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Abstract
After the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) decided to act as a stabilising force, to abandon the street and to lend democratic legitimacy to the political process designed by the army. The outcome of this strategy was that the MB was first ‘burned’ politically and then harshly repressed after having exhausted its stabilising role. The main mistakes the Brothers made were, first, to turn their back on several opportunities to spearhead the revolt by leading popular forces and, second, to keep their strategy for change gradualist and conservative, seeking compromises with parts of the former regime even though the turmoil and expectations in the country required a much bolder strategy.
Notes
1 Droz-Vincent, “The security Sector in Egypt”, 220-6; Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 194-8; and Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 5-12.
2 Just to give an example, at the end of the 2000s, internal security (or security-associated) personnel outnumbered the active military personnel by a factor of about 4-to-1 with almost 2 million in security. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 194.
3 Ibid. and Kienle, A Grand Delusion.
4 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 208-16; El Amrani, “The National Democratic Party: The Battleground”.
5 Tycoons such as Ahmed Ezz (steel), Mohamed Mansour (transportation), Zoheir Garraneh (tourism) and economists with links with international financial institutions, such as Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieddin or Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali.
6 Soleiman, The Autumn of Dictatorship; Paciello, “Egypt’s Last Decade”; Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?”.
7 Marshall-Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital”.
8 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 6.
9 M. El-Ghobashy, “Egypt Looks Ahead to Portentous Year”, Middle East Report Online, 2 February 2005, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020205
10 Beinin, The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt and “A Workers’ Social Movement”.
11 E. al-Erian, “The side effects of the security Campaign against the Brothers” (in Arabic),
http://ikhwanwayonline.wordpress.com, 28 October 2009,
12 Pioppi, “Who’s Afraid of the Islamists?”, 56-60.
13 The conservative trend inside the Brotherhood had already taken the upper hand in 2007 when a draft platform for a MB political party was leaked to the press by the Guidance Bureau reflecting a ‘step back’ with respect to the more liberal stances on issues such as women and minority rights of earlier documents.
14 On the NDP’s rapid disintegration during the 2011 uprising, see Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 8-9. On the role of the temporary defeat of security forces, see Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 222-8.
15 Following court orders, the SCAF dissolved parliament, municipal councils and the NDP. It also put top regime leaders on trial, however mainly on financial and criminal charges rather than political ones.
16 As early as June-July 2011, the Central Security Forces (CSF) had started using violence again, often in coordination with the military police. Between November and December 2011, the clash between protestors and CSF provoked about 100 casualties.
17 The MB has historically been against radical change, as a consequence losing that part of its constituency not satisfied with the movement’s conciliatory approach toward the regime, for example in the 1970s and 1980s. Al-Awadi, In Search of Legitimacy.
18 Hundreds or maybe thousands left right after the revolution or in the following months. Many joined youth movements, others created their own political parties (such as Abdel Moneim Aboul Futuh and Ibrahim Zafarani) or joined existing ones such as al-Wasat. Author’s interviews with former Brothers, Cairo, March 2013. See also A. El Sherif, “Egypt’s New Islamists: Emboldening Reform from Within”, Sada, 12 January 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/12/egypt-s-new-islamists-emboldening-reform-from-within/b1ws.
19 On Al-Shater, see A. Howeidy, “A Model Capitalist?”, al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 April 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1093/eg4.htm. On Al-Shater’s al-Nahda Project, see “Khairat al-Shater on ‘The Nahda Project’ (Complete Translation)”, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/khairat-al-shater-on-the-nahda-project-complete-translation.
20 In March 2011, a referendum on the SCAF-sponsored interim Constitution setting the legal framework for the transition process passed with 77 percent of the votes, thanks to the Islamists’ support.
21 The party was officially established on 30 April and legalised on 6 June, http://www.fjponline.com/.
22 The FJP held its first internal elections between October 2012 and January 2013, a few months after Morsi resigned from his position in the party. Al-Katatni became the party’s new president, Al-Erian vice president, and Hussein Ibrahim secretary general.
23 In March 2013, the MB finally registered as an NGO. However, until the July 2013 military coup, the organisation’s legal status was still uncertain as the case was to be examined by an administrative court. See T. Perry, “Court Ruling Hangs Over Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, Reuters, 21 March 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/21/us-egypt-brotherhood-idUSBRE92K0V120130321.
24 Author’s interview with MB senior member, Gehad al-Haddad, Cairo, March 2013.
25 On the Salafis, see Lacroix, Sheikhs and Politicians.
26 Author’s interviews with MB members, Cairo, March 2013.
27 The first FJP candidate was Khairat al-Shater, who was then disqualified by the Electoral Commission on the grounds of his not yet solved criminal conviction.
28 The first round (23 and 24 May) was passed by Mohamed Morsi with 24.8 percent of votes and Ahmed Shafiq, a former regime figure, with 23.4 percent. Other candidates were Hamdeen Sabahi (21 percent), Abdel Moneim Aboul Futuh (18 percent), and Amr Moussa (11 percent).
29 SCC ruled the lower chamber of parliament unconstitutional on the grounds that the previous electoral law with which its members had been elected was in violation of the interim Constitution of March 2011.
30 Morsi had a knife’s edge victory with 51.7 percent of votes against the 48.2 percent for the regime man, Ahmed Shafiq.
31 Stacher, “Establishment Morsi”; M. El-Ghobashy, “Egyptian Politics Upended”, Middle East Report online, 20 August 2012, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082012. For the hypothesis of a ‘coup’ within the army, see also H. Rashwan, “Morsi’s Coup Against the Army: the Hows and the Whys”, al-Ahram Weekly, 14 August 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/50324/Egypt/First--days/Morsis-coup-against-SCAF-The-hows-and-the-whys.aspx.
32 The upper chamber or Shura Council was elected in early 2012 pursuant to the March 2011 interim Constitution. Only around 8 percent of eligible voters turned out, mainly because the Council had been granted only an advisory role. The results were heavily skewed in favour of Islamist parties, even more so than the lower chamber.
33 Brown, “Egypt’s State Constitutes itself”, and N. Brown, “Egypt’s Constitution: Islamist Prepare for a Long Political Battle”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 October 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/23/egypt-s-constitution-islamists-prepare-for-long-political-battle/e4wv.
34 See Paciello’ “Delivering the Revolution? Post-uprising Socio-economics in Tunisia and Egypt”, in this issue, 7.
35 T. Perry, and T. Elyan, “Echoes of Past in new Egypt Government”, Reuters, 2 August 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/egypt-government-tantawi-idINDEE87109520120802.
36 MB-FJP members insisted they were not the ‘governing party’, but only the ‘majority party’ as the Qandil government was not political, but technical. Author’s interviews with senior FJP members and Muslim brothers Gamal Heshmat and Amr Darrag, Cairo, March 2013.
37 The situation was further aggravated by the resignation of the reformists, all experienced politicians, such as Aboul Futuh, etc. Author’s interviews with former Brothers and with Abdel Moneim Aboul Futuh, Cairo, March 2013.
38 Author’s interview with members of the MB and FJP, Cairo, March 2013. Interviewees also cited the difficulty in attracting technocrats to administrative positions because of the low wages generally offered by the public administration in Egypt and for fear of being too closely associated with the MB.
39 El Houdaiby, From Prison to Palace.
40 For an account of the modus operandi of the Constituent Assembly, see Brown, “Still Hope for Egypt’s Constitution”.
41 For an English text of the declaration, see: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx.
42 For a detailed reconstruction of how and why the Constitutional Declaration was made, see M. Basal, “Freedom and Justice Party Drafts the Declaration’s Articles. President Agrees without Consulting the Vice President. Al-Shorouk Provides a Behind-the-Scenes look at the November 21 Declaration” (in Arabic) al-Shorouk, 5 March 2013, http://shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=05032013&id=6c49af0d-dd9f-49b9-86bf-a4f6ebab0204.
43 On the ‘necessity’ of a revolutionary measure to break the political impasse, see H. Kandil, “Mohamed Morsi and the Classic Revolutionary Trap”, The Guardian, 30 November 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/30/mohamed-morsi-revolutionary-trap-egypt.
44 A. El Sherif, “Brotherly no More?”, Sada, 18 January 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/18/brotherly-no-more/f304.
45 The rationale behind this provision was that a legislative body was needed to draft and approve an electoral law and that the upper chamber was supposed to play that role. It is also important to note that the alternative would have been to allow the president to rule by decree.
46 In January 2013, General al-Sisi threatened a new direct intervention “should the state collapse”.
47 In January 2013, Morsi appointed a new Minister of the Interior, Mohamed Ibrahim Moustafa, who replaced Ahmed Gamal. Moustafa was the former assistant to the minister and headed Egypt’s prison authority. While provoking the protests of the police forces, his nomination was not a radical change with respect to his predecessor.
48 For the constitution text in English with a useful index, see “The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index”. Nivien Saleh, http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation/. For an initial analysis of the Constitution, see Zaid Al-Ali, “The New Egyptian Constitution: an Initial Assessment of its Merits and Flaws”, openDemocracy, 26 December 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/new-egyptian-constitution-initial-assessment-of-its-merits-and-flaws.
49 See, for example, Al-Ali and Brown, “Egypt’s Constitution Swings into Action”.
50 In spring 2013, for example, the MB-FJP lost student elections, traditionally an Islamist stronghold. The MB-FJP also lost support in the medical and journalist syndicates, both crucial bases for the Brotherhood.
51 MB-FJP’s new ministries were transportation, local development, investment, international cooperation and agriculture.
52 “Egypt’s New Regional Governors: A Who’s Who”, al-Ahram Weekly, 4 September 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/52010/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-new-regional-governors-A-whos-who. aspx. and ”Egypt’s Newly Appointed Governors: A Who’s Who”, al-Ahram Weekly, 17 June 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/74199/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-newly-appointed-governors-A-whos-who.aspx. The appointment of a member of the Gama’a Islamiyya as Luxor’s new governor outraged the public. The Gama’a, now a legal political party, is the organization responsible for the terrorist attack in Luxor in 1997 that killed 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians.
53 See the article by Paciello, “Delivering the Revolution?”, in this issue, 7.
54 Article 177 of the 2012 Constitution provides that, after draft electoral laws are approved by parliament, they must be reviewed by the SCC to ensure that they are in conformity with the Constitution (with the previous Constitution, the SCC reviewed the constitutionality of laws only after they entered into force and an appeal was made before it).
55 As argued in Al-Ali, “The Constitutional Court’s Mark on Egypt’s Elections”.
56 Tamarrod’s founders were members of Kefaya, the anti-Mubarak protest movement born in late 2004. Tamarrod’s campaign aimed to collect at least 15 million signatures by 30 June 2013 calling for Morsi’s resignation, more than the votes he won in June 2012.
57 For a reconstruction of the events in summer 2013 until early August, see ICG, Marching in Circles.
58 On the possible consequences of this new state-controlled and unrepresentative constitutional process, see Brown, “Mrs. Lincoln’s Egyptian Constitution”.
59 El-Baradei resigned in protest after the violent crackdown on the Brotherhood on 14 August in which hundreds of people died.
60 Morsi was finally put under house arrest and accused on 26 July of murder, kidnapping and ties with Hamas. Al-Badi’e was arrested on 20 August.
61 The 8 July clash between Republican Guards and Morsi supporters left over 80 supporters and 1 army officer dead. Again on 27 July, more than 70 pro-Morsi protesters were killed in a ferocious attack by Egyptian authorities.
62 Both the US and Europe considered cutting military aid to Egypt but so far there are no ‘radical’ measures in sight. On 15 August, President Obama announced that the United States had cancelled longstanding joint military exercises with the Egyptian Army set for September, more as a short-term, symbolic measure than a substantial one.
This article, together with those by Laura Guazzone and Maria Cristina Paciello, is a part of the research project “Islamism and Transitions”, funded by La Sapienza.
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Daniela Pioppi
Daniela Pioppi is Associate Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and temporary Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’. Email: [email protected].