Policy evolution in South African fisheries: the governance of the sector for small pelagics

Abstract

This article analyses the evolution of policy in South Africa's fishing industry using the fishery for small pelagics as a case study. Policy changes were largely instigated to reverse the inequitable distribution of economic resources and productive assets that had historically favoured the white minority at the dawn of democracy in 1994. The analysis combines ‘actor-oriented’ and ‘institutional’ perspectives, and proposes that the evolution of policy is driven by interests, networks, alliances and discourses, which are largely determined by the power and resources that can be mustered by specific actors. A major lesson from the study is that it is particularly difficult for new entrants to influence policy for transforming capital intensive fisheries, where the need for capital, market forces and conservation ideology collude to raise the entry bar.

Keywords:

• Governance
• policy evolution
• small pelagics fishery
• networks
• alliances
• discourses
• South Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

Towards South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, the outgoing National Party government attempted to tinker with the fisheries policy (e.g. by issuing Community Quotas) as an electoral stunt meant to garner support among coloured voters in the Western Cape. Despite these political manoeuvres, unrest intensified among fishermen and fish factory workers over existing fisheries policy, as they alleged it was corrupt and insensitive to their plight (poverty, food insecurity, etc.). The growing unrest led to an initiative in December 1994, following the ascendancy to power of the African National Congress (ANC), for the formulation of a new fisheries policy. The Reconstruction and Development Programme−which the ANC had used as its electoral manifesto and which enjoined the ANC to fulfil its mandate to its constituency−had also promised redress of injustices suffered under apartheid. And further, wealth redistribution is enshrined in both the Freedom Charter (ANC, 1955) and the new Constitution (Republic of South Africa [RSA], 1996a). As result of all the foregoing, a Fisheries Policy Development Committee (FPDC) was put together by ministerial decree to lead the process of formulating a new fisheries policy (Hersoug, 2002). The FPDC was supposed to include representatives from all stakeholders in the fishing industry.

From a policy development perspective, the main actors (as members of the FPDC) were the government line agency for fisheries, the Sea Fisheries Research Institute; the historical rights holders (hereafter referred to as ‘established industry’); trade unions within the fishing industry, especially those representing most black workers, such as the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU); potential (aspiring) rights holders; the unorganised informal fishing communities; and the ruling party (the ANC).

This article is part of a larger synthesis of the resource management of southern African commons based on the Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance project (see Hara et al., this issue). This project takes as its starting point the insight from Turner (2002) that finding long-term solutions to natural resource degradation in Africa requires finding ways to identify, reproduce and encourage existing positive practices of commons management across wide scales in order to meet the two major interrelated challenges for governance of commons: conservation of natural resource biodiversity and poverty alleviation. An important step in this process is to explore and understand the dynamics of the policy evolution that inform these. The article uses South Africa's pelagic sector as a case study to analyse the evolution of policy in the South African fishing industry. As pointed out above, policy changes were largely instigated by the dawn of democracy in 1994 and the urgent need for the incoming ANC government to redress the socio-economic and political injustices inflicted by 300 years of colonial and apartheid rule on its (majority) black constituency.

2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The evolution of policy and the processes it involves are analysed using a combination of ‘actor-oriented’ and ‘institutional’ perspectives.

Within the actor-oriented perspective, Keeley and Scoones (1999) have suggested three ways of understanding how knowledge leads to policy change: as a reflection of structured political interests, as a product of the agency of actors engaged in a policy arena, and as part of overarching knowledge that frames practice in particular ways. The first, the linear approach, sees knowledge as subservient to interests: officials make policy, and thereafter what matters are structures to implement policy and regulatory frameworks to enforce compliance (Jenkins, 1978; Sabateir, 1986). The second argues that by exploring the micro detail of policy and knowledge controversies, the negotiation and bargaining between multiple actors over time, one can discern why a specific policy became influential (Dobuzinskis, 1992; Keeley & Scones, 2003). The third maintains that ‘by mobilizing a legitimizing discourse – and the associated metaphors, labels and symbols of scientific authority – support is granted to “official” policies’ (Keeley & Scoones, 2003:23).

These three ways of understanding how policy is shaped and the power dynamics involved provide a multifaceted approach to the actor−knowledge−policy relationship. The ‘actor-oriented’ perspective emphasises the importance of agency. How actors enrol, develop and extend alliances and networks is related to political and economic interests and discourses. These choices are socially, economically and politically constructed. Power lies in the strength and reach of the networks the actors develop. The actor-oriented perspective proposes that policy formulation is driven by interests, networks, alliances and discourses (see Figure 1). Stakeholder groups or individuals (actors) form networks and alliances and use discourses in order to influence policy direction or win specific policy positions in support of their interests. Stakeholders might possess strength in one, two, or all three of the areas shown in Figure 1, and depending on the issue or circumstances might need to use only one or two of these. In the end, however, the three are combined for a winning formula on policy positions.

Figure 1: Framework for analysing the policy process for South African fisheries

The reform of South African fisheries policy can also be understood within three broad institutional orders: society, state and market. This is the institutional perspective. Society is characterised by close interpersonal ties, multiple social networks and shared identities that characterise and define specific stakeholder communities and their interests. The state, through the ruling class, is characterised by a hierarchical order, bureaucratic structures and authority relations, and professional unidimensional relationships. The (free) market is characterised by competition, economic efficiency and rationality. In contrast to society, relationships in the market are impersonal, task oriented and without inherent value. And in contrast to the state, markets are supposedly characterised by decentralised free and profit-driven exchange rather than central hierarchical command and formal authority (Hersoug & Holm, 2000).

This paper uses the actor-oriented and institutional perspectives to explain how fisheries policy (particularly for small pelagics) has evolved in South Africa and to offer answers to the following questions. What were the stakeholder (political, economic and social) interests regarding policy changes? What strategic alliances, coalitions and networks did they form in order to win specific policy positions? What discourses did they use to buttress and protect these interests? What resources could they muster for these policy contests?

3. METHODS

A number of key stakeholders who had been involved in the development of fisheries policy were interviewed for this study. At times it is impossible to distinguish the revision of the general fisheries policy from the sectoral (small pelagics) policy, especially for the FPDC process that led to the revised Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) (RSA, 1998a). The interviewees were the official who chaired the FPDC, key informants who had been members of the FPDC, members of the National SME Fishing Forum (inaugurated on 4 August 1999), members of the South African Pelagic Fishing Industry Association (SAPFIA), and Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) officials. They provided insights into and opinions on the various stakeholders' interests, networks, alliances and discourses. Secondary documents and publications on the policy processes were also extensively used. Hersoug (2002), Isaacs (2003) and Martin et al. (1998) were particularly valuable, especially in documenting the FPDC process.

Three specific policy landmarks were used to analyse policy evolution: the FPDC process from 1994 to 1996, medium-term rights that were implemented from 2002 and 2005, and long-term rights that were being implemented from 2006 to 2020 (from 2006 to 2018 for the small pelagics). One vital source of information was stakeholder and public comments on the policies and rulebooks developed for the medium-term and long-term rights.

It is clear that policy evolution during these three phases or landmarks has mainly been concerned with ‘transformation’ of the fishing industry. Transformation is a constitutional and legal imperative of the South Africa government. In the fishing industry, the MLRA is the primary vehicle for transformation of the sector. Three primary mechanisms can be distinguished: redistribution of fishing rights, restructuring of ownership and management of fishing enterprises, and a revamp of the industry's governance in line with the new political order.

4. THE SMALL PELAGICS FISHING SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South African purse-seine fishery for small pelagics is the largest sector in terms of catch volume, constituting between 60 per cent and 90 per cent of the total annual catch, and the second most important in terms of value (Fairweather et al., 2006; Moolla & Kleinschmidt, 2008). It is a multi-species fishery based primarily on anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) and sardine (Sardinops sagax). The anchovy and juvenile sardine are reduced to fish oil and fishmeal. Adult sardine is canned or frozen for human consumption. The small pelagics industry operates on a high-volume/low-profit basis, and has to cope with large fluctuations in the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC). These fluctuations have a major impact on the profitability and investment behaviour of the rights holders. The fishery sustains around 100 purse-seine vessels, eight fishmeal plants, six canning factories and 40 bait packing facilities (Sauer et al., 2003). According to Moolla and Kleinschmidt (2008), the sector provides the highest number of jobs in the fishing industry, employing approximately 15 000 people. The small pelagics fishery is one of the seven TAC-controlled fisheries. Fishing rights, as a percentage of the TAC, are allocated to individual companies. The company allocated such a right is referred to as a ‘rights holder’.

Before 1992 the sector was dominated by five large companies, but by 2002 the number of rights holders had increased to 113 (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [DEAT], 2004). These rights holders can be classified into two categories: the large established companies (largely white owned) that held the majority access rights prior to 1992, and the ‘new rights holders’ (also referred to here as ‘new entrants’, meaning those entities and individuals−mostly blacks who had been historically disadvantaged−who gained rights from the early 1990s following the end of apartheid). The SAPFIA, created from the previous era by the large established companies, claims to represent the majority of rights holders in the sector (SAPFIA, 2005). Most new rights holders have organised their own groupings, such as the SME Fishing Forum, the Small Fishing Companies Coalition and regional groupings such as the West Coast Fishermen's Association and the East Coast Fishermen's Association. It is important to note that the composition of these stakeholder groups and the history of their formation were very influential in defining the interests, resourcing and strengths for the policy revision and development process.

The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 (RSA, 1998a) requires the MCM branch of the DEAT to engage with stakeholders in managing marine resources. It does this through the Pelagic Resources Scientific Working Group and the Pelagic Resources Management Working Group. Before 1992 the fishing industry, including the pelagic sector, already had a very close working relationship with the Sea Fisheries Research Institute (now replaced by the MCM) that has been characterised as a form of co-management (Hutton et al., 1999). Stakeholder organisations such as the SAPFIA and the SME Fishing Forum actively engage with the MCM and each other through these forums.

5. EVOLUTION OF FISHERIES POLICIES

The evolution of South Africa's fisheries policy after the advent of democracy in 1994 can be demarcated into three stages: the FPDC process leading to the adoption of the MLRA in 1998, policy for allocation of medium-term rights (2002–2005) and policy for long-term rights (2006–2020). The base documents for policy revision were the Reconstruction and Development Programme and South Africa's new Constitution (RSA, 1996a). These two documents laid the foundation for redistribution of wealth and resources in favour of those who were disenfranchised under apartheid. This created huge expectations among the historically disadvantaged (blacks) that they could become rights holders in the fishing industry (Isaacs, 2006). On the other side, the established white-owned fishing companies were determined to hold on to their historical rights and privileged positions (Raakjær Nielsen & Hara, 2006). The Sea Fisheries Research Institute (and later the MCM) had a legal and statutory mandate to ensure the biological and economic sustainability of the industry across generations for all South Africans. The ruling ANC had to fulfil its historical role as a liberation movement and also the 1994 electoral mandate to its constituency. Thus the battle lines were drawn.

5.1 The Fisheries Policy Development Committee

The first arena and focus for the policy contests was the FPDC, tasked to review the existing Sea Fisheries Act (RSA, 1988). In accordance with the agreed guidelines, the FPDC could only make recommendations that had been unanimously agreed upon. Using this strategy, established industry blocked the inclusion of any proposals that threatened their existing interests and made sure that the FPDC was able to reach agreement only on issues where their existing interests were not threatened (Hersoug, 2002). Issues where consensus was impossible, such as the extent of redistribution and mechanisms for Black Economic Empowerment, were excluded.

One of the major proposals from the FPDC was the key principle that there would be no arbitrary or sudden removal or decrease of access rights to any holder, current or future, and that restructuring and broadening of participation would be carried out while maintaining stability within the fishing industry in order to minimise adverse effects on existing rights holders, the associated labour force and other legitimate stakeholders (Martin & Raakjær Nielsen, 1998). The FPDC also recommended the introduction of long-term transferable rights and the use of independent bodies for the allocation of rights in order to remove political interference (FPDC, 1996).

These proposals were a victory for the established industry. The victory was achieved using several strategies: influencing the FPDC committee procedures and powers; using the discourse of maintaining an internationally competitive fishing industry; and entering into an alliance with organised labour, especially the politically well-placed FAWU as a strategic partner, using the argument that large-scale redistribution of quotas would result in loss of jobs for its members.

The ANC government's shift of macroeconomic policy from the socialist-oriented Reconstruction and Development Programme to the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution1 policy in 1996 (RSA, 1996b) also favoured the established industry's arguments for maintaining an internationally stable and competitive industry in order to protect jobs. FAWU won concessions from established industry of improved pay, improved social benefits, and guaranteed employment, pensions and share options for their members in return for this strategic support (Martin & Raakjær Nielsen, 1998; Isaacs et al., 2007).

The Chairman of the FPDC found himself in a particularly invidious position since he was also the Secretary General of FAWU and had been nominated to the position of chairman of the FPDC with the support of the ANC in the hope that he would ensure its political interests. He had also led the drafting of the fisheries section of the Reconstruction and Development Programme document (personal communication, M Gxanyana, independent businessman and chairman of SME Fishing Forum, 5 May 2008, Cape Town). But as chairman of the FPDC he had to be seen as being impartial, despite the many hats that he wore.

During the committee's time in session, numerous meetings and deliberations had to be held in Cape Town on the proposals and revisions, obliging members to dedicate much of their time to the process. Established industry had teams of consultants working on policy issues round the clock to provide suggestions for amendments to the frequent changes that were being made to the policy documents. While the established industry had the time and resources for representation and attendance all the time, this was not the case for the poorly resourced and poorly organised new stakeholder groups, especially those from outside Cape Town (Hersoug, 2002). This meant that by ‘hanging in there’ and being there all the time in an actively organised manner, the established industry and organised labour were in a much stronger position to influence both the process and policy content.

A broad alliance was formed between the informal sector, environmental sector and regional Fishing Forums, advocating for the regionalisation of access rights (Hersoug, 2002; Isaacs, 2003). They argued for the devolution of management authority to local areas and for access rights for local communities and fisher folk. But the interests, dedication to the industry and therefore strategies of the various players in this large and amorphous stakeholder group were bound to be varied. In contrast to the alliance between established industry and organised labour that operated with a clear mandate from their constituency (through the SAPFIA and FAWU), this group lacked cohesion and were poorly organised and poorly resourced (Isaacs, 2003). Critically, this group had no clear strategy when issues turned to negotiations (Hersoug, 2002).

The most significant organisation representing small-scale new rights holders, the SME Fishing Forum, and the other regional groups in the pelagic sector were formed in 1999 – after the FPDC had been disbanded and the revised Act had been passed in 1998 – because the new entrants felt that the reason they had lost most of the policy positions during the FPDC was that they had not been as organised as the established industry. To increase their chances of being granted fishing rights in future, some of the new rights holders joined the established industry association, SAPFIA, on the principle that ‘if you can't beat them, join them’. However, the majority of the new rights holders or potential rights holders took the position that they stood a better chance of influencing future policy and rights allocation by forming their own groups and using these as vehicles to influence future policy revisions and garner the ANC's political support for such a drive. Groups such as the SME Fishing Forum, the Small Fishing Companies Coalition and regional-based groups such as the West Coast Fishermen's Association and the East Coast Fishermen's Association (Fairweather et al., 2006) represented this thinking. The main lesson from the FPDC policy review process leading to the MLRA was that the small-scale operators and potential rights holders were totally overwhelmed and overpowered by established industry with its labour allies. Having lost the contest in the FPDC, lobbying ANC politicians and MCM officials became the best avenue for these groups. Allegations of corruption thus became commonplace, to the extent that the Chief Director for the DEAT MCM had to be replaced.

The ANC was not entirely happy with the outcomes of the FPDC, especially the structure of access rights that the FPDC had proposed, which were retained without much change by the specially appointed Special Ministerial Panel on Access Rights (Hersoug, 2002). In particular, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the Environment2 could not see any potential for redistribution based on the policy of ‘real, long-term and transferable rights’. In this respect it is important to remember that, as is mentioned by Raakjær Nielsen and Hara (2006), transformation was supposed to benefit the broader society, not just a few individuals. The ANC felt duty bound to act on behalf of those who had been historically disenfranchised, who were also its constituency, and in the interests of South African society as whole. Thus, after a process of public hearings and written and oral submissions, the Portfolio Committee reached a compromise on all the contentious issues, including access rights (RSA, 1998b). The committee reduced the maximum term of fishing rights from 50 to 15 years. Crucially, it inserted the principle of state ownership of the resource (to ensure political responsibility for transformation) by replacing ‘selling’ with ‘leasing’ in the Bill. In this context, a ‘fishing right’ is not a ‘property right’, but rather a statutory permission to harvest a marine resource for a specified period of time, after which the right reverts to the Minister (Section 18 of the MLRA; RSA, 1998a).

While the FPDC had suggested that redistribution should be left to the markets, the Portfolio Committee made sure that the Minister would retain the final say over redistribution of fishing rights, management of marine resources and administration of the sector (Hersoug & Holm, 2000). For the ANC, it was crucial to retain the powers of final say and influence over redistribution. It thus used its political majority on the Portfolio Committee to snatch away what would have been a victory for established industry, had the main recommendations by the FPDC been passed without major revisions.

5.2 The policy processes leading to medium-term and long-term rights

Following the continuation of annual allocations from 1999 to 2001, after the revised Act had been passed in 1998, established industry and the new rights holders developed common ground on the desirability of long-term rights. Annually issued rights were increasingly seen as unsettling by both the product and financial markets. Longer-term rights were viewed as the solution to sourcing investment, stability and long-term planning for successful fishing business in the small pelagics sector. Thus even among new entrants one saw an increase in resistance to further redistribution. Leftist politicians (e.g. the South African Communist Party and the Confederation of South Africa Trade Unions) accused blacks who argued against further transformation of being turncoats who, once they join the middle class, forget where they came from and become ‘comprador bourgeoisie’. For the management agency DEAT MCM, the issuing of rights on an annual basis had become an administrative nightmare as allocations, appeals and court cases seemed to occupy most of its time (personal communication, A Share, Chief Director, Resource Management, MCM, 13 May 2008, Cape Town). The MCM felt that it would help the agency if longer-term rights were issued so that once these had been allocated it could concentrate on other governance and regulatory aspects of the industry.

Having been ‘defeated’ by ANC politicians (through the Portfolio Committee) during the final phase of the policy process, established industry was taken aback when the initiative was passed back to them to come up with the ‘rulebooks’ and to outline the objectives and assessment principles for allocating medium-term rights (Hersoug, 2002). The call for policy for medium-term rights also gave the new stakeholder groups the chance to provide inputs to the new policy, as they were now better organised than they had been during the FPDC process. After consultations between government and industry, ‘rulebooks’ for issuing medium-term fishing rights were produced (DEAT, 2001b). The criteria that had been developed related mainly to how the transformation codes as stipulated under the government's policy for Black Economic Empowerment would be applied in the fishing industry.3

The government therefore decided to issue 4-year duration fishing rights for the period 2002−2005 – the so-called medium-term rights. Even then, the DEAT MCM stated categorically that it was still committed to bringing in new entrants, but that these entrants' potential to participate in and share the risks of the industry had to be evaluated against their knowledge, experience, fishing plans and business acumen (DEAT, 2001a). The government pointed out that capability to invest in the industry had to be one of the main criteria for award of medium-term rights so as to weed out ‘papers quota holders’ and to award rights only to those who were serious about staying in the industry. Where joint ventures were to be entered into, these had to demonstrate that they would validly empower the new rights holders (DEAT, 2001a). For one thing, there was a general feeling within government that transformation had progressed significantly since 1992 and that there was now less need to bring in large numbers of new entrants (DEAT, 2004). In this context, the government pointed out that while the historically disadvantaged controlled only 7 per cent of the small pelagics fishery in 1992, involvement of blacks had increased 10-fold (from 7 to 73 per cent) by 2002 (DEAT, 2005). According to the DEAT (2005), of the 113 fishing rights allocated for the medium-term rights period, 73 per cent were allocated to black-owned entities, 75 per cent of the TAC was controlled by black-owned entities, 85 per cent of right-holders were small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and 50 per cent of all vessels belonged to black-owned entities. The DEAT indicated that consolidation would be ‘the name of the game’ in future (DEAT, 2006).

In a sector based on high-volume/low-profit, as the small pelagics are, the shakedown happens when the TACs are in a trough, a low period during which many new rights holders are forced to leave the industry or go into joint ventures, usually on unfavourable terms (Raakjær Nielsen & Hara, 2006). These characteristics of the industry necessitate long-term planning and justifiably long-term rights so that the good and bad periods even out. Thus in 2004 the DEAT MCM launched the development of a long-term rights policy to build on what was seen as the successful 4-year rights medium-term policy (DEAT, 2005).

From 2006, the government issued long-term rights (DEAT, 2005),4 which for small pelagics are 12-year rights (2006−2018). Both established industry and the SME Fishing Forum welcomed the long-term rights, arguing that this would provide business and financial stability for the sector. For small pelagics, the draft policy further proposed specifically setting aside 25 per cent of the TAC for redistribution to SMEs. The draft policy further proposed that 15 per cent of the TAC should be set aside for redistribution to applicants who had invested in the development of products for human consumption. While the SME Fishing Forum was happy with these proposals, the SAPFIA argued against taking anything more from their members, stating that the sector had already been significantly transformed and that the loss of 25 per cent of TAC for established industry could affect jobs, infrastructure and investment (SAPFIA, 2005). The SAPFIA proposed that the pool for redistribution should be limited to 10 per cent of the TAC and that this should be a ‘performance pool’ obtained from unsuccessful rights holders for reallocation amongst successful rights holders, on the basis of their overall performance score during medium-term rights, excluding transformation scores. The SME Fishing Forum countered this argument by saying that experience had shown that SMEs created more jobs than large companies (National SME Fishing Forum, 1998). Improving the TAC proportion of their rights would enable the Forum to provide yet more stable employment. The SAPFIA was also critical of the definition of ‘small and medium’ based on turnover, saying that−given the high-volume/low-profit nature of the sector−turnover was not a reliable method for determining the size of a rights holder and that the way the product was used, whether delivered for processing or packed for human consumption, had a significant effect on the size of the turnover. The SAPFIA further argued that there was no constitutional or legislative authorisation that discriminated against so-called large companies in favour of SMEs. Regarding value-adding, the SAPFIA was adamant that there was little or no room for new or value-added products in the sector.

The long-term rights policy also stated that, apart from reallocation of fishing rights, Black Economic Empowerment, as enacted under the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (RSA, 2003), would continue as under medium-term rights to act as one of the key instruments for transformation. Codes based on this Act were thus adapted for each fishing sector as part of the evaluative criteria (DEAT, 2006).5 The codes provide for a ‘balanced scorecard’ to measure transformation progress within enterprises. In issuing long-term rights, however, the DEAT MCM adopted an approach that scored applicants against each other rather than using the codes as benchmarks, on the argument that the process of granting rights should be competitive.

6. INTERESTS, ALLIANCES, NETWORKS, DISCOURSES, RESOURCES AND POWER

The ‘actor-oriented’ concept proposes that the evolution of policy is driven by interests, alliances, networks, discourses, resources and power. The trajectory of how policy evolved in the pelagic industry had all the hallmarks of these dynamics: fighting for protection of actors' interests, use of discourses or narratives to buttress and protect interests, and the formation of strategic alliances, coalitions and networks to win specific policy positions. It also demonstrates that policy does not progress through neat stages of agenda-setting, decision-making, adoption and implementation. Rather, it is often contested or reshaped, or even initiated from a range of macro or micro levels. In addition, institutions are the tools of governance (the exercise of legitimate authority; Béné, 2001) – whether by ‘institutions’ we mean stakeholder organisations or North's (1990) ‘rules of the game’.

The outcome of the FPDC process had a clear stamp of established industry. This can be seen in the key proposed policies that were finally presented to the Minister by the committee in June 1996. This victory was achieved using several strategies. One of these was entering into an alliance with organised labour, especially the FAWU, which was politically aligned to the ANC through affiliation to the Confederation of South Africa Trade Unions, a partner in government. The FAWU in turn provided this support on the basis of an offer of benefits for their members. In this sense, established industry had recruited to its side a politically well-placed ally whose interests had been turned into attempts to maintain the status quo. What one observes is that the FAWU trod a precarious line as part of the ANC ruling alliance, driving transformation while at the same time forming an alliance with established industry bent on retaining its dominant position. In recent years the relationship between labour and established industry has imploded due to the increasing loss or casualisation of jobs in the latter, resulting in the FAWU exploring formation of alliances with the other stakeholders such as the SME Fishing Forum (personal communication, Gxanyana, 5 May 2008). For the new stakeholder groups, providing a unified front, especially to deal with established industry – a strong, well organised, highly experienced and materially well-endowed opponent, with money and access to lawyers and alliances with the labour unions – proved a daunting task.

Following the FPDC's delivery of its report, the ANC-dominated Parliamentary Portfolio Committee took issue with the proposed structure of access rights, especially the lack of potential for such a policy to facilitate redistribution of rights and transformation of the industry, and therefore made sure that the ANC government retained the final say over redistribution of fishing rights in the revised Act. In doing this, the ANC used its political muscle and its majority on the Portfolio Committee.

The lessons from the FPDC process led new stakeholders to form their own representative bodies rather than joining the existing powerful SAPFIA that largely represented established industry. The thinking was that they stood a better chance of influencing future policy and protecting their interests if they formed their own groups. Being comprised mostly of companies whose owners were historically disadvantaged, they were thus also in a better position to garner political support from the ANC.

Following the issuing of long-term rights from 2006, the government has argued that while it was important to transform the industry and broaden participation for the historically disadvantaged, the proliferation of rights holders might not necessarily translate into effective participation. It would therefore be necessary to allow consolidation in some sectors in order to improve effective participation (DEAT, 2007). The government proposes opening window periods during which the Minister could look favourably at forms of consolidation, provided that these do not undermine transformation. In this context, the government's thinking is that it will mainly approve transfers between black-owned companies. In practice, it might be difficult to control who a rights holder sells his company (and the accompanying fishing right) to, since the practice of ‘fronting’ is already widespread within the industry. Even if it was possible to control such transfers, this would distort the market for fishing rights. That is, while sellers would want to get the best value for their fishing rights, buyers might offer less than the real open market price in the knowledge that the market for the rights is limited.

7. CONCLUSION

Fisheries policy in the South African small pelagics industry has evolved within the need to transform the industry by redistributing fishing rights, changing the ownership structure of companies and creating jobs. The main players have been the established industry, labour unions, new rights holders, the ruling party (the ANC) and the line agency (the Sea Fisheries Research Institute, later the DEAT MCM).

The ruling ANC's interest in policy review is to overcome the historical inequities in opportunities and ownership of rights inherited in 1994. The line agency (the DEAT MCM) has a legal and statutory mandate for conservation and sustainable utilisation of marine resources: it has to achieve transformation without jeopardising the biological integrity of the resource. Established industry's main drive and interest has been to retain as much of its fishing rights as possible to keep its enterprises commercially viable. Strategically, it has used alliances with labour unions and their organisational strength as an industrial interest group. The FAWU formed a strategic alliance with established industry to extract benefits for their members. As the relationship has increasingly soured in recent years, the FAWU has sought alliances with other stakeholders.

What can we conclude from this? The government provided a broad policy direction for the industry: transformation and governance reforms. What followed were strategic alliances and discourses by the various stakeholders, all intended to influence policy content and direction in line with their interests. The stakeholders used their ‘agency’ to position themselves strategically through networking, forming alliances based on how their interests could best be articulated to provide a winning formula. They mobilised legitimating discourses to strengthen their policy positions. From an institutional perspective, one can say that they organised themselves into ‘communities of strategic interests’, based on economic and social interests, political ideologies, common discourses that ranged from scientific to socio-economic and political, and strategic alliances or networks, in order to win specific policy positions. These interests, alliances, networks and discourses are fluid and change over time. Who prevailed in this whole process depended on what each stakeholder understood by transformation and governance reforms. Government argues that the industry has been largely transformed (DEAT, 2004) and that transformation will be deepened during the long-term rights period (DEAT, 2005). For established industry, the original main proposal that was the substance of the 1996 FPDC has eventually been achieved: long-term and tradable rights.

This special issue was produced with the support of the European Union's Sixth Framework programme through the Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa Project No. 043982. This work does not reflect the Commission's views and in no way anticipates its future policy in this area. The authors would like to thank the members of the SME Fishing Forum, members of the South African Pelagic Fishing Industry Association, and the Marine and Coastal Management officials for providing them with access to documents.

Notes

¹Fashioned on the principles and concepts of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes, Growth, Employment and Redistribution was a classic neoliberal formulation, based on the assumption that free markets would maximise South Africa's economic growth and job creation, and that benefits from this would trickle down to all levels of society.

²Parliamentary Portfolio Committees are crucial in the process of legislation. They are tasked to review new legislation and recommend changes before tabling of new legislation in parliament. Although they are composed of Members of Parliament from all parties, the majority on each committee are Members of Parliament from the majority party, which in South Africa's case is the ANC.

³Established companies would be evaluated in terms of shareholding, gender balance in management, gender balance in earnings, racial composition of management, racial composition of board directors, racial and gender salary structures, levels of investment, job creation, and catching performance. For new entrants, evaluation would be in the areas of financial plans, composition of board of directors, racial and gender salary structures, gender balance, and share ownership structures in terms of race and gender.

⁴The duration of rights in each sector was determined on the basis of level of transformation, biological status of the target species, capital intensity, need to encourage further investment and economic growth, and performance of participants during the medium-term rights.

⁵The codes used included racial composition, ownership structure, management composition and structure, gender, employment equity, skills development, affirmative procurement and corporate social investment.