Sustaining the developmental state and moving towards a developed state in Botswana

ABSTRACT

African countries that emerged from colonialism as poor then adopted developmental states to direct their economic development. Using an interpretivist research philosophy, a survey research strategy and document analysis, this descripto-explanatory article asks two research questions: how did the developmental state emerge in Botswana; and how can Botswana sustain the developmental state and, subsequently, move beyond it and graduate into the ranks of high-income developed states? The article finds that the poor state of underdevelopment at independence in September 1966 forced the choice of a developmental state into the hands of Botswana. Furthermore, the discovery of high-value minerals, particularly diamonds, coupled with a prudent mineral management policy, helped Botswana to finance a development state. The article further argues that for Botswana to move beyond the development state, there is a need to adopt initiatives such as mainstreaming the developed state ideal into Vision 2036 and National Development Plan 11.

KEYWORDS:

• Underdevelopment
• development
• developmental state
• Botswana

1. Introduction

The African countries, except Liberia (although it was briefly a colony) and Ethiopia, were colonised by western powers. This colonialism left the legacy of underdevelopment in Africa. To graduate from underdevelopment, the African countries made development their top priority. Although none of these countries had formalised developmentalism as an official economic development policy, they crafted developmental states by notably spending on education and physical infrastructure. The term ‘developmental state’ was originally associated with East Asian economies, chiefly Japan (Johnson, 1982). According to Kieh (2015), there are two types of developmental state: authoritarian (e.g. South Korea); and liberal democratic (e.g. Botswana and Mauritius). There is no universal meaning for the ‘developmental state’ (Stubbs, 2009). Therefore, its meaning is disputed and evolving (Evans, 2010a, 2010b). Several authors have attempted to define this term (e.g. Johnson, 1982; Cumings, 1984; Leftwich, 1995, 2010; Fritz & Menocal, 2006; Stubbs, 2009) although its constituent elements are problematic (Routley, 2014).

Although there is no universal definition of the term ‘developmental state’, there is a consensus that such a state is one in which the government assumes a leading role in the development process (Johnson, 1982; Cumings, 1984; White, 1992; Fritz & Menocal, 2006) and is the primary agent of socio-economic change (Edge, 1998). In a similar vein, Beeson (2007:141) holds that the developmental state ‘has become a generic term to describe governments that try to actively “intervene” in economic processes and direct the course of development rather than relying on market forces’. Some of the defining features of prototype Asian-type developmental states are: development-oriented political leadership; autonomous and effective bureaucracy; production-oriented private sector; performance-oriented governance (Meyns & Musamba, 2010); and competent bureaucracy and embedded autonomy (Kasahara, 2013). Lastly, added to the definitional issues are disagreements concerning what counts as developmental outcomes (Routley, 2012). Amongst others, developmental states are associated with economic growth (Mkandawire, 2001). Also, some argue that growth must be accompanied by features such as legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000).

It should be noted that there is a significant contention about the correlation between the developmental state and development (Beeson, 2003). However, Beeson argues that history supports the correlation between these two variables. In a similar vein, Chang (2002) argues that leading market economies, and also chief proponents of the market such as the United Kingdom and the United States, benefitted from state assistance during their industrialising phases. Hence, at the end of the day, it is very difficult to imagine how a country, particularly a developing one, can develop without state assistance. There is thus reason to believe that the developmental state will endure in the trajectory of development, particularly in crisis-prone Africa.

This article defines a developmental state as one ‘in which the government deliberately, or calculatedly, takes a decision to intervene and direct the economy’. Vital to note, a developmental state is a growth-enhancing state. Amongst other factors, this entails rent-seeking behaviour (see for example Krueger [1974] on this term) on the part of the government for the greatest good for the greatest number, à la Jeremy Bentham (1789). In this regard, a developmental state is a not a predatory one which is extractive, but is growth impeding; a typical example being Zaire, as argued by Evans (2012). Furthermore, a developmental state is not necessarily a socialist or social-democratic state because it fosters a strong partnership between the public and private sectors. This feature clearly distinguishes it from a socialist or social-democratic state. It is important to note that the developmental state is a transitory stage. That is, countries would want to advance to the status of developed state as the final stage.

The developmental state concept was formulated as a description in 1982 by Johnson (1982). However, the practice predates his formulation as sufficiently instanced by the creation of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan in 1949 to, amongst others, coordinate industrial development. It is worth noting that the developmental state predated the first formulation by Johnson and was adopted by newly de-colonised states in Africa beginning in the 1960s to graduate themselves out of underdevelopment. The practice endured in Africa but suffered a major retreat in the 1980s as a result of reduced state sizes ordered by multi-lateral bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank through Structural Adjustment Programmes. It suffered another assault in the 1990s due to public sector reforms such as New Public Management. However, the effects of the global economic crisis brought back the developmental state in the form of economic stimulus packages. Thus, the crisis ‘ … rekindled discussion on the role and nature of the state in the development process’ (UNECA, 2011:95). Thus, in 2011, the UN Economic Commission on Africa called for developmental states to deal with post-recession challenges in Africa (Africa Focus, 2011). It argued that African countries ‘ … needed a developmental state that can facilitate rapid economic, democratic and social transformation in the post-adjustment era in Africa’ (UNECA, 2011:96). Hence, the government’s developmental role in Africa became more visible in the post-crisis era. Governments were retreating from the axiom of private sector-led economic growth. In a way, it was apparent that the private sector could not grow and develop the economy unaided by the state. To illustrate, following a declining revenue envelope due to a fall in the demand for diamonds resulting from the global economic crisis, the government’s developmentalist role in Botswana assumed a new dimension. The government was forced to stimulate the economy through deficit financing (see for example Gaolathe, 2009:30).

This article contributes to existing literature by firstly suggesting how to sustain the developmental state, and secondly proposing ways to move beyond it. In terms of structure, this article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methods and then Section 3 explores whether Botswana is a developmental state. Section 4 discusses the emergence of a democratic developmental state in Botswana, Section 5 discusses the Diamonds for Development Policy and developmentalism and Section 6 discusses lessons from the developmental state in Botswana. Section 7 then proposes initiatives that Botswana can adopt to move beyond the developmental state and become a high-income economy and Section 8 concludes.

2. Methods

This article reports on a descriptive study that seeks to describe the emergence of a developmental state in Botswana. Furthermore, the study probes the reasons that led to the developmental state in Botswana, hence its explanatory dimension. This twin orientation makes it a descripto-explanatory paper (see for example Saunders et al. [2009] for a definition of descripto-explanatory study). The study was grounded in an interpretivist research philosophy and used a survey research strategy, utilising a number of secondary data sources – for example, policy documents and budget speeches and laws (e.g. the Mines and Minerals Act 1967 [Republic of Botswana, 1967]) and policies of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The BDP has ruled Botswana since 1965, and has since guided economic and development policy in Botswana. In terms of data analysis, the study used document analysis to answer two research questions: how did the developmental state emerge in Botswana; and how can Botswana sustain the developmental state and, subsequently, move beyond it and graduate into the ranks of high-income developed states?

3. Is Botswana a developmental state?

Is Botswana a developmental state? Some scholars argue that Botswana is a developmental state (Leftwich, 1995; Edge, 1998; Tsie, 1998; Maundeni, 2000, 2008; Hwedi, 2001; Mkandawire, 2001; Taylor, 2003, 2005; Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005; Lockwood, 2006; Maphunye, 2009; Meyns, 2010; Dassah, 2011; Sims, 2012; Thovoethin, 2014; Kieh, 2015). Edge (1998:333) puts it in concrete terms, saying that ‘ … Botswana is a developmental state comparable to those of the Asian Tigers’ and ‘replicable in Southern Africa’. Edge further argues that ‘Botswana’s state structure after independence was originally created for the purpose of development administration as opposed to facilitating the administration of public services’ (1998:333). Similarly, Tsie (1998:13) argues that ‘Botswana is a democratic developmental state in the sense that it has promoted rapid economic growth and capitalist development without abandoning democratic norms and practices’. Likewise, Taylor (2003:37) concedes that ‘Botswana, alongside Mauritius, belongs to a category of countries outside Asia whose phenomenal levels of growth have earned them the label so-called “development states”’. Similarly, Mothusi (2010:3) holds that ‘the strength and influence of a developmental state that emerged after independence are felt in all spheres of society, social, economic and political’. Sims (2012) argues that Botswana is a developmental state for the following reasons: the country beat the traps; the country achieved sustained levels of growth; and the country displayed key elements of the developmental state model. Lastly, in a comparative study of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia, Hwedi (2001) argues that only Botswana and Mauritius are successful development states. The same view – that only Botswana and Mauritius are successful development states in Africa – is shared by Kieh (2015).

On the one hand, scholars such as Hillbom (2012) disagree with the claim that Botswana is a developmental state – see Taylor’s (2012) dissent to Hillbom (2012). Hillbom argues that Botswana cannot be labelled an African developmental state on account of its exceptional economic growth and social development. Using Frederick Cooper’s gate-keeping state model (a state that balances the instability of internal political control against the influence of external factors; see Cooper, 2005), Hillbom builds an alternative model for Botswana. Hillbom argues that ‘ … from the 1930s until the present, Botswana has experienced a state structure characterised by natural resource dependency, lack of economic diversification, a dual society, selective social development and a close connection between the economic and political elite’ (2012:67). Furthermore, Hillbom argues that while Botswana’s socio-economic development is not in doubt, its achievement ‘is better understood as the efforts of a development-oriented gate-keeping state rather than a developmental state’ (2012:67).

Despite these diametrically opposed views, this article argues that Botswana is a developmental state. This position is based on Leftwich’s (1995, 2000:160–5) six characteristics of a developmental state: a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and legitimacy and performance. In agreement with authors such as Taylor (2012) and Hwedi (2001), this article argues that Botswana meets all but one of the foregoing ‘Leftwichian’ characteristics of a developmental state. To provide justification for this position, Botswana’s developmental record is refracted through the ‘Leftwichian’ prism:

• A determined developmental elite: When Botswana gained independence on 30 September 1966, it was one of the poorest countries in the world. Its economy was agrarian based and there were no high-value minerals such as diamonds at that time. The BDP took a deliberate decision to pursue a developmentalist route. Amongst others, this entailed the crafting of the first National Development Plan (NDP; 1968–73), which supplanted Botswana’s Transitional Plan for Social and Economic Development prepared in 1965. The NDPs are guided by the objectives of sustained development, rapid economic growth, economic independence and social justice. However, the promotion of economic growth and economic development are key objectives of the NDPs. As a result of these macroeconomic interventions, growth accelerated significantly after independence and was at its highest in the 1970s (Tregenna, 2006). Growth peaked in the early 1970s, with annual real gross domestic product growth rates of about 26% in 1971 and 1972, and this continued until the 1980s with a slowdown experienced in the 1990s (Tregenna, 2006). Thereafter, as the global economy experienced first a financial crisis and then an economic crisis, growth slowed down and even contracted. Botswana’s economic growth trajectory is presented in Table 1.

  Botswana’s diamond export-reliant economic growth shrank during the last global economic crisis. The worst year was 2009 when the economy grew by –4.6% (Mathambo, 2010). However, the government did whatever it could to keep the economy afloat during the crisis years and was lauded by, amongst others, the International Monetary Fund through Article IV Consultation meetings (see for example IMF, 2009, 2010, 2011). Since 2011, the economy has been in the recovery phase. To assist post-crisis recovery, the government launched the Economic Stimulus Programme on 10 October 2015 (Khama, 2015).

• Relative autonomy: This relates to the state’s independence from the demands of special interests (whether class, regional or sectoral) (Leftwich, 1995). Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that there are incidences of state capture by class, regional or sectoral interests. Thus, since independence in 1966, the state has endeavoured to promote national economic development. For instance, it nationalised mineral wealth through the passage of the Mines and Minerals Act in 1967 (see Masire, 2006).

• A powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy: Botswana inherited a poorly trained bureaucratic cadre. Hence, human capital development became a top priority in the post-independence years. This is still the case today, as adequately instanced by huge investments in the educational sector which has seen public servants sent for training in some of the best universities in the world. To date, Botswana has one of the best trained bureaucratic cadre in the sub-region. In a related note, Harvey & Lewis (1990:9) state that ‘considerable attention was paid, particularly within the civil service and the cabinet to putting able people into key positions and keeping them there for extended periods’. Thovoethin (2014:260) sums up the foregoing position, saying that ‘Botswana’s bureaucracy to a very large extent possesses one of the major characteristics of the Weberian ideal bureaucracy in the area of the appointment of personnel on the basis of qualification and experience’. Thus, the bureaucrats are meritoriously appointed unlike in some countries where there is cadre deployment.

• The effective management of non-state economic interests: As stated previously, the state pursues national interests such as national economic development and places them above everything else. It is notable that there is the principle of ‘Botswana First’ which exhorts citizens to put Botswana above all interests; economic and otherwise. This point was clearly articulated by President Ian Khama when delivering the 2011 State of the Nation Address on 7 November, which was themed ‘Botswana First’. He said that ‘we should rather act like a family and do what is in the common interest’ and that, ‘above all, we should have a common understanding that personal and sectional interests need to be balanced against what is in the collective interest of the nation as a whole’ (Khama, 2011:1).

• Legitimacy and performance: Botswana is the longest surviving multiparty democracy in Africa (Sebudubudu, 2005:79). The government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Regarding economic and developmental performance, Botswana has posted developmental success since independence (UNDP, 2014) and its Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2014 was 0.698, thus positioning it 106th out of 188 countries (UNDP, 2015). The 0.698 HDI value for 2014 put the country in the medium human development category (UNDP, 2015).

Table 1. Botswana’s gross domestic product growth, 1960–2004.

	1960–65	1966–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–99	2000–04
Growth (%)	6.31	10.47	15.40	11.35	4.89	4.92

Notes: Data derived from World Bank World Development Indicators.

Source: Tregenna (2006:2).

It can be deduced from the foregoing that Botswana meets all of the ‘Leftwichian’ characteristics of a developmental state except one: a weak and subordinated civil society. While it is true that civil society is weak in Botswana (see for example Molutsi & Holm, 1990; Carbone, 2005), the state does not subordinate it. Largely, it is weak due to a lack of organisational skills and overdependence on foreign funding. This article adopts the position that Botswana is a developmental state because it meets five out of six ‘Leftwichian’ characteristics of a developmental state (a score of 83%).

Vital to note, when Botswana attained independence in September 1966 it did not have enough resources to finance economic and social development, largely because there were no exploitable resources at the time. Despite this situation, the then ruling BDP leadership was resolutely developmentally oriented, as instanced by the primacy it placed on harnessing limited resources to develop Botswana, particularly, through the process of national development planning. Since the first NDP (1968–73), the government of Botswana has directed efforts towards developing the country and raising the standards of living of Botswana. The discovery and exploitation of minerals, particularly diamonds, in the early 1970s, made this possible. Between 1980 and 2013, Botswana’s HDI increased from 0.47 to 0.683 (UNDP, 2014). Consequently, Botswana graduated into the ranks of middle-income countries in mid-1992 (Mmegi, 2006). Despite these developmental achievements, there are development challenges, mainly poverty, unemployment, income inequality, HIV/AIDS, mono economy and middle-income trap. However, these problems are not essentials of a developmental state; they are pathologies. The key question is: how is the state addressing these development challenges?

4. The emergence of a developmental state in Botswana

Botswana, like all colonies, suffered neglect during colonialism, so it was one of the poorest nations in the world when it gained independence on 30 September 1966 (Edge, 1998; Tsie, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2003; Leith, 2005). On account of the foregoing, its economic viability was in doubt. As a result, it was largely held that Botswana would eventually become a Bantustan of then apartheid South Africa and/or be everlastingly dependent on international aid and charity (Munger, 1965; Chiepe, 1973). Despite the unforgiving circumstances, the then (and still) ruling BDP, led by Seretse Khama, had to chart the way forward lest Botswana became independent in name only. Key questions were: which development path/policy should Botswana take; and what role should the state play in the economy? In September 1966, and subsequently, the government took a number of decisions in favour of development, and structured its state organs and relationships with the private sector in a manner that, ex post, can allow one to describe or characterise Botswana as a developmental state. At that time, there were no exploitable high-value minerals such as diamonds. The economy was largely agrarian based and the country also had to deal with erratic and insufficient rainfall and occasional droughts. Ultimately, founding a developmental state from a country that was aid dependent and dominated by an ill-performing agrarian sector became a very difficult project. However, diamonds became a game changer.

Botswana discovered high-value diamonds in the early 1970s. The first diamond deposit was discovered in Orapa in 1972 and production started almost immediately. This was followed by other discoveries of diamond deposits in Letlhakane and Jwaneng. However, this is not to say that there was no mineral exploitation before diamonds. There were other minerals such as copper, nickel, iron and manganese. These were low-value minerals, however, and therefore could not finance the founding of a developmental state. Diamonds were responsible for changing the economic fortunes of Botswana in the mid-1970s. However, it is notable that mineral wealth alone cannot beget economic growth and development. The following fundamental structures need to be put in place: development of a legal–institutional framework of mineral wealth management;¹ development planning and budgeting regime; and trained and apolitical bureaucracy.

4.1. Legal–institutional framework of mineral wealth management

Before Botswana started mining on a big scale, it established a legal–institutional framework for the management of mineral wealth (Botlhale, 2013). The country had to address the following issues: ownership of mineral rights; mining legislation; and mining agreements (Masire, 2006). The then ruling Bechuanaland Democratic Party (now the BDP) was wedded to the belief that mineral rights had to be transferred to the state to ensure even economic development. The party’s pre-independence election manifesto is instructive because it stated that:

Leaving mineral rights vested in tribal authorities and private companies must necessarily result in uneven growth of the country’s economy, as well as deprive the Central Government of an important source of revenue for developing the country  … It will be the policy of the BDP Government to negotiate with all parties concerning the takeover of the country’s mineral rights by the Central Government … (Quoted in Leith, 2005:31)

After independence, the BDP embarked on nationwide negotiations to convince tribes to cede their mineral rights to the state. In the end, this objective was achieved, eventuating in the passage of the Mineral Rights in tribal territories bill into the Mines and Minerals Act 1967. Up to now, the Act, as amended over time, provides the legal–institutional framework of mineral wealth management in Botswana (Botlhale, 2013) and regulates activities such as issuance of exploration and mining licenses (Botlhale, 2015).

4.2. Development planning and budgeting

During its establishment, Botswana did not found a centrally planned economy. Nonetheless, it adopted centralised development planning, paradoxically, combined with decentralised development planning. NDPs guide the overall development of the country (GoB, 2011). Building on the transitional NDP (1963–69), the government formulated the first NDP (1968–73) and development planning has become public policy in the country. The first NDP was revised in 1970. The country is now on the tail-end of NDP 10 and plans are underway to craft NDP 11. Because of the importance of development planning, the activity was located in the Office of the President. Hence, on 30 September 1966, the Vice President became the Minister of Finance and Development Planning. This tradition was maintained until April 1998 when Festus Moage succeeded then president Ketumile Masire. In a related vein, Samatar (1999) credits the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning for having contributed to Botswana’s economic success.

4.3. Trained and apolitical bureaucracy

Botswana inherited a poorly trained bureaucracy, and developing a highly trained bureaucratic cadre therefore became an imperative. Rents from the mineral sector were used to train bureaucrats both locally and abroad. In addition, the principle of meritocracy is used in the public service and bureaucrats are apolitical so as to serve any government in power. This is in contrast to other political jurisdictions, for instance South Africa, where party cadres are deployed into the public service to push the agenda of the ruling party. Overall, the bureaucracy was instrumental in delivering the developmental state in Botswana. In a confirmatory note, Samatar (1999) states that Botswana’s success as a developmental state was facilitated by a professional bureaucracy that implemented public policies efficiently.

Besides these factors, some have tried to explain Botswana’s success (for example Leftwich, 2010; Lewin, 2011; Leith, 2005). For instance, Lewin (2011) attributes the success to history, circumstance, institutions and good policies. On the other hand, Leith (2005) credits Botswana prosperity to a democratic political system, visionary leadership and effective institutions. No matter the causative factors, Botswana has achieved rapid economic growth (see Table 2) and has also delivered an arguably successful developmental state in Africa. Between 1980 and 2014, Botswana’s HDI value increased from 0.453 to 0.698, an increase of 54.1% or an average annual increase of about 1.28% (UNDP, 2015) (see Table 2).

Table 2. Botswana human development indices, 1980–2013.

Year	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	Gross National Income per capita (2011 PPP$)	Human development index value
1980	60.7	7.4	2.3	4 935	0.470
1985	62.7	8.5	3.8	6 025	0.528
1990	62.7	10.0	5.4	7 833	0.583
1995	56.3	10.6	6.6	8 751	0.580
2000	48.7	11.7	7.5	9 611	0.560
2005	54.6	12.0	8.2	10 486	0.610
2010	63.4	11.7	8.8	12 763	0.672
2011	64.0	11.7	8.8	13 930	0.678
2012	64.2	11.7	8.8	14 400	0.681
2013	64.4	11.7	8.8	14 792	0.683

Source: UNDP (2014).

5. Diamonds for development policy and developmentalism

Botswana’s transformation from a poor country to a middle-income economy and the achievement of a developmental state could not have been possible without the contribution of diamonds. This point was articulated by former president Festus Mogae (1998–2008) when giving the Diamonds and Development: The Botswana Story interview to the Center for Global Development (Washington, DC, USA) on 11 October 2006. Emphasising the centrality of the diamonds sector to Botswana’ success story and founding of a developmental state, he said: ‘Botswana’s economic success is in a large measure attributed to the exportation of natural resources, more especially diamonds’ (Mogae, 2006:1).

Because of the fact that the diamonds have been designated as development diamonds,² Botswana has a Diamonds for Development Policy. Former president Festus Mogae was the champion of the Diamonds for Development Policy and presented it in a public lecture at the University of Botswana on 4 September 2007 (Mogae, 2007). The policy was also sold on the African continent. To illustrate, when Mogae was presenting at a seminar in Tunisia on 4 December 2008, he underscored the centrality of the Diamonds for Development Policy in Botswana’s economic development (African Development Bank Group, 2008; Botswana Press Agency, 2008). He also took the message to western countries such as the USA (see for example ‘Mogae takes Diamonds for Development Campaign to the US Capital’; Mmegi, 2006).

6. Lessons from the developmental state in Botswana

There are a couple of specific lessons from Botswana and some of these are outlined in the following.

6.1. The developmental state is imperative and possible in Africa

That Botswana was able to graduate from underdevelopment by adopting a developmental state inarguably demonstrates the fact that the developmental state is an imperative in Africa. Furthermore, Botswana and other developmental states, such as Mauritius, have demonstrated to the world that a successful developmental state in Africa is possible.

6.2. The need for a ruling political party to direct the trajectory of economic development

Before Botswana gained independence, the then Bechuanaland Democratic Party, through its election manifesto, decided to direct the trajectory of economic development in Botswana. The party decided on a developmental state. It decided to nationalise mineral wealth and extract rents from the mineral sector to found a developmental state. Furthermore, the party founded a sound national development planning and budgeting regime and state institutions, and trained a bureaucratic cadre.

6.3. The development of a legal–institutional framework of mineral wealth management

Botswana has demonstrated that resource blessings need not degenerate into resource curses (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Iimi, 2007; Coutinho, 2011; Pegg, 2012) and Dutch disease (Makochekanwa, 2006; Pegg, 2010; Lewin, 2011). The country did so by developing a sound legal–institutional framework of mineral wealth management. This model is largely replicable in Africa.

7. Moving towards a high-income developed state in Botswana

A developmental state, while desirable, is not the end point. It is a transitory stage and the final stage is a high-income developed economy status. Hence, for Botswana to graduate into the ranks of a high-income developed economy it should adopt some of the following initiatives.

7.1. Mainstreaming the developed state ideal into Vision 2036

In 1997 Botswana launched Vision 2016, a long-term vision that was to end on 30 September 2016. At the same time, it is in the process of crafting a new vision, Vision 2036, whose 34-member task team was appointed by President Ian Khama on 20 October 2015 (Botswana Press Agency, 2015a). Because the national vision encapsulates national aspirations, it is important that the ideals of the developed state should be mainstreamed into Vision 2036 to ensure national ownership and ultimate success.

7.2. Mainstreaming the developed state ideal into National Development Plan 11

NDP 10 is coming to an end and, currently, the government is crafting NDP 11 (Botswana Press Agency, 2015b). This therefore gives the government the opportunity to mainstream the developed state ideal into NDP 11. Thus, NDP 11 and subsequent development plans will ensure the rooting of the idea of a developed state. This will build a grand coalition around the idea of a developed state.

7.3. An expanded public–private partnership regime

Botswana adopted the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Policy in 2009 (see Republic of Botswana, 2009). However, its uptake has been slow, as instanced by few PPP projects (e.g. office of the Ombudsman; see Botlhale, 2016). Given revenue challenges since 2008 because diamonds are not selling well, coupled with projections that diamond revenue will be depleted in 2029 (Basdevant, 2008) and uncertainty from the Southern African Customs Union’ revenue (Flatters & Stern, 2005; Grynberg & Motswapong, 2012), there is a need to tap into private capital to finance economic development. There is therefore a need to use PPPs to finance development projects, benchmark and peer learn from established PPP regimes in the sub-region, such as South Africa, and beyond.

7.4. Public project implementation

Finally, the success of PPPs, budgets, NDPs and Vision 2036 is firmly predicated on successful project implementation. Therefore, given Botswana’s chequered history of public project implementation (see for example Maruapula, 2008; Mathambo, 2014, 2015), there is a need for improved project implementation. Also, and in a related vein, there is a need to speed up the implementation of the National Monitoring and Evaluation System for Botswana.

8. Conclusion

Emerging from colonialism as one of the poorest nations in the world on 30 September 1966, Botswana adopted a developmental state policy to graduate from economic underdevelopment. This was a difficult project then because there were no high-value minerals such as diamonds. However, the discovery and exploitation of diamonds in the 1970s, coupled with a prudent mineral wealth management policy (particularly Diamonds for Development Policy), graduated Botswana into the ranks of middle-income countries in mid-1992 and delivered one of the few successful development states in Africa. The country’s Gross National Income per capita increased by about 401.5% between 1980 and 2014. While Botswana is a developmental success, it is faced with development challenges such as poverty, unemployment, income inequality, mono economy and middle-income trap. However, it should be borne in mind that the foregoing are pathologies of a developmental state, not its essentials. Therefore, moving forward, there is a need to develop policy responses to these challenges to sustain the developmental state. In a related sense, Botswana should move beyond the developmental state and graduate into the ranks of high-income developed states as expressly stated by President Khama (2013). To this end, it should adopt initiatives such as mainstreaming the developed state ideal into Vision 2036, the increased use of PPPs, adoption of professional project management (particularly the hiring of professional project managers – as opposed to the existing practice of hiring accidental project managers) and the speedy implementation of the National Monitoring and Evaluation System for Botswana.

Acknowledgements

This article is an expanded and revised version of a paper titled ‘The Building of a Democratic Developmental State in Botswana’ presented at the Regional Conference on Building Democratic Developmental States for Economic Transformation in Southern Africa, 20–23 July 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Because of poor mineral wealth management policies, some mineral-rich countries have suffered resource curses.

2 This is in contrast to labels such as blood diamonds that were appended to countries such as Sierra Leone.