Progress towards Millennium Development Goals? Strategies for housing and informal settlement in Gauteng, South Africa

Abstract

The housing delivery plans of the South African province of Gauteng and two of its metropolitan municipalities broadly respond to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for improving the lives of slum dwellers and eradicating poverty. This paper evaluates some South African responses to the MDGs by considering the housing delivery and settlement upgrading plans of the provincial and local authorities for two major cities in Gauteng. In the face of pressure to demonstrate progress in meeting the MDGs, public servants have resorted to devising strategies that will present a positive picture. These include semantic changes such as subscribing to a narrow definition of informality as illegality and shifting responsibility away from particular organs of the state and onto residents, the private sector and other spheres of state. These strategies are unlikely to bring significant improvement to the lives of poor people living in informal settlements.

Keywords:

• local state
• local government
• municipality
• provincial government
• performance management
• Millennium Development Goals

1. Introduction

In South Africa the ANC (African National Congress) state has achieved much in terms of the sheer number of houses delivered, estimated at over two million nationally. The challenge to provide housing, however, remains daunting. In the face of mounting international pressure to demonstrate progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), public servants in various spheres of the South African state have employed a range of strategies. Positive programmes are evident in Gauteng province, but actual delivery of housing remains limited, and approaches to the issue of what constitutes an ‘informal’ settlement are problematic. One tactic has been to shift responsibility away from particular spheres of the state and onto residents, the private sector and other spheres of state. Tactics have also included semantic changes, such as subscribing to a narrow definition of ‘informality’ as illegality. Such window-dressing does little to improve the lives of people living in informal settlements; its purpose is rather to improve perceptions of the quantity of delivery.

2. The Millennium Development Goals in perspective

A global concern with an increasing gap between the rich and the poor and ever-harsher conditions of poverty led to the adoption of eight MDGs at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York City in 2000 (UNDPI, 2002). The first and overarching MDG is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. In response to key global development challenges and calls from civil society organisations, the eight goals seek to reduce poverty, promote education, health and equality, and combat child mortality and diseases. The goals are fleshed out into 18 targets and 48 technical indicators (UN Millennium Project, n.d.). It has been argued that the MDGs were not subject to the UN's usual level of scrutiny, editing and discussion in committees prior to adoption (Amin, 2006). Samir Amin (2006) says the claim that the MDGs build on the resolutions of a series of summits held in the 1990s obscures the fact that, during these summits, established non-governmental organisations backed by large foundations and states overshadowed the voices of the poor as represented by ‘popular organizations fighting for social and democratic progress’, and that proposals preceding the MDGs were largely rejected by states from the South. According to Amin, the MDGs were eventually drafted by a regular consultant to the CIA rather than developed in UN committees, and support was achieved because of the single common aim of reducing poverty (2006). Despite these procedural shortcomings, the following eight MDGs (UN Millennium Project, n.d.) were adopted by the general assembly, to which the Government of South Africa was party:

•	Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
•	Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
•	Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
•	Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
•	Goal 5: Improve maternal health
•	Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
•	Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
•	Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development.

The overall objective is for the MDGs to be achieved by a universal target date of 2015 (UN, 2000). Because of the ‘unprecedented political support’ (Annan, 2005) for the MDGs, progress towards these goals is from time to time placed under a magnifying glass by world summits, global media and research reports. After one such instance of scrutiny, the July 2007 midway point to the deadline, UN High Commissioner Mary Robinson stated that in ‘sub-Saharan Africa, no country is on track to meet the goals of halving extreme poverty, ensuring universal primary education, or stemming the Aids pandemic by 2015′ (Robinson, 2007). This assessment was in stark contrast to that of the South African Government. South Africa's mid-term country report (SARPN, 2007:5, 10) claimed that the country was not only well on track to meet all its MDG-related targets, but had in fact already met some of them, probably because the goals articulated by the new democratic government in 1994 were similar. The urgent need for progress was reiterated at the UN General Assembly meeting in 2008, when a two-day thematic debate was convened on ‘Recognising the achievements, addressing the challenges and getting back on track to achieve the MDGs by 2015’ (UN, 2008).

Despite their broad appeal, however, criticism has been levelled against the MDGs on various grounds. Bond points out their remoteness from grassroots struggles for social justice, the inadequacy of resources allocated to their pursuit, the slow progress towards the goals, and the modesty of certain targets in proportion to the problems that they address (2006:339–5). Devarajan et al. note the ‘ambitiousness’ of certain targets in relation to the problems that they address, and the difficulty of calculating the funding required to achieve the goals, since countries vary, for instance, in their ability to use aid effectively (2002:8–21). As regards the problem of measuring progress towards the goals, Devarajan et al. observe that certain goals and targets have not been quantified, that it is difficult to measure certain indicators, and that comparable data across countries are lacking (2002:6–21), and Bond notes a focus on national averages and a resulting failure to reach vulnerable groups (2006:341).

Adding to this body of criticism, James (2006) argues that the MDGs fail to distinguish between actual and potential results. One underlying problem is that the goals, such as achieving universal primary education, assume a consistent relationship between certain means, such as primary education, and their unarticulated ends, such as basic literacy; however, given the disparities not only between developed and developing countries but also within developing regions, achieving universal primary education ‘is entirely consistent with sizeable variations in actual learning achievements’ (2006:447). A second concern is that certain interventions, such as providing infant formula, assume the availability of other resources such as clean water, which may be readily available in developed but not developing countries, so that the interventions can fail entirely or create new problems. The impact of achieving goals and targets, therefore, hinges on the conversion of potential into actual results, for instance converting primary education into literacy or access to infant formula into freedom from illness. Consequently, the precise numerical terms in which most targets are formulated – the macro-policy targets under Goal 8 being exceptions – are a poor measure of the degree to which desired benefits have been achieved, with implications for resource allocation. Although it is not known whether the MDGs were created for their fundamental desirability, their likelihood of producing consistent outcomes, or their measurability, it is important to note that they differ in this regard, that a number of the goals are hardly quantifiable and that some goals are less likely than others to guarantee specific results (James, 2006:443–56).

Goal 7, that of ensuring environmental sustainability, includes Target 11, to have significantly improved the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 (UN Millennium Project, n.d.). While the goal is quantified in terms of a proportion of slum dwellers, it ‘lacks a well specified target’ (Devarajan et al., 2002:11). To begin with, ‘slum’ is a contested and ‘dangerous’ term (Gilbert, 2007:697–713). To make matters worse, the broad aim of significant improvement, which may be achieved in one of five areas of inadequacy, whether water, sanitation, structural quality, overcrowding or security of tenure (see Huchzermeyer, 2010:134), has been left entirely unquantified. The goal and target therefore fail to provide practical guidance.

This article is a critique of some of the strategies that civil servants in South Africa employ to be able to claim that substantial progress has been made with regard to this specific target. Delivery statistics demonstrate the ability of the South African state to build formal houses for the low income market, but not at a pace that meets need. By contrast, the strategies considered here allow state officials to demonstrate progress with regard to informal settlements without having realised the potential that informed the setting of Goal 7. These strategies confirm that James's arguments about the challenges of measurability and consistency in outcomes are applicable to the pursuit of this particular target in South Africa.

3. Recent South African responses to informal settlement

South Africa's adoption of Target 11 has been one important consideration that has informed recent local approaches to housing plans. But in an unfortunate sleight of hand the overarching goal of eradicating poverty and the target of improving the lives of slum dwellers have become conflated into eradicating slums, which in the South African context has translated into eradicating all informal settlements. According to Huchzermeyer (2008), this misinterpretation of the MDGs has occurred because of a misreading firstly of the number of people mentioned in Target 11, which refers to only about 10% of slum dwellers worldwide, and secondly of the goals of the UN agency for human settlements, which are to promote not only urban poverty reduction, but also participatory slum upgrading. This reading may rest on the misleading catchphrase ‘cities without slums’, which Huchzermeyer argues has been used to promote the target (2010:134). Huchzermeyer adds that eradication programmes are insensitive to the vulnerability of poor people's livelihoods, since people who are relocated are often found in informal housing again within a short space of time as they cannot afford the costs of formal housing (2008:4, 13).

The housing plans of the province of Gauteng and the metropolitan municipalities of Johannesburg and Tshwane respond to the MDGs on improving the lives of slum dwellers. Ostensibly keen to fulfil the earlier prediction that the South African Government would be able to meet its MDGs in advance of the global deadline, the National Department of Housing has focused its policies and programmes squarely on the eradication of informal settlements by 2014. However, while the 2008 budget vote speech again made reference to the MDGs and the 2014 deadline, success seemed unlikely given the then Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu's estimated budget shortfall of over R100 million to clear the housing backlog by 2014 (Sisulu, 2008). Yet it appears that the goal of eradicating informal settlements by 2014 continues to inform housing programmes.

Since current approaches to nationwide housing policy are heavily influenced by the fact that the halfway mark to the deadline for meeting Target 11 has passed, the province of Gauteng and two of its metropolitan municipalities have extensive housing plans for the immediate future. Local scholars are disappointed that although they were given an opportunity to influence the most recent South African housing plans, the opportunity came too late in the fast-paced process, so that the existing research design was not ideally suited to the policy-making process, and their scholarship was taken into account only in the evaluation of the policy rather than in its design (Huchzermeyer, 2006:44). This concern echoes that of researchers across the spectrum of government policy, who lobby for a stronger link between research and policy formulation (Benjamin, 2007; CPS, n.d.).

4. Aims and method

This paper evaluates public sector responses to the MDGs by considering the housing delivery plans of the provincial and local authorities for two major cities in Gauteng province against the backdrop of state-society relations. Following Dear (1981) and Kirby (1985), the range of state institutions below the central or national level is considered to comprise the local state. The respondents therefore include politicians and officials at the municipal and provincial level. To gain access to well-informed understandings of current housing delivery strategies and concerns in the cities of Johannesburg and Tshwane, in-depth interviews were conducted with four key state officials responsible for housing strategy and delivery in each of the two cities in 2008. The respondents are referred to by pseudonyms. Two of them held key positions in the provincial administration – ‘Pat’ in Tshwane and ‘Ann’ in Johannesburg – while two of them were high-ranking city councillors – ‘Tod’ in Tshwane and ‘John’ in Johannesburg.

A semi-structured interview of about 90 minutes was conducted with each respondent, using an interview guide that focused on housing delivery plans, the philosophy and strategy driving those plans, intergovernmental relations, departmental responsibilities and capacity, and state officials' approaches to informal settlements. Verbatim transcripts were used to disaggregate respondents' comments according to their relevance to state-society relations and to informal settlements. Although the limited number of interviews did not allow in-depth comparison, it was possible to identify certain apparent local particularities as well as differences between public sector officials based in the provincial and city administrations.

The analysis of this round of interviews represents but one slice of a broader study funded by South Africa's National Research Foundation. While housing alone cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive package of citizenship rights, the provision of subsidised housing is understood and studied here as a critical response by the state to informal settlement. The in-depth interviews provided detailed information and insights on housing plans and the housing policy and delivery processes, and also served as opportunities to gauge the attitude of key government officials towards informal settlements and to housing as a human right.

5. State approaches to informal settlement

To begin to explore state approaches to informal settlements, all respondents were asked whether affected communities were consulted about housing projects, whether social impact assessment formed part of their housing processes, and how housing need was assessed.

The provincial administrators generally described their role as funded delivery, and reported that they relied on municipalities to conduct in-depth consultation and to provide information about community priorities and preferences. Despite this, a feasibility study, which included a land suitability survey, was conducted as part of the planning process for each provincial housing project. ‘Greenfields’ projects, where no one was living on the land earmarked for development, would not involve consultation with a specific community, while other cases might warrant social impact assessment by the provincial government. A dedicated communication division was responsible for handling housing-project-related queries from the general public.

City councillors seemed to share the provincial administrators' view of their role, and generally relied on the legally prescribed municipal process of Integrated Development Planning (IDP) for information on community preferences. Respondent John (interview, 12 May 2008) reported, however, that consultation with the Johannesburg community went beyond what was prescribed in terms of the IDP. Although their housing budgets were negligible, city surveys were also conducted to determine the level of satisfaction among residents. Councillors considered this engagement with communities to constitute a contribution to the process. This finds some support in the fact that city councillors' knowledge of the grassroots level was both acknowledged and valued by their provincial counterparts.

Respondents' descriptions revealed a practical separation between those who actually implement the bulk of housing projects and those who consult communities. The respondents recognised this separation of roles, which they experienced as a functional division of labour. This experience may have been partly moulded by the respondents' location in a province where the local and provincial state are governed by the national governing party, which determines the overarching policy framework. In cases where the provincial and local state are not governed by the same party, greater tension may be expected to arise. The current operating framework removes accountability to grassroots communities from provincial officials who implement projects that affect those communities, but at the same time holds accountable the local authorities, who are constrained by limited budgets. This housing dynamic forms part of a larger problem of often under-capacitated local authorities in post-apartheid South Africa (Huchzermeyer, 2002:94, in reference to Chipkin).

In addition to direct consultation, the degree to which the respondents had access to expert knowledge and data on the big picture of housing need were explored. In this respect, all respondents referred to the housing demand database that would replace the waiting list that had been started in 1994 but had never been captured or maintained properly. Respondents were visibly animated when talking about the cleaning and impending completion of the demand database, which also represented a way to ring-fence the vast and growing need for housing. In the case of the provincial administrators, their employment contracts were linked to performance management. A New Public Management approach had influenced post-apartheid reform of the civil service and made performance management a reality by 1996 (Cameron, 2010:3). The respondents' focus on the 2014 deadline, however, suggested that the MDGs have informed performance indicators with regard to informal settlements. Since government made public promises about its ability to meet and exceed MDGs, one might predict a 2014 need for scapegoats. This context may explain an apparent strong preference for concrete performance indicators. In the case of the city councillors, there was an additional need to impress an increased number of visitors and journalists during the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, held in South Africa.

In 2005 the provincial administration conducted an audit to identify and record the location of all informal settlements, an exercise that all the respondents mentioned and considered helpful in understanding the demand for state-funded housing. Information on needs assessment was, however, held by the central provincial office and did not feature prominently in the planning processes in which either the provincial administrators or the city councillors were directly involved. The audit of informal settlements assisted directly with ring-fencing the responsibility of civil servants for the purpose of performance management. Respondent Ann commented,

I think the MEC [Member of the Executive Committee – the responsible elected official at provincial level] has also made it clear … because of the audit that we've run, the premier announced … so many informal settlements must be formalised and eradicated by 2014, based on the numbers that were there [at the time of the audit]. So, we can only be monitored against the numbers that were recorded at that time, not the new [growth in informal settlement]. Because, [with regard to] those new numbers, the municipalities must take responsibility [for any growth in informal settlement]. (Interview, 30 April 2008)

Respondent Pat's similar understanding supported the impression that the provincial Department of Housing was on track in terms of its goals for 2014:

Informal settlement [is] taking place [on a continuous basis]. So if you've got a target like to remove everything … [by] 2014, you will have to decide on a specific day and time [what exactly will be eradicated; and you'll have to say] I'm going to eradicate … this. Because the next moment … [when] you've done your calculation [of what needs to be eradicated], there will be another lot and another lot [of informal settlement], it's continuous – you will never stop the process. So … my understanding [is that] they made [the following] calculation [in] 2004: what was the total [number of] projects which were identified as informal settlements? And [only] those informal settlements will have water and sewerage [provided by the state] – in other words, [those particular settlements will] be formalised by 2009 and eradicated [in the sense that they will no longer be considered informal settlements]. And houses [should then be] built in those settlements by 2014. (Interview, 12 May 2008)

Apart from limiting the degree to which the state, and in particular the provincial state, would take responsibility for any growth in informal settlement, respondents shifted between broad layman's definitions and narrow official definitions of ‘informality’. The official understanding of this term has significant implications for the potential ability to claim success in eradicating informal settlements by 2014. While scholars criticise the limiting practice of defining informality as illegality (Mohamed, 2006:35–6; Barchiesi, 2007:13), respondent John subscribed to a restricted definition, as follows:

An informal settlement is something that is outside the legal framework. It has got nothing to do with whether a place has got a [formally built] top structure. Anything that has been approved, anything that has got a layout plan submitted with the Surveyor General will be [legal and formal] in terms of township establishment … So, Orange Farm, … even if you don't see a [formal] top structure, is formal. (Interview, 12 May 2008)

This definition represents a shift. In the 1990s, the Urban Foundation defined informal settlements in terms of the kind of dwelling or top structure prevalent in a settlement, which would have included makeshift dwellings built in official site-and-service areas (Huchzermeyer, 2004:148). In the context of a need to have more achievable targets, respondent John's limiting both the range of settlements that can be counted as informal and the number of informal settlements on the basis of which housing delivery can be evaluated helps to protect the state and its officials against a possible negative assessment in the face of looming internal and MDG deadlines. Officials could claim that settlements have been formalised without having to improve the level of service delivery. Another benefit of this kind of formalisation is that legal proclamation would lead to the existence of an address, which would make it possible for people living there to be recognised by the financial sector, so that they could qualify for loans. The limited definition of formalisation, then, allows the state to prepare to shift part of its responsibility to the private sector and to residents.

In addition, respondent Ann (interview, 30 April 2008) expected the growth in demand to be more manageable if numbers did not change constantly. A system of closing the database once or twice annually, Ann commented, would provide administrators with a rationale for allocating housing, rather than being forced to accommodate people who presented themselves at inopportune times and thereby being forced to try and weigh the degree of need of the poorest of the poor against the needs of the very poor.

Like their counterparts elsewhere in Africa and the developing world, contemporary South African cities reportedly experience unparalleled urbanisation and in-migration (UNFPA, 2005). The South African respondents, ostensibly overwhelmed by the challenge of housing delivery in this context, accepted and internalised superficial strategies that allowed them to demonstrate progress towards quantified targets. These included the direct limiting of liability to the extent of housing need that had been captured by a certain cut-off date and the somewhat more indirect ring-fencing of responsibility through the use of limiting definitions. Against the background of performance management, ongoing thorough needs assessment seemed to become something of an independent threat, with the result that the perceived perils of internal growth and in-migration remain intangible, potential excuses in the case of a public crisis of credibility.

6. Informal settlement and intergovernmental relations

Informal settlements and their upgrading were considered a particular priority, but this did not necessarily flow from sensitivity to the precariousness of life in informal settlements, since at least three external reasons were identified for this prioritisation. The first was the credibility of government with respect to meeting the MDGs, the second was the possibility of scapegoating in the event that these goals were not met, and the third was the shortage of land for other kinds of housing delivery programmes. In addition, the spheres of state had different abilities to respond to the need for housing and services. Both cooperation and competition between the provincial administration and the local authorities were evident in the responses to questions on consultation and needs assessment. It was therefore important to interrogate intergovernmental relations.

A degree of tension between the local and provincial spheres of government was evident. Although an apparent personality clash had contributed to more acute conflict in the City of Tshwane, there was also behind-the-scenes tension between Johannesburg respondents. The failure to contain the growth of informal settlements caused a provincial state official, respondent Ann, to express frustrated criticism of municipalities:

With regard to informal settlements, I think the challenge for me is … the fact that the department did an audit in 2005, [called the] registration of informal settlements, and we recorded all the informal settlements there, they were recorded as a certain number. And [by] … the last financial year, there are even more informal settlements. If they have not increased in terms of the number, they'll increase in terms of the size. So, that is actually affecting the whole upgrading. Because the municipalities are responsible for making sure that there is no extension of the informal settlement as well as … [being responsible for making sure that there is no new] invasion of land. There are still some land parcels that are being invaded. So the challenge has been that as a province we cannot manage that, because it is the responsibility of the municipalities … but they're not doing it, so it has been a challenge, it has been flagged, in a number of cases. … those new numbers, the municipalities must take responsibility. (Interview, 30 April 2008)

From these responses it became clear that officials in the provincial authority, which had the allocated budget and with it the responsibility for providing low income housing, were refusing to accept that this responsibility applied with regard to any growth in demand for such housing. The public sector officials of the provincial government were shifting the responsibility for providing and/or servicing any new low income housing onto local government.

It appears that the two local authorities were not keen to accept the responsibility for providing and servicing low income housing and instead found ways to shift the burden onto the private sector. Firstly, for example, respondent Tod's view (interview, 12 May 2008) that the City of Tshwane's Land Invasion Management Plan would ensure that no land would be occupied illegally means that residents who cannot secure shelter in existing accommodation will have to find a different city to live in. Since officials accepted the responsibility for providing housing only for people already identified by the province at an earlier stage, the burden had indeed been shifted back onto the shoulders of newcomer residents. Secondly, because the City of Johannesburg had little control over the invasion of private land, respondents were particularly concerned about the occupation of such areas, indicating that the city would be willing to apply for court orders that would force private owners who had facilitated settlement on their own land to provide services (respondent John, interview, 13 May 2008). In such cases, private land-owners would be compelled to take on the responsibility for servicing low income housing. Thirdly, the kind of formalisation that was prioritised in Johannesburg would provide residents with a legal address, making them more bankable, which again meant that the city could relocate some of its responsibility to the private sector. Since municipal officials had devised ways of avoiding this burden, the attempt by provincial officials to allocate all responsibility for dealing with new informal settlement to the local state was therefore a failed project.

7. Conclusion

This paper has considered a set of public sector responses to informal settlement in the context of pressures to make progress towards meeting Goal 7 of the MDGs and, more specifically, towards Target 11. The UN's consistent focus on the proportion of the urban population living in slums has led to an emphasis on numbers over conditions and this has encouraged the kind of strategies identified in interviews for this article. As Huchzermeyer argues (2010:134), eradication targets are based on a misinterpretation of Target 11. The misunderstanding has, unfortunately, framed state thinking about informal settlements in South African cities. While the specific approaches and interpretations of the four respondents in this study were partly shaped by a pragmatic approach to the demands of their position in the state bureaucracy, they nevertheless demonstrate that the concerns raised by James (2006) about the measurability of MDGs and the attainability of consistent improvements apply in the South African context with respect to this particular goal.

As part of a division of competencies between the provincial and local spheres of state, political accountability for housing plans has to a large degree been separated from their actual implementation. This has enabled the two spheres of state to shift particular responsibilities onto each other, onto the private sector and onto residents, without having to consider the difficulties of implementation.

In response to the daunting size of the task of housing delivery, but also to the political need to demonstrate progress towards Goal 7, and to the imperative to be re-elected or obtain favourable performance reports, public servants have begun to subscribe to a limited and limiting definition of informality as illegality. In practice, this could enable the state to claim that those informal settlements that existed at the time of the 2005 provincial audit of informal settlements have been eradicated, as long as all of these were legally proclaimed, and irrespective of whether services have met the needs of the people living in a given informal settlement or whether new informal settlement has taken place. A narrow definition of informality serves to protect the state and its officials. In addition, public sector officials have found ways of shifting back onto residents and the private sector the responsibility for finding adequate shelter for those who cannot afford to buy or rent existing accommodation. While these strategies enable the state to demonstrate progress in improving the lives of slum dwellers, they fail to improve the outlook for those who are in need of state provision of adequate shelter, but unable to access it.

The non-specific formulation of both Goal 7 and its Target 11 fails to provide practical guidance to states with regard to improving the lives of slum dwellers. Civil servants working to address a shortage of low income urban housing are also concerned about performance management. A lack of quantified indicators makes it possible for public sector officials to inflate progress towards housing-related targets by way of superficial strategies that do not substantially improve the everyday lives of poor people. These strategies have been implemented alongside substantial programmes such as the building of mixed income formal housing and the in situ upgrading of certain informal settlements. Window-dressing strategies, however, detract from the potential of more substantial housing, upgrading, site-and-service and social programmes by directing focus and resources away from those critical programmes.