![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
At the closing of the 20th century, Europe decided the time was ripe to take bold steps towards the creation of a truly integrated European judicial space. Of its overall goals for the new millennium, judicial integration ranked at the top as this reflected shifting global challenges in an increasingly diversified world. After more than a decade, the reality is still that of a policy area in which multiple practices of cooperation coexist. Indeed, political and cultural factors matter in explaining how judicial decisions and practices are harmonised and integrated by EU member states. The article focuses on a number of socialisation mechanisms adopted by the EU to build mutual trust among national authorities and also looks at the European Arrest Warrant as an important test bed of the strengths and weaknesses of European judicial cooperation.
Notes
1 European Council, Presidency Conclusions Citation 1999 .
2 UK and Ireland opted out. The Schengen area includes all other European member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
3 Most integrated research projects in this field have come to an end, among the most recent is the study on the European arrest warrant in law and in practice, coordinated by the Centro Etudios Sociales, Coimbra, Portugal, and concluded in September 2011.
4 European Commission, The Hague Programme.
5 Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), Art. 258-259, 260, 263, 264, 267, 277.
6 This is a very contentious issue especially in socio-legal studies. The point raised by the author rests on two arguments. The first concerns the fact that all decisions in matters such as the organisation of judicial offices, judicial governance – judicial appointments, promotions, removals, disciplinary and professional control, etc. – and the fundamental provisions of the civil and penal procedural codes are taken by the states. This leads directly to the fact that these norms are generally adopted by the legislator if not entrenched in the constitution. This is not to deny the influence exercised by the EU on the judicial policies of member states. But judicial politics and judicial policies are not equally influenced by it (see Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe, chapter 5). The second argument is more related to the indicators one may want to adopt to measure and assess a legal culture. This is a vast topic and the literature produced on it is huge. That said, culture is considered embodied not only in formal institutions, but also in organisational practices (see Ciborra and Lanzara, Labirinti dell'innovazione; Cotterrell, Law, Culture, and Society; Nelken, “Using the Concept of Legal Culture”).
7 Gless, “Police and Judicial Cooperation”, 27.
8 Bulnes, “The Application of the EAW”, 286.
9 Komarek, “European Constitutionalism and European Arrest Warrant”.
10 Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice was close to zero (the third pillar was handled by means of an intergovernmental mechanism based on the European Council and the DG Justice and Home Affairs of the European Commission). The European Court of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has a different status. For the court of Strasbourg, all laws in the judicial cooperation field should be phrased, implemented, and enforced in full respect of the fundamental rights of citizens. Therefore, any violation of human rights, regardless of the sector that the legal instrument used by the state which violated or is suspected of violation has relied upon, should be condemned.
11 Brazil's refusal to extradite Italian leftist rebel Cesare Battisti in June 2011 caused a diplomatic incident between the two governments.
12 Programme to implement mutual recognition (2001/C 12/02).
13 Mutual recognition is not a new expression in EU discourse. It was first mentioned with specific reference to the single market. Here it refers to the definition provided by the EU in the Tampere Conclusions of the European Council Presidency. Alegre and De Leaf, “Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation”. However, in Tampere, mutual recognition was linked to the following points: “the fact that it may be limited to serious crimes; whether fulfillment of the double criminality requirement as a condition for recognition is maintained or dropped; the establishment of mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of third parties and victims; the definition of common minimum standards to facilitate mutual recognition; whether enforcement of the decision is direct or indirect; determination of grounds for refusing recognition, where those grounds are the sovereignty or other essential interests of the member state; whether States have liability arrangements in the event of acquittal.” http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33131_en.htm.
14 Council Decision Citation2002/167/JHA.
15 European Commission, The Hague Programme.
16 Den Boer, “Fusing the Fragments”.
17 European Council, Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme.
18 Zielonka, “Borders in the Enlarged EU”.
19 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe.
20 Ibid.
21 European Commission, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme.
22 Checkel, “Why Comply?”.
23 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of Human Rights Norms”.
24 Kerwer, “Rules that Many Use”.
25 European Commission, The Hague Programme; and Building Trust in EU-Wide Justice.
26 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe.
27 For example, Fichera, Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant.
28 Bobek, “Quantity or Quality?”; Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe.
29 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, The Hague, Citation2004.
30 Council Framework Decision Citation2002/584 JHA.
31 Gless, “Police and Judicial Cooperation”.
32 Negro, Il Mandato di arresto europeo; empirical evidence comes from Alagna, Il reato di associazione mafiosa.
33 Kommarek, “European Constitutionalism and European Arrest Warrant”; Lazowski, The Application of EU Law.
34 Komarek, “European Constitutionalism and European Arrest Warrant”.
35 Negro, Il Mandato di arresto europeo.
36 Ibid.
37 Recent data is available from the European project “The European Arrest Warrant in Law and in Practice”, http://opj.ces.uc.pt/pdf/EAW_Final_Report_Nov_2010.pdf.