The role of politics in the migration of Zimbabwean teachers to South Africa

Abstract

This paper contributes to the debate on the role played by the political crisis in Zimbabwe in causing teacher migration to South Africa in the presence of other social and economic drivers. The paper uses data collected through a questionnaire self-administered by 100 Zimbabwean teachers in South Africa (migrants) and another 100 in Zimbabwe (non-migrants). In-depth interviews with a few migrant teachers were used to supplement these data. Although it was the second most mentioned reason for the teachers' migration to South Africa, the role played by political violence or repression in Zimbabwe in causing this migration should not be downplayed. Most migrant teachers came from Zimbabwean schools affected by political violence to a large extent before or after the 2008 presidential elections, especially rural areas. Teachers that held positions or distributed opposition party regalia were mostly displaced by violence. There is an urgent need for political transformation to more democratic rule in Zimbabwe.

Keywords:

• teacher migration
• Zimbabwean crisis
• politics
• brain drain

1. Introduction

Most international newspapers contained news about Zimbabwean teachers fleeing the country due to politically motivated violence, particularly in the mid to late 2000s. For example, the BBC News reported in 2008 that many Zimbabwean teachers had been beaten up and hospitalised in politically motivated situations. Chibaya reported in March 2007 the story of a female Zimbabwean science teacher (Stella Chikava) who escaped to South Africa and sold newspapers on the streets of Johannesburg (Chibaya, 2007). Prior to fleeing to South Africa, Stella was abducted, persecuted, abused and then released by supporters of the ruling party for allegedly supporting the opposition. The New Zimbabwe newspaper reported on 5 December 2007 the appeal case against deportation by a migrant Zimbabwean teacher called SC (Case No. EWCA Civ1278). SC entered the United Kingdom as a visitor and later on switched to a student permit – which later expired, hence her eviction. The UK Court of Appeal accepted her appeal on the assumption that as a teacher it was unsafe for SC to return to Zimbabwe where ‘teachers are readily identified as members of the MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] and are frequently mistreated as such’.

The Zimbabwe Teachers Union (ZIMTA) and the Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe place the number of teachers that have left the country since the beginning of the political and economic crisis at around 45 000, which is almost one-half of the 100 000 teacher compliment in public primary and secondary schools in 1997 (Chagonda, 2010). While many Zimbabwean teachers sought refuge in neighbouring countries in the Southern African Development Community region, others such as SC relocated to overseas countries, especially the United Kingdom. However, the paper focused on the teachers that migrated to South Africa since the country hosts the bulk of the Zimbabwean teachers that escaped the crisis. This is because South Africa's control of Zimbabwean immigrations has been more relaxed than any of the other destination countries such that some teachers could have entered the country without work permits. Teachers and other civil service workers could visit South Africa without having to obtain a visa, which until early 2009 cost about R2000 for those individuals who were not civil servants (Chagonda, 2010:12). Out of 5400 foreign teachers identified in three South African provinces (Gauteng, Eastern Cape and Limpopo) through the government system called Persal, 3796 were Zimbabweans (News24 2011).

Raftopoulos (2009:222) argued that it was only after 2000 that large numbers of people left the country because of political violence, forced removals and the economic deterioration. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) felt threatened by the formation of the hitherto strong opposition party in 1999. Hence, it resorted to fighting the opposition together with its sponsors, whites in Zimbabwe and abroad, through violence (Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010). Starting with the June 2000 parliamentary elections, periods leading to elections held after 2000 were marred by violence and intimidation of the opposition supporters, except for the March 2008 elections that occurred with little violence (Raftopoulos, 2009). The opposition, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, won most of the parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2008. But the March 2008 presidential elections did not have a decisive winner with a ‘50% plus one’ majority, making a run-off election necessary (Raftopoulos, 2009). More serious violence occurred prior to the run-off election at the end of June 2008 that targeted the electorate, particularly in rural areas, as punishment for the ruling party's loss in the March 2008 election and a ‘warning against the repeat of such a vote’ (Raftopoulos, 2009:222). Most of the violence occurred in the three Mashonaland provinces (East, Central and West), which were former strongholds of ZANU-PF. The major opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, finally withdrew from running for the presidency in the run-off election citing violence (Raftopoulos, 2009).

Available literature identified several causes and dimensions of what is now commonly called the Zimbabwean crisis. These include economic, political and social causes. Political causes and dimensions of the crisis have emerged as equally important drivers of the mass exodus that had not been experienced before in the country's history. The political crisis has often been cited as the root cause of the Zimbabwean crisis, which gave birth to the economic and social dimensions. This dimension includes government's inability to curb corruption, which involved some of its members, the prioritisation of some political and sometimes autocratic decisions despite their being detrimental to the economy, the violent ‘fast track’ resettlement programme, resorting to violence in order to suppress the opposition, and disputes with regard to election results and the rule of law (Murisa, 2010:3).

Kyambalesa (2009) blamed teacher migration on African governments that offer teachers poor salaries and, when teachers strike for better salaries, threaten to disengage all of them and hire new teachers (whether locals or expatriates). African government officials have a tendency of branding professionals that immigrate to other countries as failures and yet they do not attempt to find out why these professionals are migrating or address the causal issues such as low salaries (Kyambalesa, 2009). In addition to this branding, Zimbabwean teachers' persistent calls for better salaries and working conditions through several strikes have resulted in them being additionally branded as opposition party members aimed at placing ZANU-PF into disrepute.

Most of the teachers studied by Chireshe & Shumba (2011) had developed a negative attitude towards the profession as they saw no bright future for the Zimbabwean teacher:

Teachers have been promised better salaries and working conditions for a long time now without any change. Teachers' plight is not being addressed or is not being listened to; teachers' dignity continues to deteriorate. A change in the political situation was seen as the only source of teachers' hope.

(Chireshe & Shumba, 2011:117)

Teachers increasingly operated in an environment characterised by political violence, which targeted some of them. Chireshe & Shumba (2011) argued that one of the reasons why teachers engaged in an indefinite strike in 2008, which led to the disintegration of the entire education system, was the victimisation, harassment and intimidation of teachers for allegedly supporting the opposition.

This paper discusses the extent to which the migration of Zimbabwean teachers was determined by political violence and other aspects of the Zimbabwean political environment. In other words, in an environment that was characterised by many ‘push’ factors, to what extent was the teachers' migration to South Africa dictated by political violence or other political aspects? Other studies tend to emphasise the role of the economic deterioration and teachers' poor remuneration in driving the teachers into the diaspora (Chagonda, 2010). This paper attempts to achieve the main objective through assessing migrant teachers' reasons for migration or for not willing to return home, in-depth interviews with some of the teachers on politics in Zimbabwe, and comparing non-migrant and migrant teachers' experience of political violence at schools they taught in Zimbabwe and their rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 and currently (in 2012).

2. Methods and materials

This paper used field data collected in Zimbabwe and South Africa between April and September 2012. The migration effects of the political crisis were assessed through both quantitative and qualitative research designs. In the quantitative design, 100 Zimbabwean teachers in Zimbabwe (non-migrants) and another 100 teachers in South Africa (migrant teachers) completed questionnaires. Questionnaires were considered less expensive than other data collection tools and appropriate since teachers are literate.

The qualitative design involved in-depth interviews with three migrant teachers: two from Mashonaland East province, one of the provinces most affected by political violence towards the July 2008 run-off election (Raftopoulos, 2009); and the other one from Masvingo. One of the teachers taught at the same school as the researcher in Limpopo province of South Africa, and the others were selected through snowball sampling. While the quantitative design helped in the quantification of the occurrence of violence in Zimbabwean schools taught by the sampled teachers, the qualitative design provided more in-depth information regarding the manner in which politically motivated violence involving teachers occurred.

The Zimbabwean sample was selected from four provinces representing both rural and urban areas including Harare, Bulawayo, Manicaland, and Masvingo. While Harare and Bulawayo are predominantly urban provinces, Manicaland and Masvingo are mixed but predominantly rural. Three closely located districts were purposively selected from each province in order to reduce travelling costs. Four schools representing private, government, urban or rural council, and mission (church) schools were selected from each district. Two teachers per school, including a male and female, were randomly selected to respond to the questionnaire.

The South Africa sample involved 100 Zimbabwean teachers in three provinces including Limpopo, Gauteng, and Mpumalanga. These provinces were selected because they offered the highest chances of finding Zimbabwean teachers. Like in Zimbabwe, three districts were purposively selected from each province and quota sampling was used to represent private and government schools. Snowball or referral sampling was used to identify the Zimbabwean teachers who are scattered in different districts and private and public schools in South Africa. Snowball sampling is recommended in cases where desired respondents are difficult to locate (Castillo, 2009).

The study considered ethical issues because the teachers participated on the basis of informed consent. In cases when the respondent chose not to participate, a replacement was found from the same school or nearby schools. In addition, the study did not use the names of individuals and schools in order to guarantee their anonymity. Instead, a respondent number was generated and used for identifying the respondents. The questionnaire, which basically involved close-ended questions, was pre-tested through a pilot study conducted both in Zimbabwe and South Africa in order to improve its validity. The pilot study involved five conveniently selected teachers in South Africa and the same number in Zimbabwe. The pre-test improved the content and format of questions and the suggested answers, especially making them clearer and unambiguous to the respondents. One of the challenges of close-ended questions is the lack of clarity of the questions (Babbie, 2010:256).

Analysis of data collected through the quantitative research design consisted of frequency tables, graphs, and the Pearson chi-square test for independence between political violence and the teachers' rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics, and their migration or non-migration to South Africa. Statisticians generally agree on a chi-square value of 0.05 as the threshold of statistical significance. This means that a chi-square significance level less than 0.05, which is statistically significant, indicates the existence of an association between two variables. On the other hand, chi-square values greater than 0.05 suggest the increased likelihood of an observed distribution occurring due to chance. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used both for data entry and analysis.

The major limitation of the study emanated from the fact that the study relied on the teachers' perceptions, which are subjective. The accuracy of the results therefore depended on the assumption that the teachers sincerely and honestly responded to the questionnaires such that their views could be regarded as representing the views of other teachers in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Furthermore, politics is a sensitive topic in Zimbabwe and some of the teachers were not free to respond to the questions on the political dimension of the crisis. Hence, most of the results discussed were obtained from those teachers who were willing or trusted the researcher in order to respond to these questions.

3. Results

The results discussed in this paper are subdivided into three parts, including results that: compare and contrast migrant and non-migrant teachers' experience of political violence at the schools they taught in Zimbabwe and their rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics particularly personal security, freedom of expression and participation; assess the in-depth interviews with some migrant teachers that show how politics helped displace some of the teachers to South Africa; and analyse migrant teachers' reasons for migration or for not being willing to return home.

3.1 Teachers’ experience of political violence and rating of satisfaction regarding Zimbabwean politics

Statistically significant results (p < 0.05) indicated an association between immigration to South Africa and whether the Zimbabwean schools taught by the teachers before or after the 2008 presidential elections were affected by political violence and the extent of the violence. A significantly larger proportion (76%) of migrant teachers than of non-migrant teachers came from schools affected by political violence before or after the March 2008 presidential elections (Table 1). On the contrary, non-migrant teachers dominated among those teachers whose schools were not affected by political violence at all (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Extent of political violence at schools taught by teachers around 2008

Table 1: Whether school taught in Zimbabwe was affected by political violence before or after the 2008 presidential election (n = 192)

	Non-migrants		Migrants
	Number	%	Number	%
School affected by political violence*
Yes	57	59	73	76
No	39	41	23	24
Response to political violence
Retaliated	6	6	3	3
Contributed to migration to South Africa	0	0	63	66
Transferred to another school	15	16	4	4
Remained at same school	40	42	12	13
Left teaching profession	14	14	6	6
Stayed at home	19	20	8	8
Went on strike	2	2	0	0

Note: Some teachers did not complete the section on politics. *Significant at 5% level (p <0.05).

Source: Survey results.

Political violence significantly contributed to the teachers' immigration to South Africa whether the schools taught by the teachers were affected to a large or small extent. But not all teachers from schools affected by political violence migrated, as 42% of the non-migrant teachers remained at the same schools (Table 1). However, most of the teachers including non-migrant and migrant teachers knew a fellow teacher displaced to South Africa or the United Kingdom by violence.

The patterning of political violence by location of school taught in Zimbabwe revealed the existence of an association between both the occurrence and extent of political violence and the location of the school taught by the teachers (p <0.05). While most of the schools affected by political violence were those in rural areas (54%), most of the schools that were not affected at all were in urban areas (63%) (Table 2). Rural schools dominated overwhelmingly among the schools affected by political violence to a large extent. But urban schools dominated among the schools affected by political violence to a small extent or not at all (Table 2). These findings indicated that political violence affected rural schools to a large extent. Since most migrant teachers also came from schools affected by political violence to a large extent, this meant that political violence significantly displaced rural teachers to South Africa. Other factors such as poor salaries and working conditions, which are worse in rural than urban areas, could not account for the larger proportion of teachers migrating from rural schools. School-based reasons including poor accommodation and high workloads were only cited by few teachers as reasons for migration to South Africa (discussed later). Furthermore, salaries were inadequate for both rural and urban teachers due to inflation and the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar.

Table 2: Distribution of political violence before or after the 2008 presidential election by location of school in Zimbabwe (n = 192)

	Urban		Rural
	Number	%	Number	%
School affected by political violence?*
Yes (n = 129)	54	46	75	54
No (n = 63)	40	63	23	37
Extent of political violence*
Large extent (n = 69)	27	39	42	61
Small extent (n = 61)	34	56	26	42
Not at all (n = 62)	39	63	23	37

Note: *Significant at 5% level (p <0.05).

Source: Survey results.

The results of teachers' rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 were statistically significant (p <0.05) and those for the current period were highly significant (p <0.01) (Table 3). There were more mixed feelings among non-migrant teachers than migrant teachers on their satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008. While most of the non-migrant teachers rated their satisfaction as very bad (47%) or bad (18%), other substantial percentages responded with average (neither good nor bad) (14%) and good (18%) (Table 3). On the other hand, there was more consensus among migrant teachers in their ratings as most of them responded with either very bad (55%) or bad (30%). These findings indicated that most of the migrant teachers were not satisfied with Zimbabwean politics in 2008. Although some migrant teachers were not victims of the political violence before or after the 2008 presidential elections and their schools might not have been affected to a large extent, the fact that some of the teachers' schools were affected to a small extent could have explained why the teachers regarded the political situation as unsatisfactory.

Table 3: Rate your satisfaction regarding your personal security, freedom of expression and participation in Zimbabwe in 2008 and currently (n = 192)

Rate of satisfaction	Non-migrants (%)		Migrants (%)
	2008	Current period	2008	Current period
Very bad	47	17	55	24
Bad	18	25	30	32
Neither good nor bad	15	23	11	38
Good	18	27	4	5
Very good	1	8	0	1

Note: Results of 2008 were significant at 5% level (p<0.05), and of the current period at 1% level (p <0.01).

Source: Survey results.

Some of the migrant teachers shifted in their rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics from unsatisfactory in 2008 to average in the current period. This meant that they could not yet rate their satisfaction as good. Substantial percentages of migrant teachers maintained their rating as unsatisfactory even for the current period (Table 3). This meant that considering the migrant teachers' ratings, most of them were still unhappy about the political scenario in Zimbabwe – particularly that they feared for their personal security and were worried about the freedom of expression and participation in the country. The current political situation in Zimbabwe could be helping to retain some of the migrant teachers in South Africa. The distribution of non-migrant teachers' ratings for the current period became more dispersed but with increasing percentages rating satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics as average and satisfactory. There was a significant drop in the percentage of non-migrant teachers who were unsatisfied between 2008 and the current period (in 2012). Hence, the teachers' rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics seemed to be polarised particularly in the current period where non-migrant teachers were more satisfied with the current political situation and migrant teachers were more suspicious.

Further categorisation of this variable into unsatisfactory, neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory, and satisfactory produced more significant results, whereby 85% of the migrant teachers rated their satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 as unsatisfactory and a lower percentage (66%) of the non-migrants rated the same for this period. While taking into consideration the possibilities of ex-post rationalisations, these findings suggested that the teachers' dissatisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 significantly contributed to their migration to South Africa. This partly explains why there was an influx of Zimbabwean teachers into South Africa in 2008. The fact that the economic crisis also reached its peak in 2008 makes dissatisfaction with politics and ‘hunger’ (i.e. inadequate income to afford basic needs and their inaccessibility on the local market) the major drivers of Zimbabwean teachers' migration to South Africa.

The main reason why both non-migrant and migrant teachers were dissatisfied with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 was violence and victimisation of opposition party members and supporters. Violence was in the form of people being arrested or abducted, beaten or tortured, and killed or murdered, and it was perpetrated by war veterans, militia groups and soldiers who are ZANU-PF diehard supporters. ‘We were beaten by ZANU-PF soldiers and war veterans’, said a migrant teacher. Most of the teachers were afraid of false accusations and victimisation on the basis of hatred or jealousy. Another migrant teacher commented that teachers' lives were at risk during this period: ‘It was war, and war is not good’.

The second reason why both groups of teachers were unsatisfied with politics in Zimbabwe in 2008 was the lack of freedom of expression and association. Some of the non-migrant teachers had the following to say: ‘People could not say how they feel about leaders; the truth would not set you free’. Migrant teachers had more to say about the lack of freedom of expression and association than their non-migrant counterparts:

Anyone talking bad about the ruling party was deemed the enemy; we could not openly and safely discuss political issues; criticism of the ruling party was not permitted; it was dangerous for one to be vocal; and, once you were heard saying something against the ruling party, you were lucky to be in a prison cell, otherwise you died.

In other words, the ruling party (ZANU-PF) promoted a culture of silence, which is not consistent with democratic societies. The culture of silence was enforced by secret service agents called the Central Intelligence Organisation and other community informers. ‘One could not trust anyone’, said a non-migrant teacher.

Some of the teachers' views indicated that they were forced to vote for the ruling party instead of exercising their own choices, especially in 2008. ‘People were forced to accept what they did not want; we were told where to place our votes; and, people were forced to vote ZANU-PF’, mentioned some non-migrant and migrant teachers. A migrant teacher commented that soldiers were made observers at polling stations and this further provided enough intimidation for the people to vote the ruling party. All of these gimmicks indicated that the ZANU-PF ruling party was desperate to win the election and guaranteed that the opposition would not rule the country. In addition, the ruling party cheated or rigged elections. Democracy through the ballot, which the ruling party claimed to uphold throughout the crisis, was merely on paper rather than in practice, especially during that period.

Other aspects of democratic societies such as rule of law, transparency and the upholding of human rights were also lacking in the country in 2008, as indicated by the teachers' views. For instance, some of the migrant teachers indicated that they were not protected by the police from political violence: ‘No one cared about anyone’. As other researchers argue, the Public Order and Security Act, which was passed during the crisis, was interpreted selectively by the police against members of the opposition (Mashingaidze, 2006). There was also autocracy as everything appeared to be ZANU-PF controlled. Public information was censored and the industry was controlled by the ruling party, ZANU-PF.

A few teachers who were mostly non-migrants were satisfied with Zimbabwean politics in 2008. These teachers probably came from areas that were not affected at all by political violence, especially urban areas. The main reason for the positive rating was because they were not involved in politics. ‘Victimisation depended on participation in politics’, commented a non-migrant teacher. A few other non-migrant teachers were satisfied because they were never victimised or never witnessed anyone being arrested or beaten for expressing one's political opinions. Other non-migrant teachers were convinced that there was no violence in Zimbabwe in 2008 and that people moved and voted freely. Such comments, which are often claimed by the ruling party in the public media, cannot surmount the large volume of evidence that argue to the contrary. Although some areas of the country were really not affected by politically motivated violence in 2008, such areas are fewer than those which witnessed this violence.

The majorities of both non-migrant and migrant teachers believed that Zimbabwean politics were still unsatisfactory even in the current period (in 2012). This was because the major political problems faced in 2008 remained in place even in the current period, including lack of freedom of expression and association, censorship and the lack of transparency, and intimidation and violence against opposition party members. ‘Intimidation is still there; there is no change in the use of state organs in spreading fear; nothing changed politically’, reported some of the migrant teachers. The migrant teachers held more pessimistic views especially if the ruling party was going to lose elections in future: ‘Everything depends on whether the ruling party wins; if results are not good for ZANU-PF there is victimisation’.

All of these sentiments from the migrant teachers helped explain why most of them still remain in the diaspora, and if not guaranteed of political stability, they are likely to remain in the diaspora in the foreseeable future. It seems migrant teachers were more worried about the lack of freedom of expression and association in Zimbabwe than their non-migrant counterparts. This suggests that this aspect should have contributed significantly to their emigration.

The study also asked why teachers were victimised in the violence that occurred towards the 2008 presidential run-off election. Most of the teachers were of the view that the ruling party believed that teachers supported or sympathised with the opposition, MDC. This means that in some cases teachers were innocent victims. ‘Teachers were believed to be anti-government; they were believed to be for the opposition; they were perceived as MDC members; ruling party afraid that teachers would influence pupils against it; teachers accused of politicising people’, responded some of the teachers.

The belief that teachers would turn voters against the ruling party was sometimes because teachers were the most knowledgeable people in the community and they could see what was going wrong in the economy and government:

Educated and know their rights; teachers are the educated people in the community; they had access to information such as satellite televisions; they interact with the community; they know their rights and could mobilise society to resist oppression; they are respected in community and were likely to cause change; teachers can spread the truth.

Finally, the belief that teachers supported the opposition could have been based on actual facts because some teachers were really opposition party members. But even if they were members, they had the democratic right to support any party they wanted. This shows the political intolerance of the ruling party, ZANU-PF. The comments of a few teachers suggested that teachers actually influenced pupils against voting for the ruling party, especially pupils over 18 years old who were legible to vote: ‘Teachers were teaching pupils to change; teachers taught politics to pupils; teachers were very supportive of MDC and focused on change’.

3.2 In-depth interviews with migrant teachers

Three migrant teachers who previously taught at rural secondary schools in Zimbabwe, two of whom were directly pushed into migration by political violence in Zimbabwe, were interviewed in depth. Mr G is a specialised mathematics and science teacher aged 43 years and teaching in Gauteng province. He arrived in South Africa in 2008. Prior to his immigration to South Africa he taught at a rural mission school in Masvingo province. He was the Secretary for the MDC for his constituency from 2000: ‘As a former secretary of the MDC, I have first-hand information on the cruelty of ZANU-PF's bloody tactics to steal the election victory’. After a tip-off from ZANU-PF insiders, he disappeared from the constituency towards the March 2002 presidential elections. But his house and the property therein were damaged by violent youths from the Border Gezi Training Centre: ‘My house, which I built with the meagre salaries from the Ministry of Education, became a kraal for goats and donkeys since the doors and windows were shattered by ZANU-PF youths’.

During the campaign periods for most of the elections held after March 2002, Mr G went into hiding and only appeared during voting: ‘[he] earnestly wanted my vote to be counted’. Towards the March 2008 presidential elections, he was alerted again by a ZANU-PF insider that his luck for survival could run out since ZANU-PF resolved to unleash violence against opposition members during the election:

Since I was already at loggerheads with ZANU-PF officials in my constituency, getting out of the country was the only option. I tried to seek a transfer to another district for the sake of my safety but all was in vain. The Deputy Regional Director in the Ministry of Education for Masvingo Province, who was a ZANU-PF cadre, thwarted my efforts at transferring.

This is how Mr G ended up moving to South Africa. His story shows that teachers that participated actively in politics were mainly victimised in political violence or had to flee the country for safety.

The second teacher whose immigration to South Africa was directly driven by political violence is another mathematics and science teacher aged around 46 years teaching in Limpopo province. Mr MG is among the first batch of Zimbabwean teachers recruited in Limpopo province around April 2007. Previously, he taught at a mainly white private school in Johannesburg. Before moving to South Africa, he also taught for two years in Botswana. He left Botswana because of a new policy that required one-half of the staff at all schools to be constituted by Tswana teachers: ‘At the school I taught, all teachers were foreigners except for the administrative and supporting staff’. The school used the ‘late to arrive, first to go’ principle to screen out some of the excess foreigners, including himself.

What made Mr MG move to Botswana in the first place? ‘Politics’, he answered: ‘Twenty-seven out of thirty teachers at our school [name provided] were forced to leave by ZANU-PF youths who were backed by the central intelligence organisation (CIO). They also looted our hard-earned property’. The researcher became curious to hear more and that is when he narrated the whole ordeal. Mr MG was the MDC Secretary for his constituency in rural Chikomba district of Mashonaland East province: ‘They always targeted the Secretary because he was the one with the list of members’. It was in early 2000 when Mr MG and other teachers at his school attended the official launch of the MDC in Chitungwiza, Harare: ‘We were then tasked to introduce the party in our constituency’. When they started to campaign for the MDC opposition party, the ZANU-PF ruling party was silent. Later and towards the 2000 parliamentary elections, a ZANU-PF insider in the constituency informed Mr MG and the other teachers that ZANU-PF resolved to unleash violence on all opposition members: ‘In our constituency they had already beaten up and wounded some MDC members and they were after us’.

Mr MG and the other teachers went into hiding in Harare hotels. But members of the Central Intelligence Organisation tracked them down and on one occasion they accidentally met the ZANU-PF Youth League Chairman for their constituency, who hated them so much. MDC officials, who sponsored their hibernation, finally instructed them to move to the eastern city of Mutare and far away from the mounting pressure. On their way to Mutare, some of the teachers blundered as they suggested going via the school: ‘When we arrived at the local shopping centre, we were immediately surrounded with guns pointing at us’. They were in the custody of the ruling party's agents for five months being subjected to different types of torture, which included mental torture. They were finally pardoned and released back to their school. Towards the 2002 presidential election they were ordered to attend ZANU-PF rallies, which they refused, mimicking that they were not supposed to be politically active as civil servants. That is when they were ordered to leave the school without anything.

The third in-depth interview with Mr N, aged 40 years, who also taught in rural Chikomba district of Mashonaland East Province but was not an active member of the opposition, showed how some teachers politicised pupils against the ruling party:

ZANU-PF youths and war veterans descended on our school when we were at assembly. They ordered me as the Acting Head of the school to chant the ZANU-PF slogan. When my fellow teachers failed to chant the slogan to their satisfaction, they were allegedly associated with the opposition.

Some of these teachers were actually influencing the pupils, especially those aged over 18 years and eligible to vote, against voting for the ruling party. Some of them were distributing t-shirts for the MDC, which Mr N refused to take: ‘They were forced to surrender the t–shirts and confess their resignation from the opposition. Immediately, they were ordered to buy membership cards for the ruling party, ZANU-PF’. All this was done under intimidation, persecution and even torture. Mr N did not migrate then, but later in 2010 after realising that his income continued to be inadequate for his family's needs. Other researchers found that Mashonaland East province, which used to be the stronghold for ZANU-PF support together with the other two Mashonaland provinces, was one of the provinces most affected by political violence after the March 2008 presidential elections (Raftopoulos, 2009).

The three in-depth interviews indicated that most of the teachers were desperate for change in the political system and this resulted in some of them actively campaigning for the newly formed opposition party, the MDC, especially in the early 2000s. As other researchers argued, the ruling party used violence again opposition members in order to regain its waning support (Mashingaidze, 2006). The teachers were mainly victimised because some of them were actual members of the MDC. For some of these teachers, violence did not only involve intimidation, persecution or torture, but also the destruction and looting of hard-earned properties. Those who were not politically active were less likely to be victimised and this is probably why some teachers could not leave the country. The story by Mr N showed how some teachers were forcibly recruited into the ruling party membership, which echoes some of the migrant teachers' sentiments that they were forced to vote for the ruling party. Hence, the finding that most of the migrant teachers were not happy about Zimbabwean politics in 2008 was not a surprise. Politics in 2008 should have significantly contributed to the influx of teachers who arrived in South Africa around this time.

3.3 Migrant teachers’ reasons for migration and unwillingness to return home

Analysis of reasons for migration revealed that political violence or repression was the second major driving force behind the immigration of teachers to South Africa after inadequate salaries (Table 4). Furthermore, political violence might not have been the major reason for migration but it did play a role in influencing some of the teachers into migration. These results further supported the findings of the extent of political violence at Zimbabwean schools taught by the teachers, the teachers' rating of satisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008, and a few migrant teachers' in-depth interviews, all of which indicated that politics significantly ‘pushed’ teachers into migration to South Africa. Despite not being direct victims of political violence, other migrant teachers were indirectly ‘pushed into migration’ as most of them were dissatisfied with Zimbabwean politics.

Table 4: Teachers' reasons for migration and non-migration (n = 200)

Reason for non-migration	%	Reasons for migration	%
Lack of information	7	Poor accommodation/other services	8
Lack of kin/friend in diaspora	12	High workload/lack of materials	6
Husband or relatives disapprove	8	Expensive food or shortages	36
Family roles and responsibilities	40	Political violence or repression	36
Lack money to process papers	13	Inadequate salary	76
Subject taught not in demand	17	Fellow teachers migrating	11
Do not have a degree	7	No future for me or children	21
Fear of violence or crime	33	Lack of promotion/movement to better school	1
Love for the country	21	Need for further studies	8
Want to be close to family	51	Inadequate incentives	27
Given adequate incentives	4	Join spouse	4
Job security, pension or other benefits	13	Teachers lost dignity or respect	30

Source: Survey results.

It is worth noting from the reasons for non-migration (Table 4) that some of the teachers could not migrate because of love for the country. Although it was the fourth most common reason for non-migration, love for the country implied patriotism. This meant that even when the country went through hard times, some of the teachers still felt that ‘home was best’. Such findings were consistent with the earlier findings that some non-migrant teachers believed there was no political violence in Zimbabwe and people moved and voted freely in 2008 when there was enough evidence to the contrary.

Further analysis of the role of politics in this migration involved patterning of reasons for migration by year the teachers arrived in South Africa. The results of this analysis revealed that economic reasons (i.e. inadequate salaries) superseded political violence or repression in all three periods; that is, before 2008, 2008, and after 2008 (Table 5). But when economic reasons were measured using expensive or the shortage of foodstuffs, there was a more interesting pattern. Political violence or repression dominated over expensive foodstuffs or the shortage of foodstuffs as reasons for migration among the teachers that arrived in South Africa before 2008. But among those who arrived in 2008 and after, expensive or shortage of foodstuffs dominated over political violence or repression. The contribution of political violence or repression to the teachers' migration to South Africa significantly dropped in the after-2008 period. These results suggested that political violence or repression was responsible mostly for the migration of teachers that arrived in South Africa before 2008. This was consistent with the results of the teachers' in-depth interviews, which indicated that some of the teachers, especially those who were politically active, actually escaped from the country before the March 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Table 5: Period arrived in South Africa by reasons for migration (n = 100)

Reason	Before 2008 (%)	2008 (%)	After 2008 (%)
Poor accommodation / other services	0	13	9
High workload / lack of materials	0	7	13
Expensive food or shortages	35	36	41
Political violence or repression	46	32	28
Inadequate salary	85	65	78
Fellow teachers migrating	12	7	13
No future for me or children	8	26	28
Lack of promotion / movement to better school	4	0	0
Need to further studies	8	13	6
Inadequate incentives**	8	26	41
Join spouse	0	3	6
Teachers lost dignity or respect	31	29	25

Note: **significant at 1% level (p <0.01).

Source: Survey results.

Finally, about 55% of the migrant teachers recently thought about returning to Zimbabwe, and a few of them seriously so (Figure 2). The major reason for thinking about returning home was to reunite with families in Zimbabwe. On the contrary, 45% of the migrant teachers never thought about returning home. This was mainly because some have made up their minds to permanently stay in South Africa with their families due to the lack of political stability and poor salaries in Zimbabwe:

Figure 2: Migrant teachers' job satisfaction and migration plans

Source: Survey results.

Home is best, if politics are stable I will go; Zimbabwean economy is still poorly managed; salary is still low in Zimbabwe and the political situation is not yet fine; there are no better opportunities in Zimbabwe; I lost interest in Zimbabwe; I intend settling down with family in South Africa.

These were some of the migrant teachers' reasons for not being willing to return to Zimbabwe.

4. Conclusions

Although it was the second most mentioned reason for the teachers' migration to South Africa, the role played by political violence or repression in Zimbabwe in causing this migration should not be underplayed. This study showed that teachers in Zimbabwean schools that were affected by political violence to a large extent, most of which were in rural areas, predominated among the migrant teachers. Furthermore, overwhelming majorities of migrant teachers were dissatisfied with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 and still felt that not much has been done to improve the political environment in Zimbabwe in the current period (in 2012). While dissatisfaction with Zimbabwean politics in 2008 significantly contributed to the teachers' migration to South Africa, current dissatisfaction has caused some of the teachers not to think about returning home or think about settling down in South Africa permanently.

Some of the teachers actively participated in politics, especially as members of the MDC opposition party. Some of these teachers held important positions in the MDC such as secretaries for constituencies as they were the most educated people, especially in rural areas. Others sold MDC regalia and taught politics to pupils. These teachers are among those who were directly ‘pushed’ into migration as they escaped from the looming violence or left after being abducted, tortured and then released by supporters of the ruling party. But all this amounted to the ruling party's intolerance of opposition since the teachers had the right to choose which party to support. Migrant teachers' dissatisfaction with Zimbabwean politics was not only premised on political violence, but also other political issues such as the lack of freedom of expression or association, the ruling party's autocratic rule, and its use of force to win votes.

However, not all teachers who were in Zimbabwean schools that were affected by political violence to a large extent migrated because of politics. Despite teaching in one of the most affected provinces (Mashonaland East), one of the migrant teachers who responded to the in-depth interviews was not pushed into migration by politics but inadequate salary during the use of multiple currencies in the country. This was echoed by some non-migrant teachers, who reported that victimisation was based on participation in politics. This makes the migration of Zimbabwean teachers to South Africa more complex than simple classifications of voluntary and involuntary since some of the teachers were never victimised in the violence or never saw or heard of anyone victimised politically. Other non-migrant teachers actually claimed that there was no violence in Zimbabwe and that people moved and voted freely and were even free to express their political opinions. This is probably one of the reasons why the country is politically divided.

Lessons that emerged from the study included that politics, especially undemocratic strategies aimed at clinging to power, used by the ruling party (ZANU-PF) helped destroy one of the models of successful universalising education since the Zimbabwean education system actually collapsed in 2008. Politics also caused the country to lose some of the most qualified and experienced teachers, most of whom specialised in mathematics and science subjects. Some of these teachers were actually trained by the government through the Zimbabwe–Cuba cooperation in the training of mathematics and science teachers. Hence, overstaying in power actually caused the ZANU-PF-led government to reverse all the strides that it had made earlier in economic and social development.

For the country to regain its steps towards development, there is need to make the political and economic environment more conducive again for retaining educated and skilled citizens. Some of the teachers mentioned that Zimbabwean politics were getting better because political leaders were discouraging violence. If such campaigns are already in place, they should be strengthened, and the leaders of both parties should get involved in good faith. There is also the need for reconciliation among the two major parties, the MDC and ZANU-PF, so that they let bygones be bygones. The current situation where some migrant teachers are afraid of being victimised if they return to Zimbabwe or if the ruling party loses is not good for the re-building of the country. Finally, more effort should be put first towards stabilising politics rather than starting with stabilising the economy, since this would follow automatically after a stable political environment is reached.