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Abstract
Russia’s actions towards Ukraine in 2013-14, which inaugurated a new Cold War in its relations with the West, presented a dilemma to Russia’s allies: whether to align themselves with Russia’s choices or pursue a more independent course of action. The leadership of Belarus, Russia’s closest ally, chose the latter option both by establishing dialogue with the interim government and President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchinov, considered illegitimate in Russia and, later, by being present at the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko on 7 June 2014 and downplaying Russia’s position on the ‘federalisation’ of Ukraine as the only way out of the country’s instability. The perspective of the intra-alliance security dilemma helps explain the divergence of views between Russia and Belarus, while pointing to the changing position of the parties towards the Eurasian integration project.
Notes
1 One of Vladimir Putin’s priorities has been development of the Eurasian Customs Union (2010) and the associated Economic Space (2012). As a part of this process, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed the founding documents of the Eurasian Economic Union on 29 May 2014; the new interaction phase is set to start on 1 January 2015. The rapid evolution of the initiative, including the implementation of the Customs Union Code and establishment of the Eurasian Commission in November 2011, as well as a Court and a Crisis Fund make the Eurasian project stand out from a range of other post-Soviet institutions characterised by ineffectiveness and inertia. See Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Ukraine’s Revolution.
2 Snyder, Alliance Politics.
3 Müller, “Security Cooperation”, 372.
4 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181.
5 In the cases of Russia and Belarus, the intra-alliance security dilemma is not restricted to politico-military matters, but is closely related to economic factors such as energy cooperation. Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-military Alliance”.
6 Ukraine accounts for about 11% of Belarusian exports.
7 Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest”; Koktysh, “The Belarusian Policy of Russia”, 22-3.
8 Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, 1995, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/md_bel.nsf/1beba7ba95cdfb88c3256f6a00417b59/dbbca5487c35483dc3257694004249f3!OpenDocument. Art. 5 of the Treaty established consultation “in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties, or the threat of such an attack”. The Treaty also stipulated that parties refrain from “participation in or support for any actions whatsoever directed against the other party”, the creation of treaties directed against the other party, and using their territories “to the detriment of the security of the other (party)”.
9 Charter to the Treaty of the Union of Belarus and Russia, 1997, http://belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/ustav_k_dogovoru_o_soyuze_belarusi_i_rossii_o.html. Paragraph 2, Article 11 of the Charter of the Union defines taking “joint measures to counter threats to the sovereignty and independence of each State member of the Union” as its main goal. The Charter also establishes, in Article 16, the necessity of coordinated decisions regarding “the maintenance of collective security” and “cooperation in ensuring the territorial integrity” of the parties, as well as “the protection of the borders of the Union”.
10 Rontoyanni, “The Union of Belarus”, 124.
11 Agreement on the Creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991, http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=1. Collective Security Treaty, 1992, http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/. Art 3. and Art. 12 of the CIS Treaty; Art. 1, Art. 2 and Art. 4 and Art. of the CST(O) Treaty.
12 Alesin, “New Geopolitical Situation”, 55.
13 Baev, Russian Energy Policy, 71.
14 For instance, Paragraph 2, Article 8 of the Charter of the Union defines taking “joint measures to formulate common positions on international issues of mutual interest” as one of its goals.
15 Since 2002, the price of natural gas from Russia to resource-poor Belarus has risen constantly. According to the 2006 agreement, Belarus was to pay USD100 per 1000 m3 from the end of 2006, about 40% of the average price paid by European customers. The price would be raised to 67% in 2008, 80% in 2009 and 100% in 2011. The agreement also fixed the conditions for the creation of the Gazprom-Beltransgaz joint venture, i.e. the purchase of 50% of Beltransgaz at the price of USD2.5 bn. In December 2011, Gazprom acquired the other 50% of Beltransgaz for the same price of USD2.5bn. The deal fixed the price at USD164 per 1000 m3 for 2012, in contrast to the USD244 per 1000 m3 paid in 2011 (still about half the price paid by the European customers). See Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency, 185-9. For the implications of EU-Belarus relations, see Portela, European Union Sanctions, 89-94.
16 Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-military Alliance”.
17 Ibidem.
18 G. Jennings, “Russia deploys combat aircraft to Belarus”, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 16 March 2014.
19 Statement by Frants Klintsevich, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, on 7 May 2014, cited in “NATO moving to the East, Iskanders deployed to Belarus and Kaliningrad”, Voenno-Politicheskoe Obozrenie, 13 May 2014, http://www.belvpo.com/ru/37797.html; Viktor Bondarev, Commander-in Chief of the Russian Air Force, cited in “Belarusian airspace will be protected”, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 28 March 2014, http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2014-03-28/4_belorussia.html.
20 Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-military Alliance”.
21 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, Shuster-LIVE, 29 March 2014, http://telegraf.by/2014/03/intervyu-lukashenko-ukrainskoi-teleprogramme-shuster-live.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Wilson, “Lukashenko wants out”.
25 “Lukashenko called Putin to talk about Crimea”, Telegraf.by, 19 March 2014, http://telegraf.by/2014/03/lukashenko-pozvonil-putinu-v-svyazi-s-krimom.
26 “Lukashenko is not using swear words”, Naviny by, 23 March 2014, http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2014/03/23/ic_articles_112_184995/; “Belarus remains with Russia in any situation – Lukashenko”, Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 1 April 2014, http://www.sb.by/post/161673/.
27 “Ukraine’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs wants the Belarusian Ambassador to explain Aleksandr Lukashenko’s statements”, Unian, 24 March 2014, http://www.unian.net/politics/899921-mid-hochet-obyyasneniy-ot-posla-v-belarusi-otnositelno-zayavleniy-lukashenko.html.
28 D. Melyantsou, “Can Maidan Happen in Belarus?”, http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id728/Bell%202014%202%20%2844%29.pdf.
29 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, 29 March 2014.
30 In the first days of March, Vladimir Putin made a declaration on the resumption of contacts with the authorities of Ukraine at the ministerial level.
31 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, 29 March 2014.
32 “Lukashenko: Ukraine should not be dismembered”, Naviny by, 23 February 2014, http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2014/02/23/ic_articles_112_184685/.
33 “The ambassador of Belarus to Ukraine wishes Andriy Deshchitsa success at his new post”, Belapan, 28 February 2014, http://belapan.com/archive/2014/02/28/684703/.
34 Scharpf, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung.
35 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, 29 March 2014.
36 Official website of the President of Russia,“Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine”, 4 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763.
37 “Yanukovich says he’s Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, army will ignore ‘criminal orders’”, Reuters, 11 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/11/ukraine-crisis-yanukovich-idUSL6N0M81IM20140311.
38 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, 29 March 2014.
39 Ibid.
40 V. Maritnovich, “We did not invite anyone here”, Belgazeta.by, 10 March 2014, http://www.belgazeta.by/ru/2014_03_10/event/28510.
41 “Makey: I would not welcome a ‘Yugoslavisation’ of Ukraine”, 3 March 2014, http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/politics/Makej-ne-xotelos-by-jugoslavizatsii-Ukrainy_i_661762.html.
42 “Interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, 29 March 2014.
43 Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), “June opinion poll: Minsk defenceless in the face of Russian propaganda”, 5 July 2014, http://iiseps.org/analitica/590.
44 For an analysis, see IISEPS, “March opinion poll: Pork prices against Russian propaganda”, 5 July 2014, http://www.iiseps.org/analitica/583.
45 See Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, “The Politico-military Alliance”.
46 A reflection of Russia’s determination was also its pressure on Armenia to join the Eurasian project. Although Armenia was in the final stage of negotiation of its own Association Agreement with the EU in late 2013, its leadership suddenly declared to have changed their mind, abandoning the rapprochement with the EU and declaring that integration into the Eurasian Custom Union was its new foreign policy goal. Armenia was offered a favourable price for Russian gas, on which it is highly dependent: USD170 to 180 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2014 (corresponding to the price paid by Belarus).
47 Yeliseyeu, Belarus-EU visa facilitation, http://belinstitute.eu/sites/biss.newmediahost.info/files/attached-files/BISS_Blitz16_2013%20en.pdf; Wilson, “Belarus wants out”.
48 In 2011, the human rights defender was condemned to 4.5 years of imprisonment and property confiscation, on a charge of large-scale tax evasion. His detention was condemned by the EU and the US, as well as by international human rights organisations. Ales Byalyatski was Vice President of the International Federation for Human Rights since April 2007, had been awarded the 2005 Homo Homini Award of the Czech NGO ‘People in Need’, the 2006 Per Anger Prize, the 2011 Human Rights Defenders Award by the US Department of State, the 2012 Lech Wałęsa Award, the 2013 Václav Havel Human Rights Award of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and had been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. The release of political prisoners has always been defined by the EU as a precondition for its political rapprochement to Belarus. Following the Belarusian leadership’s crackdown on peaceful demonstrators and the trials of opposition political activists after the presidential elections of 19 December 2010, EU adopted sanctions targeting more than 260 persons, including all high-ranking Belarusian political and military officials.
49 European Commission, “Memo: ENP Package – Belarus”, 27 March 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-222_en.htm.
50 About 8% of the population in Eastern Belarus is ethnically Russian. For a different opinion on Crimea’s implications for Belarus, see Bohdan, Belarusian Army, http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-army-capacity-and-its-role-region-18931.
51 President of the Republic of Belarus, State of the Nation Address to the Belarusian People and the National Assembly”, 22 April 2014.
52 “We have to provide for our soldiers and take care of our Army”, Belta, 2 April 2014, http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/president/Lukashenko-my-dolzhny-kormit-svoego-soldata-i-berech-svoju-armiju-Video_i_664740.html.
53 Ibidem.
54 “Kseniya Sobchak’s interview with Aleksandr Lukashenko”, Doschshd’. 21 May 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/aleksandr_lukashenko_ksenii_sobchak_kto_by_ni_prishel_na_belorusskuju_zemlju_ja_budu_voevat_dazhe_esli_eto_budet_putin_efirnaja_versija-368769/.
55 President of the Republic of Belarus, “State of the Nation Address”.
56 “Lukashenko on the exemptions in the Eurasian Custom Union”, Naviny.by, 5 March 2014, http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2014/03/05/ic_news_113_433022/. See also Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, “What happened to Ukraine and what consequences might Belarus have to face?”,16 April 2014, http://belinstitute.eu/sites/biss.newmediahost.info/files/attached-files/BISS_Blitz02_2014en.pdf.
57 Belarus purchases oil from Russia at a favourable Russian internal price and then produces petroleum for export. The 2010 agreement obliged Belarus to pay customs duties on oil imports from Russia (about USD4 billion). In the course of the Eurasian Economic Union negotiations, it was decided to deduct USD1.5 billion from this sum for 2015, with Belarus hoping this would be the first step on the path towards the creation of a common energy market. See Blockmans et al., Towards a Eurasian Economic Union.
58 BBC Ukraine, “Lukashenko suggests postponing the creation of the Eurasian Union”, 14 April 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/rolling_news_russian/2014/04/140430_ru_n_lukashenko_statement_eurasian_union.shtml. Eventually, the signature of the treaty on Eurasian Economic Union on the part of Belarus was possible due to the Kremlin’s USD2.5 billion loan to Belarus, to be followed by a USD1.5 billion reduction in oil custom duties in 2015.
59 This is the case of the supranational Eurasian Council or Eurasian Parliament, an idea launched by the President of Russia’s Duma in 2012, but not supported by Belarus or Kazakhstan.
60 Shumylo-Tapiola, The Eurasian Customs Union.
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Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira
Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira is a Member of the Núcleo de Investigação em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais, Universidade do Minho (NIPCRI-UMinho), Portugal. Email: [email protected]. The author’s post-doctoral research is financed by FCT [SFRH/BPD/63834/2009], as is her research within the framework of the project on EU Partnerships [PTDC/CPJ-CPO/113251/2009]. Both are gratefully acknowledged.