Regionalism as You Like It? Armenia and the Eurasian Integration Process

Abstract

Though the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union was expected to translate into deeper integration, uncertainties and flaws in the rule-making process create loopholes that are then exploited by domestic actors with a view to pursuing their own goals. Thus, processes of rule development and adoption entail a variety of subtle differences also involving translation, adjustment and adaptation. This brings strong nuances into the prevailing picture of ‘hard regionalism’, and instead suggests the development of a malleable integration process.

Keywords:

• Armenia
• Eurasian Economic Union
• regionalism
• actor strategies

Acknowledgements

This article greatly benefitted from discussions conducted during the workshop “Regionalism and identities in the post-Soviet spaces”, organised by Caroline Dufy and Alessandra Russo at Sciences-Po Bordeaux. I would like to thank Caroline Dufy, Hugo Flavier and Julie Patarin-Jossec, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

¹ Dragneva and Wolczuk, Eurasian Economic Integration, 2.

² Vinokurov, “Russian Approaches to Integration”.

³ The CIS was created when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to manage relations between the newly independent states.

⁴ Mechanisms such as opt-outs and reservations, as well as delayed ratification or lack thereof, have been extensively used by CIS member states to water down the binding effects of CIS agreements. Dragneva, “Is ‘Soft’ Beautiful?”. 

⁵ Ibid., 319.

⁶ Delcour and Wolczuk, “Between the Eastern Partnership”.

⁷ Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 16.

⁸ Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union”; Roberts and Moshes, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

⁹ Dragneva and Wolczuk, ibid.

¹⁰ See for instance Dragneva and Wolczuk, Eurasian Economic Integration; Karliuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

¹¹ Söderbaum, “Formal and Informal Regionalism”, 54.

¹² Adler and Crawford, “Normative Power”, 23.

¹³ Hettne and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness”.

¹⁴ Two rounds of interviews were conducted at the Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow in May 2015 and December 2016. Three series of interviews were conducted with Armenian officials in Yerevan in February 2014, March 2015 and January 2017; in addition, three focus groups (with civil society experts and small businesses) were organised in Yerevan in February 2014 and November 2015. This research was undertaken as part of an EU-funded FP7 project (CASCADE, grant 613354, FMSH). The article also relies upon earlier interviews with Armenian and EU officials as part of a French-UK project studying the EU’s influence on domestic change in Armenia (ANR-10 ORAR 0014 EUIMPACTEAST).

¹⁵ Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

¹⁶ Valovaya, “V mire est' tol'ko dva prodvinutyh integracionnyh sojuza” [There are only two advanced integration Unions in the world].

¹⁷ Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, Astana, 29 May 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty_on_eeu.pdf

¹⁸ The Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was created in January 2010, with a common Customs Code taking effect in July 2010. Customs control at the borders between the three member states (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) was lifted one year later.

¹⁹ The Single Economic Space (SES) was established in January 2012 with a view to creating an integrated common market after the custom borders were removed between the member countries.

²⁰ Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

²¹ Tarr and Turdyeva, “Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Integration”.

²² Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Karliuk, “The Limits of the Judiciary”.

²⁵ Movchan and Emerson, Eurasian Economic Union’s Customs Union, 2.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Vinokurov, “Eurasian Customs Union”, 57.

²⁸ Author’s interview, Minister of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, December 2016.

²⁹ Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

³⁰ Author’s interview, Minister of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, December 2016.

³¹ Valovaya, “V mire est' tol'ko dva prodvinutyh integracionnyh sojuza”.

³² Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

³³ Karliuk, “The Limits of the Judiciary”.

³⁴ Author’s interview, Minister of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, December 2016.

³⁵ Author’s interview, SPS Department, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, December 2016.

³⁶ For instance, products such as shrimp or kiwis were sold as Belarusian goods in Russia. Van der Togt et al., From Competition to Compatibility, 23

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Author’s interview, Integration Department, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, May 2015.

⁴⁰ Dragneva et al., “Assessing Legal and Political Compatibility”.

⁴¹ Author’s interview, Minister of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, December 2016.

⁴² Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

⁴³ Valovaya, “V mire est' tol'ko dva prodvinutyh integracionnyh sojuza”.

⁴⁴ Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

⁴⁵ It is worth underlining that, in contrast to the European Commission, only the lower tier of the Eurasian Economic Commission (the Collegium) reflects supranational features, first and foremost the independence of Collegium members from the member states (Dragneva, “The Eurasian Economic Union”) ; the Ministers are defined as “supranational civil servants” (Valovaya, “V mire est' tol'ko dva prodvinutyh integracionnyh sojuza”) who do not represent their governments and can be dismissed in case they take instructions from their capital cities. However, this is not the case for the Council of the Commission, which leads the activities of the EEC and the general regulations of the integration process and consists of deputy heads of government of the member states.

⁴⁶ In case a member state does not comply even after the Eurasian Economic Commission has sent due notification, the Commission may submit a complaint to the Eurasian Union Court. This scenario has yet to occur. Van der Togt et al., From Competition to Compatibility, 22.

⁴⁷ Roberts and Moshes, “The Eurasian Economic Union”, 560.

⁴⁸ “Putin: peredacha polnomochij v EAJeS ne oznachaet utratu suvereniteta” [Putin: the delegation of authority in the EAEU does not mean a loss of sovereignty”, RIA Novosti, 29 May 2014, https://ria.ru/economy/20140529/1009842639.html.

⁴⁹ This section draws partially upon Dragneva et al., “Assessing Legal and Political Compatibility”.

⁵⁰ Delcour and Wolczuk, “The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’?”; Grigoryan, “Joining Under the Gun”.

⁵¹ Delcour and Wolczuk, ibid.

⁵² Author’s interview, EU official, Delegation of the European Union to Armenia, Yerevan, February 2014.

⁵³ Grigoryan, “Joining under the Gun”, 98.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Focus group with civil society experts, Yerevan, February 2014.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Valovaya, “V mire est' tol'ko dva prodvinutyh integracionnyh sojuza”.

⁵⁸ Even though Armenian authorities and political leaders have increasingly been vocal in criticising Russia’s arms sales to Azerbaijan, Armenia’s rival over Nagorno-Karabakh.

⁵⁹ Tarr and Turdyeva, “Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Integration”.

⁶⁰ However, the EAEU’s external tariff decreased in 2015-16 as a consequence of Russia’s implementation of its WTO commitments. Tarr, “The Eurasian Economic Union”, 7.

⁶¹ Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Treaty on the Eurasian Union, 29 May 2014, https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/en-us/0017354/itia_11102014_doc.pdf

⁶² Devyatkov, “Association Lite”.

⁶³ Kostanyan and Giragosian, “EU-Armenia Relations”.

⁶⁴ President of the Republic of Armenia, “Statement at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit”, 29 November 2013, http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2013/11/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-at-the-third-Eastern-Partnership-summit-speech/

⁶⁵ Kostanyan, “Rocky Road to EU-Armenia Agreement”.

⁶⁶ Interestingly, some of these exemptions are meant to secure the economic interests of powerful oligarchs linked to the political elite, as is the case for raw sugar – a product that is at the core of Samvel Aleksanyan’s business (one of Armenia’s most important oligarchs and a member of Parliament). The exemption was granted until 2025, i.e. three years longer than most other exemptions negotiated in the Accession Treaty. During this period, raw sugar processed in Armenia will not be re-exported to other EAEU countries (Paragraph 42, Annex 3, Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union).

⁶⁷ Movchan and Emerson, “Eurasian Economic Union’s Customs Union”, 4.

⁶⁸ Dragneva et al., “Assessing Political and Legal Compatibility”.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 20-1.

⁷⁰ Joint Press Release by the EU and Republic of Armenia on the initialling of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, Yerevan, 21 March 2017.

⁷¹ The text of the CEPA was not publicly available at the time of writing. Therefore, all comments on the substance of the agreement are based upon interviews conducted with EU and Armenian officials in Yerevan between 2015 and 2017.

⁷² Council of the European Union, Annex 1.

⁷³ Kostanyan and Giragosian, EU-Armenia Relations; Dragneva et al., “Assessing Legal and Political Compatibility”.

⁷⁴ Treaty on the EAEU, article 38.

⁷⁵ Author’s interview, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, January 2017.

⁷⁶ Author’s interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, March 2015.

⁷⁷ Author’s interview, Department of Integration, Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, May 2015.

⁷⁸ Kostanyan and Giragosian, EU-Armenia Relations.

⁷⁹ Focus group conducted with representatives of the Armenian business sector, Yerevan, November 2015.

⁸⁰ See http://eba.am/about-us/

⁸¹ Dragneva et al., “Assessing Legal and Political Compatibility”.

⁸² Putin, “Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii”. [A new integration project for Eurasia].

⁸³ Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union”.

⁸⁴ Libman and Vinokurov, “Holding-Together Regionalism”, 193.