Abstract
This article examines the contours and dynamics of popular support for democracy in South Korea, a country widely known as one of the most successful third-wave democracies in Asia. Analysis of the Korea Democracy Barometer and East Asia Barometer surveys conducted between 1996 and 2004 reveals that ordinary Koreans’ support for democracy has moved both downward and upward during the past eight years. Analysis of these surveys also reveals that the trajectories and sources of that movement vary considerably across different types of democratic support. Based on this finding that democratic authorization and exercise of power affect various manifestations of democratic support differently, we argue that to understand the dynamics of support for democracy accurately, one must distinguish between the realm of political performance and that of governmental performance.
Notes
1. The two questions used to measure electoral democratization are (1) ‘How fairly do you think the last presidential election was conducted?’ and (2) ‘How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the result of the last presidential election?’ Responses to both questions were combined to construct a seven-point index ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 7. The two questions used to measure political liberalization are (1) ‘To what extent do you think people are free to express their political opinion these days?’ and (2) ‘To what extent do you think people are free to join the group they would like to join these days?’ Responses to both questions were combined to construct a seven-point index ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 7.
2. The two questions used to measure the fairness of governance are (1) ‘How fairly do you think laws are enforced in our society these days?’ and (2) ‘To what extent was the Kim Dae Jung government regionally biased in treating people?’ Responses to both questions were combined to construct a seven-point scale index ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 7. The two questions used to measure the transparency of governance are (1) ‘How widespread do you think political corruption was under the Kim Dae Jung government?’ and (2) ‘How transparent or open was the Kim Dae Jung government to the public?’ Responses to both questions were combined to construct a seven-point scale index ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 7.
3. The three measures of support for democracy are recoded as follows: (1) democratic preference has two values, 2 = always prefers democracy and 1 = does not always prefer democracy; (2) democratic satisfaction has four values, 4 = very satisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, and 1 = not at all satisfied; (3) the Institutional Trust Index is calculated by adding trust in government values, trust in parliament values, and trust in courts values, then subtracting 2. The index range is from 1 to 10. High values indicate high trust and low values indicate low trust in three branches of government.