Abstract
The study of the complex relationship between army and monarchy in Morocco provides support for the argument that coup-proofing and institutionalisation enable civil leadership to enhance and maintain civilian control over the military. Through a strategy of coup-proofing implemented by the monarchy to protect itself from coups d’état, the army had been depoliticised. Through institutionalisation the Moroccan army is now governed by a clear set of constitutional and legal norms, principles and procedures with a system based on meritocracy. This approach is helping to stabilise relations between state and society and avoid power struggles between civilian leaders and the armed forces.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for the comments from the editor and three reviewers of The International Spectator. Funding for research for this article was received from Qatar University.
Notes
1 Dalle, Les trois Rois.
2 North, Structure and Change, 201–2.
3 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies:194.
4 Bellin, “Robustness of Authoritarianism in Middle East”, 145.
5 Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection”, 335.
6 Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing”, 133.
7 For two modern works on the subject, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, and Janowitz, The Professional Soldier.
8 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 83.
9 After 44 years as a French colonial protectorate, established with the Treaty of Fez in March 1912, Morocco regained independence from France in 1956. During the period of the Protectorate (1912-56), France took over the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs on Morocco’s behalf.
10 Owen State, Power and Politics, 45.
11 Sehimi, Évolutions des politiques de défense, 163.
12 Jazouli, “L’administration de la Défense nationale”.
13 Daguzan, Le dernier rempart, 52.
14 Ammoun, “Les F.A.R. et le trône chérifien".
15 Daguzan, Le dernier rempart, 21-49.
16 Hodges, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 23-4.
17 The Moroccan term Makhzen literally means “a place to store treasure”. Politically, in terms of power, it refers to the monarchy and its institutions, and the political and economic elite surrounding it, such as local representatives, police and high-ranking public officials.
18 Owen, State, Power and Politics, 5-22.
19 Ghomari, Armée et politique au Maroc, 70-5; Bangoura, Les armées africaines (1960-1990), 45.
20 Storm, Democratization in Morocco, 13-7.
21 Zartman, Morocco: Problems of New Power, 15-21.
22 Clément, “Les tensions urbaines au Maroc”, 393–406.
23 Leveau, Le sabre et le turban, 62; and "Morocco at the Crossroads”.
24 Ben Barka, Option révolutionnaire au Maroc.
25 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies,192-264; Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers.
26 Waterbury, “The coup manqué”, 396-8; and Leveau, Le sabre et le turban, 5-52.
27 Joffe, “Morocco: Monarchy, Legitimacy and Succession, 212.
28 Marzouki, Tazmamart: Cellule 10, 46.
29 Regnier and Santucci, “Armée, pouvoir et légitimité au Maroc”.
30 Camau, La notion de démocratie, 354.
31 Daguzan, Le dernier rempart ?, 54-5.
32 Pennell, Morocco Since 1830; Pilster and Böhmelt, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness”; Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing”. This strategy is also known as demilitarisation, and was necessitated in some Middle Eastern countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, due to the dominant role played by the military in gaining independence from the colonial powers and the leadership maintained during the period of post-independence. Thus demilitarisation, removal of the army from politics and government positions and making it focus on affairs of war is a difficult challenge. Cf Cooper, “Demilitarization of Egyptian Cabinet”.
33 Owen, State, Power and Politics, 48.
34 Desrues and Moyano, “Social Change and Political Transition”, 21.
35 Leveau, “Morocco at the Crossroads”, 108.
36 Sater, Morocco: Challenges to Tradition, 37-9.
37 Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, 336.
38 Jamaï, “Hassan II to Servants of State”.
39 Joffé, “Morocco's Reform Process: Wider Implications”, 152.
40 Leveau, “Morocco at the Crossroads”, 95.
41 See Les officiers de Sa Majesté, by former officer in the Moroccan army, Mahjoub Tobji.
42 Tahakoum or authoritarian political control is a new concept coined by the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), especially its leader Abdelillah Benkirane, to describe the role of actors undermining democracy. The concept also means that the monarchical institution is the real power behind Tahakoum. “Qu’est-ce que le ‘tahakoum’?", Telquel.ma, July 2016. http://telquel.ma/2016/07/07/quest-ce-tahakoum_1504927
43 Stated in article 42, similar to article 19 of the previous Constitutions.
44 Saaf, “Une sortie du despotisme, 9-10.
45 IMF, Morocco: Report, 37.
46 Saidy, "La structure constitutionnelle", 152.
47 This draft law is available (in Arabic) at http://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/sites/default/files/loi/31.13.pdf
48 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2015, Morocco 2015 Country Summary, http://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/morocco.pdf https://www.transparency.org/.
49 Kodmani, “The Security Sector in Morocco”, 9.
50 Tobji, Les officiers de Sa Majesté.
51 Kilani, Against Corruption, 143.
52 WikiLeaks, Morocco's Military.
53 Bennani et al., “Le service social des Forces Armées Royales", 184-9.
54 King's Speech at Parliament Opening, 13 Oct. 2017, http://www.maroc.ma/en/discours-royaux/texte-integral-prononce-par-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-devant-les-membres-des-deux
55 Hamoudi, Security Policy of Contemporary Morocco, 204-9.
56 IER, 2005 Closing Report.
57 This law is available (in Arabic) at http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/html/Ar/188525.htm
58 Caparini and Fluri, “Civil Society Actors in Defense”, 9.
59 This term is used to describe the post-coup decades of the 1970s and 1980s during the rule of Hassan II, marked by state violence against activists. It has come to be known in Arabic as sanawat ar-rasas and in French as les années de plomb.
60 In particular the writings of Marzouki, Tazmamart : cellule 10; Raiss, De Skhrirat à Tazmamart ; Serhane, Kaabazal : les emmurés de Tazmamart; Issou, Mémoires d'un soldat Marocain.
61 This popular uprising took place in response to calls for mobilisation by the February 20 movement. Tens of thousands of Moroccans took to the streets in 53 cities across the country.
62 Abdel-Samad, “Why reform not revolution”.
63 Malka, “Power and Authority in Morocco”, 73-6.