Fatal encounters: shopkeepers, neo-populism, and the exclusionary city

ABSTRACT

The present article analyzes the role that shopkeepers play in the life of cities in terms of space production, cultures, and policies on the use of public space. Shopkeepers are seen as the co-promotors of a revanchist culture that affects liberties in contemporary cities. In the light of such premises, the present theoretical study inquires into the intertwinements between this group and the dominant populist political offer. The combination of power of influence, sense of loss, and exposition to political offers that promise to give back stability, by recreating known worlds made of traditional hierarchies, roles. and sentiments, all of them situated in the locality, appears as the recipe for the re-proposition of historical authoritarian alliances that participated to the making of the contemporary exclusionary city.

KEYWORDS:

• Shopkeepers
• urban populism
• petty bourgeoisie
• space
• social classes

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Not long ago, the same was observed by Le Galès (2002, p. 114), in particular with regard to France and Italy.

2 I am not suggesting that shopkeepers as a group voted in their entirety for one party. In Italy, for example, the populist landscape is quite articulated. In this country, according to Biancalana (2020), four types of populism can be found: Lega, Berlusconi, Five Star Movements, and Renzi. To this list, in my view, neo- and post-fascism should be added. In this respect, the character of much of contemporary neofascism pretends not to be nostalgic. Rather, it aspires to go ‘beyond the right and the left’ (Jesi, 1979; Rosati, 2018). In this sense, large parts of the political elaboration of far-right movements, on the one hand, merged with the Lega, and, on other hand, entered the common sense. Moreover, with the exception perhaps of Renzi’s type of populism, all of the abovementioned manifestations share some elements. With regard to the other non-fascist populist forces, though nuanced, their position on nation, legalism, immigration, and crime are, in fact, compatible in many regards (sometimes, indeed, indistinguishable from neofascism: see Dal Lago, 2017). We know, therefore, that there is a large offer of political ‘products/items’ that present common traits. By choosing one or the other, the populist voter is mostly buying a standard, which must include certain positions on certain topics in order to be competitive. Last but not least, I am not claiming that shopkeepers and the like represent the very electoral base of certain parties. Available data are limited, and the profile of voters is not extremely detailed. Though extremely debatable (Rooduijn, 2018), there is still large agreement that the working class and the other ‘losers of globalization’ are the main recipients of certain political messages (Kriesi et al., 2006). However, we also know that the medium and the low sectors of the middle class, whose profile is compatible with that of shopkeepers, are sensitive to populist programs (Ruzza & Loner, 2017). Their ‘cultural’ compatibility with certain messages, and the way such messages shape the common sense of many of those who feel under pressure, bode for a conservative attitude of this class as a whole. In addition, beyond the actual number of populist voters in this group, shopkeepers are, as said above, relatively influential at a local level (especially, through their representative associations). This is, after all, the kind of situation where ‘distinguishing between populist attitudes and populist vote might be more interesting’ (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 344).

3 The age group 41–84 represents 56.3% of the population. In addition, 51% of the population received compulsory education only. Finally, 33% of the population earns between 0 and 800 euros per month (Limosani, 2021; Mangano, 2020).

4 Over the course of the very early twentieth century, one noticeable exception to the rule of conservativism spread among shopkeepers, is represented by the case of Portugal, and Lisbon in particular. Here the rent crisis, the indifference of the Monarchy towards this problem, and the insignificance of the socialist threat coming from the working class, pushed shopkeepers towards the radicalism of the Republican party – the left of the time in the country: see Alves (2017). Another, perhaps minor, exception, can be found in Boswell (1993): in the French rural region he studied, shopkeepers showed in fact a prolonged sympathy for the Communist Party.

5 It is also an issue that re-activates discourses on ‘civility’ which are rooted in the local public discourse, and that provide one tangible example of the ‘complexes’ that affect the local cultural intimacy: see Herzfeld (1997).

6 A creditable report (Institute of Retail Management, 2014, p. 13) insists on the efforts that the retail sector is doing to meet the demands that both the environmental question and the ethos of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pose to the economic world. However, while my personal skepticism on the theme might only show that CSR is a ‘trap’ that does not convince many consumers (Vollero et al., 2016), one cannot refrain from noticing that it is also a sham. See, among many possible readings, Simon (2009, p. 173 et passim) on Starbucks and its environmental policies.

7 The bulk of both national and international studies on this phenomenon is, simply, endless. Lees and Phillips’ (2018) work provides an essential review of some of these studies.

8 Since the 1990s the literature shows the dramatic impact that off-center superstores had on commerce in inner-city neighborhoods and rural, or semi-rural areas (Guy, 1998; Ozuduru & Guldmann, 2014, p. 5). Moreover, the policies that aim to regulate, or perhaps produce, space for commerce had a dramatic impact on the hosting communities, leading to the creation of ‘deserts’ (O’Kelly, 2009) – that is, portions of urban or peri-urban spaces, which are excluded from the possibility of buying basic goods such as food.

9 In an essential reading on these topics, Morris (1993, p. 2) observes that the mainstream historians deployed these stereotypes to bring Hitler and, crucially for the Italian case, Mussolini to power, but provided little of the context in which the actions of these strata could be understood. Moreover, on the traces of Crossick and Haupt (1984), Morris (1993, p. 4) argues that there was a ‘regrettable’ tendency for research on shopkeepers and artisans to focus too heavily on the political sphere, ignoring the social and economic context in which activity was conducted. In a working-class suburb, the social status of the shopkeeper would be high and his economic power considerable. In a more mixed residential area, retailers would find themselves lower down the social scale. This kind of considerations – the author observes – had considerable implications for the development of a petit-bourgeois identity. Petite bourgeoisie, thus, should be read ‘in its own terms’.

10 See Koivisto (2016) for an interesting reconstruction of this fundamental concept.

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Pietro Saitta

Pietro Saitta is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Messina (Italy). He has taught and conducted research in several Italian and international institutions (Columbia University, and World Health Organization, among the others). He is mostly interested in urban issues, critical criminology, environment and disasters. In particular, he is interested in the strategies of the lay actors vis-à-vis the public and private institutions, and in the interplays that take place in the context of everyday life. Among his recent works is The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters (with Domenica Farinella: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).