![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Migration from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries has been considered a growing security threat in the EU and Gulf states following the 9/11 attacks and the Arab uprisings. Since 2011, the economic slowdown, regime changes and socio-political instability have spurred growing migration pressure from SEM countries. However, the securitisation of migration of young citizens from these countries in the EU and the Gulf states is manifested in the drastic limitation of migrants’ inflows, and in the selection of prospective migrants on demographic, socio-economic and political grounds. Today’s ‘governmentality’ of youth migration from SEM countries poses ethical and development-related issues.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on a Working Paper written for the Power2Youth project, funded under the Seventh Framework programme (Fp7/2007-2013), grant agreement n° 612782”. I am thankful to participants in the project, as well as to the anonymous reviewers, for their useful suggestions. All errors are mine.
Notes
1 Delmas, "Migrations".
2 Fassin, “Policing Borders”, 214.
3 Ibid., 221.
4 Bookman, The Demographic Struggle.
5 Estimates retrieved from diplomatic representations in Saudi Arabia, http://gulfmigration.eu/estimates-of-non-nationals-by-country-of-citizenship-saudi-arabia-november-3-2013/.
6 Bakewell, “Some Reflections on Structure and Agency”, 1701. See also Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, 281.
7 On Lebanese emigration, see Tabar, Lebanon.
8 Ibid., 7.
9 Abi Samra, L’émigration libanaise, 51-6.
10 As is the case for all migrants (Fargues and Venturini, “Introduction”, 18 ff).
11 Seccombe and Lawless, “Foreign Worker Dependence”, 548.
12 Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers”, 6.
13 Birks and Sinclair, Arab Manpower, 27.
14 Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers”, 6.
15 Ibidem, 9.
16 Birks and Sinclair, Arab Manpower, 116.
17 Chalcraft, Monarchy, Migration and Hegemony.
18 Van Hear, New Diasporas.
19 De Bel-Air, “Policies and Politics”.
20 David and Jarreau, “Migrating Out”, 6.
21 De Bel-Air, “Arab Female”, 189.
22 Aydin, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy, 8.
23 Arab et al., “Maroc”, 279-80.
24 Garcia Andrade et al., EU Cooperation, 127-30; Aydin, The New Turkish Diaspora Policy, 18.
25 Boubakri, Migrations internationales.
26 Natter, Revolution.
27 De Tapia, “Turquie”.
28 Reniers, On the Selectivity.
29 Eurostat and OECD-DIOC data on migrant stocks in the EU.
30 OECD-DIOC database, 2010-2011.
31 Cammett et al., A Political Economy.
32 Czaika and Vothknecht, Migration, 12.
33 Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, 45-50. The “cumulative causation” theory of migration labels this development-led initial rise of emigration a “migration hump”. Migration levels would then reach a peak, and start declining, as wage gaps between home and destination countries begin to close. For a comprehensive synthesis of theoretical approaches to the link between migration and development, see De Haas, Migration and Development.
34 Icduygu et al., “Socio‐Economic Development”; Birks and Sinclair, Arab Manpower, 144.
35 This is also why development inequalities affect the possibilities to access international labour markets legally: in the 2000s, young migrants from the rural centre-west region of Tunisia, a region lacking industry and tourism, poor in infrastructure and with no international ties, were found confined to internal migration to the coastal regions (Bouchoucha and Ouadah-Bedidi, “Migration économique”) or to irregular migration, usually unsuccessful (Boubakri, Migrations internationales, 4).
38 Sadiqi, Intentions, Causes and Consequences, 8.
39 Flynn and Kofman, “Women, Trade and Migration”, 67.
40 Unemployment rates by age group and education, total population. Royaume du Maroc, Activité, emploi et chômage, 92.
41 Institut National de la Statistique, http://www.ins.tn/indexfr.php.
42 De Bel-Air, “Arab Female”, 194.
43 World Bank, Economic Monitoring.
44 On Lebanon, see Hamdan, "Les départs des Libanais".
45 On Egypt, see World Bank, More Jobs.
46 Pedersen and Tiltnes, “Youth in the SEM”, 11.
47 Horvath, “Securitization”, 158.
48 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, xi.
49 Luedtke, “The European Union dimension”.
50 Martín et al., Exploring New Avenues, 58-9.
51 Article 30 of the Conclusions of the European Council on the Stockholm Programme, for example, is clear about the issues of ‘legitimacy’ as a precondition for entering the EU: “Access to Europe for persons recognized as having a legitimate interest to access EU territory has to be made more effective and efficient. At the same time, the Union and its Member States have to guarantee security for its citizens. Integrated border management and visa policies should be construed to serve these goals”. Conclusions of the European Council for the Stockholm Programmes (10/11 December 2009), point 30. http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.27455!menu/standard/file/European%20Council%20conclusions%2010-11%20December.pdf
52 With nationals from sub-Saharan African states in Morocco and Tunisia or from the Middle East and ex-Soviet Republics in Turkey stranded on their way to Europe. See Natter, “Revolution”, and FIDH/GADEM, Maroc. On the political construction of the concept of ‘transit’ countries as producers of chaotic and unmanaged movements, see Içduygu and Yükseker, “Rethinking Transit Migration”.
53 Mainly through individual agreements and the platform of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Palm, Did 2016 Mark New Start, 3).
54 EC, Global Approach, 7.
55 This is evident, for instance, in the addressing of irregular migration and trafficking in the same sentence. The clear dichotomy between ‘legal’ and ‘irregular’ migration thus implicitly makes it appear ‘illegal’. The same is true for the reference to the ‘external’ dimension of asylum that runs parallel to the externalization of border control. The promotion of ‘mobility’ and short-term stays (as opposed to ‘migration’) is also noteworthy.
56 European Commission, Proposal for a Council decision.
57 European Commission, Roadmap.
58 After a previous agreement was de facto cancelled by the fall of the Ben Ali regime. Council of the EU, Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco; European Commission, EU and Tunisia establish their Mobility Partnership, respectively.
60 Ibidem.
61 Migreurop, EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership.
62 Di Bartolomeo and Fargues, “The Geography of Arab Migration”.
63 EU Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Labour Market Performance, 59–60.
64 Düvell, “Paths into Irregularity”, 288.
65 Eurostats, third country nationals found to be illegally present, annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre].
66 Delmas, “Migrations”; Fargues and Bonfanti, “When the Best Option”.
67 El-Sheikh, “Minister highlights plight”.
68 Finotelli and Arango, “Regularisation”, 506.
69 Salis, Labour Migration, 30-1.
70 Enacted in 2009, the Blue Card scheme extended to Germany in 2012. Figures for highly skilled workers, researchers and Blue Card holders are much lower for Moroccans, from 0.4 to 1.8 percent of all first permits granted for remunerated activities.
72 Bensaid et al., MISMES: Maroc, 9.
73 Eurostat data, first permits issued by categories of migration purpose [migr_resocc].
74 Eurostat data, first permits issued for family reasons by reason [migr_resfam].
75 Eurostat data, first permits by reason, age and sex [migr_resfas].
76 Ibid.
77 Eurostat data on citizenship acquisitions by sex, age, and previous nationality [migr_acq]. Sex distribution was roughly equal, and the age group 30-34 years received the highest share of citizenship acquisitions.
78 Gardner, “Strategic Transnationalism”.
79 See footnote 55.
80 See the Directive for intra-corporate transfer of non-EU skilled workers and the EU Blue Card Directive, both directed at skilled and highly skilled (Blue Card) non-EU professionals.
81 Cassarino, EU Mobility Partnerships.
82 Ibid.
83 Içduygu and Yükseker, “Rethinking Transit Migration”.
84 Calavita, “Law, Immigration and Exclusion”, 97.
85 De Giorgi, “Immigration Control”, 152, 158.
86 Içduygu and Yükseker, “Rethinking Transit Migration”.
87 de Wenden, “Les flux migratoires légaux et illégaux”.
88 Third pillar of the GAMM, for instance.
89 Fargues and De Bel-Air, “Migration to the Gulf States”.
90 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, 100.
91 Fargues, “Immigration Without Inclusion”.
92 De Genova, Working the Boundaries.
93 De Bel-Air, “Policies and Politics”.
94 Choucri, “Asians in the Arab World”.
95 Hourani, “Bilateral Relations”.
96 Thomas, “Firms see obstacles”.
97 De Bel-Air, Demography, Migration and Labour.
98 Ibid.
99 Farouk, “More than Money”, 9.
100 El-Bey, “Justice Denied”.
102 Hertog, Arab Gulf states.
103 For the reform roadmaps of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, see http://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en, https://www.vision2021.ae/en/our-vision.
104 De Bel-Air, “Arab Female”.
105 MEMO,” Egyptians”.
106 De Bel-Air, Demography, Migration and Labour, 6-7.
107 Anderson, “Revealed”.
108 AFP, “Good times”.
109 Natter, Revolution.
110 In 2015, expatriate remittances made up from 5.5 percent of Egypt’s and Tunisia’s GDP to 16 percent of the OPTs’ and Lebanon’s GDP, according to World Bank data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS
111 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
112 De Bel-Air, “Les migrations”.
113 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014, http://carim-south.eu/database/legal-module/the-constitution-of-the-arab-republic-of-egypt-2014/; the Tunisian Constitution of 2014, http://carim-south.eu/database/legal-module/the-constitution-of-tunisia-2014/
114 Skeldon, “International Migration as a Tool”.
115 Cassarino, “Channelled Policy Transfers”, 107–8.
116 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Analysis of the Mobility Partnership, 5.