The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope

ABSTRACT

The changes in the US-Japan alliance are taking place in times of a global power shift – a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity – and China’s challenge to the US’ security dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance security dilemma now manifests itself in the rise of ‘entrapment’ concerns for Washington and ‘abandonment’ anxieties for Tokyo. The US increasingly insists on more mutuality in alliance arrangements, while seeking to maintain ambiguity in its defence commitments to Japan. The relative decline of US power and the fluid regional security architecture, however, incentivise Japan to step up preparations for abandonment. Although Tokyo’s hedging strategy contributes to enhancement of the bilateral alliance in the short term, it also paves the way for Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the medium to long term.

KEYWORDS:

• United States
• Japan
• alliance
• hedging
• alignment

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

Notes

¹ Given that the geographical scope of the US-Japan alliance’s missions still largely concentrates on the Asia-Pacific region, whereas the Indo-Pacific is inclusive of the western part of the Indian Ocean (and hence not part of the alliance’s focus), the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ is used throughout, except in instances where an explicit reference is made to the ‘Indo-Pacific’.

² The Soviet-based nuclear weapons were the only serious threats coming from Asia during the Cold War.

³ These military capabilities, such as submarines and missiles, seek to either prevent an adversary from entering an area or restrict/slow down its operations.

⁴ In 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the US bulkhead against communism in the Cold War confrontation by drawing a line through the Japanese archipelago and the Ryukyu chain of islands leading to Taiwan, thus excluding Korea.

⁵ Article 9 renounces the threat or use of force for settling international disputes and commits Japan to non-possession of war potential.

⁶ This refers to yen-based figures and does not take into consideration adjustments for inflation.

⁷ This is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo where the names of 14 Class-A war criminals are included among the honoured souls of 2.5 million Japanese soldiers. Visits by Japanese prime ministers to the shrine usually lead to major diplomatic tensions between Japan and neighbouring China and Korea. For Beijing and Seoul these visits attest to Japan’s inability to come to terms with its imperialist past in Asia.

⁸ The Moon Jae-in administration scrapped the agreement in August 2019 due to ongoing historical and trade disputes with Japan.

⁹ We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this remark.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations of East Asia at the Department of Politics, University of Antwerp, as well as at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Louvain, both in Belgium. She is also a Visiting Professor at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, UK.

Yoichiro Sato

Yoichiro Sato is Dean of International Cooperation and Research and Professor in the College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan. Email: [email protected]