Preparing NATO for the Future – Operating in an Increasingly Contested Environment

Abstract

The global proliferation of precision-strike systems may be challenging the foundations of Western military-technological supremacy. Relatedly, the development of so-called Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the globe threatens to complicate Western freedom of military movement and access, and could give way to a more contested military-strategic environment. The twin challenges of precision-strike proliferation and A2/AD strongly impact NATO’s agenda, which revolves around strengthening deterrence and defence in Eastern Europe, and addressing the different threats emanating from the so-called Southern European neighbourhood. In order to address or mitigate such challenges, the Alliance needs to produce operational concepts and capabilities able to deliver deterrence and expeditionary warfare in a maturing precision-strike environment, one characterised by the emergence of A2/AD capabilities.

Keywords:

• Precision-strike
• A2/AD
• NATO
• deterrence
• expeditionary warfare

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Diego Ruiz Palmer and Alexander Mattelaer for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

¹ See, e.g., Mahnken, “Weapons: The Precision-Strike Regime”.

² For a discussion of these two paradigms, see Brimley, “The Third Offset Strategy”.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See, e.g., Watts, The Evolution of Precision Strike.

⁵ For a good discussion, see Posen, “Command of the Commons”.

⁶ See, e.g., Mahnken, “Weapons: The Precision-Strike Regime”.

⁷ Watts, The Evolution of Precision Strike.

⁸ Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets”.

⁹ For a succinct overview of the Pentagon’s first, second and third offset strategies, see Martinage, Towards a New Offset Strategy.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See, for example, Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific”; Mahnken, “China's Anti Access Strategy”.

¹² See, e.g., Simón, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy”; Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge”; Lanoszka and Hunzeker, “‘Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenge”.

¹³ See Warsaw Summit Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council held in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. See also Mattelaer, The NATO Warsaw Summit.

¹⁴ This sub-section draws on Simón, “Demystifying the A2/AD Buzz”.

¹⁵ Richardson, “Deconstructing A2/AD”.

¹⁶ Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific”.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools.

¹⁸ In any event, concerns over A2/AD predated the advent and proliferation of precision-strike technologies. During the Cold War, the US Navy’s 2nd Fleet in the Atlantic and 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean had concerns about their ability to operate freely, establish sea-control and exercise power projection against the overlapping air launch cruise missiles, coastal defence cruise missiles, anti-submarine warfare and surface to air missiles around the Soviet strongholds in the Kola Peninsula and Crimea peninsula, respectively. I thank Diego Ruiz-Palmer for alerting me to this point.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Krepinevich, Watts and Work, Meeting the Anti Access Challenge; Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific.

²⁰ On this discussion see Majumdar, “Can America Crush Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubbles’”.

²¹ See, e.g., Kroenig, “Facing Reality”; Colby and Solomon, “Facing Russia”.

²² See, e.g., Lasconjarias, The NRF.

²³ See, e.g., Deni, “NATO’s new trajectories”; Mattelaer, The NATO Warsaw Summit.

²⁴ For an overview of the dynamics of NATO-Russia geostrategic competition in Eastern Europe, see Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European Flank”.

²⁵ For an analysis of the evolving military balance in northeastern Europe, see Shlapak and Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank”; Smith and Hendrix, Assured Resolve.

²⁶ See, e.g. Bugajski and Doran, Black Sea Imperatives.

²⁷ See, e.g., Bildik, “NATO military strength”.

²⁸ See Ulgen and Kasapoglu, Threat-Based Strategy for NATO’s Southern Flank.

²⁹ See Deni, “NATO’s new trajectories”.

³⁰ For a good analysis of NATO’s Warsaw Summit, see Mattelaer, The NATO Warsaw Summit.

³¹ This and the next sub-section draw on Simón, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy”.

³² For a good overview of this process, see Ruiz Palmer, Back to the Future?

³³ See, e.g., De Haas, Russia’s Military Reforms; Ruiz Palmer, Ibid.

³⁴ On the importance of offensive capabilities to counter A2/AD systems, see Grygiel, “Arming Our Allies”.

³⁵ Gorenc, “USAFE-AFAFRICA Update”, 2.

³⁶ See, e.g., Simón, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy”; Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge”.

³⁷ Vershbow, “NATO Needs Strategy”.

³⁸ For a good description of Russian hybrid warfare, see, e.g., Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict.

³⁹ See Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare”.

⁴⁰ See Posen, “Command of the Commons”.

⁴¹ For a good overview of this process, see Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management.

⁴² On the global proliferation of precision-strike systems and A2/AD capabilities, see Mahnken, “Weapons: The Precision-Strike Regime”.

⁴³ “A New Threat to Red Sea Shipping”, STRATFOR, 5 October 2016.

⁴⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the different strategies aimed at defeating A2/AD and hedging against it, see Simón, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy”, esp. 431-3. For a cognizant discussion of deterrence by denial vs. punishment, see Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial”.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Lasconjarias and Marrone, How to Respond to Anti-Access/Area Denial?.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Thomas, “Protraction”.

⁴⁷ Grygiel and Mitchell, “A Preclusive Strategy”.

⁴⁸ Mitchell, “A Bold New Baltic Strategy”.

⁴⁹ See Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Nation’s Concept”.

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Colby, The Role of Nuclear Weapons.