The changing nature of work: The creation of a ‘working poor’ population in post-apartheid South Africa

Abstract

The post-apartheid South African broad socioeconomic policy of economic growth, social justice and poverty alleviation will arguably suffer a setback if the growing rate of atypical employment is left unattended. Atypical (subcontracting) employment undermines job security and income levels and this breeds poverty. Labour law and workers' organisations are undermined by this flexible regime of capital accumulation, which can be viewed from the perspective of Marxist régulation theory and the notion of workers' structural and associational power. While ‘symbolic leverage’ is a useful and significant concept to help in understanding the regaining of workers' power at the margins, it is imperative that we start thinking of other complementary means of engaging with the assault on the social reproduction of the affected workers. Social justice seems to provide the core answer; however, the norms of the society should form its basis.

Keywords:

• workers' protection
• symbolic leverage
• régulation theory
• flexible accumulation

1. Introduction

Aowa! It is only enough to pay for rent, and R100 for women meeting, and that is it. The grocery cupboard is always empty – with what money are we going to buy [food]? My rent is R1100 out of R1500, you see, and I have to buy transport ticket of R100. That ticket is for transport for me to travel in the morning to the station, afternoon I walk… We are just living, what can I say? If you can go to my grocery cupboard there is nothing there – sometimes we have maize meal, we can eat that with cabbage or potatoes. At times our relatives may come to our aid by buying bones so that we can eat. (Interviewee Moipore, October 2007)

Such is the plight of subcontracted workers, who toil for nine hours a day, five days a week. Survival and social reproduction1 remain elusive because wages are low owing to the changing nature of work, which has undermined labour law and workers' organisations. This type of development, the restructuring of work, has been argued to contribute to a future of ‘advanced marginality’ for significant numbers of workers in America (Wacquant, 2008).

Work is best understood as ‘paid employment’ under industrial capitalism (Edgell, 2006:1). The social construction of work (Grint, 1998:6–44) highlights the relationship between societal characteristics and modes of production as expressed in power relations in the social relation of work/production. The shifting social relations of production consequent on the reorganisation of work and its repercussions for ‘the individual, the family/household and communities’ (Strangleman & Warren, 2008:2) are instructive in this study. The changes can be understood within the labour process framework and with reference to other factors such as changing market demand and technology, globalisation and the neoliberal market logic (Marx & Engels, 1969[1848]:35–63; Marx, 1969[1898]:31–76; Braverman, 1974:85–135; Harvey, 1989:121–88; Burawoy, 1990:85–121; Amin, 1994:11–13; Bezuidenhout, 2002:12–15; Van der Walt et al., 2003:272–6).

The reorganisation or restructuring of work through increasingly flexible utilisation of labour by capital undermines workers' protection, resulting in job insecurity and inadequacy of income to meet workers' needs. This, by implication, creates a ‘working poor’ population, and the situation is exacerbated by the continuous undermining of labour law and workers' organisations due to the changing nature of work. Arguably, labour law and workers' organisations have become institutionalised tools for the stabilisation of the prevailing flexible regime of capital accumulation, as conceived by Marxist régulation theorists. Chun's concept of ‘symbolic leverage’ (2009) offers a wider understanding of how to rebuild workers' associational power (through social justice and public sentiments), especially at the margins. She draws on Silver's notion of structural power (2003, cited in Chun, 2009), the position of workers within production relations, and associational power, i.e. workers' organisations, to argue that the structural does not always define the associational. Taking this further, we need to start thinking of societal norms which provide the context for the social justice paradigm.

2. Labour market flexibility: Subcontracting of work

The changing nature of work has seen the continuous replacement of workers in standard (i.e. permanent) employment with workers in atypical (non-permanent) employment (Theron, 2003:1249–53). All forms of atypical employment practices result from labour market flexibility in terms of the ways labour is recruited, used and rewarded (Appiah-Mfodwa et al., 2000:97). This study focused on how the subcontracting of work, as a form of atypical employment, affects workers' protection. Subcontracting can be internal or external or labour-only. Internal subcontracting means that a subcontractor supplies labourers to a principal firm on a temporary basis, and external subcontracting means that a principal firm subcontracts an aspect of its operation to a subcontractor who hires workers to do the job (Bezuidenhout, 1996:2). Labour-only subcontracting means that labourers are supplied to carry out a particular task under a commercial contract. The work may be done inside or outside the premises of the principal firm, but supervised by a subcontractor who provides the tools (International Labour Organisation, cited in Bezuidenhout, 1996:2).

3. Workers' protection and poverty

Christianson posits that the contract of employment is a combination of ‘contractual agreement, collective bargaining and statutory intervention and protections’ (2001:22). Labour law should take cognisance of the erosion of workers' rights caused by the changing nature of work (Theron, 2002:29). Social justice should be at the centre of workers' protection, to drive poverty alleviation (Theron & Godfrey, 2002:21–8). The study of poverty in South Africa takes cognisance of the historical legacies of apartheid: racial oppression and discrimination. Hence, the expected social transformation and development, since the election of a democratic government in 1994, have featured as a platform for interrogating poverty. Poverty discourse in South Africa thus broadly revolves around socioeconomic inequality and access to income, social amenities and infrastructure, and how these notions are defined by race, gender and space (May et al., 1998, 2000; May, 2000; Bhorat et al., 2001; Roberts, 2001; Cheru, 2001; Aliber, 2003; Adato et al., 2006; Seekings, 2007; Du Toit, 2008).

There is an inherent assumption in South Africa that unemployment is the prime cause of poverty, and job creation is a magic bullet for poverty alleviation, with little or no attention being paid to the types of jobs being created or the restructuring of existing ones, and this continues to push more workers to the socioeconomic margins of the society. Barker warns of the choice to be made between ‘more or better jobs’, which he links to flexibility and the regulation debate (2003:187–91). For the purpose of this study I take workers' protection to mean social protection, as conceived by Olivier et al. to include the provision of ‘secure access to income, livelihood, employment, health and educational services, nutrition and shelter’ (2004:4). Secured access to income is fundamental to workers' protection. Working with the social justice paradigm, job security and adequate wages, to meet workers' needs becomes the primary hub of workers' protection.

Sixteen and a half million South Africans (34.8% of the population, 2006 data) live below the poverty line of $2.5 a day set for middle income countries (StatsSA, 2010). The present study revealed that low pay and lack of job security are central to the deprivation experienced by subcontracted workers. Klein and Rones, in their study on the profile of the working poor in the US, show that low wages and the size and composition of the family are important factors in the creation of the working poor, with education featuring as a predictor of earning (1989:3–4). Vermaak notes that the international literature's definition of the working poor as ‘those who work and belong to poor households’ seems to conflate individual earnings with household income. She opts to define the working poor as ‘those individuals who work but whose earnings are insufficient to lift them above an individually defined poverty line’ (2010:10–11). Maziya suggests that the working poor in South Africa are characterised by ‘low pay’ (1999:11).

4. The changing nature of work and the restructuring of work in South Africa

The international literature on the changing nature of work can be classified into ‘before, during, and after Fordism’ to capture the dynamics. Fundamental is the transition from a rigid to a flexible work regime (flexible capital accumulation), manifested in the reorganisation of work – in terms of technology, machine design, labour process organisation and flexible utilisation of labour (Marx, 1997[1867]; Atkinson, 1985; Braverman, 1974; Harvey, 1989; Burawoy, 1990; Burrows et al., 1992; Amin, 1994; Tonkiss, 2006; Omomowo, 2010).

4.1 Marxist régulation theory

Régulation theorists posit the social embeddedness and historical conjuncture of economic relations. They propose a theory of social regulation which says that economic development is ‘path dependent and irreversible’ (Aglietta, 1976, cited in Boyer, 2002:13; Aglietta, 1979:9; Jessop, 1997:503–26). They argue that the interaction and balance between regimes of accumulation, modes of regulation, industrial trajectories and hegemonic structures are accountable for the stability enjoyed at different phases of the development of capitalism (Lipietz, 1986:13–32; 1988:10–43; Boyer, 1988:70–9; Dunford, 1990:297–321; Hirst & Zeitlin, 1991:1–56). They used the term ‘modes of development’ to capture the dynamic nature and cyclical development of capitalism, triggered by disruptions (crisis) in the system and consequent reorganisation of the system (Boyer, 1988:76–82; Boyer & Saillard, 2002:41–4).

They draw on Bourdieu's concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ to explain how social conventions, norms, laws and institutions, and ‘mode of regulation’ function to stabilise a prevailing capitalist ‘regime of accumulation’ in the cyclical development of capitalism (see Boyer & Saillard, 2002). ‘Habitus’ is the disposition of a social actor within a social ‘field’ or ‘sub-field’, contingent on his/her ‘capital’ (power). Dominant actors tend to institutionalise their interests as the practice manifested through convention, norms and law (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992:94–140). The labour law therefore emerged out of interaction between social actors in the work sub-field. The relevance of this theory for this study is to argue that the labour law fails to protect workers in atypical employment, and rather functions to stabilise the prevailing flexible regime of capital accumulation. How this plays out at the level of work organisation can be understood using the concept of the ‘flexible firm’.

4.2 Concept of the flexible firm

Atkinson (1985) identifies the changing employment practices with the notion of an ‘ideal flexible firm’. This is a firm that is numerically and functionally flexible, i.e. the workforce can be changed at will numerically and deployed to different functions as required by demand or technology, and that is financially flexible to facilitate the fluidity of numerical and functional flexibilities. A flexible firm may organise work by outsourcing or subcontracting, offering options such as part-time work, work sharing, working at home, and so on (Burrows et al., 1992:4–5).

4.3 Restructuring of work in South Africa

The restructuring of work in South Africa can be captured under two broad headings – technological problems and labour market flexibility. In the first case, the production process is characterised by ‘racial Fordism’ and ‘racial despotism’, lack of indigenous skills and technology, expensive imported technology and low investment in research and development (Ewert, 1992:4; Adler, 1993:36; Webster, 1999:28–37; Webster & Omar, 2003:195; Omomowo, 2010). Labour market flexibility is more pronounced in the proliferation of atypical employment driven by the reduction of wage and non-wage costs (Horwitz & Franklin, 1996:3–39; Appiah-Mfodwa et al., 2000:95–109; Bezuidenhout, 2002:12–15; 1996:1–9; Van der Walt et al., 2003:272–93).

Bezuidenhout and Fakier (2006:462–85) argue that the subcontracting of work in post-apartheid South Africa has transferred the burden of social reproduction from the formal sector to the family or household precisely because of cheap labour. Von Holdt and Webster (2005:32) note that the emerging workplace order, which distinguishes core, non-core and peripheral workers, both includes and excludes workers. They argue that it weakens workers' organisations and creates a problem of social reproduction because of the poverty and exclusion of many households. The changing nature of work is impoverishing workers who are pushed to the margins of the labour market.

A review of industrial relations in South Africa shows that the effectiveness of the labour law and workers' organisations is being undermined by the nature of atypical employment. Labour law benefits employers and workers in standard employment, but neglects the rights and social protection of atypical workers. The labour law is limited to economic matters, shy of social consideration grounded on social justice to protect workers at the margins of the economy (Standing et al., 1996; Kalula, 2003; Craven & Cartwright, 2003; Cheadle, 2006; Theron, 2005).

4.4 Symbolic leverage

‘Symbolic leverage’ posits a shift away from workers' increasing loss of structural and associational power (Silver, cited in Chun, 2009:13–14) due to the changing nature of work. It offers an alternative source of agency for building workers' power from below to challenge job insecurity, low pay and deplorable working conditions. It has to do with the shifting power structure between labour, capital and the state (Chun, 2009:10–19). ‘Symbolic leverage’ strengthens workers' associational power, derived from classification struggles and public dramas targeted at stimulating the ‘spirit’ of social justice through public sympathy. It involves situating workers' exploitation, oppression and deplorable working conditions, beyond the workplace relations, in the public domain as a call on social justice to attract public sympathy and support and consequently reconfigure the power structure (Chun, 2009).

My sense here is that the normative and ideological space of the society is imperative to the activation of social justice as a source of workers' power. Therefore, the dominant norms in the society will serve either a complementary or contradictory role in this regard. For example, what should be the nature of social justice in a neoliberal ideological and policy landscape? Chun (2009) documents prolonged resistance to workers' demands by their employers and the state. In a society where dominant norms of equality and solidarity prevail, the story will be different (Adésínà, 2010). While my data are not directly concerned with the notion of ‘symbolic leverage’, they do highlight the weakening structural and associational power as indicated by labour law and workers' organisations. Workers have lost confidence in the law and unions as being incapable of protecting them. While there is a sense of helplessness, there is a visible individual agency towards sustaining their social reproduction by borrowing from micro-credit institutions, in the form of cash loans, because of dwindling support for the family to carry the burden of social reproduction (Bezuidenhout & Fakier, 2006:462–85). This form of agency is causing further impoverishment of subcontracted workers.

5. Methods

This study is small-scale qualitative research, drawing on the working experiences of subcontracted workers. A large organisation in Pretoria (hereafter referred to as ‘the organisation’), which subcontracted its cleaning services over a decade ago, was selected for this case study. Two groups of cleaners participated in this study: one group who had been permanently employed by the organisation before the restructuring and then been reemployed by subcontractors after they were retrenched by the organisation, and another group who had always worked for subcontractors. The anonymity of the participants was maintained for their protection.

This organisation was chosen for a case study because it provided an opportunity to learn about the changing nature of work (Stake, 1998:100–2). Participants were selected purposively using snowball sampling, and semi-structured face-to-face in-depth interviews were used for data collection.

One-on-one interviews were conducted with 15 cleaners and four union officials (see Tables 1 and 2 for interviewees' profiles). Five of the cleaners work for Matrix (pseudonym) and 10 for Expert (pseudonym). Most of those not unionised had previously been members of Nehawu (National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union) and permanently employed by the organisation before their retrenchment in 1998. The Nehawu shop steward and the Nupsaw (National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers) local branch secretary were part of the restructuring process that led to the subcontracting of cleaning services by the organisation in 1998. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Data were analysed manually by extracting the recurring themes from the various interviews, which informed the findings and conclusions of this study.

Table 1: Interviewees' profiles (cleaners)

Interviewee number	Date of interview	Pseudonym	Employer pseudonym (subcontractor)	Sex	Age	Year employed by organisation (SER)	Year employed by contractor (atypical)	Union
1	22/08/2007	Kelebogile	Expert	Female	47	1986 (12)	1998 (9)	N/U
2	24/08/2007	Siza	Matrix	Male	46	1982 (16)	1998 (9)	N/U
3	04/10/2007	Kabelo	Matrix	Male	64	1969 (29)	1998 (9)	N/U
4	05/10/2007	Refiloe	Matrix	Female	53	1990 (8)	1998 (9)	N/U
5	04/10/2007	Moipore	Matrix	Female	60	1987 (11)	1998 (9)	N/U
6	08/10/2007	Thabang	Expert	Female	N/A	1994 (4)	1998 (9)	N/U
7	15/10/2007	Mapule	Expert	Female	33	NEO	2003 (4)	NUPSAW
8	24/10/2007	Pule	Expert	Female	N/A	NEO	2004 (3)	NUPSAW
9	21/11/2007	Tebogo	Expert	Female	60	NEO	1993 (14)	NUPSAW
10	22/11/2007	Karabo	Expert	Female	N/A	NEO	2001 (6)	NUPSAW
11	30/11/2007	Nkateko	Expert	Female	49	NEO	2001 (6)	NUPSAW
12	20/11/2007	Phindile	Expert	Female	N/A	NEO	2002 (5)	NUPSAW
13	06/12/2007	Thabiso	Expert	Female	55	NEO	2001 (6)	SACSAWU
14	04/02/2008	Vangile	Matrix	Female	56	1988 (10)		N/U
15	18/02/2008	Nthabiseng	Expert	Female	31	NEO	1999 (8)	LIPCO
Notes: N/A = not available; SER = standard employment relationship; NEO = not employed by organisation; N/U = not unionised; NUPSAW = National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers; SACSAWU = South African cleaners, security and allied workers' union; LIPCO = Legally Independent People's Co-operation. Numbers in brackets refer to number of years interviewees were employed by the organisation or the contractor.

Table 2: Interviewees' profiles (union officials)

Interviewee number	Date of interview	Pseudonym	Union	Designation	Sex
1	11/10/2007	Andries	NUPSAW	Regional Organiser	Male
2	19/10/2007	Johnson	NUPSAW	Regional Organiser	Male
3	02/11/2007	Pumzile	NEHAWU	Shop Steward	Female
4	14/12/2007	Richard	NUPSAW	Branch Secretary	Male
Notes: NUPSAW = National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers; NEHAWU = National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union.

6. Findings

Four important themes emerge from the data analysis – lack of protection for the workers, perception of labour law, unionisation and protection, and survival strategies and social reproduction. This paper argues that subcontracting undermines the effectiveness of the labour law and workers' organisations intended to protect the workers (defined as social protection), and means workers are paid low wages, which leads to deprived workers (the working poor), as evidenced by the challenges of survival and social reproduction they experience.

6.1 Lack of social protection

The lack of social protection is a consequence of ineffective labour law and workers' organisations, expressed in low pay and lack of job security. These are some of the ways subcontracted workers reflected on their low wage in relation to their needs:

I don't mind telling you how much I am earning. Our salaries are not enough, because we get R1500 and as I have told you that I have five children, you cannot do anything with R1500. You cannot take all of them to school with that money … In 1998 when we were retrenched we were being paid R1600, and now under the subcontractor, since 1998 we are still being paid R1500. Not that it has always being R1500, it was smaller than that. It was R900, so they have always been increasing with R100 till now, which is R1500. (Siza, August 2007)

Ah! Is not enough for us, some of us, we are living in Hammanskraal, the monthly ticket to Hammanskraal is R500, and you get R1500, and when you start buying grocery, children want clothes, they have to go to school, they have to go to crèche. We are not getting anything. (Phindile, November 2007)

Is not enough. I am earning R1500 – that is very little. My monthly ticket is R112 per month, and the taxi is R10 per day. Can you see that I am only working for transport? There is no money here, but I start working from six o' clock till three o' clock. (Tebogo, November 2007)

Their account of low wages is not arbitrary. Specific key expenses such as transport, education, clothing, food and family size are highlighted to account for the inadequacy of their wages. For instance, Siza said his daughter withdrew from university when he could not afford to pay her fees because he had lost the education subsidy after he was retrenched by the organisation in 1998. He is not getting the subsidy now that he is working for a subcontractor. Low wages are linked to all the themes directly or indirectly. Subcontracting undermines workers' sources of power in labour law and organisation, which in turn causes a ‘race to the bottom’ with regards to wages (linked to the tender process of bidding for cleaning contracts), which puts a strain on survival and social reproduction. Lack of job security puts further strain on subcontracted workers as the contract may be terminated or not renewed as their contract of employment is replaced by a commercial contract. Added to this, workers are fired for stealing cleaning materials, which they say they sell for extra money to complement their wages.

No, they can fire me any time … for instance you do something wrong or the contract ends … Contracts are usually given for a period of three years, and if we are lucky they are going to renew it. (Thabang, October 2007)

I know that they can fire me at any time. They keep telling us that the contract will be finished soon. I know mine can end at any time … Because they keep on telling us that the contract will soon come to an end. (Vangile, February 2008)

Just recently there was one who was working overtime, she worked till one o' clock at night, it was Saturday, she worked the whole day till that time. When she realised that she was alone, there was nobody else, she took five litres of hand soap and tissues. When she was about to get out at the gate they saw her on the computer screen. They zoomed in and that was when they realised who she was … she was fired, not even one cent … It's because they don't have enough money, they are going to sell it so that they can cover up, there is no other alternative, they are going to sell them. (Thabiso, December 2007)

There is a sense of helplessness about job security as the cleaners are not privy to the agreement between subcontractors and the organisation. However, they suffer the consequences of such agreements. The low wages and lack of job security were linked to the weakness of the labour law and workers' organisations.

6.2 Perception of labour law

The cleaners felt that the law provides the space for work restructuring manifested through subcontracting. They suggested that the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, which they linked to the level of education, are the most affected. They also mentioned the subcontractors' lack of compliance with the labour law. They felt that the labour law allows the workers to be exploited by the subcontractors, who profit from their labour power as the middleman. Their views are captured by these excerpts from the interviews:

The law has changed. The reason I said labour law has changed is because we are now working for the contractors. Previously we were not working under the contractor, we were just working under the government [the organisation was referred to as ‘the government’]. Previously, the law gave workers many opportunities, now the law is oppressing the workers because if you did not go to school … they don't work with people who did not go to school. So the law now is oppressing people who did not go to school. Any complaint that you take to them … they don't care. (Siza, August 2007)

I think Expert doesn't enjoy operating according to this current labour law, they feel forced to comply with it. Expert is the one benefiting, they are benefiting because a lot of money is going to them. We don't know how much the organisation is giving them and they are giving us R1600 … R1500. We don't know how much the organisation is giving them. The R1600 that we are getting now, I was getting in 1998 when I was working for the organisation. (Thabang, October 2007)

This is an indication that labour law has done little or nothing to protect these workers; rather, it stabilises the prevailing regime of flexible accumulation of capital as the régulation theorists posit. Cheadle (2006) also mentions the failure of the labour law to protect workers in the most vulnerable type of employment. This is also a reflection of the dwindling structural power of workers, which resonates with the arguments of the régulation theorists, who use the notions of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ to show how the institutionalised practices in conventions, norms and law are contested. It shows the interrelationship between associational and structural power.

6.3 Unionisation and protection

The interviews showed that workers' associational power is declining. They have simply lost confidence in workers' organisations because, for them, they make no difference. Their situation is exacerbated by their lack of the education that would give them a voice. Two fundamental distinguishing characteristics of subcontracting pose serious challenges for the mobilisation and organisation of workers: first the lack of clarity about who the employer is, and second the different pay-points for subcontracted workers and workers in standard employment. This position is exacerbated by the de-unionisation caused by subcontracting. This is how the cleaners viewed the union:

The union could not fight for us; we left the union because it could not fight for us. Actually the union does not have much work to do. It might have work or it might not have work, it is the same thing. (Kabelo, October 2007)

We were members of a union, even when we went on strike they were representing us, thinking that they were protecting us, but at the end of the day we lost our jobs … Now I am not a member of a union because I don't trust the unions, but there are others that are still members of a union, it's still the same. (Moipore, October 2007)

Subcontractors also use other subtle means, such as transferring workers to a contract nearing expiry or to a location far away from their homes, to get rid of union inclined workers. This approach is used as a form of social control to discourage other workers from joining unions. This has led to the invisibility of the unions on the shop floor, compounded by the personnel incapacity of the unions. For example, only two organisers work for Nupsaw in the Gauteng region. The union response to the challenge to organise subcontracted workers is indicated in adding ‘allied’ to their names, which gives them the latitude to organise workers who do not fall directly under the industry or sector represented by a union. However, interviewees said that the onus to organise falls on the subcontracted workers, who then invited union organisers to apply for a recognition agreement by the employer, which may be subjected to a threshold of representativeness. This was set at 280 in the organisation in this study, for example.

6.4 Survival strategies and social reproduction

In view of the above emerging themes, the survival strategies of these workers were probed. They reported that they survived by depriving themselves of some of their necessities, apart from the little support they occasionally received from their extended families, which was fast wearing out. Some of them received limited support from their children who were working, mostly involved in atypical work due to lack of proper education.

I can tell my brother that I don't have maize in the house … he is the one that can give me money so that my children do not suffer, instead of my life to be ruined. (Refiloe, October 2007)

After buying the monthly ticket, and the groceries, you see that … sometimes … aah! We go to cash loans, so that they can borrow us, when is month end, your money is not enough because they would have deducted their money too. That is the life we are living. (Phindile, November 2007)

Ha … by the grace of God. The problem is that I am denying myself a lot of things. I am just saying as long as I get the money for food and for rent … Even for me to just buy shoe is difficult … That is the kind of problem we are facing. (Mapule, October 2007)

We survive through borrowing – we go to cash loans. Cash loan adds interest – when you borrow R100, you have to repay R125, and it keeps on increasing. With each and every R100 they put an increase of R25. If you take R500 you have to pay R600 and something, R625 I am sure. And you know it is possible for you to take cash loan from January to January. (Karabo, November 2007)

One of the benefits the interviewees lost to restructuring was the education subsidy for their children. The wearing out of family support created a social space for the institution of cash loans. These provide micro-credit at exorbitant interest rates, as indicated by Karabo above. Subcontracted workers often resort to such loans when their wages and their family cannot support them. The negative consequence is that they are often trapped in a cycle of debt due to the high interest rate and their low wages. This finding shows the weakening ability of the family to continually absorb the shifting burden of social reproduction from the formal or production sector (Bezuidenhout & Fakier, 2006:462–85). These developments leave us with a growing population of working poor. This study draws attention to the need to identify and take seriously the consequences of institutions (such as cash loans) that emerge to fill the gap between atypical workers' income and consumption.

7. Conclusion

The changing nature of work is undermining the effectiveness of workers' organisations and labour law in protecting workers, as evidenced by the lack of job security and low wages. Subcontracted workers therefore find it difficult to meet their needs. Support by the family is fast wearing out, opening up a space for the emergent institution of cash loans that further impoverish them. Low wages, large family size and lack of education are salient characteristics of the working poor, as the interview data from this study show. Analysis of the national poverty line may need to be complemented by qualitative studies of this kind. Workers must be given the opportunity to share their work and survival experiences. The study sheds light on how workers navigate their survival on a daily basis considering their low wages. While workers accounts' are taken with caution, a situation where a child is pulled out of university for lack of finance speaks volumes.

Subcontracting weakens the sources of workers' power, hence wages continue to drop and more people are pushed into poverty. While ‘symbolic leverage’ is an important development for workers at the margins, it must be complemented by the dominant norms in the society. While I am not suggesting that employment is an antidote to poverty, its contribution is fundamental. If significant progress is to be made in the poverty alleviation agenda of the South Africa Government, a closer look at the types of job being created in the economy becomes imperative: ‘more or better jobs’ or ‘more and better jobs’ (Barker, 2003:187–91).

Putting social justice, founded on the norms of equality and solidarity, at the centre of work relations becomes imperative in this regard. It provides the means to fuse economic and social considerations in the way work is organised or structured. More importantly, it can provide the political and ideological spaces for improving citizens' standard of living. A review of the social policy architecture in South Africa may become necessary. Able-bodied men and women between the ages of 16 and 60 are not covered by the state social security system (Lund, 2001). As Mkandawire (2004) and Adésínà (2007) note, in the African context, universal and inclusive social policy regimes foster social development, build social cohesion and reduce poverty, bridging the gap between income and social consumption.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kolawole E Omomowo

PhD Candidate

Notes

¹The term ‘social reproduction’ is used here to mean the adequacy of income to sustain the regeneration of the worker population (Dickinson & Russell, 1986).