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ABSTRACT
Ever since the 1980s, the MENA subsystem has been weakening under the weight of persistent inter-state conflict, violent non-state and sub-state actor incursions, and intense competition for influence and geopolitical advantage amongst its core states. Furthermore, a domino-like collapse of autocratic regimes across the Arab region after 2010 heralded an unprecedented level of disorder, insecurity and chaos. Regional disorder and the general crisis of the state in the Arab region has aggravated regional fragmentation and has at the same time emboldened Saudi Arabia and a small group of its neighbours to adopt a more interventionist, and at times belligerent foreign policy posture. The region’s changing dynamics provide the backdrop for closer analysis of Saudi responses to the regional crisis, which itself has been shaped by the changing of the guard in the Kingdom in 2015. The change is marked by an intensification of Saudi activism and a deepening of its role as a resurgent regional power.
Notes
1 See Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East”.
2 UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
3 Hinnebusch, International Politics of the Middle East, 1.
4 Ulrichsen, Small States with a Big Role.
5 Noble, “From Arab System to Middle Eastern System?”, 67.
6 Colombo, “Foreign Policy Activism”.
7 Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East”, 243.
8 Nonneman, “Analyzing the Foreign Policies”.
10 Karim, “The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy”.
11 Jamal Khashoggi, quoted in Filkins, “A Saudi Prince’s Quest”.
12 In 2017, the United States was the world’s largest producer of petroleum and natural gas hydrocarbons, according to the International Energy Agency. US crude oil production had reached 9.7 million barrels per day (mb/d) and exports around 1.1 mb/d. It was exporting its oil to 37 different countries in 2017. By 2022, moreover, it will be exporting 4.0 mb/d. In terms of gas production and exports, the US registered a 47% increase in gas production in the 2006-16 decade, to 28.5 trillion cubic feet (TcF). In 2017, it exported 2.7 TcF per day, which is set to increase to 9.8 TcF per day by the end of 2019. US can now produce more oil than Saudi Arabia and it can match the gas outputs of Iran, Qatar and Russia. https://www.energyindepth.org/u-s-oil-and-natural-gas-exports-projected-to-soar-in-2018/; https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Why-US-Oil-Exports-Are-Surging.html; http://www.worldoil.com/news/2018/5/22/eia-us-remains-the-world-s-top-producer-of-petroleum-and-natural-gas-hydrocarbons
13 A clear understanding of the regional and international environments is needed to understand fully how a state formulates its policies and articulates its foreign policy posture. For a conceptual discussion of this, see Lobell et al., Neoclassical Realism, State, and Foreign Policy.
14 Riedel, “Saudi King Shows no Signs”.
15 Aarts and Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance.
16 Ibid.
17 Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy Survival.
18 Gause, “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia”, 207.
19 In June 1984, a dogfight over the Persian Gulf resulted in a Saudi F-15 Eagle, under the guidance of US-operated AWACS early warning aircraft, chasing and shooting down an Iranian F-4 Phantom fighter as a warning against Iran’s targeting of GCC oil tanker traffic. It was reported at the time that Iran “scrambled a total of 11 planes, which remained in Iranian airspace, and the Saudis countered by sending up more than that number of its own planes”. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/06/05/Saudi-Arabian-fighters-shot-down-two-Iranian-fighter-bombers-in/7626455256000/
20 bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, 138.
21 Ibid.
22 Wilson and Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm.
23 A sympathetic account of Saudi Arabia’s role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm can be found in Rashid and Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War.
24 Badie, After Saddam.
25 Gause, “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia”.
26 Hinnebusch, “Explaining International Politics”.
27 Al-Alkim, Dynamics of Arab Foreign Policy-Making.
28 The Obama administration agreed to sell some USD 100 bn worth of weaponry to the Kingdom in 2012, partly in response to a perceived Iranian threat and partly to compensate for the administration’s uncritical approach to the fall of such pro-Western Arab leaders as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.
29 Al-Badi, “Saudi-Iranian Relations”.
30 See Ehteshami, “Middle East Middle Powers”.
31 Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy Survival, 173.
32 The war may have cost Saudi Arabia over USD 5 bn in the first year of its execution and perhaps in excess of USD 700 mn per month. See Riedel, “Saudi King Shows no Signs”.
33 Worth, “Saudi Arabia rejects U.N. Seat”.
34 Korany and Fattah, “Irreconcilable Role-Partners?”, 367.
35 Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince”.
36 Miller and Sokolsky, “Saudi Arabia’s New Crown Prince”.
37 Filkins, “A Saudi Prince’s Quest”.
38 Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince“.
39 Telhami, “Mohammed bin Salman”.
40 The Alliance’s inaugural meeting took place in November 2017 in Riyadh and excluded Algeria, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and all the Central Asian Muslim Republics. Qatar was the only member country which absented itself from the meeting. http://www.dw.com/en/saudi-led-islamic-military-alliance-counterterrorism-or-counter-iran/a-41538781
41 Ragab, “Beyond Money and Diplomacy”.
42 Filkins, “A Saudi Prince’s Quest”.
43 Ibid.
44 Conversations between MbS and his UAE counterpart, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, also need to be taken into account when trying to make sense of the degree of change taking place in Saudi Arabia’s regional behaviour. Personal views are clearly close and a convergence of policies, if not interests, over many of the regional issues are evident. In Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Syria, they share a common platform and with respect to countering al-Qaeda, IS and the Muslim Brotherhood their approaches also converge. They both also press their relationship with the United States and President Trump’s administration in particular as a priority.
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Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Anoushiravan Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations and Fellow of University College at Durham University, Durham, UK.