Reflections on Global Climate Politics Post Paris: Power, Interests and Polycentricity

Abstract

The Paris Agreement on climate change adopted in December 2015 has the potential to shape future climate politics and governance significantly, with broader implications for world politics at large. First of all, it solidifies the importance of ‘low-emission capacity’ as a source of power in international climate politics. Second, it supports the ongoing societal mobilisation and reinforces interest in the new climate economy. Third, it points, as a result, toward a more multipolar future climate world order. Finally, the Agreement recalibrates the role of the multilateral UN process as providing overall direction towards global decarbonisation, while leaving implementation to states, other international organisations and various non-state actors and initiatives. Therefore, phasing out global greenhouse gas emissions within the next few decades requires subnational and national policy frameworks that facilitate and promote overachievement and hence drive an upward dynamic – making the Paris Agreement a real-world experiment with an uncertain outcome.

Keywords:

• Climate change
• climate governance
• climate policy
• geopolitics
• Paris Agreement
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Notes

¹ On the Paris Agreement, see Obergassel et al., Phoenix from the Ashes; Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement”; Doelle, “The Paris Agreement”; Falkner, “The Paris Agreement”; and Rajamani, “Ambition and Differentiation”.

² UNFCCC, Art. 2.

³ Bodle et al., “The Paris Agreement”.

⁴ IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation; Höhne et al., “Analysis beyond IPCC AR5”.

⁵ For an assessment of the national climate action plans (“intended nationally determined contributions”), see UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report; UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect.

⁶ Rajamani, “Ambition and Differentiation in Paris Agreement”, 496–505; Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement”, 20.

⁷ Paris Agreement, Art. 4.2.

⁸ Oberthür and Bodle, “Legal Form and Nature”; see also the general articles on the Paris Agreement referred to above.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See, for example, “Insurers worth $1.2tn tell G20 to stop funding fossil fuels by 2020”, Climate Home, 30 August 2016, http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/08/30/insurance-funds-worth-1-2tn-tell-g20-to-stop-funding-fossil-fuels-by-2020/.

¹¹ See, for example, Vogler, Climate Change in World Politics; Terhalle and Depledge, “Great-power Politics”; Oberthür, “Where to Go from Paris”; Bäckstrand and Elgström, “EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations”.

¹² Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.

¹³ See discussion in Vogler, Climate Change in World Politics, 131–56.

¹⁴ WRI, CAIT Climate Data Explorer.

¹⁵ IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation.

¹⁶ Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.

¹⁷ IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation; Höhne et al., “Analysis beyond IPCC AR5”.

¹⁸ The Chinese action plan aims at, among other things, a peaking of CO₂ emissions “around” 2030, whereas the US government pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 26–28% from 2005 levels by 2025; see discussion in Clémençon, “Two Sides of the Paris Agreement”, 15–16; the “intended NDCs” are accessible at: http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php.

¹⁹ Ibid., 14–15; see also Dupont and Oberthür, Decarbonization in the European Union.

²⁰ UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report; UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect.

²¹ See also the discussion on the “new carbon economy” below.

²² Oberthür, “Where to Go from Paris”.

²³ IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts.

²⁴ Vogler, Climate Change in World Politics, especially 60–85; Obergassel et al., Phoenix from the Ashes.

²⁵ IPCC, Climate Change 2013.

²⁶ REN21, Renewables 2016 Global Status Report; The New Climate Economy, Better Growth, Better Climate; The New Climate Economy, Seizing the Global Opportunity; Goldman Sachs, The Low-carbon Economy.

²⁷ UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect, especially 36–7.

²⁸ Wyns and Axelson, Decarbonising Europe’s Energy Intensive Industries.

²⁹ See Pew Research Center, “Climate Change Seen as Top Global Threat”.

³⁰ See, for example, Beer, "Early Adopters of Fossil Fuel Divestment".

³¹ See Investor Network on Climate Risk, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/incr (with list of shareholder resolutions, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/resolutions).

³² See Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), http://climateaction.unfccc.int/.

³³ See Investor Network on Climate Risk list of shareholder resolutions, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/resolutions.

³⁴ Bäckstrand and Elgström, “The EU’s Role in Negotiations”; Obergassel et al., Phoenix from the Ashes.

³⁵ Delbeke and Vis, EU Climate Policy Explained; Dupont and Oberthür, “The European Union”.

³⁶ Terhalle and Depledge, “Great-power Politics”; Andresen, “International Climate Negotiations”.

³⁷ Jordan et al., “Emergence of Polycentric Climate Governance”; Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States”; Bulkeley et al., Transnational Climate Change Governance; Abbott et al., Organizational Ecology.

³⁸ Gehring and Faude, “Theory of Emerging Order”.

³⁹ Oberthür, “Interplay Management”.

⁴⁰ Especially in the decision of the Conference of the Parties accompanying the Paris Agreement; see Bodansky, “The Paris Climate Change Agreement”; Obergassel et al., Phoenix from the Ashes.

⁴¹ Hermwille et al., “UNFCCC before and after Paris”.

⁴² As they have done in the past: see Hickmann, Rethinking Authority in Global Climate Governance; Abbott et al., Organizational Ecology.

⁴³ Betsill et al., “Building Productive Links”.

⁴⁴ Doelle, “The Paris Agreement”.