The Migration Triangle: Narratives, Justice and the Politics of Migration in France

ABSTRACT

Looking at the French approach to migration in four key political moments between 2014 and 2018, three main narratives can be seen as dominating the French debate on migration, namely the Westphalian, the humanitarian and the multilateral, each related to various justice claims. Surprisingly, a securitarian approach was not as dominant as expected. However, different justice claims were used to support various political interests, often in a clearly instrumental way. In France today, the politics of migration are still important for the country’s foreign policy and are not just a domestic issue.

KEYWORDS:

• Migration
• politics
• content and discourse analysis
• global justice
• France

Despite the historical relevance of migratory questions in France, the recent, so-called ‘migration crisis’¹ has become highly politicised in the country, occupying a predominant role in the public debate and, above all, in political competition. In 2016 alone, France rejected 63,390 people at the border while receiving a total of 78,400 new applications for international protection, ranking fifth in the world for the number of applications (Eurostat 2017). France has also been one of the main European countries involved in the management of migrants crossing borders, along with the United Kingdom and Italy. For instance, between 60 and 150 migrants are halted by patrols every day along the French-Italian border, with up to 95 percent being turned back to Italy (ANCI 2017). Yet, despite the attention dedicated to the management of migration, we know very little about how migration has been discussed domestically and what kind of narratives competed in addressing the issue. This is true for political and media discourse alike. Indeed, the way French media discussed key moments of the recent phenomenon has remained almost completely underexplored.

In order to address this gap, this article investigates the cognitive dimension of the dominant narratives on migration present in the French national press between 2014 and 2017, the underlying justice worldviews and the claims embedded in the narratives. Thus, it looks into the triangle existing between politics, senses of justice and narratives of migration. Specifically, the analysis concerns three key political moments, namely the 2014 European Parliament elections, the 2016 European Union (EU)-Turkey Statement and the 2017 French presidential elections, contrasted with two ‘eventless’ weeks in May 2016. The purpose is not only to capture dominant interpretations of migration and related justice claims, but also to evaluate whether potential counter-narratives emerged. It does so by analysing narratives of migration emerging from four national daily newspapers: Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération and L’Opinion.

The article first presents a theoretical overview of the literature related to migration narratives, along with a discussion of the relevance of media as intervening actors in the production of communication and discourse, notably in relation to theories of justice. A brief explanation of our approach to content analysis and an overview of the French response to the migration question over the years follows. Analysis of the dominant narratives then provides empirical insights into the characteristics of each period. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these narratives in terms of justice claims and the French national response to the question of migration.

Discussing migration: theoretical and methodological approaches

Media, news narratives and the French press

By exploring narratives of migration in France, we are interested in understanding the way migration has been understood, communicated and discussed (Jones and McBeth 2010). The literature already tells us that media can influence people’s position in relation to a specific issue such as terrorism or, indeed, migration (Iyengar 1987; D’Amato and Lucarelli 2019). By deciding what type of news to emphasize and how to portray an event,² the press has the power to influence agenda setting with regard to decisions to be taken concerning migration.

Among numerous studies, Rodney Benson (2002) compared United States (US) and French news coverage, shedding light on structural changes in the representation of problems linked to migration. He found that, while migration during the 1970s was essentially approached as a matter of social injustice and human suffering, media discourse in the 1990s underwent a substantial change, focusing on crime and drug-related news and street riots. In his later work, Benson (2013) expanded on the relationship between the progressive polarisation of news coverage and commercialisation of printed news to the increasing reporting on ‘immigrants’ as the cause of social troubles, especially in the conservative newspaper Le Figaro. Also with respect to Le Figaro, Philippe Bourbeau (2011) sheds light on the way it has progressively securitised migration, unlike its liberal/centre/left-wing counterpart, Le Monde. Paul May (2016a) focuses his attention instead on the dominant ideas of multiculturalism and their relationship to immigration as circulated in the French press. He shows that while Le Monde, Libération and L’Humanité convey a positive interpretation of multiculturalism, the right-wing publications have hardened their discourse on immigration on the basis of culturalist views, making exaggerated and alarming projections on the consequences of immigration. Thus, the existing literature has already highlighted the partisan behaviour of certain French media on the issue of migration (Połońska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie 2016). Our contribution with this article is on the relation between narratives of migration and justice claims and how such a relationship is constructed in the French newspapers.

Migration narratives and justice claims: studying the French case through discourse analysis

France, along with the United States, have provided pilot case studies on immigration and integration policies for many years (Safran 1989). Specialised reports and academic studies have long analysed the mechanisms and dynamics of integration of the French system (Miles and Thränhardt 1995; Prost 2009). Recently, however, and particularly as a consequence of the 2005 and 2007 banlieue uprisings, the question of integration has gained new relevance in both the academic and policy debate. It has become clear that, contrary to the original French model of integration, part of the population with a migrant background has been marginalised at the political, economic, and social but, most importantly, identitarian level (Barou 2014). Yet, the literature still lacks a systematic account of the narratives on the recent migratory dynamics in the French public debate. Indeed, most studies appear outdated and unable to account for current discursive dynamics and practices of migration, and therefore, the changes and differences emerging from the challenge posed by the more recent migration flows.

We examine the French public discourse on migration in order to grasp the narratives or counter-narratives put forward and the different conceptions of justice in which they are grounded. We conceptualise narratives as those story-lines on specific issues or events that offer relatively cohesive and consistent relations between actors, actions and events. Narratives build on existing ideational settings and contextual cultural frameworks and are, therefore, causal since they represent a sense-giving device (Gómez-Stern and de la Mata Benítez 2013).

Specifically, we add an innovative perspective on politically relevant narratives by focusing on what kind of sense of global justice they refer to  (see Table 1): justice as non-domination, justice as impartiality or justice as mutual recognition (Eriksen 2016).³ The coding scheme was concept-driven, but also data-driven in that it was based on the mentioned justice claims, but also open to revision and the addition of new sub-categories if new concepts appeared in the data.

In line with the general structure of this Special Issue, we selected three politically salient periods. As in the other articles, the first two were the European Parliament elections (11 May - 8 June 2014) and the EU-Turkey Statement/deal (4 March - 25 March 2016). For the national key event, we selected the 2017 national elections (9 April - 30 April 2017).⁴ The question of migration, as well as relations with the European Union were, indeed, two particularly prominent and pressing issues throughout the entire presidential campaign. Finally, for the eventless period, we selected two weeks from 1 May to 16 May 2015 so as to cover four consecutive years in order to be able to detect similarities and differences across time.

As mentioned, the newspapers selected were Le Monde and Le Figaro, two widely-read mainstream centre-left and centre-right dailies, and two national daily newspapers with alternative political orientations, Libération, far left, and L’Opinion, classical liberal.⁵ The two selection criteria for newspapers were diversity of political affiliation and national coverage and readership. 258 articles were selected and filtered for relevance (Table 2).

Table 1. Types of justice claims

	Context of justice and normative approach	Referent actor	Reference value
Justice as non-domination	Westphalian	state	non-interference
Justice as impartiality	cosmopolitan	individual as human being	compliance with international norms
Justice as mutual recognition	subjective	individual in his/her specific identity	recognition

Table 2. Data overview per time period and per newspaper

	1) European Parliament elections	2) EU-Turkey deal	3) Eventless	4) 2017 Presidential elections
Keywords	‘Européennes’ and ‘migrants’ or ‘migratoire’ or ‘immigration’ or ‘asile’ or ‘réfugié’	‘Turquie’ and ‘migrants’ or ‘migratoire’ or ‘immigration’ or ‘asile’ or ‘réfugié’	‘migrants’ or ‘migratoire’ or ‘immigration’ or ‘réfugié’ or ‘asile’ or ‘immigrants’	‘Présidentielles’ or ‘Elections’ and ‘migrants’ or ‘migratoire’ or ‘immigration’ or ‘asile’ or ‘réfugié’
Le Monde	23	40	21	20
Le Figaro	41	10	7	13
Libération	17	16	9	12
L’Opinion	11	7	3	8
	92	73	40	53
				Total 258

Analysis of the narratives containing these justice claims was conducted in two phases. First, content analysis was used to assess the frequency of narratives within the periods under investigation in order to reveal the main patterns of the public debate on migration in France. Secondly, we selected the most quantitatively relevant narratives, and critically analysed them to shed light on the specific meanings of the problems and solutions related to the migration phenomenon per se, the migrants and the European Union.

Setting the context: migration(s) and responses in France

France is one of the European countries with the longest history of immigration. Extensive research has been conducted on the different phases and approaches developed to manage migratory inflows over the years (Hollifield and Ross 1990; Panizzon 2011; Brun 2013). Probably more than any other European country, however, one of the characteristic features of the French political approach is a cross-boundary view, considering migration not merely through the lenses of domestic and social politics but also through the prism of foreign policy (Taras 2015). For a long time, migration management represented a form of soft power over, mostly but not only, former colonies and their populations (Kasatkin and Avatkov 2014; Ding and Koslowski 2017).

The first contemporary institutional response was the creation of the Société Générale de l’immigration (GSI, General Society for Immigration) in 1924, created to organise transnational migration better and to facilitate communication between French employers and labour migrants, mostly Italian and Polish citizens at that time (Wihtol De Wenden 2017). The first comprehensive dispositions on migration were published in the 1945 administrative order,⁶ by which French nationality was transmitted by paternal or maternal filiation but also by birth in France or from a parent born in France.

Since then, various waves of migration have entered French territory, first and foremost, from the colonial reservoirs of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. During decolonisation, migration management was one of the core aspects of the renegotiation of political and diplomatic relations with the former colonies. Les Trente glorieuses of immigration during the decolonisation phase were de facto brought to a halt by the 1973 oil crisis, which caused a temporary reduction and, eventually, a suspension of legal quotas for immigration inflows (Haenni 2006). The only effective legal channel for entering the country remained family reunification.

These years of reshaping the migration regime paralleled the polarisation of the public debate on migration. The Front National (FN, National Front), founded in 1972, led the discussion on ethno-cultural nationalism (Caviedes 2015), starting openly to question non-European immigration and the approach to immigration and integration considering the country’s socio-economic struggles.

At the cultural level, under the centre-right presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Office national pour la promotion des cultures immigrées (ONPCI, National Office for the Promotion of Immigrant Cultures) was created. Yet, the dominant idea on migration was ‘return’. The well-known ‘million Stoléru’, a sum of money promised to the immigrants who decided to return to their country of origin, is a key example of that approach.

A new approach, at least at first sight, was initiated by the left-wing government led by the Socialist Party in the early 1980s. Those years were characterised by a gradual awakening and mobilisation especially in the banlieues (the Marche des Beurs in 1983 and the Convergence pour l’Égalité in 1984) of the young, second generation French. The institutional response involved the launching of a series of social programs, such as the Priority Education Zones, (ZEP) in 1981 and the creation of the Agence pour le Développement des Relations Interculturelles (ADRI, Agency for Development of Intercultural Relations) in 1982. In 1984, a residence and labour permit without geographical or professional restriction was created to ensure the security of migrants and strengthen social mobility. Nevertheless, no clear instruments and capabilities to foster the political representation of these voices was implemented while debates about the relationship between migration and national identity became more polarised.

In 1992, the government of Jacques Chirac launched a commission on nationality. The Pasqua-Debré law (no. 93-933) eventually changed the right to nationality: acquisition of French nationality by children of non-French citizens was no longer automatic but based on a ‘demonstration of will’ to be requested between the ages of 16 and 21. Crucial topics such as national identity, immigration, social injustice and security started to overlap and dominate the public sphere. Specifically, both centre-right and centre-left mainstream parties progressively shifted towards security-oriented discourses when dealing with national immigration (Mucchielli 2001).

In the early 2000s, another right-wing government focused legislative attention on introducing further measures to control and govern migration.⁷ Unlike the past, the question of how to deal with migration was focused on two levels: how to integrate the existing foreign population and how to approach new waves of immigration. Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior and later President of the Republic was a key figure in formalising a utilitaristic type of perspective reinforcing the discourse on the ‘chosen immigrant’ rather than the ‘tolerated immigrant’ (Grappi 2017): immigration was no longer possible on the basis of social or personal connections, but had to serve the country’s economic needs. Very rarely, however, did questions of injustice and discrimination appear in the political debate, such as during the 2005 and 2007 banlieues riots. Reports of discrimination and requests for more social justice were obscured by an overall focus on security and education (Moran 2011).

Table 3. Overview of the French legislative framework on migration (2006-18)

	Date of publication	Main points
Law on migration and integration	24 July 2006	Time needed for spousal reunification increased and automatic regularisation no longer valid. The 10 year resident card conditional on acquisition of a French language diploma.
Law on the control of immigration, integration and asylum	17 November 2007	Test for French language knowledge added as requirement for family reunification. A ‘reception and integration contract for families’ added as well. More resources to qualify for family reunification.
Law on immigration, integration and nationality	16 June 2011	Reform of expulsion procedures to reduce irregular migration. Maximum length of detention increased from 35 to 42 days and access to legal aid in the National Court of Asylum limited.
Law on holding migrants for verification of the regularity of stay, amending the offence for support to irregular stay by excluding humanitarian and non-profit based acts	31 December 2012	‘Solidarity crime’ suppressed. The crime for ‘Irregular entrance’ replaced by the crime for ‘Irregular stay’.
Law on the reform of asylum rights	29 July 2015	Acceleration of procedures for applications for international protection and appeal. Expulsion foreseen at the moment of application rejection. Modification of the list of ‘Safe Origin Countries’ (POS).
Law on the rights of foreigners in France	7 March 2016	Ban on circulation of all individuals considered a risk for society (3 years max for European citizens). A total number of entrances per year established, resident visa depends on good knowledge of French and adherence to national values. ‘State medical aid’ (AME) replaced with a limited ‘Emergency medical aid’ (AMU).
Law for correct application of the European Asylum Regime	21 March 2018	Authorisation for retention following the decision of transfer towards an EU country, and extension of validity of controls for residence permits. Reduction of administrative appeal period for transfers.
Law for controlled immigration, effective asylum regulation and successful integration	10 September 2018	Reduction of application time for asylum request and criminalisation of unauthorised border crossing (1 year sentence and €3750 fine)

Source: Authors’ adaptation from May (2016b) and http://www.vie-publique.fr/th/acces-thematique/immigration.html

Sarkozy’s increasingly more restrictive approach to migration was somehow inverted, or at least softened, by his successor, Socialist Francois Hollande, elected in May 2012.

On the one hand, Hollande initially adopted a more open perspective on immigration and broadened access to citizenship by reinstalling many of the automatisms in accessing French citizenship that were limited by the centre-right government in the previous years (Geddes and Scholten 2016). On the other hand, the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the consequent instability across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Syrian conflict, put the French government under enormous pressure. In fact, these events, more than any others in the recent past, put national management of migration into a direct relation with international management.

As the crisis foregrounded the vulnerability of European borders and the tenuous jurisdiction of the Schengen system, many in France questioned the dynamics of the EU’s multi-level governance of migration and integration. While calling for stronger European solidarity in the face of the migration crisis, the question of border control became increasingly important. This was a consequence not only of the 2015 terrorist attacks in the capital, but also the migrant flows to and from two European neighbours, namely the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy.

With regard to the UK, the ‘Calais jungle’ played an important role. A reception centre named ‘Sangatte’ was first opened and managed by the French Red Cross in 1999 in proximity of the Calais port. It soon became a point of reference for hundreds of migrants waiting to cross the English Channel. Nicolas Sarkozy decided to close the camp in 2002, causing the de facto ‘irregular’ displacement of the migrants into the woods. The camp was, however, re-established and closed many times before January 2016, when French authorities opened a shelter in the same location for around 4000 people. In March of the same year, however, complete demolition was undertaken. After his election, President Emmanuel Macron signed the so-called Sandhurst Treaty with the UK on 18 January 2018, by which the UK is paying France the sum of £44.5 million for fencing, closed-circuit television and detection technologies in Calais and other ports to counter irregular migration to the UK (Élysée 2018).

With respect to Italy, the question of borders started to dominate the relationship between the two countries around 2011 and France has closed its southern borders many times since then. For example, after the 2011 Tunisian crisis, a wave of migrants passed through Italy to reach France, causing the latter to reintroduce special controls close to Ventimiglia. The matter soon became highly politicised also at the EU level, with the querelle between France and Italy and their request for a revision of the Schengen Treaty leading to the adoption of EU Regulation 1051/2013. More recently, there have been reciprocal accusations of abuses on migrants between the Macron government and the Minister of the Interior of the newly elected Italian government, Matteo Salvini (Henley et al. 2018).

As shown, the political history of migration in France has been characterised by many trends, often determined by political equilibria that give preference to certain measures but with a critical intertwining of the domestic and international (both European and extra-European) levels of politics. Consequently, the way the country has narrated migration and its management has also changed over time with an increase in these topics in and across diverse media platforms and public debates.

Talking migration in France

This section presents the main narratives found in the periods analysed. Three dominant narratives were found: the ‘Westphalian’, the ‘humanitarian’ and the ‘multilateral’. The Westphalian narrative is based on the principles of the sovereignty of states, national identity, and non-interference. It generally entails an understanding of justice as non-domination, whereby the nation-state’s interests and its domestic community are given priority in the formulation of policies. By contrast, the humanitarian narrative views Europe and its member states as humanitarian actors promoting universal norms and values in the area of migration. It is based on the principles of justice as impartiality and mutual recognition in compliance with human rights. In this case, priority is given to the justice claims of individuals. However, as detailed below, it may reflect aspects of domination, in the sense of advancing states’ interests while advocating universal norms. Finally, the multilateral narrative features elements of solidarity – both legal and normative – among member states in the management of migration processes. It specifically refers to respect of international law and multilateral political engagement and usually entails justice claims of impartiality. Yet, the analysis also reveals some attempts to disguise claims of non-domination instrumentally in a multilateral-type discourse.

In addition to the dominant narratives, secondary narratives were also found, covering different themes, ranging from security to economic, normative and demographic issues. These include the ‘utilitarian narrative’, which stresses Europe’s need for skilled migrants for its own economic and demographic interests, and is advanced, in particular, in the context of multilateral commitments. ‘Security’ and ‘border protection’ themes are also important, often coupled or associated with a Westphalian-type narrative. Issues of international law and normative concerns are mostly found in reference to multilateral engagement among member states and international actors. International law is also called into question in reference to the humanitarian narrative, especially with respect to human rights. Normative concerns specifically pertain to the values and founding principles associated with European integration, such as solidarity, democracy, freedom and rule of law. Yet, as we will see, this type of argument is frequently integrated into what we have labelled the ‘hypocrisy’ narrative, namely sustaining policies of migration management for humanitarian reasons, while denying or violating basic justice principles of mutual recognition of migrants as subjects and human beings.

Interestingly, contrary to common perceptions, ‘utilitarian’ and ‘security’ themes do not appear particularly relevant in the media discourse. Similarly, references to ‘normative’ elements are quite prominent during the discussion of the EU-Turkey deal (14.58 percent), but are completely absent in the other periods. The same can be said for themes of ‘international law’ and ‘hypocrisy’ which will, however, because of their intrinsic conceptual importance, be discussed later in this section.

The overall picture of how migration is talked about in France (Table 5) shows that a Westphalian narrative, characterised by the domestic community as the main referent of justice, is predominant during elections periods, notably during both the EU elections (2014) and the French presidential elections (2017). The distribution across newspapers can be considered even between two mainstream national newspapers, the liberal-centre-left Le Monde and the conservative Le Figaro, followed by the left-oriented Libération. The humanitarian narrative is more recurrent during the period of the EU-Turkey deal than in other periods, yet we will see how this type of narrative has often been manipulated by different actors to serve political interests other than humanitarian concerns. News coverage in this case is linked to left-oriented newspapers, in particular and in order of importance Libération and Le Monde. Finally, we find that the multilateral narrative based on the justice claim of impartiality is, quite intuitively, pervasive in discourses about the EU-Turkey deal but also in the so-called eventless week in which arguments in favour of respect of commitments and the need for political agreements prevail.

Table 4. Relevance of main narrative themes

	2014 European Parliament elections	2015 eventless week	2016 EU- Turkey Statement	2017 national presidential elections
Westphalian	13 (36.11%)	6 (16.6%)	11 (11.45%)	16 (41.02%)
humanitarian	8 (22.2%)	12 (33.3%)	32 (33.3%)	9 (23.07%)
multilateral	6 (16.6%)	10 (27.7%)	7 (7.29%)	6 (15.38%)
international law	-	-	16 (16.6%)	-
border protection	-	3 (8.33%)	7 (7.29%)	4 (10.25%)
utilitarian	7 (19.4%)	2 (5.55%)	4 (4.16%)	1 (2.56%)
normative	-	-	14 (14.58%)	-
security	2 (5.55%)	3 (8.33%)	1 (1.04%)	3 (7.69%)
hypocrisy	-	-	4 (4.16%)	-
Total	36 (100%)	36 (100%)	96 (100%)	39 (100%)

Table 5. Overview of main narratives for the French case

Narrative	Meaning	Justice claim	Main events	Main newspapers
Westphalian	Non-interference; external sovereignty of states; national identity	non-domination	Presidential elections, EP elections	Le Monde, Figaro, Libération
humanitarian	Rights protection; reciprocity; human beings	impartiality, mutual recognition	EU-Turkey deal, eventless week	Libération, Le Monde
multilateral	Respect of international law and political engagements; supranational	impartiality	eventless week, EU-Turkey deal	Figaro, Le Monde

In the following sections, we present a representative number of quotes that provide significant focus on the various conceptualisations of global justice.

The Westphalian narrative

As mentioned, the Westphalian narrative is dominant during the period of elections at the European and national levels. During the 2014 European Parliament elections, an understanding of justice as non-domination is insistently adopted by national politicians, particularly by Front National leaders, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Marie Le Pen. In particular, the Westphalian justice claimed by Marine Le Pen can be understood in three interrelated ways. First, the pivotal message of the party’s nationalist agenda is an identitarian issue, that immigrants and immigration need to be stopped as they represent both a security threat and an attack on the integrity of the French population. Second, the European Union is held accountable for the increase in the influx of immigrants because of the Schengen agreements, undermining the security of French citizens. Here, the discursive dynamic seems to reflect considerations of power relations between member states and the EU. More specifically, a dynamic of domination is revealed in the limitations the EU imposes on French autonomy, as France is deprived of its decision-making power over migration. The message is clear: “No à Bruxelles, Oui à la France” [No to Brussels, Yes to France]. The solutions proposed to regain full sovereignty over the French community, as well as full protection of its citizens, is exit from the Schengen area or withdrawal from the EU. This type of narrative becomes even more concrete when referring to the need to control borders, a recurrent theme in which the securitisation of migration becomes prominent and migration is seen as a channel for importation of crime.

During April and May 2015, the public and political debate is focused on reform of the asylum system, particularly following the EU initiative to introduce mandatory quotas for member states. In this scenario, France’s non-domination claim of justice toward the EU emerges clearly as the quotas are perceived as an imposition, particularly since, as Manuel Valls claims, France has already taken on its share:

Ce que la France dit, c’est que les réfugiés doivent être répartis entre les Etats membres de façon plus équitable. Cela suppose de tenir compte des efforts déjà consentis par chacun. Aujourd’hui, la France, l’Italie, l’Allemagne, le Royaume Uni et la Suède accueillent 75% des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile en Europe. [What France says is that refugees have to be allocated among member states in a more equal way. This would require taking into consideration the efforts already made by everyone. Today, France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden receive 75% of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe] (Libération 2015).⁸

The debate becomes even more heated during the political confrontation between the EU and the United Kingdom, exemplified in the French press as the quintessential opponent to communitarian policies. A neat distinction is introduced at this stage between economic migrants, represented as spoilers with no rights, and refugees, particularly in the conservative press:

Les migrants ne sont pas, en majorité, des combattants de la liberté, vrais réfugiés politiques, mais bien des personnes choisissant de quitter leurs pays d’origine pour des raisons économiques. Il ne s’agit pas, pour l’essentiel, de mouvements spontanés, mais de flux organisés par des trafiquants, nouveaux marchands d’esclaves qui adaptent leur activité criminelle en créant des circuits lucratifs. [Migrants are not, in the majority, freedom fighters, real political refugees but rather people who decide to leave their country of origin for economic reasons. These are not, in general, spontaneous movements but organised flows managed by traffickers] (Larrivé 2015).

Migration management remains at the heart of the narrative during the period of negotiations with Turkey. However, the focus of the narrative is diverted towards Turkey’s bargaining power over the EU, and particularly, the ability of Turkish politicians to dictate the line to EU member states. As stated by a French diplomat,

Soyons réalistes, le règlement de la crise migratoire passe par la Turquie. Mais nous ne pouvons pas tout accepter. Il va falloir rectifier le tir. [Be realistic, the solution to the migration crisis passes through Turkey. But we cannot accept everything. We need to make some adjustments] (Mével 2016).

This type of argument is raised by politicians on various sides, claiming that Turkey is being unfair in its demands and pursuing the maximisation of its own political agenda and electoral support through manipulation of the migration crisis.

However, it is interesting to note that a non-domination type of argument also appears in the French press when discussing Franco-German relations. It does so from two perspectives. On the one hand, French politicians, particularly Prime Minister Manuel Valls (2014-16), lament Germany’s dominance over France in the management of migrants, specifically, with respect to relocation. Germany’s admission of too many refugees is perceived as a lack of solidarity towards France as France will eventually be forced to receive migrants and refugees crossing their border. At the same time, the issue of France’s role in European politics is raised by adversaries, who criticise the French government’s lack of commitment and leadership in the management of migration. Managing the migration crisis could have been a test for a country seeking a leading role in Europe; instead, it was left up to Germany, able therefore to privilege its interests. Critics underline that France is not only losing the chance to lead Europe towards a resolution of this critical problem but also limiting its chances to protect its own national interests.

Moreover, in contrast to other secondary narratives presenting humanitarian and multilateral concerns, border protection is a major issue in the conservative press, which tends to highlight security interests and the deal as a necessary measure to stop migration from becoming a major cause of Europe’s political, social, and economic destabilisation.

The 2017 presidential elections see Marine Le Pen once again at the centre of public discourse against migration, this time directly linked to security and terrorist threats, as well as the economic unsustainability of receiving more migrants. The narrative unfolds in ways similar to those during the 2014 elections, maintaining the same solutions – borders closures, exit from Schengen and abolition of ius soli – and the same accusations – the EU should give France back its autonomy in terms of migration policies. Overall, security and border protection gain saliency, with most of the claims made by Le Pen underlining the importance of migration and security as an electoral and campaign issue.

The humanitarian narrative

The humanitarian narrative is almost absent during elections periods. Claims of impartiality and mutual recognition are raised exclusively by journalists from the left-oriented press during the 2014 EP elections. In this case, the political debate on the reform of the Schengen system is criticised by both mainstream newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro, for neglecting the role of migrants as human beings, particularly with respect to the inhumane conditions in which migrants find themselves once they reach Europe. In spring 2015, humanitarian narratives increase in correspondence to the humanitarian crisis of migrants dying in the Mediterranean Sea. Both France and the EU are blamed for not being able to apply impartiality justice principles that take migrants into account as human beings. In this sense, reform of the asylum system is deemed necessary to facilitate the reception of refugees. Although the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini seeks approval from the UN to “sauver des vies en Mèditerranèe et empêcher des pertes humaines supplèmentaires” [save lives in the Mediterranean and avoid additional human losses] (Stroobants 2015), the press remains highly critical of France and the EU for acting only retroactively, and continuing to promote selective justice principles that do not distinguish between refugees and illegal migrants:

De même, la France va sauver en Mèditerranèe des Syriens qui n’auraient pas eu risquer leur vie si elle leur avait accordè les visas leur permettant de venir dèposer leur demande d’asile par avion. [Similarly, France is going to save some Syrians in the Mediterranean who would have not risked their lives if they had been granted a visa to allow them to take a flight to apply for international protection] (Baumard 2015).

The political discourse on negotiations with Turkey is permeated by concerns for human rights in terms of respecting international law and, in particular, the 1951 Geneva Convention (a multilateral narrative). In most cases though, it is possible to detect a fake humanitarian narrative, accusing politicians of being hypocritical. The hypocrisy, stressed by journalists of Libération and Le Monde, lies in the claims that the deal will save human lives by applying justice as impartiality, while de facto it will deny migrants recognition through expulsion policies. France and Germany are equally accused of betraying Europe’s founding values in order to seal the deal with Turkey, in spite of Turkey’s poor reputation in terms of respect of human rights and freedom of speech. Recognising Turkey as a safe country for repatriation is another concrete example of the tension between principles of justice such as impartiality, and justice as non-domination.

The multilateral narrative

The 2014 electoral period was characterised by the media’s almost exclusive attention on public interventions by Nicolas Sarkozy, recently returned to politics and elected chairman of the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP, Union for a Popular Movement). In particular, the proposal for a ‘Schengen 2’, as it was dubbed by the media, represented one of the pivotal themes of the European campaign. Sarkozy’s stance is analytically interesting since it questions the EU’s ability to be fair in applying Schengen principles. Yet, in contrast to nationalist calls, he does not reject the EU, but calls for a stronger union in which nationalist interests can be protected as well:

Nous devons cesser de croire au mythe de l’égalité des droits et des responsabilités entre tous les pays membres.” […] “L’absence de leadership met l’Europe en danger, car sans vision, sans cap et sans priorité. [We have to stop believing in the myth of equality of rights and responsibilities among all the member states. […] The lack of leadership is putting Europe in danger because it remains without a vision, a path and a priority] (Dubois 2014).

Sarkozy’s argument contains elements of justice as impartiality, in that member states are equally responsible for managing migration processes, as well as non-domination. Particularly in terms of security, the French national identity and model should not be subjugated to the EU’s interests: “Ce n’est pas un paradoxe que de plaider tout à la fois pour l’Europe et pour la défense de notre identité, c'est à dire la spécificité de notre modèle […] Nous devons être Europeéns et Français.” [It is not a paradox to defend Europe and to defend our identity, meaning the specificity of our model. […] We have to be Europeans and French] (Libération 2014). Interestingly, this is a clear attempt to use the main features of an established narrative, that is, the multilateral, to interpose an apparently unrelated justice claim, that is, non-domination. It was criticised in Libération as short-sighted with respect to migration processes and purely instrumental to the electoral campaign.

The subject of solidarity among member states grew in importance in 2015. The press mostly reported on the EU migration agenda and the agreement among heads of states and the EU leadership on the need to reform the EU migration system in order to share the ‘burden’ of migrants, an argument which highlights the emergence of utilitarianism. An example is Prime Minister Valls’ request for asylum reform while opposing relocation quotas:

Je suis contre l’instauration de quotas de migrants; ceci n’a jamais correspondu aux propositions françaises. […] En revanche, l’Europe doit avoir une politique de l’asile et la France a entrepris de réformer la sienne pour la rendre plus efficace. L’asile est un droit, attribué selon des critères internationaux appliqués par tous les pays de l’Union européenne. C’est aussi pour cette raison que le nombre de ses bénéficiaires ne peut faire l’objet de quotas: on est demandeur d’asile ou on ne l’est pas. [I am against the establishment of migrant quotas; it has never corresponded to French requests. […] On the contrary, Europe has to have an asylum policy and France has undertaken to reform it to make it more efficient. […] Asylum is a right, recognised according to international criteria applied by all European Union countries. It is also for this reason that the number of recipients cannot be the object of quotas: either you are an asylum seeker or you are not] (Libération 2015).

In terms of multilateral narrative, the EU-Turkey deal is characterised by the dominant theme of the alliance between France and Germany. While Angela Merkel is usually praised by pro-European newspapers such as L’Opinion for calling on multilateralism and solidarity among member states to help and relieve southern European countries, notably Greece and Italy, the Chancellor is also harshly criticised by both politicians and the conservative press for monopolising the political dialogue with Turkey. Nevertheless, some, such as Le Monde, also criticise France itself and President Hollande in particular for being passive with regard to managing the crisis and negotiating the deal.

A normative theme also emerged in terms of respecting international law. Some member states are worried about the legality of the pact with Turkey and, more broadly, about the EU’s ability to apply justice as impartiality. We have seen how the same question unfolded in the conservative press with respect to border protection, with the centre and left-oriented press underscoring that the deal violates international norms on migration and refugees. The EU, headed by France and Germany, is criticised for applying a non-domination perspective, allowing Turkey to dictate the rules on treatment of migrants and not respecting its own founding values, in particular by giving up the principle of reception (principe d’accueil) in order to meet Turkey’s demands.

Face à ce qui ressemble à une sous-traitance de la crise des migrants à la Turquie, les congratulations n’étaient pas de mise dans les couloirs du Conseil européen. L’Union sort essorée de ces discussions. Pour régler la grave crise humanitaire de la mer Egée, elle a accepté de transiger sur le principe de l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile qui arrivent sur son territoire et a conclu un accord qui la lie étroitement avec une Turquie dont le pouvoir central fait preuve jour après jour d’un autoritarisme inquiétant. [Considering what seems to be a subcontracting of the migrant crisis to Turkey, congratulations are not due to the European Council. The Union comes out of these talks exhausted. In order to deal with the serious humanitarian crisis of asylum seekers who arrive on its soil, it [the EU] has concluded a deal that links it closely to Turkey whose central power is increasingly showing a worrisome shift towards authoritarianism] (Le Monde 2016).

Finally, a utilitarian turn is once again evident during the 2017 presidential elections, in which multilateral agreements were put under pressure by member states struggling to respect the rules on quotas.

Discussion of the findings and conclusions

The close relationship between migration, foreign policy and a sense of justice is a characteristic of French history. An inclusive and universal sense of national belonging has always been a core feature of France’s national and international reputation. Yet, the challenge posed by the recent migration flows towards Europe has revealed new perspectives and views within the French debate on migration.

This article has addressed the question of what type of narratives on migration were advanced in the French national press and public debate during four periods between 2014 and 2017. Interestingly, our study has shown that, during electoral periods (2014 and 2017) at both the national and EU levels, politicians are keen on employing a Westphalian narrative centred on claims of justice as non-domination. At those times, the politicisation and securitisation of migration becomes evident, a key issue at the core of political parties’ positioning and competition.

The focus on national priorities in the face of the migration challenge highlights the relevance of the domestic community as the referent actor of the narrative, not only in opposition to migrants and asylum seekers, but also in competition with other EU member states. Yet, the analysis also revealed attempts by other actors such as journalists and civil society representatives to produce a counter-narrative. This was the case particularly with respect to the EU-Turkey agreement, when the tension between different claims of justice – impartiality vs non-domination – brought out the hypocrisy and consistent lack of solidarity of European governments.

The article also showed that French politicians called for more solidarity within the EU and respect for multilateral commitments in order to manage migration processes, particularly in terms of redistribution and quotas. Yet, multilateral narratives often disguised clear utilitarian objectives, using selective justice to legitimise certain types of migrants – qualified, legal – over others. A normative element was also consistently present in this narrative, involving respect for international law and greater solidarity among EU members to share the burden of migrants. The German-French alliance during the EU-Turkey deal provided an example of this kind of dynamic. The same arguments were also backed by a humanitarian narrative, in which respect of human rights was established as a sine qua non for engaging in multilateral commitments inside and outside the EU.

Although the question of migration in France is still marked by its historical legacy, several new tensions have emerged since different narratives and justice representations have entered the political arena. Overall, France seems to be a particularly revealing case of the ‘migration triangle’, meaning that distinctive relationship between political interests, narratives and senses of justice. In particular, it seems to be even more true today than in the past that what is perceived as the dominant approach to migration has become increasingly more political, the outcome of negotiation between both domestic and foreign policy interests.

Acknowledgments

This article is one of the outputs of research conducted in the framework of the GLOBUS research project - Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice, which received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 693609. For more information: http://www.globus.uio.no.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Silvia D’Amato

Silvia D’Amato is Max Weber Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Email: [email protected]

Anna Lavizzari

Anna Lavizzari is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy.

Notes

¹ Building on the Introduction to this Special Issue (D’Amato and Lucarelli 2019), we refer throughout to ‘migration’ in a more general sense in order to include diverse categories and legal profiles. However, the analysis presents how these various terms have been used and which ones have dominated the public debate in different periods.

² For a recent comparative study on news coverage on far right movements in Italy and France, see Castelli Gattinara and Froio (2018).

³ Justice as non-domination entails a Westphalian-type understanding of respect of reciprocal sovereignty among states. Hence, priority is given to justice claims of states and their citizens. Justice as impartiality focuses instead on the universality of rights (in this case specifically migration rights) and priority is given to justice claims of individuals as human beings. Finally, justice as mutual recognition concerns the ability of the EU to take into due account third countries’ interests and perceptions and therefore to consider and value individual migrants for their specific identity. Here, priority is given to justice claims of the “subjective (non generic) other” (Eriksen 2016).

⁴ In order to be able to examine a larger spectrum of political actors and discourses, we selected the first round of national elections, considering that the third week would allow us to cover the discourse by Front National (FN) and La République En Marche (LaREM) in more depth.

⁵ Articles from Le Figaro and L’Opinion (for periods 1, 3 and 4) were collected through the online database Factiva. Articles from Le Monde and L’Opinion (period 2) were collected by accessing their online archives.

⁶ This was modified with the 1973 law on nationality, which remained the guiding legal framework on nationality until the 1980s.

⁷ In 2004, the Code of entry and residence of foreigners and the right to asylum (CESEDA) was adopted to establish various legal measures in the field of migration and asylum and was reformed numerous times, most recently in 2015 and 2016 (see Table 3).

⁸ All translations are by the authors.