South Africa's Multilateral Challenges in a ‘Polypolar’ World

Abstract

The emerging global order is challenging multilateralism in the sense that power is becoming situational: centres of gravity are overlapping and transient, and the transnational interdependence that characterises this ‘polypolar’ world challenges small and great powers alike. Emerging powers are forming a ‘new middle', straddling the North-South divide with dynamic new multilateral formations, and prioritising economic self-interest. South Africa is at risk of being relegated to a new global periphery if it gives priority to political solidarity with the global South rather than economic pragmatism in its multilateral strategies. Its comparative advantage in the diplomatic arena is its middle power credentials. If it rationalizes its multilateralism to focus on diplomatic niche areas it can enhance its political influence in global governance institutions, despite its small economic stature.

Notes

¹Zondi, “Contributing the South African Perspective”, 27.

²Nelson Mandela referred to “the new South Africa which you helped to bring into being” when he delivered his maiden speech as South African President to the UN General Assembly on 3 October 1994. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/un49th.html

³A possible causal link will not be explored in this article.

⁴Fukuyama, “End of History”.

⁵Shaw et al., “Emerging Powers and Africa”, 27.

⁶Haass, “Age of Nonpolarity”.

⁷The analysis will thus focus on the systemic level, but with the caveat that any comprehensive understanding of SA's foreign policy should be contextualised with due consideration for domestic variables, as well as psychoanalytical attention to aspects of agency at the individual foreign policymaker level.

⁸For discussion of the post-1994 inflation in SA's diplomatic relations, see Muller, “Current Events in SA Diplomacy”; Van der Westhuizen, “Global Conference Circuit”; and A. Nzo, Parliamentary Briefing by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 8 February 1999. http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/99210_foreig99_10095.htm

⁹The other two being Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former President F.W. De Klerk. The fourth in the group and Africa's first Nobel Peace laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli, died in 1967.

¹⁰Among many other achievements, SA secured developing world support for the 1995 indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was a driver in the 1997 Ottawa Process on the banning of land mines, the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court, and the formulation and adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. Geldenhuys, “SA as Norm Entrepreneur”.

¹¹As South Africa's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad emphasized in a speech to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Cape Town, in February 2007, “the importance of maintaining multilateralism has never been so pertinent … [it] remains the most effective and efficient system for addressing global problems. In history no other form of inter-state cooperation has delivered the same results as multilateralism.” http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/pahad.htm

¹²Jordaan, “Concept of a Middle Power”.

¹³Puchala, “Third World Thinking”.

¹⁴Jordaan, “Concept of a Middle Power”, 167.

¹⁵Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa”, 147.

¹⁶Initiated by the formation of the first ‘Third World’ grouping, the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), during the 1950s.

¹⁷Cooper et al., Global Governance and Diplomacy, 2.

¹⁸In anticipation of the post-1994 democratic dispensation, Nelson Mandela outlined the ethical foundations of SA's future foreign policy in a 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, “South Africa's Future Foreign Policy”.

¹⁹Serrão and Bischoff (“Foreign Policy Ambiguity”, 364) recall that SA's foreign policy was so riddled with inconsistencies that some commentators alleged the country had no foreign policy at all.

²⁰Speech by South African President Thabo Mbeki to the National Assembly on the occasion of the consideration of the budget vote of the Presidency, Cape Town, 13 June 2000, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mbeki.htm

²¹Address by South African President Thabo Mbeki at the UN Millennium Review Summit. New York, 15 September 2005. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mbeki.htm

²²See, for example, Francis Kornegay's (Will a BRIC Fall on IBSA?) discussion.

²³Shaw et al. (“Emerging Powers and Africa”, 37) illustrate his tenacious lobbying by pointing out that between 2000 and 2008, Mbeki attended every single G8 summit – one more than George W. Bush, the senior G8 leader!

²⁴Habib (“South Africa's Foreign Policy”, 145–7) argues that Mbeki's personal impact on SA's multilateral profile is informed by the fact that he is an example of second generation nationalist leadership within the global South. These leaders, Habib explains, are “acutely aware of their countries’ relative weakness and that their anti-colonial agendas will not materialise outside the transformation of the balance of power in the global order”. They therefore display a combination of principle and pragmatism: in order to subvert the power relations of the international system, they not only have to understand the rules of the game, but also actively play by those rules until such time as they have opportunity to change it. This requires a calculated, sophisticated and very proactive approach, something at which Mbeki excelled.

²⁵Bond, Talk Left, Walk Right, 4.

²⁶ Ibid., 296.

²⁷Address by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs during the State of the Nation Debate in Parliament: “A Better Africa and a Better World”, Cape Town, 9 February 2009.

²⁸Habib, “South Africa's Foreign Policy”, 148.

²⁹Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa”, 145.

³⁰G8, Africa Action Plan, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/africaplan.html

³¹Speech by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on “South Africa's Foreign Policy Focus Today and in the Future” at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 30 March 2010. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mashabane.html

³²Spies, “Multilateral Maze”.

³³Kotzé, “Identity and International Dynamics”.

³⁴As proposed by Secretary General Annan in his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom.

³⁵Spies, “Multilateral Maze”.

³⁶NAM, Plan of Action: 2006 – 2009, par. 39.3. This position was also forcibly reiterated by Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad in his speech to SAIIA, February 2007. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/pahad.htm

³⁷Geldenhuys, “SA as Norm Entrepreneur”, 101.

³⁸Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa”, 146–9.

³⁹As Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Nkoana-Mashabane acknowledged during a lecture at Rhodes University in October 2009: “The era of being the toast of the world is over; we are now viewed and treated like any other country.” http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mashabane.html

⁴⁰Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”.

⁴¹Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers.

⁴²Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.

⁴³Kornegay, Will a BRIC Fall on IBSA?

⁴⁴Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC in 2003, and identified the four countries as having the economies with the greatest development potential on the basis of positive economic fundamentals, large and growing populations, and the ability to exploit resource assets, such as oil.

⁴⁵First articulated in Resolution 8(23) of the African National Congress’ 52nd National Conference, December 2007, and subsequently echoed in foreign policy statements of the South African government. See, for example, the lecture by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane, at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 22 October 2009. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mashabane.html

⁴⁶Shaw et al. (“Emerging Powers and Africa”, 32) assert that the BRIC countries all use soft power to promote their national interest.

⁴⁷De Haas, “Time for EU and NATO”, 43.

⁴⁸Haass, “Age of Nonpolarity”, 44.

⁴⁹Caution is required: in the extreme sense of the word, polypolarity could imply a paradox in that poles would be considered randomly interchangeable. This is obviously not (yet) the case in a global system where the sovereignty of states continues to be the bedrock of international law.

⁵⁰Wiseman, “Pax Americana”.

⁵¹Haass, “Age of Nonpolarity”, 44.

⁵²Barston, Modern Diplomacy. Chap. 3.

⁵³Jordaan, “Concept of a Middle Power”, 170–1.

⁵⁴Wiseman, “Polylateralism and New Modes”, 37.

⁵⁵Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Chap. 3.

⁵⁶Address by South African President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of the Presidency budget vote for 2010/2011, Cape Town, 12 May 2010. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/jzuma.html

⁵⁷Lecture by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 22 October 2009, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mashabane.html

⁵⁸BBC News, “Copenhagen Deal Reaction in Quotes”, 19 December 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8421910.stm. Note that Di-Aping later apologised for his tone.

⁵⁹Zondi, “Contributing the South African Perspective”, 29.

⁶⁰Habib and Selinyane, “Constraining the Unconstrained”, 181.

⁶¹Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa”, 148.

⁶²G20 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders’ Statement, 24–25 September 2009, http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.

⁶³Kornegay, Will a BRIC Fall on IBSA?, 1.

⁶⁴Shaw et al., “Emerging Powers and Africa”, 27.

⁶⁵SA Presidency, Medium Term Strategic Framework.

⁶⁶Zuma paid a state visit to Brazil in October 2009 and the visit was reciprocated by President Luiz Inacio Lula of Brazil in July 2010.

⁶⁷Register of state visits undertaken by and scheduled for Jacob Zuma contained in websites of the SA Presidency (http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (http://www.dfa.gov.za/).

⁶⁸The FIFA Soccer World Cup was hosted by SA from 11 June to 11 July 2010.

⁶⁹Identified by Goldman Sachs in 2005, as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam.

⁷⁰Shaw et al., “Emerging Powers and Africa”, 29 and 35.

⁷¹In a speech during his state visit to Russia, President Zuma stated as much: “As South Africa, we are strategically located on the southern tip, as a gateway to the rest of the continent.” (Official opening of the talks between the South African and Russian Federation delegations on the occasion of the official visit by South African President Jacob Zuma, Moscow, 5 August 2010, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/jzuma.html).

⁷²Address by South African President Jacob Zuma to G20 business leaders on partnering with Africa's dynamic markets, Toronto, 24 June 2010, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/jzuma.html. In his speech, he referred to the continent 53 times, while mentioning SA only seven times.

⁷³Shaw et al., “Emerging Powers and Africa”, 36.

⁷⁴Speech by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on “South Africa's Foreign Policy Focus Today and in the Future” at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 30 March 2010. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/mashabane.html

⁷⁵Wiseman, “Polylateralism and New Modes”, 51.

⁷⁶Jordaan, “Concept of a Middle Power”, 170.

⁷⁷Cooper et al., Global Governance and Diplomacy, 1.