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ABSTRACT
Turkey’s response to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s independence referendum took most observers by surprise. The prevailing assumption was that, despite its vocal objections, Turkey would eventually just accommodate the results of the referendum because years of engagement and a KRG-centred Iraq policy had created multi-faceted interdependencies, which would be hard to overturn. However, rhetoric dictated policy. In a counter-intuitive move, Turkey realigned its partnerships to chart a new policy which involved greater coordination with the central government of Iraq. This reaction is best understood through a study of contextual variables at regional, domestic and leadership levels which have led to major changes in Turkey’s regional policies.
Notes
1 “I Don’t Regret the Vote of 3 Million People”, Basnews, 27 January 2018. http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/interviews/410277.
2 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey”, 100.
3 Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”, 151.
4 Gunter, “Erdogan’s Backsliding”, 101.
5 Park, “Turkey’s Isolated Stance”.
6 Sazak and Kurc, From Zero Problems.
7 Aras and Karakaya-Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East”.
8 Yavuz, Emergence of a New Turkey.
9 Yavuz and Özcan, “Turkish Democracy”.
10 Öğür et al, Kuzey Irak-Türkiye İlişkileri [Northern Iraq-Turkey Relations]. All traslations from Turkish by the author.
11 Bache-Fidan, “Turkish Business”.
12 Morelli and Pischedda, “The Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership”.
13 Halhallı, “Kurdish Political Parties”.
14 Park, “Turkey, the US and KRG”.
15 Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”.
16 The pros and cons of the personalised nature of Turkey-KRG relationship is addressed in Özpek, “Paradigm Shift”.
17 Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy.
18 Arango and Krauss, “Kurds’ Oil Deal”.
19 Duman, “Türkiye’nin Irak Politikası” [Turkey’s Policy towards Iraq].
20 Author’s interview with Fouad Hussein, Chief of Staff to the KRG Presidency, Ankara, June 2015.
21 Kardaş, Turkey Navigates Iraq.
22 Ghaddar, Iran May be Using.
23 “Davutoğlu’ndan ‘Irak’ta Mezhep Savaşı’ Uyarısı” [Davutoğlu Warns against ‘Sectarian War in Iraq’], BBC Turkish, 6 March 2015.
24 “Türkiye, ‘Musul Operasyonu’na Peşmerge ile Katılacak’” [Turkey will Take Part in Mosul Operation together with Peshmerga], Habertürk, 5 October 2016.
25 Nakip, “Powder Keg Iraq”.
26 Duman, The Situation of Turkmens.
27 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey”, 99-100.
28 Salahaddin and Aziz, “Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan”, 151.
29 Similarly, when Barzani announced his desire for an independence referendum for the first time in 2014, one Turkish official had a positive reaction: “Turkey Ready to Accept Kurdish State in Historic Shift”, Financial Times, 27 June 2014.
30 One analyst argues that Turkey’s “active diplomacy” came too late in the crisis to make any meaningful impact. The earlier indecisiveness was arguably because of President Erdoğan’s preference for behind the scenes contacts to dissuade Barzani (Dalay, Evolution of Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan’s Relations, 4). It must be noted, though, that when the KRG press sought to portray such initiatives as Turkey’s green light to the referendum “under certain conditions”, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stepped in to issue a rebuke (“MFA Spokesperson’s answer”, 29 July 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-40_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusunun-ikby-basininda-yeralan-haberler-hk-sc.tr.mfa).
31 “Iraqi Kurdistan Referendum Poses Challenge for Turkey”, Financial Times, 21 September 2017.
32 I appreciate an anonymous reviewer’s comments to that effect.
33 Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy”.
34 Interestingly, the Turkish side shared such concerns with their American counterparts even during the initial phases of the Turkey-KRG rapprochement, facilitated by the Americans, as per a cable from the US Embassy in Ankara, dated 22 February 2010, published by wikileaks: https://ia801000.us.archive.org/23/items/243148-10ankara282/243148-10ankara282.pdf
35 Özcan, The KRG’s Referendum.
36 Dalay, Evolution of Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan’s Relations, 5.
37 Kardaş, “Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis”.
38 Zaman, “ABD Suriye’de” [US in Syria].
39 Weiss, “From Constructive Engagement”.
40 The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli justified his support for the AKP with reference to “the acute survival problem with which the nation is confronted”. “Bahçeli: Türkiye Ağır Bir Beka Sorunu Yaşamaktadır” [Bahçeli: Turkey Goes through a Grave Survival Problem], Ulusal Kanal, 11 February 2018.
41 Saadoun, “Kurdish Flag Fans Controversy”.
42 There has been a flourishing coverage of the new nationalism in Turkish society, which is also supported by polling. See, for instance, Hoffman et al.
43 Ala’Aldeen, State-Building in a Fragmented Kurdistan.
44 Üstün and Dudden, Turkey-KRG Relationship.
45 Yeşiltaş, “Stratejik Körlük” [Strategic Blindness].
46 Both President Erdoğan and MHP leader Bahçeli took issue with Barzani’s statements: “Erdoğan’dan Barzani’ye Son Uyarı!” [Last Warning from Erdoğan to Barzani!], A Haber, 17 September 2017.
47 Dalay, “Regional Implications”.
48 Though originally slated for 2019, early presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2018.
49 Özdamar, “Leadership Analysis”.
50 He said: “Honestly, we did not expect Barzani to commit such a mistake. It seems we were mistaken. At a time when our relations were at their best historically, this decision, which was undertaken without prior consultation and meeting with us, is a betrayal to our country.” “Erdoğan: Açıkçası Son Ana Kadar Barzani’nin Böyle Yanlışa Düşeceğine İhtimal Vermiyorduk, Yanılmışız” [Erdoğan: Honestly, We did not Expect Barzani to make such a Mistake, We were Mistaken], Milli Gazete, 26 September 2017.
51 For a brief evaluation of the referendum process, its broader context, and its aftermath, by members of an international group of observers, see Park et al., “On the Independence Referendum”.
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Şaban Kardaş
Şaban Kardaş is Associate Professor at the TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara, Turkey.