Youth as Actors of Change? The Cases of Morocco and Tunisia

Abstract

In the last decades, ‘youth’ has increasingly become a fashionable category in academic and development literature and a key development (or security) priority. However, beyond its biological attributes, youth is a socially constructed category and also one that tends to be featured in times of drastic social change. As the history of the category shows in both Morocco and Tunisia, youth can represent the wished-for model of future citizenry and a symbol of renovation, or its ‘not-yet-adult’ status which still requires guidance and protection can be used as a justification for increased social control and repression of broader social mobilisation. Furthermore, when used as a homogeneous and undifferentiated category, the reference to youth can divert attention away from other social divides such as class in highly unequal societies.

Keywords:

• Youth
• employment
• mobilisation
• Morocco
• Tunisia

Acknowledgements

The ideas presented in this article were elaborated in the framework of POWER2YOUTH, an EU-funded project under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), grant agreement n° 612782.

Notes

¹ Sukarieh, “From Terrorists to Revolutionaries”.

² Sukarieh and Tannock, “The Global Securitisation of Youth”.

³ Sukarieh and Tannock, “Youth Rising?” and “Best Interests of Youth or Neoliberalism?”. See also the assessment of the AHDR 2016 in Paciello and Pioppi, “Is Arab Youth the Problem?”.

⁴ This article is a re-elaboration of parts of three research reports published as POWER2YOUTH working papers: Paciello et al., Youth in Tunisia, Paciello et al., Public action towards Youth, and Paciello et al., A Comprehensive Approach.

⁵ Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt, 144-225; Tsourapas, “The Other Side”; Bogaert, “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts”; Catusse et al., “L’Etat face aux débordements”; Zemni and Bogaert, “Trade, Security and Neoliberal Politics”; El-Said and Harrigan, “Economic Reform, Social Welfare, and Instability”.

⁶ Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag, “Jeunesse des sociétés arabes”; Bono, “Une lecture d’économie politique”.

⁷ Ben Romdhane, Tunisie. état, économie et société.

⁸ Ennaji, “Social Policy in Morocco”, Catusse “Maroc: un fragile état social”.

⁹ Bono, “Une lecture d’économie politique” ; Desrues, “Moroccan Youth”.

¹⁰ For Morocco, Paciello et al., Public action towards Youth, Mejjati-Alami, “L’ajustement structurel et la dynamique"; Achy, Trading High Unemployment for Bad Jobs; for Tunisia, Paciello et al., Youth in Tunisia; Elbaz, “Quand le régime du ‘changement’”; Meddeb, Courir ou mourir; Pfeifer, “Neoliberal Transformation”.

¹¹ For Morocco, Seddon, “Winter of Discontent”; Buehler, “Labour Demands, Regime Concessions”; Seddon, “The Politics of ‘Adjustment’”. For Tunisia, Keenan, “The Origins of Labour Autonomy”.

¹² For Morocco, see the studies by the CNJA (Enquête nationale auprès des jeunes; Enquête nationale éducation-formation); World Bank, Morocco: Strengthening Poverty; and the speech given by the King, 8 October 1999, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-de-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-lors-de-l’ouverture-de-la-session-d’automne-de-la, 30 July 2001, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/discours-à-loccasion-du-deuxième-anniversaire-de-lintronisation-de-sa-majesté-le-roi. For Tunisia, World Bank, Dynamique de l’emploi, and Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion.

¹³ For a critical analysis of the concept of youth exclusion, see Paciello and Pioppi, A Comprehensive Approach.

¹⁴ Between 1982 and 1993, the proportion of workers integrated in the civil service dropped from 65.4 to 23.7%. El Aoufi et al., Chômage et employabilité des jeunes; Ben Ali, “Economic Adjustment and Political Liberalisation”. 

¹⁵ Bennani-Chraïbi, “Jeunesses marocaines et politique”, 137; Paciello et al., Public action towards Youth.

¹⁶ Bennani-Chraïbi, Soumis et rebelles; Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag, Jeunesses des sociétés arabes; Emperador “Diplômés chômeurs au Maroc”; Emperador, “Does unemployment spark collective action”, 198.

¹⁷ Bogaert and Emperador, “Imagining the State”; Bennani-Chraïbi, “Jeunesses marocaines et politique”.

¹⁸ For a review of these employment programmes, see Gouitaa, “Aspects institutionnels de la pauvreté”; Ibourk, Contribution of Labour Market Policies.

¹⁹ Cavatorta, “More than Repression”; Emperador, “Does unemployment spark collective action”.

²⁰ Catusse, “Morocco’s Political Economy”.

²¹ See the speech given by the King to the government, 16 December 1999, http://hiwar.justice.gov.ma/HiwarFr/uploads/Doc/DiscoursFr.pdf.

²² See Joekes,“Working for Lipstick?”, Cairoli, “Garment Factory Workers”, Bourquia, “Gender and Employment”, Martinez, “Emerging Grassroots Processes”.

²³ For agribusiness in Morocco, Corrado et al., Migration and Agriculture, 251-2; for the service sector in Tunisia, Meddeb, “La Tunisie, pays emergent”.

²⁴ Catusse, “Morocco’s Political Economy”.

²⁵ Paciello et al., Youth in Tunisia, Paciello et al., Public action towards Youth.

²⁶ Catusse, “Morocco’s Political Economy”, 203.

²⁷ The 10th Development Plan (2002-2006) optimistically claimed that the unemployment rate had declined from 15.6% in 1994 to 15% in 2001 as proof of the positive results of the employment policies pursued by the government (Tunisian government, Xème Plan de développement, 88). Similarly, the 11th Development Plan (2007-2011) applauded the success of economic and social policies, announcing that unemployment had declined to 14.3% in 2006 from 15.1% in 2001 (Tunisian Government. XIème Plan de développement, 14). Public authorities very seldom referred to the unemployment of graduates as a problem, preferring more neutral expressions such as “the question” of the employment of graduates (Hafaïedh, “Trajectoires de chômeurs diplômés en Tunisie”). For more detail, see Paciello et al., Youth in Tunisia.

²⁸ Murphy, Economic and political change; Hibou, La force de l’obéissance; Tsourapas, “The Other Side”.

²⁹ Huber, “Youth as a New ‘Foreign Policy Challenge’”. See the 10^th (2002-2006), 11^th (2007-2011) and 12^th (2010-2014) Development Plans (Tunisian government, Le Xème, XIème et XIIème Plan de developpement).

³⁰ Cassarino, “Channelled Policy Transfers”; Hibou, La force de l’obéissance.

³¹ Cassarino, Ibid., 105-6.

³² For example, Dhillon and Yousef, Generation in Waiting or, for Tunisia, Hibou, La force de l’obéissance and Hibou et al., Tunisia After 14 January.

³³ Bono, “Pauvreté, exception, participation” and, “Une lecture d’économie politique”. 

³⁴ Berriane, “Complexities of Inclusive Participatory Governance”; Desrues, “Moroccan Youth”.

³⁵ [Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary conditions allowing young people to develop their capacities, let their energies bloom, take on their responsibilities and broaden their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development.] Constitution tunisienne 2014, Chapitre I - Les Principes Généraux.

³⁶ The examples in academic or development literature are too many to give a full account. See Honwana, Youth and Revolution; World Bank, Tunisia, and Promoting Youth Opportunities; and ILO-Tunisian Ministry of Employment, Transition vers le marché; the new Arab Human Development Report, Youth and the Prospects, etc.

³⁷ Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?

³⁸ As an example, see the speech by the King in August 2012 (Discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation à l'occasion du 59ème anniversaire de la Révolution du Roi et du people, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-intégral-du-discours-adressé-par-sm-le-roi-à-la-nation-à-loccasion-du-59ème).

³⁹ Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly, “La Dynamique Protestataire”.

⁴⁰ Bono, “Une lecture d’économie politique”. 

⁴¹ Bogaert, “The revolt of small towns”; Buehler, “Labour Demands, Regime Concessions”.

⁴² For examples of this ‘new’ discourse, see the National Strategy of Youth (Stratégie nationale intégrée de la jeunesse) (2015-2030) elaborated under the strict supervision of the World Bank and the Centre pour l’Intégration Méditerranéen de Marseille (Ministère de la Jeunesse, Stratégie nationale intégrée).

⁴³ Paciello et al., Public action towards Youth; Hanieh, “Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual?”.

⁴⁴ Ministère de la Jeunesse, Stratégie nationale intégrée de la jeunesse, 1. See also the amended Constitution adopted in 2011 (Articles 33 and 170). http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/fr/details.jsp?id=13535.

⁴⁵ Bono, “Une lecture d’économie politique".

⁴⁶ Molina, “The Monarchy vs. 20 February Movement”.

⁴⁷ For Morocco, Bogaert, “The revolt of small towns”; for Tunisia, Allal,“Ici ça ne bouge pas”; Ayeb, “Social and Political Geography”; Zemni, “From socio-economic protest to national revolt”.

⁴⁸ Ayeb, Ibid.; Gana, “The Rural and Agricultural Roots” ; Bergh and Rossi-Doria, “Plus ça Change?” ; Bogaert, “The revolt of small towns”.

⁴⁹ For Morocco, Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly, “La dynamique protestataire”.

⁵⁰ Allal, “Réformes néolibérales”; Hamdi et al., Mobilization of the marginalized.

⁵¹ World Bank, Tunisia; Arab Human Development Report, Youth and the Prospects.

⁵² Herrera and Bayat, Being Young and Muslim, 15.

⁵³ A quick look at the internet suffices to spot a plethora of youth initiatives in Morocco and Tunisia by national governments, development agencies and global powers. See also Huber, “Youth as a New ‘Foreign Policy Challenge’”.

⁵⁴ For Tunisia, World Bank, Tunisia; ILO-Tunisian Ministry of Employment, Transition vers le marché du travail; for Morocco, see Ministère de la Jeunesse, Stratégie nationale intégrée.

⁵⁵ Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters.

⁵⁶ International Alert, Experiences and perceptions; Meddeb, Young People and Smuggling;

⁵⁷ Hamdi et al., Mobilization of the Marginalized.

⁵⁸ Lamloum, “Les jeunes des quartiers populaires”; Meddeb, Young People and Smuggling.

⁵⁹ Furlong and Cartmel, Young People and Social Change, 139.