When the Accession Legacy Fades Away: Central and Eastern European Countries and the EU Renewables Targets

ABSTRACT

Renewable sources of energy are considered to play a crucial role in the transition towards a decarbonised economy. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ positions vis-à-vis the European Union’s (EU) renewables goals do not form a homogenous group and have changed over time. After joining the Union, these countries initially supported the EU’s renewables targets due to post-accession compliance; however, once this accession legacy faded away, they started to pursue their preferences in a more assertive way, which resulted in different strategies and priorities. The development of CEE countries’ positions towards renewables targets is thus connected to the ‘emancipation’ of these countries and a more assertive way of pursuing their preferences at the EU level, once they were ‘freed’ from the influence of post-accession conditionality.

KEYWORDS:

• Central and Eastern Europe
• climate change
• compliance
• national preferences
• renewables

In order to meet the goals set by the 2016 Paris Agreement (Rogelj et al. 2016) – that is, to prevent a global average temperature increase of more than 2° Celsius, and ideally no more than 1.5° Celsius, above pre-industrial levels – the European Union (EU) set its own goal of a climate-neutral economy by 2050. The main idea is to create an economic system that will produce only a limited amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions that will be absorbed by natural processes (the so-called ‘removal’). This goal, originally proposed by the European Commission (EC) in 2011 (EC 2011) and later reaffirmed in December 2018, was confirmed by member states at the December 2019 European Council (European Council 2019). Only Poland “at [that] stage, [could not] commit to implement this objective” (1). The European Council’s plan to “come back to this in June 2020” was thwarted by the Covid-19 pandemic that dominated 2020. The following Council meeting in July 2020 focused on the post-pandemic recovery; although energy and climate issues were an important part of this discussion – with member states agreeing that “30% of the total amount of Union budget and [Next Generation EU] expenditures [should] support climate objectives” (European Council 2020b, 14) –, achieving unity on climate policies among member states was not a priority at that time.

Since the second half of 2000s, there has been a strong convergence of energy and climate policies at the EU level aiming at lessening the carbon footprint of the Union (Skjærseth 2016). Even though most analyses focus on GHG targets (for example, Skovgaard 2013), renewables are a crucial aspect of the EU’s decarbonisation efforts. Renewable sources of energy are indeed a key tool, because they produce a limited amount of GHG emissions and are sustainable. Their carbon footprint is much smaller compared to fossil fuels even from a life-cycle perspective (Amponsah et al. 2014). Since the energy sector is responsible for up to 80 per cent of GHG emissions (EEA 2020), energy transition towards low-carbon energy sources (such as renewables) is considered to be the key to achieving a climate-neutral economy, in the EU and beyond.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that entered the EU during the three rounds (2004, 2007 and 2013) of the so-called eastern enlargement (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) are often considered a homogenous bloc with a negative attitude towards the EU’s climate ambitions (Austvik 2016; Skjærseth 2016). An increasing number of studies, however, argues that this is not the case (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017; Ćetković and Buzogány 2019; Nosko and Mišík 2017) and that these countries have different (and not only negative) preferences for energy and climate policy.

This article hopes to contribute to the scholarship pointing out the heterogeneity of the CEE region in these policy areas (Ćetković and Buzogány 2019; Zapletalová and Komínková 2020) by looking at a previously unexplored dimension of these policies; that is, by asking what factors have influenced the evolution of CEE countries’ positions on EU targets for renewable energy sources. It argues that these positions have been influenced by the post-accession conditionality placed on CEE countries. Once they became EU members, these countries supported the Union’s renewables targets (within the so-called 2020 package; see below for more details) as a result of automatic compliance due to the impact of post-accession conditionality. However, with the fading away of this accession legacy, the negotiation strategies of CEE countries changed, and they started to pursue their positions in a more assertive way. This resulted in their heterogeneous positions towards the EU’s 2030 goals. Overall, this analysis thus supports the argument that CEE countries are not a homogenous group, but there are significant differences among them in the area of climate and energy policy.

After this introduction, the article first presents a theoretical framework based on post-accession conditionality that it uses to explain the changing nature of CEE countries’ positions towards EU renewables goals. The next section provides a general background on the EU’s decarbonisation goals with a special focus on renewables. The article then examines the positions of individual CEE countries towards the 2020 and 2030 goals as well as the development of their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) as these are connected to the 2030 goals. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the article and proposes further research.

The impact of post-accession conditionality on CEE countries’ preferences

Countries that entered the European Union during the eastern enlargements (see Ceka and Sojka 2016) have been thoroughly studied in the academic literature since the early 2000s (for example, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In the pre-accession period, research focused on why the EU decided to enlarge to the east (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002; Schimmelfennig 2001) and how CEE countries were coping with membership requirements (Lendvai 2004; Raik 2004). After these countries joined the EU, the literature looked into the changes that the ‘new’ member states brought to the EU and how they were performing in comparison with the ‘old’ members. Renewed attention to this issue emerged in the late 2010s in connection with the increased interest in the EU’s integration capacity (Börzel et al. 2017; Hobolt and Wratil 2020; Toshkov 2017), migration (Roos 2019; Slominski and Trauner 2018) or the rule of law (Closa 2019; Pech and Scheppelle 2017).

Initial analyses of the changes brought about by the eastern enlargements painted a rather negative picture of the decision-making capacity of the EU. This was caused, for example, by increased transaction costs (Hertz and Leuffen 2011) or increased contestation at the Council meetings (Plechanovová 2011). However, expectations about the Council of the EU being paralysed by gridlock due to the high number of participants (that is, member states) were not fulfilled (Mattila 2008). Later examinations painted a different picture about decision-making processes in the enlarged Union. Dimiter Toshkov (2017, 178), for instance, argues that “the Eastern enlargement has not had a major negative effect on the decision-making capacity of the EU”. Moreover, he claims, more legislation was produced in the decade after the first round of eastern enlargement (2004-2014) than in the previous decade (1994-2004). This situation can be explained – at least partly – by the newcomers’ compliance with procedural rules and their position as followers, rather than pace-setters. Tanja Börzel and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2017, 210) argue that the CEE countries’ experience with pre-accession conditionality “ha[d] a positive impact on compliance after accession [was] achieved”.

In fact, there has arguably been a visible change in CEE countries’ behaviour within the EU since they joined the Union. Over time, these states became more active and started to pursue their own preferences in a much more assertive way as the effect of post-accession conditionality (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Sedelmeier 2008) faded away. Post-accession conditionality initially brought the preferences that CEE countries pursued at the EU level in line with the expectations of the main actors, especially the EC and the big member states. CEE countries had become used to following the Commission’s recommendations from the pre-accession process because conditionality placed on them in this period (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010) gave them no other choice. To be clear, despite the strong pressures of conditionality, CEE countries presented a set of specific preferences already during the pre-accession period. Concessions from the EU, however, were often in the form of transition periods (Tosun 2011) rather than changes to the accession conditions. Used to an automatic transposition of EU rules from the accession process, the CEE countries kept this habit also in the post-accession period, as evident from their high transposition record or their voting behaviour in line with the majority of EU members. This is what we call ‘post-accession conditionality’.

Indeed, empirical examination of the voting pattern in the Council of the EU shows that “the new Member States [were] clearly less likely to dissent with the Council majority by voting ‘no’ than the older Member States” (Hosli et al. 2011, 1266) during the first years of membership. Similarly, several CEE member states complied also with challenging requirements like shutting down their nuclear power plants. While these requirements were agreed upon during the accession negotiations, they were fulfilled only once the impacted countries became members of the Union (Mišík and Prachárová 2021). The famous ‘world of dead letters’ described CEE countries’ compliance with EU rules as a combination of transposition of “EU Directives in a compliant manner” and “non‐compliance at the later stage of monitoring and enforcement” (Falkner and Treib 2008, 308). This conclusion about CEE countries’ compliance, however, was not supported by later studies, which, on the contrary, have found similarities between the CEE countries and the other EU members (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017). With time and more experience as member states, CEE countries became assertive and started pursuing preferences that were based on other factors than post-accession conditionality. Freed from this legacy that had initially shaped all CEE countries’ preferences in the same way, their preferences started to differ, and their activities at the EU level lost the original regional specificity.

In the following, we discuss these assumptions in the case of EU targets in the area of renewables that are part of EU energy and climate policy. This is a good case study as it allows a comparison of CEE countries’ positions on two sets of goals – one introduced in 2008, shortly after the EU accession of most of these countries, the other in 2013, when many of the examined countries had been members for almost a decade. As we shall see, when it comes to the package that was adopted in 2008, these countries made only limited remarks that did not translate into a vote against the Commission proposal. However, during the negotiations on the 2030 targets, CEE countries were much more active and critical. This change in position towards cooperation within the EU in general and with the EC in particular can also be seen in the negotiations of the NECPs, where many CEE countries – and not only them – did not follow the EC’s recommendations.

CEE countries are not a group with homogenous preferences, there are significant differences among them in many policy areas, including energy and climate.¹ Several CEE countries have supported the 2050 carbon neutrality goal from the very beginning, while others have joined the group later. Apart from case studies (Braun 2019; Copsey and Pomorska 2014; Davidescu et al. 2018; Norvaiša and Galinis 2016), however, CEE countries are still analysed as a group without looking at the differences among them, even in the most recent studies (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017; Skjærseth 2016; Wurzel et al. 2019), although there are exceptions to this rule.²

Against this background, this article examines the various positions of CEE countries towards renewables targets with reference to the 2020 and 2030 energy and climate packages drawing on data from several sources, including official EU documents, national position papers, member states’ negotiation positions, secondary literature, as well as NECPs. However, since not all CEE countries have publicly presented their positions on the issue and the secondary literature is limited for some countries, the level of information provided in the article varies from country to country.

The decarbonisation of the EU’s economy

The EU has developed two energy and climate packages that include short- and mid-term goals contributing to the decarbonisation of its economy. The general framework of the 2020 climate and energy package was adopted by member states at the spring 2007 European Council meeting in Brussels (European Council 2007) and set the following goals to be reached by 2020: a 20 per cent decrease of GHG emissions compared to the 1990 level; an increase of the share of renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption to 20 per cent; and a 20 per cent increase of energy efficiency. While the first two targets were binding at the level of member states, the third was only recommended. These targets were the result of negotiations between the EC, a group of member countries (led by Germany) advocating for ambitious targets and another group supporting lower goals. While several of the countries in the latter group were from the CEE region (with Poland being the main player), the group also included Western member states of the EU (for example, Italy).

In order to translate these general goals into particular policies, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament adopted several directives and a decision in 2008, “harmonizing climate and energy legislation to ambition levels unmatched by any major EU partner or competitor” (Skjærseth 2016, 509). For the arguments presented in this article, the Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources that set binding targets for all member states (Official Journal of the European Union 2009) is the most important one. The Directive created the conditions for a sharp increase of renewables within the EU as it not only developed a system of subsidies (“feed-in tariffs”), but also introduced a rule according to which electricity from renewables must be accepted by the distribution system at any time (“priority access”). This created a favourable situation for renewables (Janda et al. 2017) as, under normal circumstances, distributors accept electricity from producers on the basis of the grid’s needs.

In 2011, the EC presented the Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC 2011), in which it claimed that in order to achieve “a competitive low carbon economy” (4), the EU needs to decrease its GHG emissions by 80 per cent compared to the 1990 level. This created a basis for a long-term decarbonisation planning within the Union, but also brought to light opposition against such a goal by several member states as the Roadmap was not endorsed in 2012 due to a Polish veto.

When the Commission presented its vision for the 2030 energy and climate framework in 2013 (EC 2013a), it envisioned a system similar to the 2020 targets, with at least some of the goals being binding at the member states level. However, EU members were reluctant to such a proposal, and the final version of the framework was “watered down compared to the Commission’s original plans” (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017, 95). The first target, that is, increasing the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 27 per cent by 2030, was set at the EU level, and so was the second (and non-binding) goal of increasing energy efficiency by 27 per cent (compared to 1990) by 2030. The third target, a 40 per cent decrease of GHG emissions compared to the 1990 level, was also set at the EU level; for this goal, however, due to the inclusion of the Effort Sharing Mechanism, there is a link between individual member states’ efforts and the overall goal. The first and second targets were revised in 2018 – to a 32 per cent share of renewables and a 32.5 per cent increase of energy efficiency by 2030, respectively. The third target was increased to a 55 per cent reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 by the European Council (2020a) in December 2020, with European Parliament’s approval pending.

The Commission had to find a way to make sure that the targets binding at the EU level will be achieved. Therefore, the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (EU/2018/1999) developed a new governance system in which member states are supposed to create mid- and long-term national targets to support the EU’s overall targets. The first tool was the NECPs for the period 2021-30; another was the national long-term strategies that are supposed to support the 2050 decarbonisation goal. Article 34 of the Regulation stated that if there was an “ambition gap” identified in the NECP of a country, the EC would issue a recommendation that the concerned member state “shall take due account of” (see also Schoenefeld and Knodt 2021). Such a gap would be identified by the EC through existing tools: for example, in the case of the renewables share, a formula contained in Annex II of the Governance Regulation (Official Journal of the European Union 2018) and a staff document of the Commission (EC 2019a). All draft NECPs were assessed against this benchmark (and others), and the EC provided recommendations as to how to revise the proposed targets and trajectories.

The final (that is, revised) versions of NECPs were submitted by member states in late 2019 and early 2020. The EC also evaluated these documents and published a report on their impact on reaching the 2030 targets claiming that “higher shares of renewables are fundamental to achieve higher greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets” (EC 2020, 3). Reducing GHG emissions by 55 per cent compared to the 1990 level would require a 38-40 per cent share of renewables in the energy mix by 2030 (compared to 32 per cent as envisioned in the NECPs). The EC stated that “[n]early all final NECPs have confirmed or in some cases increased their renewable energy ambition compared to the draft plans” (Ibid.).

The 2020 climate and energy package

When the 2020 energy and climate package was introduced, CEE countries did not express strong positions against it, and most of their criticism was directed towards the targets in the area of GHG emissions. Poland, together with the Czech Republic, was one of the most visible opponents of the 2020 goals, especially the GHG emissions reduction one. However, Poland “never succeeded in creating a common eastern European front, mainly because the other eastern European Member States prioritized being part of the ‘in‐group’ over fighting for their position” (Skovgaard 2013, 1147). This claim supports the argument regarding the importance of post-accession conditionality. Nonetheless, once the agreement was translated from the level of the European Council into a secondary act (Directive 2009/28/EC on renewables) that was transposed into national law and utilised for the development of renewables, several CEE member states realised that the related policies included challenges that they were not prepared for.

A strong Polish opposition emerged in the area of GHG emissions in connection to the Emission Trading System (ETS), due to its expected negative impact on the economy (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland voiced their concerns related to the increase of renewables right after the EC presented its proposal for the 2020 package (Skjærseth 2016). While the so-called Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) was critical of some elements of the package – and supported preferences that differed from the initial proposal and even the adopted version of the climate and energy legislation – these countries “did not try to block the package as such” (Braun 2014, 450). To be sure, at the end of the negotiations, the Visegrad Group managed to obtain concessions and better conditions (Braun 2019); however, these concerned emissions production, not renewables or the energy mix.

Bulgaria and Romania partly supported Poland’s opposition to emissions regulations, but refrained from going too far with it, as they did not want to challenge the position of the bigger member states that were advocating for the policy (Braun 2014). The Baltic States joined the Visegrad Group in its criticism of the targets (mainly focusing on GHG emissions), arguing that such climate commitments threatened their energy security (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017). On the whole, however, the Baltic countries were not very visible actors in the preparation of the 2020 package. For its part, Slovenia, although joining other CEE countries’ (especially the Visegrad Group’s) coordination meetings, was “present but not active” (Buchan 2010, 6).

In spite of such criticism of the EC’s proposal, “the package’s main structure remained intact throughout the 2008 negotiations” (Skjærseth 2016, 518), and the Council of the EU and the European Parliament eventually adopted the four legislative acts included in the package in a form very similar to the Commission’s initial proposal. As can be seen from Table 1, although almost most CEE countries were critical of the goals set in the 2020 package, none of them voted against it.

Table 1. Positions of CEE countries towards renewables targets in the 2020 climate and energy package

Country	Position towards renewables	Country	Position towards renewables
Bulgaria	Critical, but did not want to go against big member states	Lithuania	Voiced concerns about the impact of climate goals on energy security
Czech Republic	Voiced concerns, was among the main critics, but did not vote against the proposal	Poland	Critical of the Commission’s proposal
Estonia	Voiced concerns about the impact of climate goals on energy security	Romania	Critical, but did not want to go against big member states
Hungary	Voiced concerns, but did not vote against the proposal	Slovakia	Voiced concerns as part of Visegrad Group
Latvia	Voiced concerns about the impact of climate goals on energy security	Slovenia	Not very active in the process

Source: Author’s compilation based on Bocquillon and Maltby (2017); Braun (2014); Skovgaard (2013).

Note: The table does not include Croatia as it was not an EU member state during the preparation of the 2020 package.

As far as implementation is concerned, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the negative experience with renewable policies in the early 2010s (connected to questionable or even directly illegal activities like corruption resulting in court cases) led to their de facto dismantling (Gürtler et al. 2019; Mišík and Oravcová 2020). This happened almost immediately after the transposition of the renewables directive and had an impact on these countries’ willingness to support further EU targets (including those for 2030). The situation in Bulgaria and Romania was similar: EU rules did not manage to support durable change as these two countries’ energy policies were modified immediately after having met the EU requirements concerning the levels of renewables (Davidescu et al. 2018). Poland maintained its negative position towards renewables (and other parts of the 2020 package) also after its adoption – to the point that the EC sued the country before the European Court of Justice in 2013 for not transposing the directive on renewable energy (Olung 2017). Despite these challenges, however, we can observe a steady increase of the renewables share in the CEE region since 2010 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Share of renewable sources of energy in the gross final energy consumption of CEE countries (percentage)

The 2030 climate and energy framework

Almost immediately after the adoption of the legislation related to the 2020 package, negotiations on further progress in the EU’s decarbonisation started. These were partly connected to the international negotiations at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen and the proposal to increase the EU’s commitment in the GHG emissions area to 30 per cent. However, this discussion came to nothing. Another important push came from the publication of the 2050 Roadmap for a low‐carbon economy in 2011 (EC 2011). More ambitious goals advanced by the proponents of increased emissions targets (that is, several member states and the EC) met with strong criticism, with “Poland playing an even more prominent role” in this respect compared to the 2020 package negotiations (Skovgaard 2013, 1152). Warsaw not only rejected these ideas in the Environmental Council, but also blocked the adoption of the Roadmap at the June 2011 European Council, citing the high costs for its economy in general and the fact that almost all of its electricity comes from coal in particular (Nelsen and Simon 2012). By 2014, the unanimity from the 2020 package eroded and “[m]any Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) questioned the need for new ambitious climate and energy policies; Poland opposed the whole idea of a low-carbon economy” (Skjærseth 2016, 510).

The 2030 framework was a “’re-packing’ compromise to satisfy the main veto players”, including Poland and other CEE countries (Skjærseth 2015, 89). However, there was no ‘eastern front’, and although some studies claim that the CEE countries did “not want new binding renewable or energy-efficiency targets” (Skjærseth 2016, 520), the picture within the region was more complex. After the EC published the 2013 Green Paper “A 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies” (EC 2013a), it also launched public consultations (EC 2013b) that revealed the preferences of several member states. We can identify two main groups within the CEE region (Table 2). The first group was made up of supporters. In the negotiation phase, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia supported the development of a binding renewable target (Geden and Fischer 2014). The latter two backed the EC’s 2030 proposal and, together with another 11 member states, called for ambitious energy and climate policy. These countries argued that “taking ambitious EU action now is the best way to ensure we unlock the full range of immediate economic opportunities and longer-term benefits from decarbonisation” (The Green Growth Group 2013, 6). In the case of Slovenia, an important issue was environmental restrictions (37 per cent of Slovenian territory is protected under Natura 2000) that limit potential investment in renewables. The country indicated that, while it supports the 2030 goals, it may encounter problems in contributing adequately to the goal (Crnčec et al. 2021). This was later reflected in the Slovenian NECP (see below). Lithuania supported the goal as well, but asked for consideration of national specificities (EC 2013b).

Table 2. Positions of CEE countries towards renewables targets in the 2030 climate and energy framework

Support for EU targets		Opposition to EU targets
Estonia	Supported an ambitious goal	Bulgaria	Did not support a renewables target
Lithuania	Was supportive of a binding target	Czech Republic	Was explicitly against setting targets
Slovenia	Supported an ambitious goal	Hungary	Did not support a renewables target
No public position		Poland	Strong opposition
Croatia	Did not take a public position	Romania	Member states should set their targets
Latvia	Did not take a public position	Slovakia	Did not support a renewables target

Source: Author’s compilation based on European Commission (2013b); The Green Growth Group (2013); Visegrad Group (2014).

The second group was formed by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Slovakia. These countries released – under the Visegrad Group heading and with the leadership of the Slovak presidency of the Group – a statement saying that “the introduction of any legally binding renewable energy […] targe[t] at EU or national level is not desirable” (Visegrad Group 2014, 1). Because of this document, the Visegrad Group “received all of Europe’s attention” (Braun 2019, 1111). The group had become very active and visible during the negotiations of the 2030 framework already before the publication of this statement. In October 2012, the ministers of economy of the Visegrad Group countries had adopted the position that “[f]urther increase of deployment of RES [renewable energy sources] should respect differences between the countries and be conditioned by corresponding infrastructure development” (Polish Presidency of the Visegrad Group 2013, 1). While the group used the competences of member states in relation to the energy mix enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty to support their fossil fuel sector, its members argued against an increase in the renewables share for financial reasons in the “Concept Paper on the Climate and Energy 2030 Vision” that was presented at the meeting of environmental ministers of the Visegrad Group and Bulgaria and Romania in April 2013 (Ibid.). The Czech Republic especially opposed any target for renewables (EC 2013b). In sum, contrary to the negotiations of the 2020 package, individual CEE countries presented various preferences during the negotiations of the 2030 climate and energy framework. This trend continued also in the preparation of their NECPs, during which member countries entered negotiations directly with the EC.

National Energy and Climate Plans

CEE countries have submitted their NECPs at the end of 2018 (Table 3) in accordance with the Governance Regulation. The main point of NECPs was to create a link between member states and EU-wide targets in all three areas of decarbonisation (lowering GHG emissions, increasing the share of renewables and decreasing energy consumption). Differences between member states, when it comes to their approach towards renewables until 2030, are very visible in the EC’s evaluation of the draft NECPs (EC 2019b). While the Commission praised Estonia and Lithuania for setting ambitious goals, all other CEE countries (with the exception of Croatia) proposed 2030 targets below the level based on the formula included in the Governance Regulation. Overall, 17 member states, a large majority, “put forward contributions below the share resulting from the formula” (EC 2019a, 5), which created an ‘ambition gap’ between the EU-wide 2030 renewables target and member states’ proposed contributions.

Table 3. Proposed national contribution of renewables (in percentage) to the 2030 climate and energy framework in NECPs (draft and final)

	Draft NECPs	Recommendation	Final NECPs	Change	Ambition level
Bulgaria	25	27	27.09	+2.09	OK
Croatia	36.4	32	36.4	0	over
Czech Republic	20.8	23	22	+1.2	NO
Estonia	42	37	42	0	over
Hungary	20	23	21	+1	NO
Latvia	45	50	50	+5	OK
Lithuania	45	34	45	0	over
Poland	21	25	21-23	+2	NO
Romania	27.9	34	30.7	+2.8	NO
Slovakia	18	24	19.2	+1.2	NO
Slovenia	27	37	27	0	NO

Source: Author’s compilation based on European Commission (2019a) and the Commission’s assessments of individual NECPs.

To close this gap, member states were supposed to revise their NECPs and all national targets (not only those related to renewables) included in these documents. Member states had until the end of 2019 to submit the final version of their NECPs to the EC. Table 3 provides an overview of national contributions in draft and final NECPs as well as the EC’s recommended levels from the evaluation process. Overall, the gap was closed in the final versions of NECPs, which shall deliver between 33.1 and 33.7 per cent of renewables in the gross final energy consumption at the EU level (EC 2020). The EC’s evaluation claims that “[n]early all final NECPs have confirmed or in some cases increased their renewable energy ambition compared to the draft plans” (3). However, the EC adds that the aggregated figure conceals differences in ambitions across various countries. Although those member states that were criticised for the low ambition of their NECPs revised them in the end, in many cases the revised plans did not reach the levels recommended by the EC.

All in all, five CEE countries proposed national contributions in their final NECPs that are in line with the EC’s recommended levels. While seven out of eleven CEE countries eventually increased their national 2030 renewables targets compared to their initial NECPs drafts, only in the case of two of them (Bulgaria and Latvia) this meant reaching the level recommended by the EC. Other three countries increased their goals only minimally. Moreover, Slovenia was the only examined country that did not increase its goal from the draft to the final NECP even though its draft did not reach the recommended level of renewables. Along with Slovakia, these two countries are the furthest away from the EC’s recommended level.

Conclusion

Climate change has been part of the EU’s core agenda for several years; with the launch of the European Green Deal, it became its flagship issue at the domestic level as well as internationally (Samper et al. 2021). The Covid-19 pandemic has not changed this, as the post-pandemic recovery is supposed to be green (European Council 2020b). Despite this EU-level effort, however, the key actors in the process of decarbonisation of the EU’s economy are member states, since almost all competences connected to achieving these goals are under their purview.

This article investigated CEE countries’ positions on EU targets in the area of renewable sources of energy. It argued that the CEE countries do not form a single bloc although they share a rather similar history of post-Communist development (Mišík and Oravcová 2021). By opening the ‘CEE box’, this article highlighted differences, but also commonalities, in these countries’ positions towards developing common climate and energy goals at the EU level.

The development of CEE countries’ positions towards renewables targets is connected to the ‘emancipation’ of these countries and a more assertive way of pursuing their preferences at the EU level, once they were ‘freed’ from the influence of post-accession conditionality. In fact, CEE countries supported the 2020 goals and connected legislation – in spite of their criticism – because of a tendency to post-accession ‘automatic compliance’ caused by their experience with conditionality during the accession process (on the concept see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Later, these countries developed their preferences independent of the accession legacy, and differences among them emerged. Poland, the most visible opponent of the decarbonisation goals, became an even firmer critic over time, while other CEE countries presented their priorities more vocally. This translated into a wide spectrum of positions on energy and climate issues in general, and renewable sources of energy in particular. This conclusion is complementary to that of Simona Davidescu et al. (2018), who claim that Bulgaria and Romania dismantled their renewables policies once the policy goals had been achieved due to the pressure of domestic veto players and technical constraints.

The positions of member states on these issues have in many cases been hidden from the eyes of researchers and accessible only through interviews with participants in Council of the EU meetings willing to (fully or partially) share their experience and knowledge. Differences between CEE countries have been made evident in the preparation of NECPs that represent the ambitions of member states in energy and climate policy in the mid-term (until 2030) and thus provide a unique insight into member states’ priorities and preferences. On the one hand, Estonia and Lithuania were praised by the EC for their ambitious targets (together with three other member states), and Croatia’s 2030 target exceeded expectations; on the other, even after the revision of their NECPs, six CEE countries still plan to contribute to the EU’s 2030 renewables target at a level that is lower than that necessary to achieve the binding target at the EU level. These results thus confirm previous research that showed different voting patterns among (part of) CEE countries on energy-related issues in the Council of the EU in the period 2007-2018 (Ćetković and Buzogány 2019).

To conclude, the article offers two main contributions to the literature on EU climate and energy policy. First, it provides an explanation of why some CEE countries lately became visible critics of ambitious EU climate and energy targets: after that post-accession conditionality faded away, these member states developed preferences based on their individual domestic priorities and not on a common accession legacy. In some cases, this led to supporting EU targets (for example, Slovenia), in others to openly opposing them (for instance, Poland). Second, the article points out similarities and differences between individual member states from the CEE region when it comes to EU renewables target. It thus contributes to the growing literature that acknowledges heterogeneity within the CEE region (Bocquillon and Maltby 2017; Ćetković and Buzogány 2019; Mišík and Oravcová 2021).

Further research should focus on explaining these differences and applying the theoretical framework, according to which the more assertive attitude of CEE countries is the result of their emancipation from the legacy of post-accession conditionality. It should also investigate domestic sources of climate and energy preferences, including economic reasons and different ideological orientation of governments.

Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges the UACES Research Network `The Role of Europe in Global Challenges: Climate Change and Sustainable Development' for the organisation of a dedicated online workshop, and the co-editors for bringing this special issue to fruition. The Jean Monnet Network ‘Governing the EU's climate and energy transition in turbulent times’ (GOVTRAN: www.govtran.eu), which is funded by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union, deserves credit for additional support. The author would like to thank Thomas Hoerber and Jonas Schoenefeld, the journal editors and four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on previous versions of this article. The author would also like to thank Nada Kujundžić for language editing.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency Grant No. APVV-16-0062.

Notes on contributors

Matúš Mišík

Matúš Mišík is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia.

Notes

¹ See the works by Bocquillon and Maltby (2017) or Ćetković and Buzogány (2019), although the latter focuses on only six CEE countries.

² See the important contributions by Braun (2014; 2019).