the interest and ambition to start a fishing business would make efforts to acquire capital.

The new policy dispensation required the government to downsize, devolve and democratise participation in the economy (Government of Zimbabwe, 1990). This phase was characterised by a search for new strategies and approaches to co-opt the managerial capacities of users (Murombedzi, 1992). A fundamental prerequisite was for users to have clear and unambiguous rights to the resource before any meaningful user participation could be instituted. According to Nyikahadzoi (2006), the focus of user participation in the fishery was on defining strategies for redistribution of access rights. According to a very loose agreement, all big companies were supposed to downsize their operations to six rigs per company, and small companies were supposed to obtain a minimum of four rigs but not more than six (Jul-Larsen et al., 1998). The limits were based on Palfreman and Lovland's (1994) finding that to be profitable and realise economies of scale a kapenta fishing company should have at least four rigs.

Nyikahadzoi (2006) notes that the market as an allocating mechanism rewarded the companies with the best knowledge of the industry, economies of scale and financial capital. Such companies were well positioned to take advantage of the incentives provided through the ESAP. For example, trade liberalisation opened up new markets and gave easy access to the much-needed foreign currency, and enabled white-owned companies that were fishing in Cabora Bassa to exploit the comparative advantage that Mozambique had over the production of kapenta. These companies imported kapenta from Mozambique, thus depressing the price of the local product. On the other hand, the ESAP failed to promote spontaneous behavioural change among black entrepreneurs. In fact, new entrants continued to look to the state for support – a legacy of the bureaucratised economy built at independence (Jul-Larsen et al., 1998).

The persistent inequality divided the fishing community between black operators (who preferred state intervention because they had political sympathy) and white operators (who preferred a free market because they had a big market share in both the financial and output markets).3 The Kapenta fishermen were organised in two Producers Associations, which were divided along racial lines with antagonistic objectives. On one hand, the white-dominated KPA (Kapenta Producers Association) sought to protect the whites from losing licences through the licence redistribution exercise. On the other hand, the Indigenous KPA also lobbied the state to take an active role in the redistribution of licences. Such a contradiction militated against a viable and coordinated management strategy that could find acceptance across all interest groups.

3.3 Redistribution as a combination of state and market-driven initiatives

In an effort to address the economic imbalances created by the market forces under the ESAP, the government adopted the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST). This programme was designed to help emerging black entrepreneurs access funds through the Indigenous Business Development Bank (Government of Zimbabwe, 1995). The Minister of Environment and Tourism used two statutory instruments to take licences from the established operators and sell them at the market (Jul-Larsen et al., 1998).

In May 1995 the Minister withdrew and terminated all commercial fishing licences, using powers from Section 82 of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975. This piece of colonial legislation allowed the Minister ‘if necessary or in the interests of the preservation, and conservation … to prohibit any person from fishing absolutely or subject to certain conditions’ (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982). The Act further stated that the Minister may or may not give a reason for the withdrawal of licences. In addition, it was not obligatory for the Minister to authorise compensation to anyone unduly affected by the termination of a fishing licence. Using his powers, the Minister informed fishing companies that, as from January 1996, there was going to be a reduction in the number of licences held by each big kapenta fishing company. He issued a directive saying he wanted 60 licences from white operators for redistribution among black entrepreneurs.4 The approach paralleled the maximum farm size limit that was used to expropriate land from white commercial farmers for redistribution among the blacks. In addition, the Minister instituted a sliding scale on licences – an element of ZIMPREST that focused on resolving inequalities in land ownership patterns. This approach pursued market mechanisms for land acquisition through the introduction of a land tax (Government of Zimbabwe, 1995). The sliding scale was designed to make it very expensive for companies to maintain a high number of fishing licences.

3.3.1 Established industry challenges government

The KPA (the white-dominated) challenged the government in court, arguing that use of government power deprived people of their livelihoods even though they were abiding by laws and regulations and acting in a manner not detrimental to the flora and fauna of Zimbabwe, which the act was specifically designed to protect.5 The established companies felt that the exercise violated their property rights as outlined in international norms of human rights. The Association advocated the broadening of access rights rather than the redistribution of existing licences.6 It argued that new entrants could be accommodated in the industry without jeopardising the biomass or taking licences from the established operators. Its argument was based on Marshall's 1991 study, which had established that there was no evidence suggesting that kapenta was overfished, as it had proved to be a resilient fishery and capable of sustaining high levels of fishing effort. The established companies argued that since the lake water level and not fishing effort was the primary determinant of fluctuation in catch per unit effort, then there was no justification for controlling fishing effort, let alone redistributing existing licences (Court Case Number 356-96). Nevertheless, the government had difficulties in accepting this argument, which fundamentally contradicted global narratives of the tragedy of the commons.

Although both parties agreed that there might have been a decrease in total catch, they offered different reasons for the decline. White operators blamed reduced inflow of water into the lake and theft of a portion of the catch as the main causes of declining catch levels (kapenta fishing is carried out at night and it is easy for crew to sell part of the catch before landing). The KPA (the white-dominated) therefore dismissed the government's claims that the decline could have been caused by an increase in fishing effort. The operators argued that since there was no known research to support the contention that new licences could not be issued, then the decision to reduce the number of licences owned by large companies was unreasonable and indicative of an improper exercise of discretion (Court Case Number 356-96). They argued that if the government could contain the theft of kapenta, the landed catch per rig would increase by 30 per cent.

The government won the case on the grounds that the fishery was jointly owned by Zambia and Zimbabwe, and therefore Zimbabwe could not unilaterally issue more licences. The court also noted that Marshall's findings were for the pre-1991 period and the current status of the resource might have changed. The only alternative to achieve equitable distribution of access rights was to redistribute the existing licences.

The KPA (the white-dominated) also challenged the sliding scale, arguing that there was no reasonable basis for the sliding scale or differentiation in fees payable by companies and that the decision constituted improper exercise of discretion. The Association lost the sliding scale case in the High Court but appealed to the Supreme Court (Court Case Number 356-96), where it won. The Supreme Court ruled that the sliding scale was invalid as the changes in fees were not in compliance with the law (Civil Appeal number 259/96). Firstly, the fees were not fixed by the Minister and were not contained in regulations published in the Government Gazette; and, secondly, the acting Director was not empowered to set a sliding scale of fees. After the ruling, it appeared that the government became cautious in trying to bring more blacks into the fishing industry. The ruling served to widen the gap between blacks and whites, and also between the established companies and the government.

3.4 A cooperative approach to redistribution

The KPA (the white-dominated) sought a cooperative arrangement to resolve the infighting caused by the inequality in access rights.7 They offered three reasons for this approach.8 Firstly, white operators felt that it was the only way to improve the credibility of the industry as representing the interests of the diverse races of the country. Secondly, many white operators also realised that, as long as the inequality persisted, the probability of government using its confiscatory power as a tool to maximise public support would remain very high. Thirdly, insecurity of tenure was also curtailing the white-owned companies' ability to access funds from banks.

The Association and the government made a joint proposal that sought to deal with redistribution in a cooperative manner.9 Under this proposal, all big companies were supposed to relinquish their licences and retain six licences per company. Priority to buy the relinquished licences was given to small companies that were operating fewer than four rigs, the majority of whom were black entrepreneurs and cooperatives. White-owned companies with fewer than four fishing rigs were eligible for more licences, up to four. The transfer of fishing licences was conditional on the recipient taking over specified assets from existing companies at a price recommended by a valuation team.

In order to involve the users in the management of the fishery, it was proposed that a Joint Fisheries Management Forum be set up comprising representatives from the industry and government. The purpose of the forum was to assist in research and enforcement. The proposal provided an important initiative towards economic prosperity for all companies and self-governance of the fishery. However, the cooperative approach could not lead to equitable distribution of licences as government's active participation was not forthcoming. Hence the proposed co-management arrangement collapsed.

3.5 Redistribution through expropriation

In 1997 the long-awaited scientific research revealed that ‘the conventional management based on Maximum Sustainable Yield is not relevant and the traditional bio-economic approach is not the way forward’ (ZZSFP, 1997:26). Although it was conclusive that more companies could be recruited without threatening the biomass, the governments of the two countries adopted a precautionary approach to safeguard the economic interests of those already licensed. At the same time, there was growing disappointment among the blacks over the slow pace at which redistribution was taking place, and the Zimbabwean government used force to redistribute access rights among its nationals.

From 2000 the government introduced radical approaches similar to the fast-track land reform to acquire fishing licences. The acquired licences were redistributed among women and youth groups, indigenous entrepreneurs and war veterans. The result was an increase in small companies operating fewer than four rigs (Nyikahadzoi, 2006). This created a new management challenge, because in order to reduce operation costs (primarily fuel costs) small companies concentrated their fishing operations in prohibited areas close to the shore, such as breeding areas and fish reserves. Here they could catch high volumes of immature kapenta.

Redistribution through expropriation destroyed any cooperative relationship that had existed between companies and management authorities. According to Nyikahadzoi (2006), both racial groups seemed to blame the government for its approach to licence redistribution. Many black Zimbabweans expressed profound disapproval over the lack of clear structured support for new entrants. On the other hand, white operators also criticised the government for its tendency to rationalise the acquisition and distribution on the basis of political demands rather than on valid economic and technical grounds.

4. CONCLUSION

Resource management in Zimbabwe has gone through a history of contestation, expropriation and disenfranchisement, which has complicated the relationship between the state and the industry and also the relationships among users. Our research has shown that cooperative management arrangements between the state and users were very difficult to institute, despite the existence of a supporting legal framework. The redistribution process was for the most part heavily influenced by external political and macroeconomic factors that undermined the state's redistribution attempts and eroded its capacity to act as a sovereign economic regulator. In consequence, global agendas have neutralised the state's attempts to achieve a more equitable access to natural resources in Zimbabwe. Unsurprisingly, whatever the state did to eliminate imbalances the outcomes were different from what it had intended.

Victims of governance policies always manage to seek support from higher institutions that tend to support their positions. Whites for a long period have been successful in supporting the economic positions they obtained through colonial rule by using a combination of narratives based on the market and the discourse of the pursuit of human rights. In contrast, the blacks based their arguments on promises made during the liberation struggle and thus had high expectations for change brought through a political process. This paper shows that, where different interests compete openly, the more adept and better resourced always win. The sympathetic approaches embodied in affirmative action polarised the fishing community, making cooperative arrangements impossible. It may be that coercion and use of force are necessary but not sufficient to achieve property rights reforms.

This special issue was produced with the support of the European Union's Sixth Framework programme through the Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa Project No. 043982. This work does not reflect the Commission's views and in no way anticipates its future policy in this area.

Notes

¹When Mozambique gained independence in 1975, the Portuguese left the country extremely rapidly.

²Following the cessation of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, the distribution channels for kapenta improved significantly to all parts of the country.

³Indigenous Kapenta Producers Association and Kapenta Producers Association (KPA) constitutions and bylaws.

⁴Synopsis of minutes of meeting held on 19 June 1995 by the Minister of Environment and KPA.

⁵Correspondence from KPA to lawyers dated 18 June 1995, ref. WCM K853.

⁶Comment by KPA on the framework for the new approach to management of the Lake Kariba kapenta fishery, August 1995.

⁷Minutes of an extraordinary meeting of the KPA held in Kariba on 1 October 1998.

⁸Minutes of the executive committee of the KPA held in Kariba in March 2005.

⁹Joint KPA/Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management proposal on reallocation of kapenta fishing permits, September 1995.