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Abstract
The EU’s response to the Arab Spring is seen as one of its biggest missed opportunities. It has been unable to bring together its different tools of foreign, development and security policy into a strategic joined-up approach. The interconnectedness of the socio-economic and political demands of the popular uprisings across the north of Africa represented a unique opportunity to implement such a joined-up approach. The EU’s ambitious rhetoric and pledges to promote ‘deep democracy’ have not been matched at policy level in the fields of money, market or mobility. Whilst certain member states have sought to overcome the different operating logics of the development, diplomatic and security communities in their regional Arab Partnership programmes, a number of structural and circumstantial factors limit the effectiveness of these attempts, at both the EU and member state level.
Notes
1 Anan, In Larger Freedom, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html.
2 Maxwell, How Development and Foreign Policy Connect?
3 The term “broken links” was first used by Ana Palacio in her article, “The Arab Spring and Europe’s Turn”, Project Syndicate, June 2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-arab-spring-and-europe-s-turn.
4 The scope of this article does not allow for an exhaustive review of each of these elements, thus there is no pretence to engage with the conceptual debate with the same academic rigour as others have done.
5 See, amongst others, Lancaster, Foreign Aid; Woods, “The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid”; and Maxwell, How Development and Foreign Policy Connect? The term ‘joined-up thinking’ overlaps with the term ‘comprehensive approach’, used primarily by NATO to refer to joint civil-military handling of conflict situations, and the term ‘whole-of-government approach’, used primarily by the OECD to refer to government departments coming together to effectively manage crises in fragile states. For more, see respective literature from both organisations, http://natolibguides.info/comprehensiveapproach and http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/37826256.pdf.
6 Christie, Implementing Holistic Government. For other critiques of the joined-up approach, see Schraeder et al., “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle”.
7 Chandler, “The Security-development Nexus”; and Pender, “From ‘Structural Adjustment’ to ‘Comprehensive Development’”.
8 S. Lehne, “Promoting a Comprehensive Approach to EU Foreign Policy”, Carnegie Europe, February 2013, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/02/21/promoting-comprehensive-approach-to-eu-foreign-policy/fiou. See also Smith, European Union Foreign Policy; and Fitz-Gerald, “Addressing the Security-Development Nexus”.
9 The commitment to policy coherence is embedded in the European Consensus on Development adopted in December 2005. In 2009, the EU agreed to make the PCD agenda more operational and to focus coherence efforts on five priority areas for achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security.
10 Syed, “The 3 D’s of Foreign Affairs”. See also Clinton, “Leading through Civilian Power”.
11 If one episode stands as an example of Europe’s blinkeredness, it was the historic mistake of France’s former Interior Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, who, at the height of the popular uprisings in Tunisia, approved the export of police equipment and crowd-control devices to Ben Ali so that he could bring the protests under control. For more, see “French Foreign Minister Urged to Resign”, New York Times, 3 February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/world/europe/04france.html?_r=0.
12 High Representative, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”.
13 Ibid. “Deep democracy” includes: “Free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.”
14 Balfour, EU Conditionality after Arab Spring.
15 J. Techau, “What if the EU had Reacted Strategically to the Arab Spring?” Carnegie Europe, 27 February 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/27/what-if-eu-had-reacted-strategically-to-arab-spring/h1x6.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Balfour, EU Conditionality after Arab Spring.
19 “EU Support for Governance in Egypt: ‘Well-intentioned but Ineffective’”, European Court of Auditors, Press Release, 18 June 2013, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/22610801.PDF.
20 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. See also François and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development”.
21 World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
22 Badia and Sarsanedas, Europe Must make an Effort.
23 See for instance, the joint Egypt-European Union Task Force, which included representatives of the European External Action Service, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and member states. On the Egyptian side, participants included politicians from the Upper House (the Shura Council) and the Constituent Assembly, civil society organisations, business leaders, etc. “EU-Egypt Task Force: Co-chairs Conclusions”, 14 November 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133511.pdf.
24 C. Ashton, speech delivered at Forum Nueva Economia, Madrid, 13 June 2013.
25 European Council, “Decision Establishing European External Action Service”.
26 Ashton, “Debate on Review of EEAS”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20130612+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
27 The EEAS Review of 2013 addressed issues of organisation, functioning and performance. What internal changes, modifications to legal texts, or other wider issues will be considered as part of the institutional transition this year remain to be seen. For full document, see EEAS Review, July 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf.
28 J. Techau, “How to Breathe New Life into the European External Action Service”, Carnegie Europe, 7 Jan 2013, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=54102.
29 S. Maxwell, blogpost, “Simon Maxwell: Bridging Research and Policy in International Development”, 12 Dec 2013, http://www.simonmaxwell.eu/blog/review-of-influencing-tomorrow-future-challenges-for-british-foreign-policy-by-douglas-alexander-and-ian-kearns.html.
30 For more, see DANIDA, “Road Map for the Implementation of the Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation in 2012: Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights”, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Goals/Strategy/Road%20Map%202012%20Freedom%20Democracy%20Human%20Rights.ashx.
31 DANIDA, “Evaluation of Danish Support to Civil Society”, January 2013, http://www.oecd.org/derec/denmark/CS_strategien_web_DANIDA.pdf.
32 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategic Framework Document: Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2013–16”, September 2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Det-vil-vi/Strategier/Danish%20Arab_web.pdf.
33 UK Government, “Leading the UK Government’s Strategic Response to the Arab Spring: The Arab Partnership”, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/88486/Arab-Partnership-booklet.pdf.
34 For a full list of past and current projects, see https://www.gov.uk/arab-partnership-participation-fund.
35 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, “Annual Report to the House of Commons International Development Committee”, June 2013, http://www.icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ICAI-Annual-Report-2012-13.pdf.
36 Maxwell, “Written Evidence to the International Development Committee”, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmintdev/566/566vw07.htm.
37 National Audit Office, “Review of the Conflict Pool”, March 2012, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Review-of-the-Conflict-Pool.pdf.
38 For more details, see “Documentación de Planificación”, Programa Masar, http://www.aecid.es/ES/d%C3%B3nde-cooperamos/norte-de-%C3%A1frica-y-oriente-pr%C3%B3ximo/programa-masar/formulaci%C3%B3n.
39 “Plan Bienal de Evaluaciones 2013-2014”, http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/Cooperacion/Evaluacion/EvaluacionCooperacionES/20130712%20Plan%20BienalREV%20%281%29.pdf.
40 See for instance, Sjursen, “Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy”.
41 See for instance, Jørgensen, “The European Union in Multilateral Diplomacy”; as well as Schumacher, “The EU and the Arab Spring”.
42 For one critic, a focus on efficiency “suggests that we care more about whether we have joined-up policies than we care about the overall impact of our policies on poor people and poor countries”. See O. Barder, “Policy Coherence is a Hobgoblin”, Centre for Global Development, 26 September 2013, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/policy-coherence-hobgoblin.
43 In the Horn of Africa, for example, the EU combined various CFSP instruments including crisis management tools, the anti-piracy Operation Atlanta, deployment of training missions for the naval forces of the countries in the region, development cooperation instruments and political influence. See Soliman et al., “The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”, and K. Georgieva, “Horn of Africa Crisis: One Year on”, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/georgieva/hot_topics/horn_africa_one_year_on_en.htm.
44 European Union External Action Service, “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, March 2011, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf.
45 See N. Witney, “Missing in Action Again: The European Union and Mali”, World Politics Review, 22 January 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12651/missing-in-action-again-the-european-union-and-mali.
46 See for instance, Dworkin and Michou, “Egypt’s Unsustainable Crackdown”.
47 See Tardy, European Security in a Global Context, 26.
48 “The problem of Europe is not that it lacks power, soft or hard, but that it is fragmented and, consequently, ineffective.” See Torreblanca, La fragmentación del poder europeo.
49 See, for instance, Burke, “Running into the Sand?””, and Wouters, “The Arab Uprisings and the European Union”. See also OSI, How Could a European Endowment?, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eed-paper-20110927.pdf.
50 See Nogaj, “The Cost of Non-Europe”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/cone_dev_policy_/cone_dev_policy_en.pdf.
51 For more, see Whitman and Juncos, “The Arab Spring, the Eurozone Crisis”.
52 Ibid.
53 EEAS, “Human Rights at Heart of External Action”.
54 It is worth noting that the EU’s ban on sales of ‘repressive’ equipment left plenty of room for interpretation: the guideline paper was by no means exhaustive and fixed no date or preconditions for expiry of the ban. Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Egypt”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138599.pdf.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Hélène Michou
Hélène Michou is Project Coordinator and Researcher at ECFR Madrid. Email: [email protected].
Eduard Soler i Lecha
Eduardo Soler i Lecha is Research Director at CIDOB. Email: [email protected].
José Ignacio Torreblanca
José Ignacio Torreblanca is Professor at UNED University in Madrid and Senior Policy Fellow at ECFR. Email: [email protected]. The authors would like to thank Richard Gowan, Anthony Dworkin and the participants in the seminar “Restoring the Broken Link: a Joined-up Approach to Security, Development, and Democracy in North Africa”, held in Barcelona in July 2013, at which some of the ideas were discussed as part of a project funded by the Spanish Development Agency (Grant 11-CAP2-1561-AECID).