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Abstract
The 2010 Strategic Concept reaches an equilibrium among different Allies' views by rejecting extreme options, combining ‘regional’ and ‘global’ elements in a new common ground, and setting up flexible guidelines for NATO's future evolution. It is the result of 20 years of transatlantic debate over NATO's role and geographic reach, and represents a significant step forward with respect to the previous Strategic Concept approved in 1999.
Notes
1 North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
2 The Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
3 Yost, “New NATO and Collective Security”, 153. For a more extensive assessment of the debate in the 1990s, see by the same author, NATO Transformed.
4 Ringsmose and Rynning, Come Home, NATO?, 2.
5 Kamp, “NATO after Afghanistan”.
6 On liberal internationalism see, among others, Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politics.
7 For a critical assessment of ‘humanitarian war’, see Krauthammer, “Short Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War”.
8 Brown, “Una OTAN minimalista”, 75.
9 Albright, “Enlarging NATO”.
10 R.G. Lugar, NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business, a Call for US Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance. Speech to the Overseas Writer's Club, Washington DC, 24 June 1993.
11 UK House of Commons Defence Committee, Future of NATO and European Defence, 17.
12 Ibid., The Future of NATO, 7.
13 Petersen, “NATO's Next Strategic Concept”.
14 Jonson, The Debate about Art. 5 , 6.
15 Carpenter, “NATO's New Strategic Concept”, 12.
16 Ringsmose and Rynning, Come Home, NATO?, 2.
17 Védrine, “Défense: L’Europe sous tutelle”.
18 On Western adversity to casualties see, among others, Coker, Humane Warfare, and Ignatieff, Virtual War.
19 Hyde-Price, “NATO's Political Transformation”, 50.
20 On Eastern European countries’ security priorities, see Asmus et al., NATO, New Allies and Reassurance.
21 During the drafting of the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Norwegian Defence Minister Grete Faremo called for a NATO focus on collective defence according to Art. 5, deemed the Alliance's fundamental mission. See O’Dwyer, “Norway Minister: NATO must Revisit”.
22 Interviews with the author at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, June 2010.
23 Yost, “NATO's Citation1999 Strategic Concept”, 23.
24 See Aybet and Moore, “Missions in Search of a Vision”.
25 Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
26 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
27 Ibid.
28 Ramirez, “The New NATO Strategic Concept”.
29 Ringsmose and Rynning, Come Home, NATO?, 9.
30 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
31 Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The consultation defined in Art. 4 seems to be much more limited than the one set down in the 1999 Strategic Concept.
32 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”
33 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
34 Kamp, “Towards a New Strategy”, 27.
35 Faber, Beyond Tradition.
36 Kamp, Way to New Strategic Concept, 4.
37 Silvestri and Marrone, “The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept”, 44.
38 Ramirez, “The New NATO Strategic Concept”, 171.
39 Ringsmose and Rynning, Come Home, NATO?, 13.
40 Kesserling, Towards a New Strategic Concept, 8.
41 European Parliament Press release, “NATO Boss Rasmussen Calls for Stronger Security Cooperation with EU”, 16 November 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20091113STO64420
42 Yost, “NATO's Evolving Purposes”.
43 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, 3.
44 Marrone, NATO's Strategic Concept.
45 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
46 IISS, “More Consensus, but Challenges Remain”, 1.
47 Ringsmose and Rynning, NATO's New Strategic Concept, 14.
48 A. Marrone, “The New NATO Strategic Concept. Just One Step in the Right Direction”, Aspenia Online, 26 November 2010.
49 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
50 Shea, “What Does a New Strategic Concept Do”, 25.
51 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, 8.
52 See McNamara, NATO Summit Citation 2010 .
53 NATO, Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
54 Hyde-Price, “NATO's Political Transformation”, 50.
55 Ringsmose and Rynning, NATO's New Strategic Concept, 7.
56 Whittman, “An Alliance for the 21st Century”, 36.
57 On why the US is particularly satisfied about “rebuilding” NATO in a “globalized world”, see the remarks by US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, during the Brookings conference, “Success at the Lisbon Summit: the US Perspective”, 22 November 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1122_lisbon_summit/20101122_lisbon_summit.pdf
58 McNamara, NATO Summit Citation 2010 , 3.
59 J. Eyal, “NATO's Summit: Great on Presentation, Less Good on Substance”, RUSI online, November 2010, 1.
60 J. Fiss, “NATO and the Lisbon Treaty”, EU Observer, 8 December 2010, 1.
61 J. Eyal, “NATO's Summit: Great on Presentation, Less Good on Substance”, RUSI, November 2010, 2.
62 Whittman, “An Alliance for the 21st Century”, 37.
63 Group of Experts, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf
64 IISS, “More Consensus, but Challenges Remain”, 2.
65 See, among others: O. Antonenko, “NATO and Russia Turn Over a New Leaf”, IISS Voices, November Citation2010; “Obama: NATO Summit was ‘Extremely Productive’”, CNN, 20 November 2010, 1; Liegis, “NATO: Three Cheers from Lisbon”, 3.
66 See Shea, “NATO at Sixty”.
67 A. Marrone and G.M. Raffa, “Le sfide del bilancio della difesa”, AffarInternazionali, 16 May 2011.
68 Silvestri and Marrone, “The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept”, 39.