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Abstract
In the context of the increasing securitisation of cultural heritage, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have reacted differently to the recent wave of iconoclasm perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and similar radical groups and terrorist organisations. With cultural heritage now discursively identified as a security concern, the three states enacted security practices to deal with the newly emerged security threats. All three cases show a tight association between the protection of cultural heritage, development and security policies. State-driven cultural heritage protection policies continue to be designed around the notion of multilateral cooperation, although innovative forms of public-private multilateralism and civil-military cooperation are increasingly being introduced.
Acknowledgements
Serena Giusti would like to thank the Department of Politics and International Relations of Westminster University, London, where she carried out part of the research for the article.
Notes
1 Van der Auwera, “Contemporary Conflict”.
2 These countries were chosen as they are key global ‘cultural players’, with significant engagement in a wide range of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations activities, and therefore well positioned to shape the international community’s efforts at cultural heritage protection.
3 Buzan, People, States and Fear.
4 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”.
5 Waever, “Securitisation and Desecuritisation”.
6 Ibid.
7 For an in-depth analysis of the process of securitisation of cultural heritage that inspired the first section of this article, see Giusti and Russo, “Monuments Under Attack”.
8 See, for instance, www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/iraq-syria/Iraq SyriaReport-en.pdf.
11 www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/GBS/38GC/pdf/France2.pdf. As for the UK, it is noteworthy that no relevant statement by a political leader could be found, signalling the country’s low profile on the matter.
13 Floyd, Security and the Environment; “Can Securitization Theory”.
14 This consideration is in line with the observations of heritage theorists like Tim Winter, in the emerging field of “heritage diplomacy” – to which this article aspires to contribute – in which the difference between the notion of soft and hard power tends progressively to blur. See in particular Winter, “Entangled Materialities of International Relations”; “Heritage Diplomacy”.
15 Rieker, “French Foreign Policy”. Fostering this argument, Rieker asks whether international governmental organisations (IGOs) are useful. This article argues that the French approach to multilateral cultural cooperation is a good case in favour.
16 United Nations Security Council, Resolution on UN Mission in Mali, 8. To implement its mandate, MINUSMA has engaged in various activities through its Environment and Culture Unit, including the training of all civil, military and police personnel to raise their awareness of Mali’s cultural heritage; support to the programme coordinated by UNESCO and the Ministry of Culture to rehabilitate the damaged heritage sites in the north of Mali; support for the resumption of cultural events in the northern regions of Mali, contributing to the transmission of intangible heritage and social cohesion. The mission also launched a Quick Impact Project (QIP) for the rehabilitation of four manuscript libraries (https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/cultural-heritage). For an analysis of the cultural mandate of MINUSMA and its limitations, see Petrovic, “Cultural Dimension of Peace Operations”.
17 French soldiers were ordered to do “whatever it takes” to avoid collateral and direct damages in Gao and Timbuktu. See Martinez, Cinquante propositions françaises, 16.
18 Presidency of the French Republic, Press Kit, 5.
20 UNESCO, Decisions adopted at 195th session, 40.
21 United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Adoption of Measures, 5.
22 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conférence internationale.
23 UNESCO, UNESCO’s Participation, 2.
24 French Republic, Act on Freedom of Creation, Architecture and Cultural Heritage, Art. L111-11.
25 Willsher, “Louvre to Offer Shelter”.
26 UNESCO, UNESCO’s Participation, Annex, 1.
27 Wiseman defines polylateralism as, “the conduct of relations between official entities…and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities”, in Wiseman, “‘Polylateralism’”, 41.
28 UNESCO, UNESCO’s Participation, Annex, 2.
29 Noce, “Global fund to protect cultural heritage”. These figures were confirmed to the authors by a diplomat serving at the Directorate for Culture, Education, Research and the Network, France's Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris, 5 April 2018).
30 In the words of former President Hollande, “[W]e must do whatever it takes to protect world cultural heritage…this includes diplomatic action…as well as military action… . France will take responsibility for both” (translation by the authors), extract from Hollande, “Speech at Louvre”, 18 March 2015; “France will take all necessary action to improve the protection of artefacts and sites as well as to combat the trafficking that sustains the financing of terrorism”, extract from Hollande, “Speech at the Ambassadors’ Week”, 25 August 2015; “We have three priorities: to prevent extremists from seizing cultural property;…to prevent illicit trafficking and looting;…to restore [endangered cultural property]” (translation by the authors), extract from Hollande, “Speech at MET”, 20 September 2016.
31 Ang et al., “Cultural Diplomacy”, 371.
32 United Nations Security Council, Resolution on Adoption of Measures.
33 Presidency of the French Republic, Press Kit, 28.
34 UNESCO, UN Security Council Highlights.
35 Chrisafis, “Macron Hails Power of Beauty”.
38 Ibid.
39 On the emerging doctrine of ‘cultural peacebuilding’, see Foradori and Rosa, “Expanding the peacekeeping agenda”.
42 Kirchgaessner, “Italy’s ‘Monuments Men’”.
44 This slogan has been used by the prime minister on multiple occasions, as in this case during United States President Barack Obama’s visit to Rome on 27 March 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-renzi-italy-joint-press-confe.
45 (authors’ translation) http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/cultura.
46 Ignazi et al., Italian Military Operations Abroad.
47 The Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage has been described as the “most effective military policing force in the world for protecting works of art and archaeological property” (Rush and Benedettini Millington, Carabinieri Command, 1). The Carabinieri operated in Kosovo (2002-03) and Iraq (2003-06), where they performed a range of cultural heritage protection activities, including census, monitoring and protection of cultural heritage sites threatened by post-conflict instability; investigation and recovery of looted artefacts; advising, training and institutional and capacity-building activities.
48 The UK supported the unanimously adopted resolution UN 2347 (24 March 2017) on cultural heritage during armed conflict proposed by France and Italy.
49 This was possible after the government decided to include the Cultural Property (Armed Conflict) Bill as part of the Queen’s Speech in 2016; it received Royal Assent on 23 February 2017. This unit builds on the UK’s Joint Service Cultural Property Protection Working Group created in 2014 as a part of the British army.
50 Stone and Bajjaly, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq.
51 A 2007 British government-commissioned report on cultural diplomacy explains this tension well. See, Bound et al., Cultural Diplomacy.
52 A lack of strategic thinking with respect to this matter in British foreign policy has been underlined by the policy community and academia (Edmund et al., British Foreign Policy and National Interest).
53 Rivera, Distinguishing Cultural Relations from Cultural Diplomacy.
54 It is interesting to note the gradual increase in FCO grant-in-aid ODA to the British Council budget (from £119M in 2016/17 to £170M in 2020/21) against a sharp decrease in FCO grant-in-aid non-ODA (from £39M in 2016/17 to £0.0 in 2020/21). See British Council, Corporate Plan 2017-2020.
55 Included among the financed projects are a scheme led by the University of Liverpool focused on Yazidi historic shrines in Dohuk, Mosul and Sinjar in Iraq; and the creation of a database of cultural heritage on Soqotra, a Yemeni archipelago between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
57 British Council, In Harm’s Way, 26.
58 The Guardian, “Palmyra's Arch of Triumph recreated in Trafalgar Square”, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2016/apr/19/palmyras-arch-of-triumph-replica-erected-in-central-london-video
59 British Museum, Soft Power and UK’s Influence Committee, 27.
60 Former Italian Minister of Cultural Heritage and Activities Francesco Rutelli in his intervention during the conference, “The Blue Helmets for Culture. The Italian role in cultural peacekeeping”, Rome, 21 June 2017.
61 Vestheim, “Instrumental Cultural Policy”, 65.
62 The ongoing transformation of cultural heritage protection and the resulting emphasis on its security and development related dimensions has not meant the complete replacement or abandonment of ‘traditional’ cultural heritage projects. For example, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation continues to support archaeological, anthropological and ethnological missions abroad, which numbered 170 in 2015, many of which are unrelated to security/development considerations (https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/cultura/archeologiapatrimonioculturale.html). As for France, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is supporting 159 archaeological missions abroad in 2018, all of them characterized by cooperation and partnership with local stakeholders (data relating to French missions were provided to the authors by a diplomat serving at the Directorate for Culture, Education, Research and the Network, France's Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Paris, 5 April 2018).
63 This consideration fits well into the discussion about the under-researched question of the complexities of the international ordering of cultural heritage governance. See Winter, “Heritage Diplomacy”, 16.
64 Hameiri and Jones, “The Politics of Non-traditional Security”.