Britain and the League of Nations: Was There Ever a Mandate for Palestine?

Abstract

Upon capturing Palestine in December 1917, Britain assumed the role of belligerent occupant, and therefore, it had no power to alter the legal order of the country, which it nonetheless did in 1920. In order to grant itself full power of governance over Palestine, Britain drew up the “Mandate for Palestine,” a document in which it declared its aim of promoting a Jewish “national home” in Palestine. This article examines this and other documents from the 1920s to argue that Britain did not have the legal grounding to alter its status as belligerent occupant, and that the League of Nations never took a position on Jewish territorial rights or on the legality of Britain’s governance of Palestine. It argues further that the United Nations misread this history in 1947 when it took the Mandate for Palestine as a commitment of its predecessor to Jewish territorial rights in Palestine, and thus, as a basis for recommending the partition of Palestine.

Keywords:

• League of Nations
• British Mandate
• Zionism
• sovereignty
• Balfour Declaration
• Treaty of Sèvres
• Treaty of Lausanne
• belligerent occupation

Much of the scholarship on twentieth-century Palestinian history starts from the premise that the British Mandate for Palestine was put into legal effect by the League of Nations, and that the concept of a Jewish national home outlined in the mandate enjoyed international legitimacy.¹ However, this article argues that Britain did not have the legal grounding to issue the “Mandate for Palestine”—a document it drew up as its blueprint for governing Palestine—because Britain never gained sovereignty over Palestine.² The League of Nations never took a position on the legality of Britain’s legal status in Palestine or on Britain’s promise to the Zionists to see to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Likewise, scholarship on this period has not problematized the fact that the League’s successor, the United Nations (UN), overlooked this critical legal prerequisite when it assumed wrongly that Britain and the League of Nations had committed the international community to granting territorial rights to the Jewish people in Palestine.

These issues manifested most conspicuously in the UN’s 1947 Partition Plan. First, a committee³ and then, the General Assembly,⁴ recommended Jewish statehood via a territorial partition of Palestine. The partition was premised on the misconception that Jewish territorial rights in Palestine had been recognized, and on the further misconception that Britain had any status in Palestine beyond that of belligerent occupant. When the Jewish Agency declared statehood in 1948, it cited the Mandate for Palestine as a legal basis. The Mandate for Palestine incorporated Britain’s 1917 Balfour Declaration, a wartime document in which Britain’s war cabinet indicated that it viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”⁵ The 1948 declaration explained that: “This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.”⁶ But the inflated value the UN assigned to the Mandate for Palestine in its 1947 Partition Plan as a step toward Jewish statehood was far from self-evident. This article argues that in 1947, the UN gave only cursory attention to British and League of Nations documentation from the 1920s regarding the Mandate for Palestine, documentation that casts doubt on whether the Mandate actually proclaimed Jewish territorial rights, or whether Britain had the legal status to govern the country, let alone promote a Jewish national home in it. Specifically, this article explores, among other documents, the Mandate for Palestine, the meeting minutes of British and other European colonial authorities in the aftermath of World War I, and British parliamentary records from the 1920s, to conclude that Britain did not in fact have legal standing in Palestine for its claimed mandate, and that neither Britain nor the league had legal standing to give “international sanction” to Jewish territorial rights in Palestine, even had they purported to do so.

Britain’s Dubious Transition to Civil Administration in Palestine

The phrase “historical connection” that the Jewish Agency quoted in 1948 from the Mandate for Palestine actually only appeared in the preamble of the document. In international documents, preamble paragraphs give reasons for the operative provisions that follow, but they do not create obligations. Therefore, even if the Mandate for Palestine had been a document carrying legal force, it did not commit Britain to promoting a Jewish national home in Palestine. The first three preamble paragraphs read as follows:

the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them;

the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country;

and whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.⁷

In a November 1920 memorandum that he penned shortly before finalizing the text of the Mandate for Palestine, British Foreign Secretary George Curzon explained that “the Zionists” had “pleaded for the insertion” of the last “phrase in the preamble, on the ground that it would make all the difference to the money that they aspired to raise in foreign countries for the development of Palestine.”⁸ Curzon explained that an earlier draft of this third preamble paragraph had read: “recognising the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute Palestine as their National Home,”⁹ and it had been included at the Zionists’ insistence. He explained further, however, that when this draft “was first shown to the French Government it at once excited their vehement criticisms on the ground of its almost exclusively Zionist complexion and of the manner in which the interests and rights of the Arab majority (amounting to about nine-tenths of the population) were ignored. The Italian Government expressed similar apprehensions.”¹⁰ France and Italy’s concern was that the preamble read as if the “national home” meant Palestine as a territorial entity. The draft had been shown to France and Italy because they, along with Japan and Britain, constituted the Principal Allied Powers¹¹ who had just drafted and gained Turkey’s signature on a peace treaty at Sèvres, France, in August 1920. They hoped the treaty would have Turkey ceding sovereignty to the four of them, so that they could then give Syria (including Lebanon) to France, and Iraq and Palestine to Britain.

According to Curzon, the draft preamble that included the word “reconstitute” was ­“considered by an Inter-Departmental Conference [in London], in which the Foreign Office, Board of Trade, War Office and India Office were represented, and which passed the final draft.”¹² Members of these British departments had also objected “that the use of such words might be, and was, indeed, certain to be, used as the basis of all sorts of political claims by the Zionists for the control of Palestinian administration in the future.”¹³ In other words, these departments of government did not want the Mandate for Palestine to read as a commitment to convert Palestine into a Jewish state. The view of these departments was “that, while Mr. Balfour's Declaration had provided for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, this was not the same thing as the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish National Home.”¹⁴

The British government had already publicly made the point in January 1918 that “national home” did not mean a state.¹⁵ Curzon conceded the same to the Allies in April 1920 when they met in San Remo, Italy, to draft the peace treaty. At the meeting, Curzon implored the Allies to let him write the Balfour Declaration into the peace treaty with Turkey, telling them, somewhat sheepishly, that “the Jews” were urging him to include it, and that they would be “deeply incensed” if it were omitted.¹⁶ When Curzon tried to tell the Allies that they had already endorsed the Balfour Declaration in previous public statements, Japan’s ambassador demanded to “place on record” that “his own government had never accepted the declaration.”¹⁷ Meanwhile, France’s representative said that “there had never been any official acceptance of Mr. Balfour's declaration by the Allies of the British Government.”¹⁸ In any event, after getting negative reactions from France and Italy, Curzon changed the third preamble paragraph to read as indicated above.¹⁹

The fact that the Balfour Declaration did not call for a Jewish territorial state was made clear by Curzon at the April 1920 meeting. The discussion was memorialized by two notetakers, one who recorded in English and who was formally identified as the “British Secretary,” and one who recorded in French. Where the parties discussed the meaning of the Balfour Declaration, the notes in the two versions were not consistent. Only the French version captured what was actually said as regards the meaning of the Balfour Declaration.

As recorded in French, French Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand put the matter to Curzon, saying: “I ask that it be formally understood and written into the procès-verbal that the phrase ‘civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities’ includes, in the understanding of the British Government as of ours, political, civil, and religious rights.”²⁰ Curzon replied, again per the French notes: “I don’t see a difference between civil and political rights. In English, the word ‘civil’ refers to political rights.”²¹ Therefore, Curzon agreed with Millerand that the Balfour Declaration called for the protection of Arab political rights, a reading inconsistent with Jewish statehood.

In the English-language notes, however, Millerand’s demand was recorded differently. The British secretary did not quote Millerand verbatim but paraphrased, characterizing Millerand’s demand as being “that he would ask formally, with a view to having it recorded in the procès-verbal, that it should be understood that provision should be made for the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”²² But this rendering of Millerand’s demand does not make sense. Millerand would have had no reason to demand a commitment to protect civil and religious rights only, because those were the terms already used in the Balfour Declaration, which Curzon was asking Millerand to accept. What Millerand wanted was clarification that Britain understood the term “civil” rights to include rights related to the political structure of the country.²³

Britain would later reaffirm that the Balfour Declaration did not envisage turning Palestine into a Jewish state in each of two so-called white papers, one in 1922²⁴ and another in 1939.²⁵ What is more, in its 1948 declaration of statehood, the Jewish Agency did not explain how Jewish statehood supposedly gained “international sanction,” even if one were to accept its reading that the Balfour Declaration called for Jewish statehood. The Jewish Agency was giving a false impression that the major powers had endorsed Jewish territorial rights, and further, that Britain had legal authority to govern Palestine and to specifically give the Mandate for Palestine the force of law. But it did not.

The Mandate for Palestine called for drastic changes in how Britain would govern Palestine. Indeed, the British government was aware that as long as it maintained the status of belligerent occupant, which it assumed upon occupying Palestine militarily in December 1917, it could not introduce changes like those contemplated in the Mandate for Palestine. It also understood that even though the Covenant of the League of Nations had suggested the mandate system for Turkey’s Arab provinces, a right to govern could not come from the League.

Britain initially handled its status in line with the law of war, at least at the formal level, by declaring itself to be in belligerent occupancy and setting up a military administrative apparatus that it called the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration.²⁶ A state taking control of foreign territory in wartime may only administer it in a way that preserves order, pending a peace treaty. Both Britain and Turkey had recently signed a multilateral treaty on the law of war that made this clear,²⁷ and Britain had even written this treaty into the guidance to its military. In its instructions on belligerent occupation, the British Army’s 1914 manual on the law of war stated that “altering the existing form of government” was not permitted, nor was “upsetting the constitution and the domestic law, and ignoring the rights of the inhabitants.”²⁸ Britain’s military officials in Palestine thus clearly understood this international obligation.²⁹

The British government in London, however, was under pressure from the Zionist Organization to begin administering in a way that would facilitate Zionist aspirations. In 1918, Britain thus let the Zionist Organization dispatch to Palestine a “Zionist Commission,” which lobbied for regulations to facilitate land purchases by the Jewish National Fund and other Zionist entities.³⁰ Despite the law on belligerent occupation, Zionist pressure led the British military administration to adopt regulations as if Britain was sovereign, and in 1919, Britain adopted ordinances on the licensing of veterinarians,³¹ on business partnerships,³² and on registration of marriages.³³

Notwithstanding the law of war, in July 1920, and without Turkey’s consent to the draft peace treaty, the British Crown announced that it was instituting governance of Palestine on the basis of the league’s mandate system. King George V published a message “to the People of Palestine” announcing that “the Allied Powers whose arms were victorious in the late war have entrusted to my country a mandate to watch over the interests of Palestine.”³⁴ The king’s claim that the Allies had “entrusted” Palestine to him was a reference to the fact that during the April 1920 San Remo conference, France, Italy, and Japan had agreed that Britain should receive a mandate for Palestine once Turkey gave its Arab provinces to the four of them collectively, as they were hoping Turkey would do. But the king ignored that step and claimed that the Allies had authorized Britain to start mandate rule immediately. He also ignored the fact that until they actually got Palestine from Turkey, the Allies had nothing to give.

The king’s distortions in his message to the people of Palestine did not end there. “The Allied and Associated Powers,” he continued, “have decided that measures shall be adopted to secure the gradual establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. These measures will not in any way affect the civil or religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population of Palestine.”³⁵ As per the Treaty of Versailles signed between the Allies and Germany in June 1919, the “Allied and Associated Powers” numbered twenty-seven entities.³⁶ But the San Remo conference only involved three of the Principal Allied Powers besides Britain. The king’s claim that it was the “Allied and Associated Powers” who decided to promote a national home for Jews in Palestine was therefore far from true. He effectively misled the people of Palestine into believing he had far greater backing for the “national home” idea, but it was purely Britain and Britain alone. France, Italy, and Japan were dragged into it.

This manipulation was not lost on the Arabs of Palestine, who had already organized into several political collectives across Palestine known as the Muslim-Christian Associations to advocate for Arab demands and rights as early as 1918. These associations held seven Palestine Arab congresses between 1919 and 1928, and in the 1921 congress, delegates protested Britain’s establishment of a civilian administration, a change that would be an unlawful attempt at unilateral termination of Britain’s status as belligerent occupant. In a 1921 petition to the League of Nations that depicted the full extent of the Palestinian delegates’ knowledge of the law, the congress noted: “The present provisional Administration in Palestine, which has no right to enact laws before the future status of the country has been defined, but which should govern according to the laws of the past regime, has framed laws and regulations connected with personal liberty and individual appropriation of land and other matters, and has already started putting these into execution.”³⁷ The congress demanded that “laws and regulations before the war be still carried out and all others framed after the British occupation be annulled.”³⁸ Years later, one of Britain’s civilian officers, Albert Hyamson, acknowledged that there had been “no legal basis” for proclaiming civilian rule, given a lack of cession of sovereignty from Turkey.³⁹ Hyamson served as director of immigration in the civilian administration. He called the purported termination of belligerent occupancy an “unprecedented step” taken “in a country whose status was that of Occupied Enemy Territory.”⁴⁰

In a 1924 legal case in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Britain attempted to explain how it could unilaterally terminate belligerent occupancy through the mandate system and give itself a right to rule. Britain’s principal legal adviser, Cecil Hurst, said, “From 1918 up until 1920 the occupation was a military occupation. In 1920 it was converted into a civil occupation.”⁴¹ He conceded that, “In the international law sense of the term there has been no succession between Turkey and Great Britain in regard to Palestine. All that has happened is that Palestine as a geographical entity has passed under the control and under the administration of Great Britain.”⁴² But then, Hurst said, “The British rights, therefore, today in Palestine, are really an emanation from the occupation which began in 1918.”⁴³ Opposing counsel in the court case, who was from Greece, mocked Hurst and derisively called his theory one of ‘“spontaneous generation’ of the British mandate.”⁴⁴

Britain’s Pursuit of Territorial Status in Palestine: Sèvres, Lausanne, and the League Council

Notwithstanding its 1920 switch to a civilian administration in Palestine, Britain understood that it needed to gain legal status in a fashion that would be internationally accepted. The British government in fact had a plan for gaining territorial rights as a basis for governing Palestine, a plan centered on the Treaty of Sèvres. Those states that were seeking to govern territories of either Germany or Turkey were expected to get them by peace treaty. For Germany, this had been accomplished in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, in which it renounced sovereignty over its “oversea possessions” in favor of “the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”⁴⁵ The major “possessions” were German South West Africa and German East Africa. While still meeting at Versailles, the Allies parceled them out, giving German South West Africa to the Union of South Africa, and German East Africa to Britain.

At San Remo, the Allies prepared to follow the Versailles model. They designated Syria (including Lebanon) to go to France, and Palestine and Iraq to Britain.⁴⁶ They wrote up a peace treaty wherein Turkey would renounce sovereignty in their favor, just as Germany had done for its possessions. In August 1920, Turkey obliged by signing the Treaty of Sèvres containing this renunciation.⁴⁷ The cession provision read as follows: “Outside her frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty Turkey hereby renounces in favor of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title which she could claim on any ground over or concerning any territories outside Europe which are not otherwise disposed of by the present Treaty.”⁴⁸

This provision would have solved Britain’s problem, except for one obstacle: the Treaty of Sèvres specified that ratification was required before it could enter into force.⁴⁹ That process promised to take some time, and Britain was not prepared to wait. It was under pressure from the Zionist Organization to show that it was serious about implementing the Balfour Declaration, and it faced increasing protests from the Arabs of Palestine, including petitions from the Palestine Arab congresses to the League of Nations denouncing the Balfour Declaration.

Britain therefore took further steps to unilaterally solidify its governance, purportedly under the mandate system. One step was to define the territory it wanted. The majority of the Arabs of Palestine insisted that Palestine should remain an integral part of Syria as its southern province, forming a united Arab Kingdom. But France and Britain had already secretly agreed in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to carve up the Arab east between themselves. In December 1920, France and Britain concluded a treaty to define Palestine and Syria as separate entities⁵⁰—a treaty that was legally dubious, as the Treaty of Sèvres had not yet been ratified and Turkey still held sovereignty over the territories it would cede. States do not have the right to divide up the territory of other states. Not only did France and Britain unilaterally sever Palestine from Syria, Britain also drew up its Mandate for Palestine document in December 1920, declaring that it planned to govern Palestine by the mandate system and specifying that it planned to implement the Balfour Declaration. It made this document public and sent it to the League of Nations.⁵¹

Britain sought approval of the Mandate for Palestine document by the league council, an approval whose legal significance, if any, was not clear. While article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the mandate system⁵² and defined what mandates were, it left the choice of territory and designation of mandatories up to the Allies. Therefore, article 22 did not give the league power to approve a mandate, nor did it require the submission of a mandate document to the league. When asked in the British Parliament about the process of establishing mandates, Curzon explained, quite correctly, that, “If you look at Article 22 of the Covenant of the League you will find that reference to the League of Nations is not obligatory.”⁵³

Notwithstanding, article 22 did provide that if states chose to govern by mandate, they were to act “on behalf of the League,” though this provision was not closely implemented. Article 22 stated that “responsibility” for “tutelage” on behalf of Geneva would be undertaken by states “willing to accept it.”⁵⁴ In other words, states willing to accept it would be charged with a responsibility under the League of Nations. But while British Prime Minister David Lloyd George said at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that Britain had decided “to accept the doctrine of a mandatory for all conquests in the late Turkish Empire and in the German Colonies,”⁵⁵ he regarded it as a matter within Britain’s discretion whether to govern those territories under the mandate system or as colonies.

Britain submitted its mandate document for approval to the league council in December 1920 for reasons that related less to legal necessity than to politics. Britain was anxious to put an end to Arab opposition to its agenda in Palestine, and endorsement by the league might convince Palestine’s Arabs that opposition was hopeless. But Britain immediately encountered opposition from within the league. The league’s assembly, the collectivity of member states, adopted a resolution noting “that the Treaty of Sèvres has not yet been ratified,” and that it would thus be “premature to press for immediate action by the Council.”⁵⁶ Without devolution of territorial authority from Turkey, the assembly did not see a mandate as a possibility. Italy, which was not only one of the Principal Allied Powers but a member of the council, characterized potential mandates in Turkey’s Arab provinces as “mandates deriving their origin from the Treaty of Sèvres.”⁵⁷ Italy explained that “they could not be approved so long as the question of the revision of that Treaty was pending.”⁵⁸

Britain pressed on, however. It wanted endorsement even if it could not yet hold a mandate. The Foreign Office issued a press statement acknowledging that its quest for a mandate depended on the Treaty of Sèvres.⁵⁹ Arthur Balfour, representing Britain, conceded the point to the council, saying that “while the Treaty of Sèvres remained unratified, the Mandate could not legally be in force.”⁶⁰ Ultimately, nothing the council could do would give Britain the territorial status it needed before it could hold a mandate. Britain thus sought approval of the text, but not of the mandate itself, though it made it clear that it would not let the council tinker with the text. In the British Parliament, Lloyd George was asked whether the league could “alter, amend, and reject a mandate,” to which he replied that, “It will require the unanimous consent of the Council of the League to reject.”⁶¹ The council could adopt resolutions only by unanimity, effectively giving Britain a veto over any attempt to challenge its plans in Palestine.

The council scheduled the text of the Mandate for Palestine for discussion but made no effort to assess it under article 22 of the covenant. It thus did not question whether the provisions in the Mandate for Palestine committing to the Zionist mission conflicted with the requirement in article 22 of promoting the well-being of a territory’s population. Nor did it challenge the provision giving full power in Palestine to a British-appointed administration, which was in clear conflict with the requirement that the state receiving a mandate provide only advice and assistance to those under its rule. Finally, the council did not ask Britain why it had ignored the injunction in article 22 that the wishes of the population be considered in the choice of a mandatory. The Arabs of Palestine wanted no mandatory at all but were especially against Britain because of its promotion of Zionism.⁶²

Italy again objected on the grounds that the Treaty of Sèvres was yet to be ratified.⁶³ But when the issue appeared on the council’s agenda on July 24, 1922, Italy dropped its objection, apparently because Britain had quietly made a deal with Italy on unrelated territorial issues.⁶⁴ On July 24, 1922, the council did not discuss the text of the Mandate for Palestine, but the following notation appeared in the meeting minutes: “the articles of the mandates for Palestine and Syria are approved. The mandates will enter into force automatically and at the same time, as soon as the Governments of France and Italy have notified the President of the Council of the League of Nations that they have reached an agreement on certain particular points in regard to the latter of these mandates.”⁶⁵ The fact that France insisted on getting the Syria mandate approved before allowing the Palestine mandate to be approved, and that the Syria mandate would be approved once France and Italy agreed on a text, reflected the politicized nature of the council’s behavior. The council effectively stated that the Syria mandate would be rubber-stamped if Italy dropped its objections. Moreover, while the notation indicated that Britain could not actually hold a mandate for Palestine before the text of the Syria mandate was finalized, it said nothing to dispense with the need for Britain to acquire territorial rights from Turkey.

Even though the council made clear in its notation that Britain had yet to hold a mandate, and despite Balfour’s acknowledgement to the council of the need for devolution from Turkey as per the Treaty of Sèvres, within two weeks of July 24, 1922, the Crown promulgated an order-in-council providing for the establishment of new institutions in Palestine and for powers of governance to be exercised by a British-appointed high commissioner.⁶⁶ The order-in-council, which would serve as a quasi-constitutional document for Palestine, did not mention the League of Nations as a source of the territorial authority that was being claimed. It did, however, require that “the provisions of the mandate” be “executed.”⁶⁷ Despite having no territorial authority in Palestine, the Crown was thus proclaiming the full power of legislation.

The order-in-council claimed a basis in law by reciting in its preamble clause the bases of possible British jurisdiction for territory outside Britain, as listed in an enactment called the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act.⁶⁸ The 1890 act stated that Britain could gain jurisdiction by “treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful means.”⁶⁹ The order-in-council declared that “His Majesty has power and jurisdiction in Palestine,” but it did not specify any particular one of those categories that might apply, much less any specific enactment in one of the categories.⁷⁰ In fact, no specific enactment existed, and none of the categories applied.

A treaty basis was what Britain sought, namely through the Treaty of Sèvres, but it remained unratified. The league’s covenant was, of course, a treaty, but if it was the intended basis, it would have been mentioned by name. Regardless, the covenant did not convey territorial rights. The inclusion of this list of possible bases of jurisdiction showed that the British government understood that it needed some internationally accepted basis for its unilateral assumption of full power of governance and legislation in Palestine. The absence of any specificity showed that it was covering for the fact that it had none.

By autumn 1922, Britain and the Allies lost hope that Turkey—now under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk—would ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, so they invited Turkey to Lausanne, Switzerland, to negotiate a treaty acceptable to Turkey. In July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed,⁷¹ and as before, ratification would be required.⁷² Though Turkey did agree to renounce sovereignty over its Arab provinces, the treaty did not specify any beneficiary. In fact, it made no mention of Britain or the Allies. Instead, Turkey renounced “tous droits et titres,” all rights and titles, outside Turkey itself—“le sort de ces territoires,” the future of these territories, the provision continued, “étant réglé ou à régler par les intéressés,” being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.⁷³ In French legal usage, “intéressés” means a party with a legal or property-type interest.⁷⁴ Since the Treaty of Lausanne gave no such interest to Britain, it was not a beneficiary of Turkey’s renunciation of sovereignty. By this provision, Turkey was agreeing to leave “these territories” to themselves.

Moreover, three provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne on transitional issues referred to these territories as “states” that were being “detached” from Turkey.⁷⁵ So, while there was no explicit cession to these new states, their characterization as “states” implied that they would hold their own sovereignty upon Turkey’s renunciation. These “states” were not named in the Treaty of Lausanne, but Palestine was obviously one of them. Indeed, in the aforementioned 1924 court case relating to Palestine, the PCIJ interpreted the Treaty of Lausanne this way, finding that Turkey’s territorial rights in Palestine transferred to Palestine itself, not to Britain.⁷⁶

Nonetheless, Curzon tried to find rights for Britain in the Treaty of Lausanne. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, he informed the league secretariat that he planned, at the next meeting of the council, to ask for “the simultaneous entry into force of the British mandate for Palestine and the Treaty of Lausanne.”⁷⁷ Curzon had no way of knowing when the Treaty of Lausanne might be ratified, but he evidently took the devolution clause to attribute rights to Britain based on what had already been “settled” or “regulated.” He suggested in his note to the secretariat that Britain had waited long enough for France and Italy to finalize the Syria mandate and that the council should no longer honor what it said on July 24, 1922 about the simultaneous entry into force of the Palestine and Syria mandates. By linking Britain’s status in Palestine to a peace treaty that, by his lights, gave rights to Britain, Curzon was acknowledging that Britain needed territorial rights deriving from Turkey. He was repeating the acknowledgment that Balfour had made in the council, and that the British government had made in its press statement, that, absent rights coming from Turkey, Britain could not hold a mandate over Palestine.

Shortly after Curzon’s communication to the League, events short-circuited his plan. Italy and France resolved their differences over the Syria mandate and so informed the council. The council took up the two mandates again, focusing on the Italy-France rapprochement. As had been the case on July 24 1922, there was no recorded discussion, but on September 29, 1923 a notation was entered in the council minutes, stating that, “in view of the agreement between the Governments of France and Italy in respect of the mandate for Syria, the mandates for Palestine and Syria would now enter into force automatically and at the same time.”⁷⁸ The council did not explain further. However, given that Curzon had just asked the council to determine that a Palestine mandate could take effect only upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne, and given that ratification had not occurred by September 29, 1923, the notation could not have meant that the mandate took effect then and there.⁷⁹

Notwithstanding, for the next quarter century, the British government was content to act as if it did hold a mandate over Palestine as from September 29, 1923. In 1947, as it sought advice from the newly established UN, it did give its read on what the council had done on September 29, 1923. To justify having been in Palestine lawfully, Britain explained: “The terms of the draft Mandate for Palestine were approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th July, 1922. At that time peace had not been concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey. It was not until the 29th September, 1923, after the Treaty of Lausanne had entered into force, that the council of the league was able formally to give effect to the Palestine Mandate.”⁸⁰ The Treaty of Lausanne, however, was only ratified and entered into force on August 6, 1924.⁸¹ Britain simply asserted here, falsely, that the Treaty of Lausanne was in force by September 29, 1923. This blatant falsification was the only way the British government could explain that its tenure in Palestine was anything more than belligerent occupancy.

The UN Partition Plan and the Ongoing Acceptance of Britain’s Deception

Britain’s deception was of no small moment. Shortly after its falsified 1947 claim to legal presence in Palestine, a UN committee, the Special Committee on Palestine, recommended the partition of Palestine. The Jewish Agency, which had been created in 1929 by the Zionist Organization to represent Zionist interests in the League of Nations, argued before the UN committee that “an international undertaking was given to the Jewish people some thirty years ago in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate for Palestine, to reconstitute our national home.”⁸² This “undertaking,” the Jewish Agency claimed, was “confirmed by 52 nations,” meaning the membership of the league, “and embodied in an international instrument, known as the Mandate for Palestine.”⁸³

Incredibly, the UN committee did not understand the falsification of dates to which Britain was resorting in order to convince it that the Mandate for Palestine had been a document carrying legal force. The committee accepted the Mandate for Palestine as having “entered into force formally on 29 September 1923.”⁸⁴ Ignoring the interpretations of the British government itself, the UN committee interpreted the Balfour Declaration, as incorporated into the Mandate for Palestine, as opening the door to Jewish statehood,⁸⁵ which it proceeded to recommend through partition.⁸⁶

Britain’s fraudulent 1947 explanation of its status in Palestine was at odds with a different fraudulent explanation for its status that it gave in 1946 when it drew the US into a project seeking a solution for Palestine, a project called the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. “Turkish sovereignty over Palestine was not,” the 1946 statement read, “formally renounced by Treaty until the signature on the 10^th August, 1920, of the Treaty of Sèvres.”⁸⁷ No mention was made that the Treaty of Sèvres never took effect and that, hence, Turkey did not renounce sovereignty over Palestine—or any of its former Arab provinces—in 1920. In any event, that 1946 explanation was abandoned the following year and replaced with the equally fallacious 1947 explanation about the league council and the Treaty of Lausanne.

One is left, then, with four official British explanations of how it supposedly held territorial rights in Palestine: the 1920 claim by King George V of a decision of the Allies; the 1924 explanation to the PCIJ about a self-generated right; the 1946 explanation to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry based on a treaty that was a legal nullity; and the 1947 explanation to the UN based on falsification of the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne. None of the four provided a viable explanation. Indeed, the fact that Britain repeatedly tried to claim territorial rights for itself shows its understanding that it needed such rights before it could govern Palestine.

As for grounding Jewish territorial rights in Palestine in public law, the document cited by scholars is the Mandate for Palestine. “Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state,” writes one analyst, “is couched in the 1922 Mandate.”⁸⁸ This claim fails not only because the Mandate for Palestine did not contemplate Jewish statehood, but also, and more fundamentally, because Britain never gained the territorial status that it needed for a valid mandate. Throughout the three decades it controlled Palestine, Britain remained the belligerent occupant it became in 1917. And as belligerent occupant, it lacked a legal posture to establish a national home for the Jewish people or to make other changes to the legal order of Palestine.

The Mandate for Palestine thus did not achieve status in law at the international level. Curzon, who personally opposed Britain’s promotion of Zionism, feared, as evidenced in his November 1920 memorandum, that the term “reconstitute” would become “the basis of all sorts of political claims by the Zionists for the control of Palestinian administration in the future.”⁸⁹ Curzon’s concern was realized in 1948 when the Jewish Agency used the Mandate for Palestine to claim an “international sanction” for Jewish statehood. In the diplomacy surrounding Palestine, however, no such “international sanction” is to be found. The mandate that supposedly embodied that “international sanction” never came into existence. As the international community now struggles, a century on from Curzon’s time, to shape a viable outcome in what remains a troubled land, it may not be out of place to take into account that the accepted learning about territorial rights in Palestine does not bear scrutiny.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

John Quigley

John Quigley is a professor emeritus at Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University. He is author of The Legality of a Jewish State: A Century of Debate over Rights in Palestine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021) and of Britain and Its Mandate over Palestine: Legal Chicanery on a World Stage (London: Anthem Press, 2022).

Notes

1 See, e.g., Susan Pedersen, “Writing the Balfour Declaration into the Mandate for Palestine,” International History Review 45, no. 2 (2023): 279, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2022.2123377 (claiming that the Mandate for Palestine “gave the Zionist project the protection of international law”).

2 UN Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p. 18, vol. 1, 2nd session, A/364 (September 3, 1947), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/703295?ln=en.

3 UN Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p. 47.

4 UN General Assembly, Resolution on Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Future Government of Palestine, A/RES/181(II) (November 29, 1947), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/667160?ln=en&v=pdf.

5 “Palestine for the Jews: Official Sympathy,” The (London) Times, November 9, 1917, 7, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive.

6 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette, no. 1, May 14, 1948, https://www.gov.il/en/departments/general/declaration-of-establishment-state-of-israel.

7 League of Nations, “Annex 391: British Mandate for Palestine,” Official Journal 3, no. 8 (August 1922): 1007, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/829707?ln=en.

8 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, Mandates A, November 1920, p. 435, cabinet paper 2197, file CAB 24/115, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

9 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115. “Mandates A” meant the mandates referred to in Covenant article 22, paragraph 4, which were being called “Class A” mandates, as opposed to those referred to in article 22, paragraphs 5 and 6, which were being called “Class B” and “Class C” mandates respectively.

10 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115.

11 The United States had been a “principal” power after entering the war against Germany, and through the Paris Peace Conference. But not having declared war on Turkey, it did not participate in efforts to reach a peace treaty with Turkey.

12 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115.

13 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115.

14 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115. Although the declaration of November 2, 1917 was referred to as “Balfour’s,” it was not issued by him, but by the UK War Cabinet, of which he was not a member.

15 Report of a committee set up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon [His majesty’s high commissioner in Egypt] and the sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, March 16, 1939, presented by the secretary of state for the colonies to parliament by command of his majesty, March 1939, London, Annex F: The Hogarth Message of January 1918, Command Paper 5974, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

16 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, held at the Villa Devachan, San Remo, Italy, on Saturday, April 24, 1920, at 4 p.m., Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, series 1, vol. 8 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1968), 159.

17 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 167.

18 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 160.

19 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115.

20 Notes du secrétaire prises au cours de la réunion tenue le 24 avril à 16 heures à la Villa Devachan, Doc. 18, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques français 1921 (annexes Janvier 10, 1920–Décembre 31, 1921), April 24, 1920, p. 174, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/archives-diplomatiques/offre-culturelle/publications-et-travaux-scientifiques/documents-diplomatiques-francais/. (All translations conducted by the author).

21 Notes du secrétaire prises au cours de la réunion tenue le 24 avril à 16 heures à la Villa Devachan, Doc. 18, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques français 1921, p. 174

22 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 169.

23 In the rendering by the British secretary, Curzon replied, “In the British language, all ordinary rights were included in ‘civil rights.’” British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 169.

24 No. 5: The Colonial Office to the Zionist Organization, June 3, 1922, correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization, Enclosure in No. 5: British Policy in Palestine, United Kingdom, Command Paper 1700, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

25 “Palestine: Statement of Policy Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty,” May 1939, ¶4, United Kingdom, Command Paper 6019, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

26 British Foreign Office, Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory in Palestine (O. E. T. A. South), report by Col. C. N. French, August 1919, file T 1/12367/35457, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom; John J. McTague Jr., “The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917–1920,” JPS 7, no. 3 (1978): 57, https://doi.org/10.2307/2536201.

27 International Peace Conference, Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague, October 18, 1907, article 43, file 195/IHL/19, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907.

28 United Kingdom War Office, “Chapter XIV: The Laws and Usages of War on Land,” in Manual of Military Law (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1914), article 354, p. 288, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015031059614&seq=9.

29 Norman Bentwich, “The Legal Administration of Palestine under the British Military Occupation,” British Yearbook of International Law (1920–21): 139, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/byrint1&div=12&id=&page=.

30 Note by Dr. Weizmann dated September 6, 1919, in Land Legislation in Mandate Palestine, ed. Martin Bunton, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17.

31 An ordinance to provide for the licensing of veterinary surgeons dated March 2, 1919, in Legislation of Palestine 1918–1925: Including the Orders-In-Council, Ordinances, Public Notices, Proclamations, Regulations, Etc., comp. Norman Bentwich, vol. 1 (Alexandria: Printed for the Government of Palestine by Whitehead Morris, 1926), 52.

32 An ordinance to provide for the registration of partnerships dated May 29, 1919, in Legislation of Palestine 1918–1925: Including the Orders-In-Council, Ordinances, Public Notices, Proclamations, Regulations, Etc., comp. Norman Bentwich, vol. 1 (Alexandria: Printed for the Government of Palestine by Whitehead Morris, 1926), 53.

33 An ordinance to provide for the registration of marriage and divorce dated September 23, 1919, in Legislation of Palestine 1918–1925: Including the Orders-In-Council, Ordinances, Public Notices, Proclamations, Regulations, Etc., comp. Norman Bentwich, vol. 1 (Alexandria: Printed for the Government of Palestine by Whitehead Morris, 1926), 57.

34 “The New Era in Palestine: King’s Message,” The (London) Times, July 12, 1920, 13, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive.

35 “The New Era in Palestine,” The (London) Times.

36 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) dated June 28, 1919, in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 2, p. 43, https://www.loc.gov/item/lltreaties-ustbv002/.

37 Draft Mandate for Palestine, letters dated September 2 and 10, 1921 from the Palestine Arab Delegation, League of Nations, September 27, 1921, file C-372-M.-260.1921.VI, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

38 Report on Middle East conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12 to 30, 1921, Appendix 23: Deputation of Executive Committee of the Haifa Congress received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at Government House, Monday, March 28, 1921, p. 150, file CAB 24/126, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

39 Albert M. Hyamson, Palestine under the Mandate: 1920–1948 (London: Methuen & Co., 1950), 33.

40 Hyamson, Palestine under the Mandate, 35.

41 Permanent Court International Justice (PCIJ), The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, speeches made and documents read before the court, speech by Sir Cecil Hurst on behalf of Great Britain at the public sitting on July 15, 1924, p. 24, series C, no. 5-1, https://www.icj-cij.org/pcij-series-c.

42 PCIJ, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, series C, no. 5-1.

43 PCIJ, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, series C, no. 5-1.

44 PCIJ, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, speeches made and documents read before the court, discours prononcé par S. Exc. M. Politis (Grèce) à la séance publique du 16 juillet 1924, p. 57, series C, no. 5–1, https://www.icj-cij.org/pcij-series-c.

45 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) dated June 28, 1919, Treaties and Other International Agreements.

46 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the UK Supreme Council, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 170.

47 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Sèvres, August 10, 1920, Cmnd. 964, https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=63986.

48 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, article 132.

49 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, article 433.

50 Franco-British Convention on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia, Paris, December 23, 1920, article 1, League of Nations: Treaty Series, vol. 22, p. 355, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2022/v22.pdf.

51 United Kingdom Foreign Office, Draft Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine as Submitted for the Approval of the League of Nations, 1921, Cmnd. 1176, no. 3, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/HSTP01015_1920-21/upload_pdf/1015_1920-21.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%22publications/tabledpapers/HSTP01015_1920-21%22.

52 “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed March 12, 2024, https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/covenant.

53 United Kingdom House of Lords, parliamentary debates, June 25, 1920, series 5, vol. 40, column 877, Hansard-UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/.

54 “The Covenant of the League of Nations.”

55 Secretary’s notes of a conversation held at Mr. Pichon’s room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 30, at 11 a.m., Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 3, 785, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv03/d54.

56 League of Nations, The Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings (Meetings held from the 5th of September to the 5th of October 1921), 1921, at p. 343 (subcommittee) and p. 357 (assembly), League of Nations, Geneva.

57 League of Nations, “First Meeting (Private) Eighteenth Session of the Council: Held at Geneva on Thursday, May 11th, 1922, at 5 p.m.,” Official Journal 3, no. 6, part 2 (August 1922): 518: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/leagon3&i=520. By this date, Turkey was seen as unlikely to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres in its original form.

58 League of Nations, “First Meeting (Private) Eighteenth Session of the Council: Held at Geneva on Thursday, May 11th, 1922, at 5 p.m.,” 518.

59 “Status of Palestine: Mandate and Treaty,” The (London) Times, May 12, 1922, 9, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive.

60 League of Nations, “First Meeting (Private) Eighteenth Session of the Council: Held at Geneva on Thursday, May 11th, 1922, at 5 p.m.” 518.

61 United Kingdom House of Commons, parliamentary debates, November 8, 1920, series 5, vol. 134, Hansard-UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/.

62 Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (King-Crane Commission), Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 12, 772, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv12/d380.

63 League of Nations, “Fifth Meeting (Private): Held at St. James’s Palace, London, on Wednesday, July 19th, 1922, at 10:30 a.m.,” Official Journal 3, no. 8, part 2 (August 1922): 799, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/leagon3&i=801.

64 Note of a conversation held at 10 Downing Street, London, S.W. 1 on Monday, July 3, 1922, at 12 Noon, Secret S. 49, within the files related to the appendix to a memorandum by Signor Schanzer, file No. CAB 23/36/10, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom.

65 League of Nations, “Twelfth Meeting (Private): Held at St. James’s Palace, London, on Saturday, July 22nd, 1922, at 3:30 p.m.,” Official Journal 3, no. 8, part 2 (August 1922): 825: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/leagon3&i=827.

66 United Kingdom, Palestine Order in Council, 1922 (August 10), Statutory Rules and Orders no. 1282, p. 362, National Archives, Richmond, United Kingdom. Also in the Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine, September 1, 1922, https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/23184/palestine-order-council-palestine-constitution.

67 United Kingdom, Palestine Order in Council, para. 5.

68 Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890: An Act to Consolidate the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, August 4, 1890, Victoria 53 & 54, chap. 37, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/53-54/37/enacted; Henry Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902).

69 Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890: An Act to Consolidate the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts.

70 United Kingdom, Palestine Order in Council, preamble.

71 No. 701–Traité de paix, Lausanne, July 24, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 28, p. 12, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2028/v28.pdf (authentic only in French. Quotations in the text are from an unofficial British translation).

72 No. 701–Traité de paix, article 143.

73 No. 701–Traité de paix, article 16.

74 Jean Baleyte et al., Dictionnaire économique et juridique (Paris: LGDJ, 1992) (a vested interest in an enterprise). “Definition of Interesse,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary website, accessed March 13, 2024, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interesse (a legal interest in property).

75 No. 701–Traité de paix, article 30 and article 46; Protocole 12: Relatif à certaines concessions accordées dans l’Empire Ottoman, article 9, League of Nations Treaty Series, https://treaties.un.org/pages/lononline.aspx?clang=_en.

76 PCIJ, Judgment of March 26, 1925, The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, series A, no. 5, p. 32, https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_05/15_Mavrommatis_a_Jerusalem_Arret_19250326.pdf?__cf_chl_tk=OqaRJutMerMzqqc01d7Gfoxr_vfDQSJqvat635IQqoM-1710314783-0.0.1.1-1919. In 1988, the Palestine National Council similarly took the Treaty of Lausanne as the start date of Palestinian statehood. United Nations, Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, annex III, Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, November 15, 1988, files A/43/827, S/20278, p. 13, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/50478?v=pdf.

77 League of Nations, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General, August 16, 1923, file C.536.1923.VI.

78 League of Nations, “Twenty-Third Meeting (Private): Held at Geneva on Saturday, September 29th, 1923, at 10:30 a.m.–Agenda Item 1092: British Mandate for Palestine,” Official Journal 4, no. 11, (November 1923): 1355, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/leagon4&i=1355.

79 League of Nations, “Twenty-Third Meeting (Private): Held at Geneva on Saturday, September 29th, 1923, at 10:30 a.m.–Agenda Item 1092: British Mandate for Palestine,” 1355.

80 The Political History of Palestine under British Administration: Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty’s Government presented in 1947 to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Published at Jerusalem, 1947, p. 1–2, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185776/ (emphasis added).

81 No. 701–Traité de paix (footnote shows final ratifications on August 6, 1924).

82 UN, statement of David Ben-Gurion, oral evidence presented at public meetings, Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p, 10, vol. 3, annex A, file A/364 (September 3, 1947), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/604716?ln=en&v=pdf.

83 UN, statement of David Ben-Gurion.

84 UN Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p. 18.

85 UN Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p. 20–21.

86 UN Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, p. 47.

87 A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, vol. 1, p. 3 (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991).

88 Yuval Shany, “Legal Entitlements, Changing Circumstances and Intertemporality: A Comment on the Creation of Israel and the Status of Palestine,” Israel Law Review 49 (2016): 408, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223716000224.

89 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, p. 435, file CAB 24/115.