Violence and social change. The new routes of sovereignty in the globalised world

ABSTRACT

To understand the content and the historical forms of violence, it is necessary to define it in relation to the different notions that dot its path of meaning (power, domination, strenght, order, sovereignty, etc.). Moreover, this allows us to grasp its new configurations connected to the systemic upheavals that characterize the globalised world. In contemporary society violence now shows a double face, which is a combination of renewed forms of traditional violence and ‘new’ forms that derive from processes of social differentiation. These ‘new’ forms of systemic-molecular violence are linked to a biotechnological domain that opens up a new scenario to the possibility of violating freedoms and rights in the globalised world.

KEYWORDS:

• Violence
• power
• domination
• sovereignty
• identity
• techne
• globalization

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Maria Giovanna Musso is associate professor at University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, where she teaches Sociology of Change, Creativity and Art and Sociological Theories. She has conducted studies on complex systems, art and science, development and globalization. Her research topics include the relationship between violence against women, identity, social imaginary and social bond; the relationship between art, science, technology and their impact on social change.

Notes

1 Here the relation between form and content is to be taken in terms of Simmel’s acceptation, i.e., ‘content’ is to indicate the subject of sociation (Vergesellschaftung), that is ‘everything that in individuals, in the immediate concrete places of every historical reality is present as driver, interest, purpose, inclination, psychic situation and movement’ (Simmel, 1989, p. 9; see also Simmel, 1999, pp. 37–39). Form, on the other hand, is that almost geometrically identifiable structure of social life with which recognizable outlines of relations and things are defined, through which a certain feature is impressed on life and its psychic and social contents (Ibid.).

2 Violence against women is paradigmatic in this sense, given that in many societies, and in western societies until the middle of the last century, it is considered normal, legitimate and often not indictable under law (see Musso et al. in this same issue).

3 Theories and definitions of violence can be found in a vast range of literature, sociological, juridical, historical, politological, criminological, anthropological and psychological, which is impossible to take into account here. The ‘violence’ entry in the Enciclopedia Treccani is unsurprisingly drawn up by four authors from different disciplinary fields (see Jervis et al., 1998). The definition given by WHO is the following: ‘The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.’ (Krug et al., 2002, p. 5). For a history of violence cfr. Muchembled (2008) e Pinker (2011). In sociological terms, the topic has been addressed among others by Collins (2008); Corradi (2009); Galtung (2000); Appadurai (1996, 2013, 2017); Maniscalco and Pellizzari (2016); Wieviorka (2009, 2012). Among the most significant anthropological contributions see also Héritier (1996a); Farmer (2004); Dei (2005). For a review of the socio-anthropological literature see Ferreri’s text in this same issue.

4 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/18/the-virus-doesnt-discriminate-but-governments-do-latinos-disproportionately-hit-by-coronavirus

5 Plato in Phaedo attributes the reasons behind oppression and violence to the body. ‘Wars and revolutions and battles, you see, are due simply and solely to the body and its desires’ (Plato, 2000, p. 78)

6 Stanley Milgram and Philippe Zimbardo are two psychologists who carried out a number of experiments in the 1960s and 1970s on violence and the role of institutions and of social legitimation. The first experiment required some volunteers to play the part of teachers instructed to inflict increasingly violent punishment on (false) students each time they gave an incorrect answer to questions set by the experimenter. Although the suffering inflicted on the pupils became increasingly unbearable – given the (sham) screams and the begging for mercy coming from the room where the actor-pupils were shut up – most of the volunteers continued to inflict increasingly powerful electric shocks, following orders given by the experimenter (Milgram, 1974). In the second experiment carried out by Zimbardo (2007) in Stanford, the volunteers were divided into two groups: guards and prisoners. After the first interactions, the participants became totally involved in their assigned roles and there was an escalation in violence and brutality (although this had been expressly forbidden) on the part of the guards towards the prisoners, until the experiment had to be broken off (Ibid.).

7 Muchembled (2008) in particular has shown how in Europe, from 1600 onwards and at the time of the nation-states, mortal violence in society was persecuted and repressed by the public authorities until it became taboo. The criminal justice system and the police force were the tools through which it was possible to counteract the widespread tendency to settle social and individual conflicts by means of mortal combat.

8 Not only historically but also sociologically, Nazism in general and the Holocaust in particular cannot be read as a single unicum in the history of the West. In order to understand their range and implications, we must analyse both ‘the singularity of the event and its inscription in the long view of history’ (Traverso, 2003, p. 5) and insert it into the social and cultural picture against the background of which it became possible (Bauman, 1989).

9 According to Weber, rationalization constitutes the real destiny of the West. It is with what super-powerful constraint determines, and will perhaps continue to determine, the lifestyle of every individual born into this mechanism 'until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt’ (Weber, 1958, p. 181).

10 This line of thinking includes both Marxist theory and the works of Franz Fanon, Georges Sorel and Jean-Paul Sartre, although there are clear differences in emphasis and functions that each of these authors assigns to violence as the motor for social change. For a critical review of the different conceptions of violence represented by these authors see Arendt, 1970. For a discussion of conflict as one of the motors for social change see Ferrara, 2012, pp. 92–99.

11 Authors such as Sorel, Sartre and Marinetti are exceptions to this tendency, and the work of Michel Foucault, which, without dealing directly with violence, allows us to take a wider view of its diverse forms through an elucidation of the relations between order and power.

12 As Arendt holds, violence may also accompany power but is not identified with it. It ‘is distinct due to its instrumental character’ (p. 49) and ‘functions as the last resource of power’ changing it into domination. ‘Domination through pure violence comes into play when power is being lost’ (p. 58). ‘The loss of power becomes a temptation to replace power with violence’ (p. 59). For a different conception of power and potency see also D’Andrea, 2014.

13 I use the term puissance, which is the closest to the Italian term potenza, in the absence of a similar term in English. Perhaps the terms 'might' or 'mightiness' come close but it seems to me that puissance is the most inclusive. Puissance is a force that can be both personal and social, characterized by a particular dynamis in which strength and power are combined. For more details on the meaning and the implications of this term, in addition to the specifications shown in this text, see also Magatti, 2018, pp. 19–31.

14 Schmitt defines sovereignty as the ‘supreme, non-derived sovereign power’ (Schmitt, 1972, p. 34) and underlines that in the history of sovereignty there is no dispute around the concept in itself, but there is dispute regarding its effective use, regarding who decides where public or state interest lies, or safety and public order, for example in the case of conflict (Ibid.). The issue of sovereignty is the issue relating to the subject of sovereignty (Ibid.). For Schmitt, the decisive moment of sovereignty is the state of exception. ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception’ (ivi, p. 33). As the author himself stresses, the exception has no juridical meaning and as a consequence is a sociological category: ‘the exception is what is not referable to the norm’ (ivi, p. 39). Sovereignty has also diverse uses (e.g., Bataille, 2009). Here we are only interested in highlighting its relationship with violence, so we will set aside other acceptations of the term.

15 Effectively, the state of exception, although theorized by Schmitt in reference to the agents of politics, in particular to the State agents, has a situational value in which it is only a question of deciding who exercises the function of sovereignty. ‘If only God is the sovereign, […] or emperor, or prince, or people: the question is always oriented towards the subject of sovereignty. It is always a question of the application of the concept in a concrete, factual situation.’ (Schmitt, 1972, p. 37).

16 The literature on globalization is too vast to report here. For a discussion on its initial aspects, see Musso, 1998.

17 The theme of development and processes of decolonization is another area too vast to even be mentioned here. In addition to the texts cited in this work, see the bibliography contained in Musso, 1996 and 1998.

18 The nudge, perfected by Thaler and Sunstein (2009), is an instrument exemplifying this type of process. It is an expedient thought up to direct individuals’ choices in a more rational and cheaper way through restructuring the architecture of the decisional context. Created in order to facilitate choices considered the best, that is the most functional, for individual and collective well-being, it can clearly be used for a variety of purposes and, if its application continues to aim for the enhancement of well-being, there is a problem for the freedom of choice and the so-called ‘sovereignty’ of the consumer. Thaler and Sunstein’s ‘liberal paternalism’, in fact, risks proving another subtle method of control and intrusion in the life and sphere of freedom of the citizen on the part of businesses and marketing.