From Bolsonaro to Lula: Understanding Brazil’s Passive Neutrality on Palestine and Israel

Abstract

This essay examines Brazil’s foreign policy approach toward Palestine and Israel by comparing the administrations of Presidents Jair Bolsonaro and Lula da Silva. In outlining elements of continuity and discontinuity between them, the essay argues that it is necessary to examine Brazil’s strategic diplomacy regarding Israel’s ongoing illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories and its brutal attacks on Palestinians in light of key structural changes that have occurred in Brazil. These include the growth of the agribusiness sector and the Evangelical Church, both of which have significant influence over the foreign policy choices of successive Brazilian presidential administrations, regardless of their political or ideological leanings. As a result, as this essay shows, neither Bolsonaro nor Lula could fully implement their stated agendas toward Palestine and Israel; indeed, despite the latter’s defense of a two-state solution, this will not translate into punitive measures against Israel, especially given the international permissiveness of Israeli crimes.

Keywords:

• Palestine
• Israel
• Brazil
• foreign policy
• Lula
• Bolsonaro
• agribusiness
• Evangelicalism

Lula da Silva’s triumph in Brazil’s 2022 presidential election created widespread expectations that, following right-wing Jair Bolsonaro’s term, the left-leaning president and member of the Workers’ Party would restore the country’s reputation as a bulwark of democracy and progressive policies domestically, regionally, and globally.¹ Indeed, some of Lula’s stated priorities, which include curbing the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest, strengthening South American integration, and finalizing the trade agreement between the Mercosur and the European Union, were unthinkable during the Bolsonaro years, which were marked by isolationism, disregard for international norms, and antidemocratic values.² As for the country’s foreign policy, analysts predicted a 180-degree shift following Lula’s win.³ Foreign Affairs even published an article under the suggestive title, “The Restoration of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” arguing that “after the tumult of the Bolsonaro years, Brazil can reassert itself as a valuable force on the international stage.”⁴

Among Bolsonaro’s controversial foreign policies was his unbridled support for the Israeli regime and its Zionist project. In fact, during his reelection campaign, many of his supporters waved Israeli flags at his rallies, and on election day in October 2022, the country’s former first lady, Michelle Bolsonaro, was photographed casting her vote in a T-shirt with a print of the Israeli flag.⁵ It is no surprise that Bolsonaro’s endorsement of the Zionist agenda, which includes vowing to move the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a show of support for Israel’s mission to claim the city as its undivided capital, was welcomed by Israel’s far-right leaders like Benjamin Netanyahu.⁶ Concomitantly, Bolsonaro hardly mentioned Palestine or the Palestinians. When he did, he claimed that Palestine was not a country and, therefore, should not have an embassy in Brasília.⁷ Denying Palestinian nationhood or the very existence of a Palestinian people is a common discursive mechanism used by advocates of the Zionist settler-colonial project of establishing a Jewish state in the whole of historic Palestine.⁸

But since Lula’s accession to the presidency in January 2023, two issues have arisen regarding Brazil’s foreign policy on Israel and Palestine. The first relates to the extent to which the new Brazilian president will bring about a significant shift from his predecessor, given that Lula has restored the country’s traditional position of supporting a two-state solution—a position that Bolsonaro did not officially change—but fallen short of pressuring Israel to end its illegal occupation. While it is unlikely that Lula will do so, opposition to a Palestinian state is certainly a far cry from his diplomatic approach. The second issue relates to the consequences that a change in policy could have on Brazil’s diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel and other governments in the region. Indeed, Brazil has become an increasingly important commercial partner of several Middle Eastern states, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This issue is more pressing in light of a range of geopolitical and economic changes currently impacting the region, including: the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the normalization of diplomatic relations between several Arab states and Israel, China’s new role as a global hegemon, Israel’s war on Gaza, and the Israeli national unity, far-right government’s increasingly apartheid and settler-colonial policies in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Situating the analysis within the two aforementioned issues, this essay argues that there are elements of continuity and discontinuity between Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s approaches toward Palestine and Israel. In the case of Bolsonaro, his ideological backing for Israel was not enough to allow him to implement a range of policies. For example, although it is undeniable that commercial relations between Brazil and Israel underwent unprecedented growth during his presidency, the far-right leader was not able to move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem—a clear example of how other actors, such as the Arab League and the Brazilian agribusiness sector, played an important role in constraining him. But this essay argues that the same can be said in the case of Lula. Despite stated sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, representing a departure from Bolsonaro’s policies, Lula and the Workers’ Party will likely continue to abstain from meaningful action to compel Israel to accept Palestinian statehood within the pre-1967 borders. In this essay, I show that this is due to long-standing commercial, security, and evangelical ties between the two countries that were deepened during the Bolsonaro years. Beyond this, I posit that Lula’s inability or unwillingness to significantly shift Brazil’s policy toward Israel, including through sanctions or a range of legal measures, indicates the widespread international permissiveness of Israel’s illegal and apartheid occupation of Palestine, as well as of its recurring violations of Palestinians’ human rights. The permissiveness I refer to is also evident in how the international community failed to decisively exert influence on Israel to halt its violent war on Gaza.

The Foundations of Brazil’s Middle East Foreign Policy

Brazil’s role as a supplier of agricultural commodities to global markets underpins its relationship with the Middle East. The country is the largest net exporter of food commodities in the world and stands among the top five producers of thirty-four agricultural products.⁹ Since 2000, the value of the country’s agricultural exports has been expanding by an average of 10 percent annually and the agribusiness sector accounts for approximately 40 percent of Brazil’s exports.¹⁰ China, the European Union, and the United States are major destinations for Brazilian agricultural exports, receiving almost 55 percent of the total.¹¹ This rapid development of Brazil’s agribusiness industry means that its power to influence political leaders and policymaking is also growing. Indeed, the agribusiness caucus in the National Congress of Brazil, the Agribusiness Parliamentary Front,¹² is well organized and consists of almost 300 Members of Parliament (MP), two-thirds of the total MPs.¹³ Given its capacity to influence legislative debates, the agribusiness lobby has significant leverage on practically every aspect of Brazilian politics and economics, including environmental law, the tax regime, and foreign affairs. As an example, in an April 2023 trip to China and the Arab Gulf, Lula was accompanied by more than two hundred businesspeople, among whom were numerous representatives of the agribusiness sector, as well as politicians and executives who had supported Bolsonaro in the 2022 presidential election.¹⁴

As for the Middle East, in 2022, Brazil exported $18 billion worth of food commodities to Arab countries, $2 billion to Israel, and $2 billion to Iran,¹⁵ the most important of which are sugar, minerals, poultry, and meat. In fact, Brazil is a major supplier of halal meat to the Middle East.¹⁶ But beyond meat, Middle Eastern and North African states count among the world’s largest importers of grains, which means that ensuring reliable sources of agricultural products is a fundamental part of food security in many of these water-scarce countries. As a result, several states in the region consider Brazil a strategic partner. This is especially the case among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, whose strategy is two-fold: importing products from food-producing countries on one side, and investing in these countries’ food industries on the other.¹⁷ For example, the UAE is among the top foreign investors in Brazil, with an estimated $5 billion invested in 2022,¹⁸ and Saudi companies hold stakes in different Brazilian agribusiness companies, especially in the meat sector.¹⁹ Given the region’s increasing importance for Brazil, it is unsurprising that both Bolsonaro and Lula visited the Gulf during their first year in office, and that, until Bolsonaro, successive Brazilian governments adopted diplomatically neutral stances regarding certain issues in the Middle East, especially when it came to commercial partners engaged in political rivalries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. In other words, it is in Brazil’s best interest to prioritize cultivating commercial ties in the region over taking political stances.

Strategic diplomacy has likewise underpinned successive Brazilian governments’ passively neutral policies toward Israel and Palestine. Since the late 1960s, Brazil has consistently supported the right of Palestinians to self-determination and the right of Israel to live in peace with its neighbors, a position Guilherme Casarões and Tullo Vigevani call “equidistance.”²⁰ This stance remained largely unchanged until Bolsonaro’s presidency, during which the Brazilian government expressed a clear bias in favor of Israel. However, importantly, that Brazil has consistently and nominally supported a two-state solution does not mean that any Brazilian government prior to or since Bolsonaro’s was ever willing to actually pressure Israel to end its illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories through sanctions or other punitive measures. In addition to its commercial ties with Israel and its powerful evangelical base, this is due to Brazil’s security and geopolitical priorities. To be sure, Israel is one of Brazil’s key commercial partners, and trade relations between the two countries are more than sixty times higher than those with Palestine. That is, most of the products exported by Brazilian producers to Israel consist of commodities such as oils, mineral fuels, meat, and soybeans,²¹ while trade between Brazil and Palestine consists mostly of meat products, reaching the relatively modest sum of $30 million in 2022.²² What is more, in 2007, Israel became the first country outside of Latin America to sign a trade agreement with the Mercosur.²³

Brazil and Israel also have established security ties since the 1970s, when the former was under military dictatorship. This is due to the international climate created by the Cold War, during which Latin American regimes “favored US-backed military regimes, which were dependent on the use of force for their survival.”²⁴ This contributed to strengthening ties between Israel and several right-wing Latin American governments seeking Israeli weaponry for “suppressing internal dissent.”²⁵ In fact, Lula strengthened these ties during his second presidency (2007–10) when he signed a security cooperation agreement with Israel.²⁶ And in 2014, Brazil hired Israeli security company International Security and Defence Systems, which has had a presence in Latin America since the 1980s, to manage and coordinate security during the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.²⁷ Security coordination between Israel and Brazil is therefore not new, and “Despite the difference between the [Workers’ Party] government’s position toward Israel’s occupation and that of the right-wing presidencies, the material underpinnings of the two countries’ attempts to promote pacification expertise have existed for decades.”²⁸ Indeed, even today, “pacification practices and discourses” in Israel and Brazil are strikingly similar.²⁹

Another factor explaining Brazil’s passive neutrality toward Israel and Palestine relates to geopolitics. In the context of an international community that is unwilling to meaningfully hold Israel accountable for its violations of Palestinians’ rights, Brazil has avoided departing from this tacit consensus and risking retaliation from more powerful countries such as the United States and Russia, which have vested interests in Israel, and which often take opposing stances on global disputes. For example, Brazil’s good relationship with both the United States and Russia explains to a great extent its position of neutrality during the Syrian civil war, a conflict that generated a great deal of disagreement within the international community and among the US and Russian governments.³⁰ Indeed, in 2011, Brazil abstained on two occasions on voting on UN Security Council (UNSC) draft resolutions calling for sanctions against the Syrian regime.³¹ In addition, the normalization and warming of relations between Israel and Brazil’s top commercial allies in the region, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, means that Brazilian exporters would not jeopardize business opportunities with GCC countries and Israel by imposing commercial sanctions on the latter, even as a result of Israel’s brutal 2023 war on Gaza.

The Lingering Effects of the Bolsonaro Years

Bolsonaro’s term enhanced the Brazilian government’s relationship with Israel on multiple fronts. In addition to promising to follow the United States in moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem during his 2018 presidential campaign, the right-wing politician welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu in Brazil in December 2018—the first prime minister of Israel to visit the country. Then, in March 2019, Bolsonaro and a group of Brazilian businesspeople traveled to Israel to negotiate trade initiatives, and while Bolsonaro could not deliver on the promise to transfer the embassy, his administration opened an office in Jerusalem in 2019 to “promote trade, investment, technology, and innovation.”³² Indeed, the most palpable result of Bolsonaro’s new approach toward Israel was seen in trade relations. Between 2019 and 2022, Brazilian exports to Israel increased tremendously by nearly 600 percent, totaling $1.8 billion in 2022,³³ while imports from Israel to Brazil grew by more than 100 percent during the same period. Brazil’s commodities exporters, who largely supported Bolsonaro, benefitted the most from Brazil’s enhanced relationship with Israel and Arab states, exports to which also increased during Bolsonaro’s term, reaching $17.7 billion in 2022.³⁴

Beyond trade, the former Brazilian president’s strong evangelical base in Brazil heavily influenced his policies toward Israel and Palestine. Despite identifying as a Catholic, Bolsonaro developed close ties with several powerful evangelical figures in Brazil, particularly from within the Christian Zionist and staunchly pro-Israel Pentecostal movement, who supported him in the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections.³⁵ As Joseph Williams argues, “Among Pentecostals, the close connection between the mid-century healing revival and fascination with Zionist efforts illustrated the intense interest among the faithful regarding all things Israel.”³⁶ Moreover, the evangelical movement in Brazil is expanding significantly, expected to reach 40 percent of the country’s population by 2032, surpassing Catholics by 8 percent.³⁷ This is reflected in the growing influence of evangelical congregations in the country’s parliament, with more than 130 MPs (25 percent of the total number of MPs) and 14 senators (17 percent of the total) declaring themselves members of the Evangelical Caucus.³⁸ The renewed influence of the Evangelical Church, not only in Brazil, but also across Latin America, creates a more favorable environment for Israel, especially in view of the extreme-right, national unity coalition governing the country at the time of writing. Indeed, the expanding influence of evangelical and populist leaders across Latin America “seems to have given Israel an opportunity to strengthen its diplomatic ties in the region, which had deteriorated since the 1990s.”³⁹

A third factor underpinned Bolsonaro’s support for Israel: his admiration for former US President Donald Trump. In fact, the Bolsonaro administration endorsed Trump’s decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, as well as the Abraham Accords, almost immediately. In an appearance before the parliament in March 2020, Ernesto Araújo, Bolsonaro’s ultraconservative minister of foreign affairs from 2019 to 2021, called the accords an “innovative initiative to break the inertia in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, frozen for more than a decade.”⁴⁰ Araújo belonged to the so-called “ideological wing” of the Bolsonaro administration, and in his inaugural address, he promised to “liberate” Brazil from globalist and universalist ideologies, and expressed his admiration for the United States, Israel, Hungary, Poland, and what he called “new Italy.”⁴¹ And during a visit to Israel in March 2019, Araújo highlighted his support for the country as “maybe the best example of what a nation which has self-confidence, strong leadership, democracy, and good policies can accomplish.”⁴² Touting the Zionist biblical claim to the land, he went on: “A three-thousand-year-old nation that is also an innovative nation. It is an amazing country, and we really have so much to learn from your experience.”⁴³ Araújo did not make any reference to Palestine or the Palestinian people.

The Bolsonaro administration’s support for Trump and his policies was also strategic: the “Trump of the tropics,” as media outlets referred to the Brazilian president, allowed Brazil to achieve “the status of major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally” of the United States.⁴⁴ However, despite the emergence of populist, far-right politicians across the world spreading mistrust in liberal democracies, they were largely unable to radically reorganize political institutions and translate their views into concrete policies. Indeed, Valerie Hudson and Benjamin Day argue that “Trump’s iconoclasm has dramatically raised the demand for informed explanations of how and when leaders matter for global politics, both within and without the academy.”⁴⁵ In this way, despite Bolsonaro’s unabashed support for the erstwhile US president’s foreign policies, his capacity to formulate and implement similar policies did not go unchallenged in Brazil. Other branches of Brazil’s foreign policy establishment and different segments of Brazilian civil society modulated Bolsonaro’s impulsive style in an attempt to safeguard the economic interests of the country’s agribusiness industry. For example, when the chairman of the Brazilian congress’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, Eduardo Bolsonaro, accused the Chinese company Huawei of espionage, members of the Brazilian government and of the agribusiness sector acted swiftly to soothe the Chinese government and investors.⁴⁶ Brazil’s vice president, Hamilton Mourão, also interceded on different occasions with Chinese authorities on behalf of the Bolsonaro administration.⁴⁷ Similarly, when Bolsonaro announced his intention to move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem, the Brazilian government blocked the plan—with the support of representatives of the meat industry—after the Arab League sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil denouncing the move, stating that it would represent a breach of international law that would have adverse consequences for the relationship between Brazil and the Arab world.⁴⁸

While entrenching Brazil’s relationship with Israel in significant ways, Bolsonaro could not fully implement his far-right agendas as part of Brazil’s foreign policy. Indeed, it would be erroneous to neglect the importance of Brazil’s rise as one of the world’s top food producers and exporters, including to Israel and many Arab states, in the country’s foreign policy decisions. The Bolsonaro years thus evince Joseph S. Nye’s claim that, “transformational leaders” have shown limited efficacy in changing political systems enduringly;⁴⁹ rather, the geopolitical and economic interests of a range of influential actors, including in Brazil’s foreign policy establishment, constrain the capacity of leaders to shape foreign policy.⁵⁰ As the next section shows, however, this is equally true for Lula’s administration.

Lula, the Workers’ Party, and the Two-State Solution

Since assuming office in January 2023, the new Brazilian president has changed Brazil’s foreign policy in various aspects. Lula repositioned Brazil in the discussion over climate change and strengthened the country’s relationship with China and among BRICS countries;⁵¹ he vowed to deepen South American integration and to finalize the trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur; and he reaffirmed Brazil’s traditional position as an advocate of international law, multilateralism, and social justice. As an example, he denounced social inequality in the world and demanded that a “high propriety” be placed on the food security of countries of the Global South.⁵² But on certain political issues, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he remained strategically neutral, expressing his willingness to participate in a “peace group” to find a solution to the conflict.⁵³ Keeping his country’s interests in mind, Lula would not disrupt Brazil’s important business arrangements with either China or Russia, nor would he risk upsetting the United States, without significant consequences.⁵⁴

Regarding Israel and Palestine, Lula also played the diplomatic card. He restored Brazil’s position of defending a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines, a policy for which the Workers’ Party has advocated since at least 1989, when Lula first ran for president.⁵⁵ Since its foundation in 1980, the party has maintained a friendly relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which the Brazilian government recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1979.⁵⁶ As a member of the Workers’ Party, Lula reflected this position, especially on a trip to Israel and Palestine in 1993 as a future presidential candidate, when he met with Israeli and PLO representatives in the midst of the Oslo Accords.⁵⁷ And with the party’s unchanging position toward Israel and Palestine, Lula sought to play an active role as a mediator between Israelis and Palestinians following his first presidential victory in 2002.⁵⁸ Although the attempt was unfruitful, the initiative is considered a historic moment for Brazilian diplomacy because it projected Brazil as a mediator of international conflicts.

Some of Lula’s most important advisers have also been strong advocates of the two-state solution. In 2010, Celso Amorim, Brazil’s minister of Foreign Affairs during Lula’s first two presidencies, argued that Brazil was “an unyielding defender of an independent Palestine, living in peace with Israel, within the pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”⁵⁹ Although Amorim has never been a member of the Workers’ Party and has served as a diplomat in different Brazilian administrations, he became deeply associated with Lula’s foreign policy views over the last twenty years. According to Amorim, Brazil’s foreign policies under Lula were marked by solidarity, multilateralism, and commercial diplomacy. Regarding the latter, he wrote that, “although Brazilian foreign policy objectives cannot be reduced to a mercantilist view of the world, an active diplomacy, not limited by outdated preconceptions, helped to boost Brazilian business all over the world.”⁶⁰

It is instructive to examine Brazil’s relationship with the Middle East in this context, as Lula’s advocacy of Palestinian rights will not translate into serious diplomatic or economic pressure on Israel. As mentioned, Israel’s economic and security ties with Latin America improved significantly in the last two decades and, in Brazil, this process occurred to a great extent during the governments of the Workers’ Party. Indeed, Mustafa Özşahin and Segâh Tekin argue that “[d]uring the consecutive presidencies of Lula, Dilma Rousseff, and Michel Temer, following the publication of the National Defense Strategy in 2008, Brazil expanded its cooperation with the Israeli defense industry.”⁶¹ There is no reason to believe that this cooperation will change significantly during Lula’s third presidency, and it is thus unlikely that Lula will change the country’s foreign policy on Israel and Palestine. Moreover, even if the Brazilian president was willing to cut, or significantly reduce, the country’s commercial and cultural ties with Israel, he would have to bypass the most conservative parliament Brazil has had since the 1988 Constitution came into effect. In fact, Renato Ochman, the president of the Brazil-Israel Chamber of Commerce, affirmed in an interview in August 2023 that the new Brazilian president would not interfere in the commercial relationship between the two countries.⁶² In addition, he argued that the challenge is making the trade relations between Brazil and Israel based more on technology and less on agricultural products and raw materials.⁶³

On the diplomatic level, however, Brazil’s posture has changed. For example, in January 2023, Brazil and Argentina released a joint statement expressing concern for the escalation of violence in Palestine and renewing “their appeal for a just, pacific, and definitive solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict.”⁶⁴ The statement also reaffirmed both countries’ support for a Palestinian state and for the right of Israel to live in peace with its neighbors. In February 2023, another joint public statement signed by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico condemned the Israeli far-right cabinet’s announcement of its plans to expand the construction of settlements in the West Bank.⁶⁵ And as Israel launched its latest war on Gaza in October 2023, Lula’s position reflected Brazil’s traditional equidistant approach. The Brazilian president described Hamas’s attack on October 7 as terrorism and Israel’s response as “disproportionate,”⁶⁶ and while he called it a genocide—“not a war”—on October 25,⁶⁷ he did not condemn Israel nor accused it of perpetrating the genocide. Rather, he ambiguously stated that “What is currently happening in the Middle East is serious, and it’s not a question of discussing who is right or who is wrong, who fired the first shot and who fired the second.”⁶⁸

Brazil’s diplomatic actions regarding the Gaza war focused almost entirely on proposing resolutions to the UNSC, an organ that, due to its internal divisions, has shown in the last years a minimal capacity to find solutions for international conflicts such as the ones in Syria, Ukraine, and Palestine.⁶⁹ It was clear from the beginning of Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas that American, French, and British unconditional support of Israel would prevent the UNSC from acting decisively to stop the massacre of civilians in Gaza. Brazil was also one of the countries that supported South Africa’s case in the International Court of Justice against Israel for committing genocidal acts in Gaza.⁷⁰ Although some analysts saw the action as a departure from Brazil’s traditional position and a reflection of a greater alignment with the BRICS (of which South Africa is a member),⁷¹ it is unlikely that the Lula administration will escalate its diplomatic actions against Israel. This is in contrast to several Latin American leaders who recalled their ambassadors from Israel and severed diplomatic ties with the country as a result of the war.⁷² However, it is important to note that, despite the so-called pink tide that ushered in center-left governments in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru over the last few years, even if these governments continue to condemn Israeli violations of international humanitarian law and to call for Palestinian statehood, it is improbable that they will take further punitive actions against Israel given the longstanding commercial, security, and ideological ties that bind them. In addition, there is no guarantee that these governments will remain in power for much longer, as the victory of the far-right and pro-Israel Javier Milei in the November 2023 Argentinian presidential elections indicates.⁷³

Different Narratives, Similar Policies

Despite the liberationist and reformist rhetoric of new center-left and left-wing governments that have come to power in several Latin American countries, including in Brazil, the reality is that various other geopolitical, economic, and ideological interests continue to significantly influence their foreign policy approaches. In Brazil, the growth of conservative forces in parliament, mostly represented in the agribusiness sector and the Evangelical Church, is compelling Lula to compromise on many issues to guarantee that his administration has a working majority in Congress. Consequently, although Lula’s administration has steered away from ideologically backing Israel and has returned to nominally defending a two-state solution, it is unlikely that it will take strong action (not limited to UNSC resolutions doomed to fail) to pressure Israel to end its occupation and support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It is likewise unlikely that it will contribute to global efforts to hold Israel accountable for its ongoing violations of international law and international humanitarian law, which have reached unprecedented levels in its war on Gaza that began in 2023.⁷⁴ In this way, the fact that Lula and Bolsonaro project differing narratives with regard to Israel and Palestine will not translate to significant changes in their administrations’ foreign policies.

Ultimately, Lula’s transformational foreign policy discourse and inspirational rhetoric are not reflected in his passive neutrality regarding Palestine and Israel; indeed, going beyond the call for a two-state solution would not bode well for the leader of Latin America’s largest economy and of a country that has diplomatic, security, and commercial relations with countries as varied as the United States, China, Russia, Iran, Israel, and several Arab states. But perhaps most urgently, Lula will not be motivated to break with the widespread international consensus—including among an increasing number of Arab states—on remaining passive in the face of Israel’s illegal occupation and violation of Palestinian rights so long as this global order continues to serve their collective interests.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gabriel Huland

Gabriel Huland is a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Bath, UK. He holds a PhD from SOAS, UK. Prior to joining academia, he was a journalist.

Notes

1 Hussein Kalout and Feliciano Guimarães, “The Restoration of Brazilian Foreign Policy: How Lula Can Make Up for Lost Time,” Foreign Affairs, March 15, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-america/restoration-brazilian-foreign-policy.

2 Bolsonaro’s controversial views on topics such as climate change and the effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccine resulted in policies like the suspension of the Amazon Fund and delay in purchasing vaccines when Brazil faced alarming infection and death rates related to the pandemic. The Brazilian government created the Amazon Fund in 2009 to raise donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor, and combat deforestation, as well as to promote preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon. See Brazil’s True Believers: Bolsonaro and the Risks of an Election Year, International Crisis Group, June 16, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/brazil/brazils-true-believers-bolsonaro-and-risks-election-year; Hussein Kalout, “Bolsonaro’s Failed Diplomacy Leaves Brazil Isolated as Pandemic Rages,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/07/bolsonaro-failed-diplomacy-brazil-isolated-coronavirus/.

3 Kalout and Guimarães, “The Restoration of Brazilian Foreign Policy.”

4 Kalout and Guimarães, “The Restoration of Brazilian Foreign Policy.”

5 “‘May God Bless Brazil and Israel’: Michelle Bolsonaro Wears Israel T-shirt during Vote,” New Arab, October 31, 2022, https://www.newarab.com/news/michelle-bolsonaro-wears-israel-shirt-during-brazil-vote.

6 “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Begins Israel Visit with Embassy Decision Pending,” Reuters, March 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-brazil-idUKL8N21I08O/.

7 Anthony Boadle, “Bolsonaro busca aproximação com países Árabes após polêmica sobre embaixada em Israel,” Reuters, October 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1X41P2/.

8 Rashid Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine (New York: Macmillan, 2020); Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (London: Oneworld Publications, 2007); Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).

9 “Brazil Grain Outlook,” Miller, January 9, 2023, https://millermagazine.com/blog/brazil-grain-outlook-4940.

10 Constanza Valdes, “Brazil’s Momentum as a Global Agricultural Supplier Faces Headwinds,” US Department of Agriculture, September 27, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2022/september/brazil-s-momentum-as-a-global-agricultural-supplier-faces-headwinds/.

11 “Exports of the Agribusiness in Brazil in 2022, by Product Category,” Statista, June 20, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1176694/export-value-agribusiness-brazil-category/#:∼:text=In%202022%2C%20exports%20of%20soybean,exports%20totaled%209.2%20billion%20dollars.

12 Called “Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária” in Portuguese.

13 Hugo Souza, “PL compõe 1/4 da bancada ruralista na câmara, que chega a 300 deputados,” De Olho nos Ruralistas (blog), April 26, 2023, https://deolhonosruralistas.com.br/2023/04/26/pl-compoe-1-4-da-bancada-ruralista-na-camara-que-chega-a-300-deputados/.

14 Pedro Henrique Gomes, Guilherme Mazui, and Filipe Matoso, “Com Viagem à China, Lula busca ampliar relações e marcar nova fase da política externa brasileira,” G1, March 21, 2023, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2023/03/21/com-viagem-a-china-lula-busca-ampliar-relacoes-e-marcar-nova-fase-da-politica-externa-brasileira.ghtml.

15 Guilherme Waltenberg and Paulo Silva Pinto, “Brasil amplia exportações para Árabes e Israelenses,” Poder360, August 21, 2022, https://www.poder360.com.br/economia/brasil-amplia-exportacoes-para-arabes-e-israelenses/; “Brazil Exports to Iran,” Trading Economics, accessed December 19, 2023, https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/exports-to-iran#:∼:text=Exports%20to%20Iran%20in%20Brazil%20averaged%20103.21%20USD%20Million%20from,source%3A%20Mdic%2C%20Brazil.

16 Ali Saifi, “Brazil Is the Biggest Halal Food Supplier in All over the World,” BBM, July 6, 2022, https://magazinebbm.com/blog/brazil-is-the-biggest-halal-food-supplierin-all-over-the-world-2266.

17 Adam Hanieh, Money, Markets, and Monarchies: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 267.

18 John Benny, “UAE’s Investments in Brazil Reach $5 Billion,” The National, April 16, 2023, https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2023/04/16/uaes-investments-in-brazil-reach-5-billion/.

19 Ana Mano, “Brazil’s BRF Formalizes Halal Joint Venture as Ties with Saudi Arabia Strengthen,” Reuters, August 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/brazils-brf-formalizes-halal-jv-ties-with-saudi-arabia-strengthen-2023-08-02/.

20 Guilherme Casarões and Tullo Vigevani. “O lugar de Israel e da Palestina na política externa Brasileira: Antissemitismo, voto majoritário ou promotor de paz?,” História (São Paulo) 33, no. 2 (July–December 2014): 150–88, https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-43692014000200009.

21 “Brazil Exports to Israel,” Trading Economics, accessed December 19, 2023, https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/exports/israel.

22 “Brazil Exports to Palestine,” Trading Economics, accessed December 19, 2023, https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/exports/palestine.

23 “Israel Signs Free-Trade Pact with Mercosur,” Haaretz, December 19, 2007, https://www.haaretz.com/2007-12-19/ty-article/israel-signs-free-trade-pact-with-mercosur/0000017f-dbdc-d3ff-a7ff-fbfc792d0000.

24 Mustafa C. Özşahin and Segâh Tekin, “Israel’s Latin America Policy: A Reappraisal,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 14, no. 2 (2020): 243, https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2020.1804124.

25 Özşahin and Tekin, “Israel’s Latin America Policy,” 243.

26 Erella Grassiani and Frank Müller, “Brazil-Israel Relations and the Marketing of Urban Security Expertise,” Latin American Perspectives 46, no. 3: 124, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19831442.

27 Grassiani and Müller, “Brazil-Israel Relations,” 125.

28 Grassiani and Müller, “Brazil-Israel Relations,” 124.

29 Grassiani and Müller, “Brazil-Israel Relations,” 114.

30 Rafaela E. Fioreze, “The Brazilian Position in the United Nations on the Situation in Syria (2011): A Perspective from Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Dilma Rousseff,” Universidade federal da paraíba, 2011, https://periodicos.ufpb.br/index.php/ricri/article/download/51301/34843/174784.

31 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China,” United Nations, October 4, 2011, https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm.

32 Dan Williams, “Brazil Opens Israel Trade Mission in Jerusalem, Short of Full Embassy Move,” Reuters, March 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-brazil-idUKKCN1RC093/.

33 “Brazil Exports to Israel,” Trading Economics.

34 Ana Mano, “Brazil Exports to Arab Nations Hit 33-Year High, Agro Products Prevail,” Reuters, January 19, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/brazil-exports-arab-nations-hit-33-year-high-agro-products-prevail-2023-01-19/#:∼:text=Commodities-,Brazil%20exports%20to%20Arab%20nations%20hit,year%20high%2C%20agro%20products%20prevail&text=SAO%20PAULO%2C%20Jan%2019%20(Reuters,of%20Commerce%20said%20on%20Thursday.

35 Deborah Bizarria, “Igreja evangélica foi a maior perdedora das eleições,” Folha de S.Paulo, November 27, 2022, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2022/11/igreja-evangelica-foi-a-maior-perdedora-das-eleicoes.shtml; Michael Stott, “Brazil’s Evangelical Church Preaches the Bolsonaro Revolution,” Financial Times, December 16, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e7a47196-1817-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385.

36 Joseph Williams, “The Pentecostalization of Christian Zionism,” Church History 84, no. 1 (2015): 178, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009640714001747.

37 José E. D. Alves, “Projeções indicam que evangélicos serão maioria no Brasil nos próximos dez anos,” #Colabora (blog), May 30, 2022, https://projetocolabora.com.br/ods16/transicao-religiosa-evangelicos-serao-maioria-nos-proximos-dez-anos/.

38 “Bancada evangélica define Eli Borges como novo líder em 2023,” Carta Capital, February 8, 2023, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/bancada-evangelica-define-eli-borges-como-novo-lider-em-2023/.

39 Özşahin and Tekin, “Israel’s Latin America Policy,” 243.

40 Ernesto Araújo, “Exposição do ministro ministro das relações exteriors: Embaixador Ernesto Araújo na comissão de relações exteriors e defesa nacional do senado,” Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, March 5, 2020, https://www.funag.gov.br/images/2020/NovaPoliticaExterna/7_Ernesto_CREDN.pdf (translation from Portuguese provided by the author).

41 Ernesto Araújo, A nova política externa Brasileira (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2019), 26.

42 Araújo, A nova política externa Brasileira, 171.

43 Araújo, A nova política externa Brasileira, 171.

44 Leslie E. Wehner, “Stereotyped Images and Role Dissonance in the Foreign Policy of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” Cooperation and Conflict 58, no. 3 (2023): 10, https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221108814.

45 Valerie Hudson and Benjamin Day, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019), 31.

46 Eliane Oliveira, “Agronegócio quer salvar relação com a China, após acusações de espionagem de Eduardo Bolsonaro,” O Globo, November 26, 2020, https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/agronegocio-quer-salvar-relacao-com-china-apos-acusacoes-de-espionagem-de-eduardo-bolsonaro-24766813.

47 Bloomberg, “Brazil’s Vice-President Hamilton Mourao Heads to China to Mend Ties,” South China Morning Post, May 19, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3010824/brazils-vice-president-hamilton-mourao-heads-china-mend.

48 “Arab League Warns Brazil Not to Move Embassy to Jerusalem,” Al Jazeera, December 11, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/11/arab-league-warns-brazil-not-to-move-embassy-to-jerusalem; Reuters, “Brazil Risks Middle East Trade with Potential Israel Embassy Move,” Haaretz, November 13, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/americas/2018-11-13/ty-article/brazil-risks-middle-east-trade-with-potential-israel-embassy-move/0000017f-db2a-db22-a17f-ffbb5d5d0001.

49 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), xii.

50 Nye, Presidential Leadership, 11.

51 BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. In a meeting in August 2023, the collective started a movement of expansion by inviting Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to join.

52 Andreia Verdélio, “Lula e Macron conversam sobre acordo entre Mercosul e União Europeia,” Agência Brasil, June 23, 2023, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2023-06/lula-e-macron-conversam-sobre-acordo-entre-mercosul-e-uniao-europeia.

53 “Brazil’s Lula Calls for ‘Peace Group’ to Broker Ukraine-Russia Deal,” Reuters, April 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brazils-lula-calls-peace-group-broker-ukraine-russia-deal-2023-04-16/.

54 Kalout and Guimarães, “The Restoration of Brazilian Foreign Policy.”

55 Kyeld Jakobsen, A política externa do partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2021), https://fpabramo.org.br/publicacoes/estante/a-politica-externa-do-partido-dos-trabalhadores-pt/.

56 Jakobsen, A política externa do partido, 41; Casarões and Vigevani, “O lugar de Israel e da Palestina.”

57 Jakobsen, A política externa do partido, 57.

58 Adar Primor, “Brazil Leader Talks Mideast Peace, How to Be Friends with Both Israel and Iran,” Haaretz, March 11, 2010, https://www.haaretz.com/2010-03-11/ty-article/brazil-leader-talks-mideast-peace-how-to-be-friends-with-both-israel-and-iran/0000017f-db39-db22-a17f-ffb96ec10000.

59 Celso Amorim, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003–2010),” Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional 53 (December 2010): 236, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292010000300013.

60 Amorim, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 216.

61 Özşahin and Tekin, “Israel’s Latin America Policy,” 248. Lula and Dilma Rousseff belong to the Workers’ Party and Michel Temer to the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement). Temer was an ally of the Workers’ Party until December 2015, when he openly stated his dissatisfaction with Rousseff. Temer, who was Rousseff’s vice president, became president in the aftermath of Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016.

62 Marsílea Gombata, “Comércio com Israel aposta em tecnologia para crescer,” Valor Ecônomico, August 21, 2023, https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2023/08/21/comercio-com-israel-aposta-em-tecnologia-para-crescer.ghtml.

63 Gombata, “Comércio com Israel.”

64 Find the joint statement (in Spanish) in the following link: https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/declaracion-conjunta-con-motivo-de-la-visita-oficial-la-republica-argentina-del.

65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, “Comunicado conjunto de los gobiernos de Argentina, Brasil, Chile y México sobre la expansión de los asentamientos Israelíes en Cisjordania,” news release no. 069/23, February 17, 2023, https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/comunicado-conjunto-de-los-gobiernos-de-argentina-brasil-chile-y-mexico-sobre-la.

66 André Lucena, “Lula critica reação desproporcional de Israel a ataques do Hamas,” Carta Capital, October 24, 2023, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/lula-critica-reacao-desproporcional-de-israel-a-ataques-do-hamas/.

67 Lucena, “Lula critica reação.”

68 Andreia Verdélio, “President Lula Says War in the Middle East is Genocide,” Agência Brasil, October 25, 2023, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2023-10/president-lula-says-war-middle-east-genocide.

69 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Calling for Humanitarian Pauses in Israel-Gaza Crisis on Account of Veto by United States,” United Nations, October 18, 2023. https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15450.doc.htm.

70 Guilherme Botacini, “Governo Lula declara apoio à denúncia contra Israel por genocídio na Corte de Haia,” Folha de S. Paulo, January 10, 2024, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2024/01/governo-lula-declara-apoio-a-denuncia-contra-israel-por-genocidio-na-corte-de-haia.shtml.

71 Botacini, “Governo Lula declara.”

72 Ivana Saric and Rahul Mukherjee, “Which Countries Have Withdrawn Diplomats over Israel’s Actions in Gaza,” Axios, November 16, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/11/16/israel-gaza-war-countries-against-cease-fire-diplomats.

73 “Israel-Palestine: Who Is Argentina’s Israel-Loving President-Elect, Javier Milei?,” Middle East Eye, November 20, 2023, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-war-argentina-javier-milei-president-elect-who.

74 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A. A. Khan KC, on the Situation in the State of Palestine: Receipt of a Referral from Five States Parties,” International Criminal Court, November 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-karim-aa-khan-kc-situation-state-palestine.