The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?

Abstract

The EU’s reaction is slow; the EU is divided; the EU is unable to deliver: time and time again, newspapers depict the image of an incoherent and uncoordinated EU foreign policy. This time, the topic under discussion was the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis. Many have compared the EU’s internal divisions over Libya with those over the Iraq war, an often used example to illustrate the limits of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article aims to assess the coherence of the EU’s short- to medium-term response to the Libyan crisis. It distinguishes between the horizontal, inter-institutional, vertical and multilateral dimensions of EU coherence. The analysis shows that unilateral actions or inactions of the member states mainly account for the EU's incoherent response. The post-Lisbon institutional structure has done little to compensate for these internal divisions. While the EU cannot change the course of national foreign policies, it should increase its ‘leadership for coherence’, Europeanise its crisis response in the medium term and aim at preventing incoherence in the longer term.

Notes

¹ “Europe's Foreign Policy in Line of Fire over Libya”, DAWN, 24 March 2011, http://www.dawn.com/2011/03/24/europes-foreign-policy-in-line-of-fire-over-libya.html.

² European Commission, Concept Note Libya, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/mid_term_review/final_concept_note_libya_en.pdf.

³ The legitimacy and representativeness of the TNC had been called into question, especially since some of its leading members were former members of the Qadhafi regime (K. Mahmoud, “Secret European Delegation to be Sent to Libya to Convince Gaddafi to Step Down”, asharq alawsat, 9 March 2011, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=24439).

⁴ UNSC, S/RES/1970 (2011).

⁵ UNSC, S/RES/1973 (2011).

⁶ The operation's air command included nine EU member states, Norway, the US, Canada, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

⁷ From the beginning of the operation on 31 March until 29 August, the coalition conducted a total of 20,871 sorties, including 7,848 strike sorties (NATO, “NATO and Libya”, 29 August 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_08/20110830_110830-oup-update.pdf).

⁸ Nevertheless, fighting continued over the loyalist strongholds of Sirte, Bani Walid and Sabha, and NATO extended its bombing campaign for another three months (K. Fahim and R. Gladstone, “NATO Extends Libya Bombing Campaign”, The New York Times, 21 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/middleeast/nato-extends-libya-role.html).

⁹ H. Morris, “Date with History as UN Acts over Libya”, Financial Times, 27 February 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/75315bb4-42a2-11e0-8b34-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1YfoHilUD.

¹⁰ See, for example, H. Kundnani, and J. Vaïsse, “EU Foreign Policy: Moving on from Libya”, openDemocracy, 15 April 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/hans-kundnani-justin-vaïsse/eu-foreign-policy-moving-on-from-libya; S. Namara, “The Crisis in Libya Exposes a Litany of Failed EU Policies”, web memo, The Heritage Foundation, 3 March 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/the-crisis-in-libya-exposes-a-litany-of-failed-eu-policies; Nicoll, “War in Libya”, http://www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=53935&type=full&servicetype=Attachment.

¹¹ J. Benitez, “Diplomats Mourn ‘death’ of EU Defence Policy over Libya”, NATO Source, Alliance news blog, 24 March 2011, http://www.acus.org/natosource/diplomats-mourn-death-eu-defence-policy-over-libya.

¹² The analysis focuses on the period starting with the beginning of the crisis (15 February) and ending with the rebels’ takeover of Tripoli (22 August). Considering high volatility in the country at the time of writing and the uncertainty regarding future developments, it would be premature to assess the coherence of the EU's medium- to long-term response.

¹³ This article draws on insights from eleven semi-structured interviews conducted in different languages with experts from academia, national diplomatic services, EU institutions and international organisations, held between 6 and 28 June 2011. Quotes were translated by the author.

¹⁴ “What is Frontex”, Frontex, 28 June 2011, http://www.frontex.europa.eu.

¹⁵ Ashton, Declaration on Events in Libya.

¹⁶ European Council, Declaration – Extraordinary European Council.

¹⁷ T. Vogel, “EU Opens Office in Benghazi”, European Voice, 23 May 2011, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/eu-opens-office-in-benghazi/71147.aspx.

¹⁸ “Factsheet Libyan Crisis”, European Commission / Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), 21 June 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ As a comparison, the United States has provided around €56.7 million for humanitarian assistance in Libya as of 9 June 2011 (US State Department, “Fact sheet: US Humanitarian Assistance”, 9 June 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/165315.htm).

²¹ European Commission, Libya: EU Geared up for the Humanitarian Challenge.

²² “Hermes 2011 Running”, Frontex, 22 February 2011, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art96.html.

²³ “Update Joint Operation Poseidon 2011”, Frontex, 26 March 2011, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art104.html.

²⁴ Council of the European Union – Justice and Home Affairs, Southern Neighbourhood Region – Council Conclusions.

²⁵ Council of the European Union, Decision 2011 /137/CFSP.

²⁶ “New EU Sanctions put the Squeeze on Libyan Oil Sector”, EUbusiness, 12 April 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict-oil.9ji.

²⁷ Council of the European Union, Libya: Six Ports Targeted.

²⁸ On 16 September 2011, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2009 allowing states to unfreeze Libyan assets for certain urgent needs, after notification of the UN and in consultation with the Libyan authorities (UNSC, S/RES/2009 (2011)).

²⁹ Council of the European Union, EU Lifts Asset Freeze.

³⁰ Council of the European Union, Decision 2011 /210/CFSP.

³¹ Bloching, “CSDP and EU Mission Update – June-July 2011”, 2.

³² For more information on the Battlegroups, see: EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet – EU Battlegroups.

³³The Battlegroups would not have had a combat role. The use of force would have been restricted to the protection of humanitarian workers under threat and self-defence (I. Traynor, “Libya Conflict: EU Awaits UN Approval for Deployment of Ground Troops”, The Guardian, 18 April 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/18/libya-conflict-eu-deployment-ground-troops).

³⁴ European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 11.

³⁵ The terms ‘coherence’ and ‘coordination’ often appear together. In this article, and in accordance with relevant EU documents (e.g. Treaty texts, ESS, Report on the Implementation of the ESS), coherence is understood as a guiding principle or goal, while coordination is seen as an activity through which coherence is pursued (see also De Coning, “Coherence and Coordination”, 5-9).

³⁶ Ibid., 5.

³⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the terms ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’, see: Missiroli, Coherence for Security Policy, 5-7.

³⁸ See Versluys, “Coherence in EU External Action”, 2.

³⁹ These three member states were chosen due to their specific role in the response to the Libyan crisis: France was the most proactive member state; Germany played the role of ‘reluctant power’; and Italy was most affected by the crisis due to its close economic ties and geographic proximity to Libya.

⁴⁰ For more details, see Keller et al., Frontex Agency, 10-22.

⁴¹ M. Simone, UNHCR senior liaison officer with Frontex, “Q&A: Working for Refugees on Europe's Outer Borders”, UNHCR, 10 May 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4bf29c8b6.html.

⁴² Ashton, Declaration on Events in Libya; Declaration on Libya.

⁴³ J. Buzek, “On the Situation in Libya”, Warsaw, 21 February 2011, http://proxy.ep-president.eu/president/view/en/press/press_release/2011/2011-February/press_release-2011-February-28.html; H. Van Rompuy, “Statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, on the Developments in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood”, Prague, 23 February 2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119450.pdf; J.M.D. Barroso, “Message on the Situation in Libya”, Brussels, 23 February 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/121.

⁴⁴ N. Busse, “Kein erkennbarer Gewinn”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 May 2011.

⁴⁵ Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁴⁶ M. Knigge, “Should Europe even try to Speak with One Voice on Foreign Policy”, Deutsche Welle, 6 July 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5753906,00.html.

⁴⁷ M. Banks, “Barroso Leaps to Defence of EU Foreign Policy Chief”, The Parliament, 5 April 2011, http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/barroso-leaps-to-defence-of-eu-foreign-chief/.

⁴⁸ Interview with a senior Commission advisor, Brussels, 8 June 2011.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Interview with an EEAS official, Brussels, 9 June 2011.

⁵¹ Interview with a French diplomat, Brussels, 8 June 2011.

⁵² Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 7 June 2011.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Interview with a French diplomat, Brussels, 28 June 2011.

⁵⁵ Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁵⁶ “Europe's Foreign Policy in Line of Fire over Libya”, EUbusiness, 23 March 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.986.

⁵⁷ “Ashton Defends EU Unity over Libya”, Euronews, 22 March 2011, http://www.euronews.net/2011/03/22/ashton-defends-eu-unity-over-libya/.

⁵⁸ “Berlusconi Under Fire for not ‘Disturbing' Gheddafi”, Reuters, 20 February 2011. For more on Berlusconi's response to the Libyan crisis, see the article in this issue, p. 31.

⁵⁹ In 2010, Libya provided 22% of Italy's oil imports and 13% of its gas imports (“Facts on Libya: Oil and Gas”, International Energy Agency, 21 February 2011, http://www.iea.org/files/facts_libya.pdf).

⁶⁰ Interview with an Italian official, Rome, 15 June 2011.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁶³ Interview with a French diplomat, Brussels, 8 June 2011.

⁶⁴ European Council, Declaration – Extraordinary European Council.

⁶⁵ “Italy Recognizes Libyan Rebels' Interim Council: FM”, Xinhua, 5 April 2011.

⁶⁶ Interview with an Italian official, Rome, 15 June 2011.

⁶⁷ J. Pawlak, “Italy Quarrels with EU Partners over Libyan Migrants”, Reuters, 11 April 2011.

⁶⁸ “France Blocks Italian Trains Carrying Migrants”, BBC Europe, 17 April 2011.

⁶⁹ A meeting in Rome between Sarkozy and Berlusconi and their respective interior, foreign and economy ministers on 26 April silenced the diplomatic row.

⁷⁰ “Schengen State Denmark to Re-impose Border Controls”, BBC Europe, 11 May 2011.

⁷¹ G. Westerwelle, “Official Declaration on UNSC Resolution 1973”, Berlin, 18 March 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CB9L-mp62Oc.

⁷² Interview with an Italian official, Rome, 15 June 2011.

⁷³ Interview with a French diplomat, Brussels, 8 June 2011.

⁷⁴ Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 7 June 2011.

⁷⁵ The concept of operations (or CONOPS) is the first step in the planning of a CSDP operation involving military assets. The CONOPS has to be approved by the EU Military Committee, the Political and Security Committee and the Council.

⁷⁶ Bloching, “CSDP and EU Mission Update – April 2011”, 1.

⁷⁷ “Nordic Battlegroup”, Swedish Armed Forces, http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/.

⁷⁸ “Europe Planning For Libya Force Despite UN Concern”, Agence France-Presse, 22 April 2011.

⁷⁹ N. Busse, “Eine Sensation, die ohne Folgen bleibt”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 May 2011.

⁸⁰ Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, 9 June 2011.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁸³ The AU's position was not united and partly incoherent: when the AU refused to recognise the TNC on 23 August, 20 of its members had already recognised it as Libya's legitimate government (R. Hall, “African Union Refuses to Recognise Libya's New TNC Government”, The Independent, 27 August 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/african-union-refuses-to-recognise-libyas-new-tnc-government-2344675.html). Despite little progress in the formation of an inclusive government, the AU as a whole finally recognised the TNC on 20 September.

⁸⁴ “Gaddafi Calls in Favours from Africa”, Financial Times, 27 March 2011.

⁸⁵ Interview with an Italian official, Rome, 15 June 2011.

⁸⁶ Consensus view of several interviewees.

⁸⁷ The external perception, often conveyed by the media, may give a distorted picture: while abstract forms of horizontal incoherence or behind-the-scenes institutional struggles might pass unperceived, unilateral actions or diplomatic rows between the member states tend to receive disproportionate media attention (e.g. “Libyan Crisis Exposes North-South Divide on EU Response”, monsters&critics, 21 February 2011, http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1620914.php/Libyan-crisis-exposes-north-south-divide-on-EU-response-2nd-Lead).

⁸⁸ Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 7 June 2011.

⁸⁹ C. Ashton, quoted in “Europe's Foreign Policy in Line of Fire over Libya”, EUbusiness, 23 March 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-conflict.986.

⁹⁰ See also H. Kundnani and J. Vaïsse, “EU Foreign Policy: Moving on from Libya”, openDemocracy, 15 April 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/hans-kundnani-justin-vaïsse/eu-foreign-policy-moving-on-from-libya.

⁹¹ Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁹² Lindstrom, The European External Action Service, 5.

⁹³ Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 7 June 2011.

⁹⁴ Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 6 June 2011.

⁹⁵ Lindstrom, The European External Action Service, 5.

⁹⁶ Interview with an EEAS official, Brussels, 9 June 2011.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 7 June 2011.

⁹⁹ “France, Germany, Poland on EU's Common Defence Policy”, Civic Platform, 13 December 2010, http://www.platforma.org/en/about-civic-platform/art958,france-germany-poland-on-eus-common-defence-policy.html.

¹⁰⁰r European Council, Conclusions of the European Council – 23/24 June.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² N. Busse, “EU stärkt Grenzschutzagentur Frontex”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 June 2011.

¹⁰³ In July 2011, Britain reportedly blocked a secret proposal tabled by Ashton for a permanent operational civilian-military headquarters (B. Waterfield, “Britain Blocks EU Plans for ‘Operational Military Headquarters’”, The Telegraph, 18 July 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html).

¹⁰⁴ Art. 42 (2) Treaty on European Union.

¹⁰⁵ H. Kundnani and J. Vaïsse, “EU Foreign Policy: Moving on from Libya”, openDemocracy, 15 April 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/hans-kundnani-justin-vaïsse/eu-foreign-policy-moving-on-from-libya.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with a French diplomat, Brussels, 8 June 2011.

¹⁰⁷ “Westerwelle lobt Nato-Einsatz jetzt doch”, Zeit online, 27 August 2011, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-nato-einsatz.