China's Growing Military Capability in Search of a Strategy

Abstract

China's rapid military modernisation in the past decade has raised concern over when and how China will use its military power in the future. There is no definite answer to this concern. However, the new course in Taiwan, urgent non-traditional security issues, the domestic agenda for re-allocating resources to development of a ‘harmonious society’, and the looming economic crisis could shape China's foreign policy goals so that it continues the engagement approach adopted in the past decade.

Notes

¹China's military modernisation has been very comprehensive, ranging from procuring new systems, restructuring the defence industry, reforming defence organisation, upgrading the quality of personnel, training and exercises see Shambaugh, Modernising China's Military. For a specific analysis of China's information-related modernisation aimed at building up information dominance, see Stokes, China's Strategic Modernisation.

²For a thoughtful analysis of the issue of China as a status quo power, see Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power”, 5–56. For a contrasting view, see Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China.

³During his first visit to China in 2006 as Commander of the US Pacific Command for dialogue over China's manufacture of aircraft carriers, Adm. Timothy Keating was asked by high-ranking Chinese naval officials about the possibility of the US force withdrawing to east of Hawaii, leaving the Pacific west of Hawaii to China. “Keating: mei guanqie zhongguo fazhan hangmu bimian xingcheng weixie” [Keating: the US is concerned about China's development of aircraft carriers; avoiding to become a threat], China Times, 19 December 2008. http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,130505+132008121900744,00.html. Nan Li also shows that China is attempting to build up a regionally dominant power by 2020 with an operational range stretching from the northwest Pacific to the East Indian Ocean. Li, “The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities”.

⁴For instance, with regard to aircraft carriers, a critical platform for projecting power, it will take China years to manufacture a fleet. See Storey and You, “China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions”, and Erickson and Wilson, “China's Aircraft Carrier Dilemma”.

⁵Swaine, “Chinese Decision Making Regarding Taiwan”, 289–336. See also, Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, and Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.

⁶For an analysis of these military exercises, see Lin, Zhonggong junshi yanxi zhi yanjiu, 1990–1996 [Study of China's Military Exercises, 1990–1996].

⁷On the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis, see Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait, and Swaine, “Chinese Decision Making Regarding Taiwan”. It should be noted that these exercises also served to develop the new military doctrine announced by Jiang Zemin in 1993 of ‘local war under high-tech conditions’.

⁸Ding, “The Lessons of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis”, 379–402.

⁹A long-held theory in China over US involvement in the Taiwan Strait is that it aims to divide China and Taiwan. A different explanation is given for US involvement in the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and that is to underline the credibility of its strategic commitment. See Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation”, 87–123.

¹⁰On China's perceptions and calculations and their impact on US-Taiwan-China interaction, see Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up”, 5–40.

¹¹The two terms, sea denial and anti-access, are used interchangeably here to describe China's maritime capability. Anti-access is to deter or deny the entry of enemy forces into a theatre of operation. Area denial indicates limited duration denial of enemy freedom of action in a theatre of operation. See US Department of Defense, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, 23. http://www.defencelink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf

¹²Li, “The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics”, 443–63.

¹³On China's negotiation of border disputes, see Taylor Fravel, “Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes”, 46–83.

¹⁴For China's internal debate over future warfare, see Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare. For China's evolving military doctrine, particularly differences between ‘local war’ and ‘local war under high-tech conditions’, see Li, “New Development in PLA's Operational Doctrine and Strategies”.

¹⁵There were different interpretations of this issue in the Chinese military. See Dreyer, “The PLA and Kosovo”, 100–19.

¹⁶Waldron, “The Kosovo War: Implications for Taiwan”, 255–77.

¹⁷Finkelstein, China Reconsiders its National Security. For a related analysis, see Shambaugh, “China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security”, 52–79.

¹⁸“Maliujia zhi kunjing Hu jintao henguanxin” [Hu Jintao is concerned about the Malacca Dilemma], China Times (Taipei), 20 March 2006, cited in http://www.tycool.com/2006/03/20/00005.html

¹⁹Taylor Fravel and Liebman, “PLAN's Evolving Interests and Potential Influence”, and Hartnett and Vellucci, “Towards a Maritime Security Strategy”.

²⁰Ding, “China's Energy Security Demands”, 35–8.

²¹Mulvenon and Finkelstein, China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, and Li, “New Development in PLA's Operational Doctrine and Strategies”.

²²O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

²³Lewis and Xue, “China's Search for a Modern Air Force”, 64–94.

²⁴Gill, Mulvenon and Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps”, 510–86.

²⁵“US watching for anticipated test of new PRC missiles”, Taipei Times, 12 July 2008. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/07/12/2003417234

²⁶http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/lacm.htm

²⁷Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, http://www.sinodefence.com/space/default.asp and http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/index.html

²⁸Kondapalli, “The Behemoth on the Move”.

²⁹There is no consensus on the main target of the PLA's sea denial operations, whether the US or Taiwan. See Chang, “The PLAN Anti-Access Role in Taiwan Contingency”, and McDevitt, “The PLAN Anti-Access Role in Taiwan Contingency”.

³⁰ China's National Defense in 2008, issued in January 2009. http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm

³¹Li, “The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities”.

³²For an analysis on Japanese's attitude toward nuclear weapon issue, see Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon”, 63–75.http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_kamiya.pdf

³³Some argue that the regional political order is already being shaped by the growing China. Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia”, 64–99.

³⁴Vaughn, US Strategic Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf, and R. Halloran, “America Overhauls its Asia-Pacific Force”, The Japan Times, 10 October 2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20051010a1.html. For an official Japanese version of US-Japan collaboration, see Chapter 2 of Part III of Defense of Japan 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/35Part3_Chap2_Sec2.pdf and http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/36Part3_Chap2_Sec3.pdf

³⁵Romberg, “First the Easy Steps, Then the Difficult Ones”, and “Take a Long-term Perspective”.

³⁶“Keating: mei guanqie zhongguo fazhan hangmu bimian xingcheng weixie” [Keating: the US is concerned about China's development of aircraft carriers, avoiding to become threat], China Times, 19 December 2008. http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,130505±132008121900744,00.html. See also the article by Hughes in this issue, 59.

³⁷Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia”, 64–99.

³⁸See McVadon and Allen, “China's Foreign Military Relations”. http://www.stimson.org/china/pdf/chinmil.pdf

³⁹In the recent ‘Libing 2008’ military exercise held from 26 August 2008 to 25 September 2008 in the Beijing Military Region, foreign military observers were allowed to talk without restrictions with Chinese military officials after the exercise was concluded.

⁴⁰He, China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations. http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/ap/07/yh07chinaschanging.pdf

⁴¹Fu, “PLA's Participation in Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations”.

⁴²In November 2008, a total of 1,952 military personnel were employed in PKO tasks, including 91 military observers and 1,861 engineering/transport/medical support staff.

⁴³These factors include: historical memory (originating from the Sino-Japanese war), Japan's history textbook issue (in which there are different interpretations of Japan's behaviour in China during World War II), worship at the Yasukuni shrine, regarded by the Chinese as the symbol of the rebirth of Japanese militarism, by Japanese political leaders, territorial and related resources disputes (such as over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Island and undersea crude oil reserves), the tainted food issue (in which Chinese food producers exported tainted food to Japan) and competition for leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

⁴⁴Lin, “More Carrot Than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy”, 1–27. http://www.wsichina.org/cs9_1.pdf

⁴⁵Wang, “China's ‘New Diplomacy’ Goes to Japan”, and Smith, “A New Agenda for Japan and China”.

⁴⁶G. Kessler, “China Gave ‘Strong Message' To North Koreans, Rice says”, Washington Post, 21 October 2006.

⁴⁷“Zhongguo dalu tiaozheng guojia anquan zhanlue” [China adjusts its national security strategy], China Times, 25 July 2008.

⁴⁸Shi, “Fazhan zhongguo ziji de gongmin shehui jituan” [Developing China's own civil society groups].

⁴⁹ China's National Defense in 2008, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_4.htm

⁵⁰ Ibid.